心事信息?而我们从小熊维尼§§354-356身上可以学到很多东西

E. Savigny
{"title":"心事信息?而我们从小熊维尼§§354-356身上可以学到很多东西","authors":"E. Savigny","doi":"10.1515/9783110330571.113","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In P. I. 352 ff., Wittgenstein mentions the case “that our thinking plays us a queer trick”, viz. that we quote the law of excluded middle in order to argue: if we reject a sentence, then its negation is true and has therefore got a sense. We may, however, be overlooking a “grammatical sentence” like “[our] sense-impressions can deceive us” (P. I. 354). This sentence just means: if someone, on account of using his sense-organs, erroneously believes that it is raining, “he has the deceptive impression that it is raining”; this is why “the fact that the false appearance is precisely one of rain is founded on a definition” (P. I. 354). The temptation mentioned above will then result in the very important philosophical insight that it is precisely nondeceptive sense-impressions that convey true “information that it is raining” (P. I. 356). In this way, believing something is masqueraded as being confronted with informative entities (“mental representations”). It can be shown that Wittgenstein exposes this mistake in several contexts where nouns are introduced into the language of 31 the mental, nouns designed to designate mental objects of mental confrontations like “sense” or “entertain” or simply “have”.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Sind Eindrücke Informationsträger? Was wir aus PU §§354-356 lernen können\",\"authors\":\"E. Savigny\",\"doi\":\"10.1515/9783110330571.113\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In P. I. 352 ff., Wittgenstein mentions the case “that our thinking plays us a queer trick”, viz. that we quote the law of excluded middle in order to argue: if we reject a sentence, then its negation is true and has therefore got a sense. We may, however, be overlooking a “grammatical sentence” like “[our] sense-impressions can deceive us” (P. I. 354). This sentence just means: if someone, on account of using his sense-organs, erroneously believes that it is raining, “he has the deceptive impression that it is raining”; this is why “the fact that the false appearance is precisely one of rain is founded on a definition” (P. I. 354). The temptation mentioned above will then result in the very important philosophical insight that it is precisely nondeceptive sense-impressions that convey true “information that it is raining” (P. I. 356). In this way, believing something is masqueraded as being confronted with informative entities (“mental representations”). It can be shown that Wittgenstein exposes this mistake in several contexts where nouns are introduced into the language of 31 the mental, nouns designed to designate mental objects of mental confrontations like “sense” or “entertain” or simply “have”.\",\"PeriodicalId\":317292,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series\",\"volume\":\"48 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2013-11-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330571.113\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330571.113","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

在P. I. 352 ff。在维特根斯坦看来,“我们的思维对我们开了一个奇怪的玩笑”,即我们引用排中律来论证:如果我们拒绝一个句子,那么这个句子的否定就是真的,因此就有了意义。然而,我们可能会忽略一个“合乎语法的句子”,比如“[我们的]感官印象会欺骗我们”(P. I. 354)。这个句子的意思是:如果某人,由于使用他的感觉器官,错误地认为在下雨,“他有一种欺骗性的印象,认为在下雨”;这就是为什么“错误的表象恰恰是雨的表象这一事实是建立在定义之上的”(P. I. 354)。上面提到的诱惑会导致非常重要的哲学洞察力,即正是非欺骗性的感觉印象传达了真实的“下雨的信息”(P. I. 356)。通过这种方式,相信某事是伪装成面对信息实体(“心理表征”)。可以看出,维特根斯坦在几个语境中暴露了这个错误,在这些语境中,名词被引入到精神的语言中,这些名词被设计用来指定精神对抗的精神对象,比如“感觉”、“娱乐”或仅仅是“拥有”。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Sind Eindrücke Informationsträger? Was wir aus PU §§354-356 lernen können
In P. I. 352 ff., Wittgenstein mentions the case “that our thinking plays us a queer trick”, viz. that we quote the law of excluded middle in order to argue: if we reject a sentence, then its negation is true and has therefore got a sense. We may, however, be overlooking a “grammatical sentence” like “[our] sense-impressions can deceive us” (P. I. 354). This sentence just means: if someone, on account of using his sense-organs, erroneously believes that it is raining, “he has the deceptive impression that it is raining”; this is why “the fact that the false appearance is precisely one of rain is founded on a definition” (P. I. 354). The temptation mentioned above will then result in the very important philosophical insight that it is precisely nondeceptive sense-impressions that convey true “information that it is raining” (P. I. 356). In this way, believing something is masqueraded as being confronted with informative entities (“mental representations”). It can be shown that Wittgenstein exposes this mistake in several contexts where nouns are introduced into the language of 31 the mental, nouns designed to designate mental objects of mental confrontations like “sense” or “entertain” or simply “have”.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信