From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series最新文献

{"title":"The Coherence Theory of Truth: Russell’s Worst Invention?","authors":"Stewart Candlish, N. Damnjanovic","doi":"10.1515/9783110330571.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330571.13","url":null,"abstract":"In his 1989 book, The Coherence Theory of Truth: Realism, anti-realism, idealism, Ralph Walker attributed the coherence theory to various people, ranging from Spinoza to a temporal stage of Wittgenstein. I give a brief account of the origins of the idea that there is something properly called the ‘coherence theory of truth’, explicitly embraced by some philosophers and legitimately attributable to others. An examination of even the textbook ‘coherence theorists’ reveals that none deserves the label. Attempts to pin this label onto someone, even oneself, fail for good reason: ideas initially framed in coherentist jargon quickly mutate, as so-called coherence theorists, when put under the modest pressure involved in moving from slogans and rhetoric to the articulation of a theory, flee in different directions.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127261521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Ludwig Wittgenstein über Wilhelm Busch – “He has the REAL philosophical urge.”","authors":"Josef G. F. Rothhaupt","doi":"10.1515/9783110330571.297","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330571.297","url":null,"abstract":"Das Werk des Malers, Zeichners und Dichters Wilhelm Busch (1832-1908) hatte auf Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889- 1951) zeitlebens einen erheblichen und nachhaltigen Einfluss. Mit dem Vortrag wird das Augenmerk der Wittgensteinforschung eben auf dieses Faktum gelenkt. Dabei kommt die „Wahlverwandtschaft“ zwischen Busch und Wittgenstein deutlich zum Vorschein. Und es zeigt sich, was Wittgenstein meint, wenn er am Ende seines Lebens in einem Brief an seinen Schuler und Freund Rush Rhees ausdrucklich lobend vermerkt, dass Wilhelm Busch den echten philosophischen Impetus besitze. So kann das Studium der Werke von Busch einen innovativen Zugang zur Philosophie Wittgensteins eroffnen. Und gegenlaufig kann sich von Wittgensteinschen Auffassungen her auch ein neuer Blickwinkel auf Busch als Philosophen ergeben. In einem ersten Schritt sind die, in den vergangenen zwei Jahrzehnten recherchierten und gesammelten, Belege fur diese „Wahlverwandtschaft“ beizubringen. Unabdingbare Voraussetzung hierfur sind einerseits umfassende Kenntnisse uber den Wittgensteinschen Gesamtnachlass und andererseits Studien des Gesamtwerkes von Wilhelm Busch. So lassen sich fur viele Schriften, Bildergeschichten und Zeichnungen von Busch explizite Zitate, Abbildungen, Referenzen, Hinweise und Anspielungen bei Wittgenstein in verschiedenster Weise angeben. Neben der Auswertung des philosophischen Nachlasses von Wittgenstein mussen weitere Untersuchungen vorgenommen und zusatzliche Dokumente prasentiert werden. Beispielsweise die Auswertung von Wittgensteins Briefwechsel mit Schulern, Freunden und Verwandten, das Einholen authentischer Zeitzeugenberichte und die Recherche bisher unbekannt gebliebener biographischer Dokumente. In einem zweiten Schritt sind diese Belege in den Kontext Wittgensteinscher Philosophie einzuordnen und als Elemente Wittgensteinschen Philosophierens zu interpretieren. Dabei zeigt sich nicht nur, dass Wittgenstein Werke von Busch – die Prosaschriften „Eduards Traum“ und „Der Schmetterling“, die Bildergeschichten z.B. „Maler Klecksel“ und „Anleitung zu historischen Portrats“, die Marchensammlung „Ut Oler Welt“, den Briefwechsel „Wilhelm Busch an Maria Anderson“, die Nachlassgabe „Hernach“ und viele Zeichnungen und Karikaturen sehr gut kannte, hoch schatzte, oft zitierte und markant in sein schriftstellerisch-philosophisches Gesamtwerk integrierte, sondern es wird auch deutlich, dass der Einfluss von Wilhelm Buschs Lebenswerk und Lebensform bis ins Zentrum der Arbeit des Philosophen Ludwig Wittgenstein hineinreicht. So kommen Themen wie „Philosophie und Literatur“, „Philosophie und Witz“, „Philosophie und philosophischer Impetus“ in der Wittgensteinforschung ins Blickfeld.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114379359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Sind Eindrücke Informationsträger? Was wir aus PU §§354-356 lernen können","authors":"E. Savigny","doi":"10.1515/9783110330571.113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330571.113","url":null,"abstract":"In P. I. 352 ff., Wittgenstein mentions the case “that our thinking plays us a queer trick”, viz. that we quote the law of excluded middle in order to argue: if we reject a sentence, then its negation is true and has therefore got a sense. We may, however, be overlooking a “grammatical sentence” like “[our] sense-impressions can deceive us” (P. I. 354). This sentence just means: if someone, on account of using his sense-organs, erroneously believes that it is raining, “he has the deceptive impression that it is raining”; this is why “the fact that the false appearance is precisely one of rain is founded on a definition” (P. I. 354). The temptation mentioned above will then result in the very important philosophical insight that it is precisely nondeceptive sense-impressions that convey true “information that it is raining” (P. I. 356). In this way, believing something is masqueraded as being confronted with informative entities (“mental representations”). It can be shown that Wittgenstein exposes this mistake in several contexts where nouns are introduced into the language of 31 the mental, nouns designed to designate mental objects of mental confrontations like “sense” or “entertain” or simply “have”.