Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour最新文献

{"title":"A Response to Hekki Patomäki': On Social Mechanisms","authors":"Gabriel A. Pierzynski, Jonathan Joseph","doi":"10.1111/jtsb.70026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.70026","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Heikki Patomäki (<span>2025</span>) sets out three aims in his critique of the patrimonial imperialism piece by Pierzynski and Joseph (<span>2025</span>), published in this journal. The first is that the patrimonial imperialism argument assumes a traditional International Relations (IR) framework of ‘levels of analysis’ which is subsequently critiqued. The second criticism relates to the manner in which critical realism is deployed, specifically its use of the notions of the ‘real’ and ‘actual’. Third, Patomäki presents an alternative explanation of the causes of the Russo-Ukrainian war, utilising a process-ontological and holistic lens. The following reply will counter these criticisms through a focus on the primacy of social mechanisms as explanatory vehicles. The reply will assert that Patomäki's (<span>2025</span>) multi-causal method for deducing the causes of the Russo-Ukrainian war shifts focus away from the identification of dominant causal mechanisms such as that we identify as patrimonial imperialism than on dominant causal mechanisms. The reply will be structured as a series of quotes from the critique and replies.</p><p>We do not assume that Russia must be understood as inherently imperialist. We provide a diagnosis of a set of underlying mechanisms based on our understanding of state–society relations and how this has coalesced around the reproduction of patrimonial imperialism and perpetuated through each iteration of the Russian state. Although critical realism points to the multiplicity of structures and generative mechanisms, it is essential for a political scientist to be able to identify those that are more dominant and relatively enduring, something that is done through focussing on the causal mechanism that can best explain which structures arise and how they come to be ingrained and perpetuated. The causal approach focused on the identification of dominant mechanisms can be subject to examination through such things as historical and process-tracing analyses. That is not to say that patrimonial imperialism is an iron law of reality, or something more ‘real’ than all other explanations. It is best understood though asking about the dominant causal mechanism arising out of state-society relations, noting that this does by necessity influence all analyses of Russian decisions or outcomes. It is considered one of the primary factors for the initiation of the Russo-Ukrainian war, but the critical realist model of stratified reality does not assert that it is the only reason or cause. It is a diagnosis of a dominant mechanism or set of mechanisms, a social structure that perpetuates itself through regime changes, and influences state decisions over a long duration. Therefore, asserting that the patrimonial imperialism framework is a totalising one is mistaken, it is about locating dominant mechanisms in a wider framework of a multi-causal reality.</p><p>Rather than seeing this in terms of IR's levels of analysis, the basis of t","PeriodicalId":47646,"journal":{"name":"Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour","volume":"56 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jtsb.70026","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145887936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Elementary Forms of Practical Life: A Durkheimian Genealogy of Social Practice","authors":"Lorenzo Domaneschi","doi":"10.1111/jtsb.70022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.70022","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This article revisits the classical foundations of the concept of ‘social practice’ to reassess the epistemological and ontological assumptions underpinning the praxeological turn. Engaging critically with Marx, Weber and especially Durkheim, it shows how current practice theories often rely on partial readings of the classics, overlooking crucial resources for understanding coercion, differentiation and order. The paper argues that Durkheim's theory of ritual offers a more robust foundation for a sociology of practice and develops a bifocal framework that distinguishes between constitutive and institutional orders of practice. Drawing on contemporary interpretations of Durkheim by Rawls and Karsenti, the article demonstrates how practices simultaneously generate collective effervescence and classificatory stability, thus accounting for coercive force, nonheroic novelty and differentiated carriers (<i>Träger</i>). This Durkheimian reconstruction provides a common conceptual ground for contemporary debates, strengthening practice theory through a sociologically grounded perspective.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47646,"journal":{"name":"Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour","volume":"55 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145750761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Climate Emergency and Different Ways to Fail? The Fermi Paradox, the Simulation Hypothesis, Agency and Hope","authors":"Jamie Morgan","doi":"10.1111/jtsb.70023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.70023","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Humanity seems stuck on different ways to fail to meet the challenge posed by a declared climate emergency and manifest the problems of ecological breakdown. Rather than reprise these failures, we use the Fermi Paradox and simulation hypothesis to make a simple point about agency. The argument unfolds in two sections. I first introduce the Fermi Paradox and in a series of subsections I explore its different aspects. In the following section and its subsections, I do the same regarding the simulation hypothesis. The guiding question for both is, ‘should we be worried?’ Among other things, I point out that it is unwarranted fatalism to infer from the former (Fermi) that we are doomed or because of the latter (simulation) that nothing matters. At the same time, we are acting as though we are doomed and as if it didn't matter. I conclude with some brief comment on agency and hope.