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123006098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Wittgenstein and Sebald: The Place of Home and the Grammar of Memory","authors":"D. Schalkwyk","doi":"10.1515/9783110330571.317","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330571.317","url":null,"abstract":"Wittgenstein appears in W.G. Sebald’s work in a variety of forms, both explicit and implicit. My paper traces the place of the Austrian philosopher in the German novelist’s fiction by examining the common role of the concept of the loss or search for home in each via the grammar of memory. Sebald invokes Wittgenstein explicitly in his novel Austerlitz, and the tales that make up The Emigrants and Vertigo. But there are also more implicit, suggestive modes of interaction between them. I argue that if Wittgenstein thought of himself as the inventor of similes, Sebald, as it were, returns his philosophical similes to their place or home in the world, giving them a literal historicity that is paradoxically also fictional. Sebald calls upon Wittgenstein’s idea of returning language to its “home” by examining the devastating effects of the mid-European, and especially Jewish, withdrawal of home and the devastation of memory which Wittgenstein’s philosophical work passes over in silence. The evocation of the biographical figure of Wittgenstein in Sebald’s attempts to come to terms with loss and denial following the Holocaust in characters like Jacques Austerlitz, Paul Bereyter, Max Ferber, and the narrator himself, suggests that an ethics of memory consonant with the demands of human suffering from the Belgian Congo to Theriesenstadt lies in following Wittgenstein’s disavowal of causal explanation for the never-ending quest for “seeing conncetions”.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131038823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Objective Interpretation and the Metaphysics of Meaning","authors":"M. Reicher","doi":"10.1515/9783110330571.181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330571.181","url":null,"abstract":"In some sense, everything can be interpreted, but some things virtually seem to call on us to interpret them, notably those things that are products of In some sense, everything can be interpreted, but some things virtually seem to call on us to interpret them, notably those things that are products of intentional human actions, i.e., artifacts. This holds in particular for sequences of linguistic signs, i.e., texts. In this paper, three closely interrelated questions concerning the interpretation of texts shall be explored: 1. What does it mean to interpret a text in the first place? 2. Can interpretations be right or wrong? In other words, can interpretive claims be true or false? 3. Is there such a thing as an objective meaning of texts (i.e., a meaning that exists independently of interpretations)? There is not one single activity that is called “interpretation” but various distinct ones. All of them are in some way or another related to what one may call the “meaning” of the text. However, the concept of (textual) meaning is ambiguous too. It shall be argued that there is at least one kind of interpretation which indeed can be right or wrong. Consequently, there are interpretive claims that are true or false. These are interpretations that aim at a description of the objective meaning of a text. An interpretation of this sort is right if it corresponds to the text’s objective meaning, and it is wrong if it fails to do so. This objectivist position shall be defended against some popular objections, and the notion of an objective meaning shall be clarified. ntentional human actions, i.e., artifacts. This holds in particular for sequences of linguistic signs, i.e., texts. In this paper, three closely interrelated questions concerning the interpretation of texts shall be explored: 1. What does it mean to interpret a text in the first place? 2. Can interpretations be right or wrong? In other words, can interpretive claims be true or false? 3. Is there such a thing as an objective meaning of texts (i.e., a meaning that exists independently of interpretations)? There is not one single activity that is called “interpretation” but various distinct ones. All of them are in some way or another related to what one may call the “meaning” of the text. However, the concept of (textual) meaning is ambiguous too. It shall be argued that there is at least one kind of interpretation which indeed can be right or wrong. Consequently, there are interpretive claims that are true or false. These are interpretations that aim at a description of the objective meaning of a text. An interpretation of this sort is right if it corresponds to the text’s objective meaning, and it is wrong if it fails to do so. This objectivist position shall be defended against some popular objections, and the notion of an objective meaning shall be clarified.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132954365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Generisches Wissen in kategorialen Inferenzstrukturen: Zur Metaphysik des Begrifflichen","authors":"Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer","doi":"10.1515/9783110330571.191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330571.191","url":null,"abstract":"Auserhalb bloser (mathematischer) Formalsprachen bestimmen materialbegriffliche Inferenzformen den Inhalt unserer Worter und Satze. Diese materialbegrifflichen Schlusse sind durch einen Kanon kategorial vorsortierten Wissens als nomalerweise verlasslich bestimmt. Die Entwicklung eines derartigen generischen Wissens und des inhaltlich Sagbaren fallen daher weitgehend zusammen. Deswegen zahlen nicht blos die pradikatenlogischen Definitionen komplexer Pradikate in sortalen Gegenstandsbereichen oder andere rein verbalterminologische Regelungen zu den ‚transzendentalen’ Bedingungen empirischer Gehalte, sondern ganze Systeme von allgemeinen Vor- Beurteilungen. Diese gehen als eine Art Metaphysik des Begriffs den empirischen Einzelurteilen in gewissem Sinn a priori voran. Sie sind auch nicht durch Einzelbeobachtungen oder auch statistische Haufigkeiten korrigierbar, sondern bewahren sich in gemeinsamen Orientierungen auf allgemeine Weise.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129065836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Is there a Language 'Behind' Speaking? How to Look at 20 th Century Language Theory in an Alternative Way","authors":"Sybille Krämer","doi":"10.1515/9783110330571.39","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330571.39","url":null,"abstract":"There is a standard ‚picture‘ of how to look at 20th century theory and philosophy of language: Within this picture normally a pragmatic shift is identified from structure oriented (Saussure, Chomsky..) to act oriented concepts of language (Wittgenstein, Austin, Searle, Habermas…). The aim of my talk is to suggest another way of looking at the ‚logical geography’ of language theory by investigating the distinction language theorists often make between type/token, schema/use, rule/realization. From this perspective, a new kind of division emerges: On the one hand we can identify proponents of a ‚two worlds model‘ of language. To this ‘cluster’ belong structural thinkers such as Saussure and Chomsky as well as the speech act theorists Searle and Habermas. On the other hand, there are those philosophers who take the approach of an ‘embodied model’ of language, rejecting the division between schema and use. To this category Wittgenstein, as well as Austin, Davidson, Derrida and Butler can be seen to belong. This typology may seem surprising. My talk hopes to make it plausible.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116949809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Wittgenstein and Literature","authors":"B. Mcguinness","doi":"10.1515/9783110330571.257","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330571.257","url":null,"abstract":"Gabriel Garcia Marquez’s title Vivir para contarla almost fits Wittgenstein. After a life, extremely mouvementee certainly, but one would have thought sad, he said it had been a wonderful one. This is because it was lived at a high level of interiorization. Every element: war, love, exile, racial persecution, concern for his sins and salvation was wrestled with in search of the perfect – usually the most difficult – solution and this was usually a search for the right spontaneous reaction (a typical Wittgensteinian paradox or “double bind”). And this wrestling was not so much recorded as conducted in his Tagebucher. Reading of books so entitled – by Tolstoy, Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky and Gottfried Keller – was part of the culture of his family, who tended to model and guide their lives by literature on the margins of religion, such as this. It is perhaps relevant that much of the most intimate part of Wittgenstein’s own diaries was written in a simple code understood in his family, as if it were addressed to them like one of the “confessions” (Gestandnisse) he sometimes talked about and at least once made. The most confessional volume of his diary passed after his death to his most trusted sister until she confided it to his best friend. Only recently has it come to light. Keller inspired Wittgenstein with the idea that keeping a diary was the only road to integrity and