</p>","PeriodicalId":47646,"journal":{"name":"Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour","volume":"55 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jtsb.70023","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145750700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Relational Quiddity of Virtual/Digital Reality","authors":"Pierpaolo Donati","doi":"10.1111/jtsb.70018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.70018","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Does the digital/virtual have a reality? For a critical realist, there is no doubt it does, since what can cause something is real. But what kind of reality is it? The article argues that this reality is a relational quidditas. The diffusion of new AI-based technologies increasingly blends analogue and virtual realities, making it essential to understand the causal processes of exchange between them. Digital/virtual reality is constituted by the relationships it designs, and these relationships are increasingly programmable through incentive structures that optimise engagement and control. Using a critical realist lens, the author distinguishes the lifeworld (D1), hybrid/virtual environments (D2) and AI-based technical systems (D3) and analyses the exchanges between them. He argues that current systems excel at simulating first-person experience and signalling sociality, but lack second-person relational reflexivity (mutual respect, responsibility, shared normativity). This absence, combined with the capitalist incentives of platforms, generates asymmetrical ‘companionship’ relationships. that risk degrading relational assets (trust, reciprocity, care). It is necessary to clarify the process of colonization as one through which digital rationalities replace analogue and embodied relationships. Claims about augmented and virtual reality must, however, be evaluated, emphasising their limited and uneven adoption.</p>","PeriodicalId":47646,"journal":{"name":"Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour","volume":"55 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jtsb.70018","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145581083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Quantum Intra-Active Rituals: Reinterpreting Randall Collins' Social Theory","authors":"Robert Lee","doi":"10.1111/jtsb.70017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.70017","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper reinterprets Randall Collins' theory of Interaction Rituals with a quantum social ontology. While Collins' theory has broad explanatory powers, its ontological foundations are incoherent. Quantising Interaction Rituals yields Quantum Intra-active Rituals, a set of processes that synchronically instantiates the agent and social structure into a ‘flat’ and monadological collective mind or superorganism. Rituals facilitate emotional entrainment between subjects and can escalate into moments of collective effervescence, which, I suggest, is the collective mind or superorganism powerfully (re)embedding itself into the human being. The result of this process is not Emotional Energy as Collins posits, but the emergence of Personal Teleology or Personal Narrative—that is, collective effervescence transforms human beings into persons that embody and enfold the teleology of the collective mind or superorganism. Instead of a deterministic world with networks of separate individuals engaging in mechanistic and utility-maximising behaviour as Collins suggests, Quantum Intra-Active Rituals posits an indeterminate world of inseparable persons engaging in super-organismic and teleological behaviour. It is, ironically, a metaphysical picture more consistent with Emile Durkheim's <i>The Elementary Forms of Religious Life</i> than Collins' own neo-Durkheimian theory. Quantum Intra-active Rituals suggests social structures are actually living entities energised by the collective emotions generated through collective rituals.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47646,"journal":{"name":"Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour","volume":"55 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145521917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Place Attachment and Climate Adaptation in Older Adults: A Proposed Theoretical Model","authors":"Pablo De Gea-Grela,&nbsp;Diego Sáchez-González,&nbsp;Lorena Patricia Gallardo-Peralta","doi":"10.1111/jtsb.70020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.70020","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Place attachment is increasingly recognised as a key factor in older adults' climate adaptation, though its mechanisms remain poorly understood. This study analyses causal links between place attachment and climate adaptation, proposing a theoretical model to clarify these processes. A literature review of empirical studies (2000–2025) from Web of Science and Scopus was conducted. Findings show that place attachment shapes climate adaptation by influencing risk perception, reinforcing identity and fostering community ties. Although it promotes resilience and informed decisions, strong attachment may hinder relocation, reducing adaptive capacity. The proposed model integrates affective, cognitive and functional dimensions of place attachment, alongside mediating factors such as risk perception and social networks. It provides a framework to better understand adaptation in later life and informs interdisciplinary research and policy. The study highlights the importance of including place attachment in adaptation strategies that both respect emotional bonds with place and support mobility when necessary.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47646,"journal":{"name":"Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour","volume":"55 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145469903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Groupcism as an Acceptable Type of Discrimination","authors":"Patrick Effiong Ben","doi":"10.1111/jtsb.70019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.70019","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Sometimes I am with a group of people but feel <i>socially distant</i> because their activities make me think, ‘I don't belong here!’ However, the distance between me and them is not created by intentional acts of exclusion. It stems from my non-participation in their chosen activities—the things other members of the in-group do for fun—for personal reasons. Although we share a lot in common, such as being supporters of the same football club, staff at the same institution, students at the same university or having shared religious beliefs, we differ in the things we do for fun; not all of us are smokers, not all of us drink beer/alcohol, and not all of us speak the same languages. The feeling of <i>social distance</i> that one experiences when excluded from activities enjoyed by members of one's in-group is a form of discrimination. In this perspective paper, I expose this type of discrimination as acceptable within in-groups for two reasons: (1) the general lack of discriminatory intentions towards victims and (2) the spatial situatedness of the discriminatory activities. I call this acceptable type of discrimination ‘Groupcism’. I argue that <i>groupcism</i> is regarded as an acceptable form of discrimination not primarily because of the two reasons stated above, but because of another two: (1) other activities that the victims of <i>groupcism</i> share with the members of their in-group; and (2) the agency to opt in and out of the sub-group activities that engender <i>groupcism</i>.</p>","PeriodicalId":47646,"journal":{"name":"Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour","volume":"55 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jtsb.70019","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145469753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Why Cognitive Science Needs Phenomenology: Rethinking the Epistemology of Consciousness Through Intuitive Dualism","authors":"Rebecca Peng,&nbsp;Amit Hagar","doi":"10.1111/jtsb.70016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.70016","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Cognitive science needs phenomenology, not despite, but because of the epistemic challenges posed by consciousness. This article argues that the pervasive presence of intuitive dualism, the empirical cognitive tendency to distinguish the mental from physical, is a widespread and entrenched feature of human experience. Drawing on work in developmental psychology and cognitive anthropology, we suggest that first-person experience, often bracketed or marginalised in scientific accounts, must instead be treated as a legitimate source of epistemic access. The goal is in no way to return to metaphysical dualism but to recognise that the intuitively dualist subjective experience forms the data any science of consciousness must take seriously. Reframing the study of consciousness through phenomenological epistemology not only acknowledges the ontological stakes of mental phenomena but also realigns scientific inquiry with the lived realities it seeks to explain. This interdisciplinary rethinking offers a path forward for reconciling cognitive science, philosophy and the enduring puzzle of consciousness.</p>","PeriodicalId":47646,"journal":{"name":"Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour","volume":"55 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jtsb.70016","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145407474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Language and Society: A Controversy Between Searle and Bourdieu","authors":"Sedat Bingöl","doi":"10.1111/jtsb.70015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.70015","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>My aim in this article is to establish a connection or bridge between philosophy of language and philosophy of society by showing the relationship between language and society within the framework of John Searle and Pierre Bourdieu's ideas. To this end, I discuss Searle's claim that it is language that creates social reality and, in a sense, human civilisation. I argue that his strong emphasis on the constitutive role of language actually demonstrates the relationship between language and society. In order to make this relationship more visible, I discuss Bourdieu's views on language and his criticisms of speech acts theory. Using these criticisms against Searle's claims, I offer a comprehensive analysis of the two thinkers' views on the relationship between language and society. Fundamentally, I try to strengthen the connection I plan to establish between philosophy of language and philosophy of society by analysing, evaluating and comparing both Searle's and Bourdieu's views on the relationship between language and society. By addressing these two thinkers together, I try to violate the distinctions and boundaries between these two thinkers as well as between problem areas and philosophical disciplines.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47646,"journal":{"name":"Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour","volume":"55 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145316824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Ayn Rand: Realism, Morality, Selfishness and Capitalism","authors":"Steve Ash","doi":"10.1111/jtsb.70014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.70014","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Moral theories are not just theories regarding the nature of the world and human behaviour but also societal influences that enable or constrain human behaviour. One theory with significant influence is Ayn Rand's philosophy of objectivism which holds that the highest moral value is selfishness and ‘the words “to make money” hold the essence of human morality’. For Rand and her followers, this argument is built on the recognition of reality and the avoidance of the error of contradictory thinking. In this paper I consider objectivism from the standpoint of the well-developed ontological and epistemological framework of critical realism. This metatheoretical position is used because Rand explicitly builds her moral philosophy on the same ontological realist premises that are argued for in <i>A Realist Theory of Science</i>. By taking this approach, I show that Rand's conception of both epistemology and moral value is incompatible with the ontological realism she professes and therefore her influence is unwarranted.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47646,"journal":{"name":"Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour","volume":"55 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145228057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}