constancy: a man should always be reflecting on his own character. (We are not far from Socrates’ ho anexetastos bios ou biotos anthropoi.) Keller found in his diary occupation for an idle hour – for Wittgenstein it was a necessity. Sometimes he interrupts his philosophical notebooks to exclaim in code on his weaknesses, his vanity, his sins or his aspirations. His real life perhaps was there. But how did his philosophy enter into this and do we need to know this life or “Life” in order to understand or profit from that philosophy? At some times he thought his work was comparatively unimportant. It dealt with one form of the illusions of grandeur or profundity that beset us – but only some of us, the thinkers. Its methods though are the same in essence as those required in the moral sphere. A man has to realize that he is just a man (“Er ist, wie die Menschen sind.” was a typically dismissive judgement.) and to be aware of the temptations and idols that mislead him. Again and again in philosophy it is a problem of the will not of the understanding that is attacked. This accounts for the passion that sometimes invested Wittgenstein’s criticism of the mathematicians for example. We may compare G.E.Moore’s, though a kindly man, going red at the neck in discussion. For these two philosophy was not a game. Truth had to be sought seriously. But that brings us near to another temptation: vanity and the wish to win at all costs. (There was vanity too in the composition of the Tagebucher and the invention of similes – another Wittgensteinian “bind”.) I think it is arguable, however, that his","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125062349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Wittgenstein on the Inverted Spectrum","authors":"D. Stern","doi":"10.1515/9783110330571.135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330571.135","url":null,"abstract":"The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on \"Inverted Qualia\" begins by noting that \"Qualia inversion thought experiments are ubiquitous in contemporary philosophy of mind (largely due to the influence of Shoemaker 1982 and Block 1990). The most popular kind is one or another variant of Locke's hypothetical case of “spectrum inversion”, in which strawberries and ripe tomatoes produce visual experiences of the sort that are actually produced by grass and cucumbers, grass and cucumbers produce experiences of the sort that are actually produced by strawberries and ripe tomatoes, and so on.\" This paper reviews and evaluates what Wittgenstein had to say on the topic. In the Philosophical Investigations , Wittgenstein observes that the idea of private experience, \"that nobody knows whether other people also have this or something else\" (sec 272) supports the assumption that it is possible, but unverifiable, that \"one part of mankind had one sensation of red, and one part another\", and thus the possibility of spectrum inversion. However, he does not explicitly discuss such hypotheses. Recently, Block (2007) has drawn attention to Wittgenstein's discussion of spectrum inversion in the \"Notes for Lectures on 'Sense Data.'\" There, Wittgenstein discusses \"cases in which we should say that the person sees green what I see red\" (Wittgenstein 1993, 285), conceding that a single person case of spectrum inversion is conceivable, but denying that this could always be the case. Block argues that a slippery slope leads from the concession of the possibility of spectrum inversion in a particular case to a scenario in which many people experience long-term spectrum inversion, and that such scenarios are verifiable hypotheses. I evaluate Block's critique of Wittgenstein, and Canfield's (2009) response to Block's reading.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114983028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Conceptualizing Technoscience in a Reasonable, Constructivist Way","authors":"E. Bińczyk","doi":"10.1515/9783110330571.227","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330571.227","url":null,"abstract":"The text presents a specific, “reasonable” version of constructivism, widely inspired by Bruno Latour`s actornetwork theory and also other results of the so-called STS – science and technology studies. It pictures science and technology as both practically successful and historically institutionalized. The article shows that constructivist position turns out to be especially promising when we analyze the role of scientific discoveries and technological innovations in the globalized world. The border parameters of our reality (understood as institutional, symbolic and also material context) are constantly transformed on such a large scale that only dynamic and anti-essentialist theoretical frameworks is able to grasp these processes. Thus, a reasonably projected constructivism is a theoretical background convenient to face political problems of the risk society today.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133012569","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}