From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series最新文献

{"title":"Return to an Old Refrain: What Proof Does to Concepts","authors":"I. Hacking","doi":"10.1515/9783110330595.35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330595.35","url":null,"abstract":"Starting form Wittgensteins Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics the ariticle giaves an overview onWttgensteins thoughts on proofs and mathematics, its reception and the relation from pure to applied mathematics.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125387288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How to Make Wittgenstein’s Concept of Meaning Complete?","authors":"I. Kasavin","doi":"10.1515/9783110330595.135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330595.135","url":null,"abstract":"The well-known Wittgenstein’s expression sounds: «The use of the word in practice is its meaning» (Wittgenstein, L. 1978. The Blue and Brown Books. Oxford. P. 39.). This insight into the problem of meaning faces three challenges, namely, if this formula is 1) logically clear; 2) empirically probable; and 3) conceptually complete. 1) In order to understand this thesis we need to know the meanings of the words involved and to be able to operate with this sentence in communication. According to Wittgenstein, we cannot know the isolated meanings of the words. So everything what remains is to learn how to deal with this language construction without knowing initially what “use”, “practice” and “meaning” are. It is evident that words are used in speech and in language in general. Is this a practice Wittgenstein had in mind? If yes, why he underlines then the practical use of the word in particular? What kind of practical use outside language can we imagine? So the expression “use in practice” is basically unclear unless we prescribe a solely emotional content to it, where word “practice” makes the word “language” sound stronger. 2) We presupposed that use of words is a speech act or any other linguistic activity . The Wittgenstein’s idea of meaning consists then in rejecting meaning as a stable mental state and treating it as a process, a change from one state to another. Either meaning is a routine, circulating activity or a communicative innovation , a mental or behavioral form of psycho-physiological activity, in any way meaning is an activity , and we have to agree with Wittgenstein in this point. 3) So the scheme proposed by the Wittgenstein’s formula includes a linguistic agent, his activity and a word which thereby receives meaning. Is it an isolated agent or a participant in a collective language game? Is this game determined by some rules? Are these rules arbitrary or not? How do people master them? Do they understand rules in the same way? Is there anything outside language game that influences the meaning? All these questions reveal the necessity to go beyond the initial Wittgenstein’s formula and problematize the concepts of mind, spirit, naming, meaning, use, language game, and appealing to other concepts as well. Can meaning be considered as something mental? Is meaning a kind of activity, its quality or function? Is meaning a kind of communication, its quality or function? Is meaning a kind of surrounding, its quality or function? So what is the key concept which can make the Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning complete – this is the major issue of my paper.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123959190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Our grammar lacks surveyability.","authors":"H. Sluga","doi":"10.1515/9783110330595.185","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330595.185","url":null,"abstract":"The article is about the famous sentence in the PI that „our grammar lacks surveyability.“ Sluga explains what this means, what the consequences are and how it can be applied in other fields.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123369510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"‘Resolution’ – an Illusion of Sense?","authors":"Genia Schönbaumsfeld","doi":"10.1515/9783110330595.169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330595.169","url":null,"abstract":"Resolute readings’ initially started life as a radical new approach to Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, but are now starting to take root as a way of interpreting the later writings as well – a trend exemplified by Stephen Mulhall’s latest book (2007), Wittgenstein’s Private Language , as well as by some recent work published in Metaphilosophy (Hutchinson 2007; Harre 2008). In this paper I will show that there are neither good philosophical nor compelling exegetical grounds for accepting a resolute reading of the later Wittgenstein’s work. It is possible to make sense of Wittgenstein’s philosophical method without either ascribing to him an incoherent conception of ‘substantial nonsense’ or espousing the resolute readers’ preferred option of nonsense austerity. If my interpretation is correct, it allows us to recognize Wittgenstein’s radical break with the philosophical tradition without having to characterize his achievements in purely therapeutic fashion.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121741587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"On the Origin and Compilation of ‘Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness’","authors":"Kim van Gennip","doi":"10.1515/9783110330595.343","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330595.343","url":null,"abstract":"This paper scrutinises the relation between ‘Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness’ and the source text, MS 119. There are two reasons that necessitate this task; first, ‘Cause and Effect’ omits an entry that is of crucial importance to Wittgenstein’s philosophising as it developed in the late 1930s. Second, the source text enhances our understanding of the role and purpose of at least two long passages in ‘Cause and Effect’. An elaboration of both these points improves our understanding of ‘Cause and Effect’ in particular and emphasises the need and necessity for transparent editorial procedures in editing Wittgenstein’s Nachlass in general.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127523069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Sind Tatsachen vom Sprachspiel konstituiert? Zu Wittgensteins Philosophie 1946-51","authors":"K. Neumer","doi":"10.1515/9783110330595.315","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330595.315","url":null,"abstract":"Wittgenstein wird gewohnlich ohne weitere Nuancierung unter Philosophen eingestuft, die dafur pladieren, die Tatsachen seien von der jeweiligen Sprache, Kultur oder dem jeweiligen Weltbild etc. konstituiert. Letztere Behauptung kann auch die These nach sich ziehen, das die Tatsachen an sich – ohne die Sprache, die Kultur bzw. das Weltbild, die sie sozusagen erst konstituieren – nichts seien bzw. keine konstitutive Rolle im Hinblick auf die letzteren hatten. Wittgenstein will in der Tat immer wieder die Bedeutung von Sprache, Kultur bzw. Welbild gegenuber der Fakten selbst hervorheben. In einigen Textstellen stellt er dennoch die Frage, ob und inwieweit die Sprachspiele durch „ein Gerust von Tatsachen“ bedingt sind. Seine Antwort lautet, das, wenn sich einige Dinge anders verhielten, als sie sich gewohnlich verhalten, dies dem Sprachspiel seinen Witz nehmen wurde, das Spielen des Sprachspiels unmoglich machen wurde oder aber ein anderes Sprachspiel zum Resultat hatte. Das legt schon die Schlusfolgerung nahe, das „die Moglichkeit eines Sprachspiels durch gewisse Tatsachen bedingt ist“. Im Vortrag wird erstens der Frage nachgegangen, inwieweit sich diese Behauptungen in die Spatkonzeption uberhaupt einfugen und zweitens untersucht, ob es einen Unterschied diesbezuglich zwischen der Konzeption der Philosophischen Untersuchungen und jener der Periode 1946-1951 gibt. Mit der letzteren Untersuchung wird also auch ein Beitrag zum Problem „Third Wittgenstein“ geleistet.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116653382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Wittgenstein on ‘Primitive’ Languages","authors":"Roy Harris","doi":"10.1515/9783110330595.243","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330595.243","url":null,"abstract":"Is there anything of value to be salvaged from the notion of ‘primitive’ languages introduced by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations? Setting up ‘primitive’ languages is evidently not an idle jeu d’esprit, but is intended to throw intellectual light on the mechanisms to be found in less ‘primitive’ languages, such as German, English, etc. Wittgenstein seems to have been pondering this idea since at least the early 1930s, since we find references to such languages ‘complete in themselves’ cropping up the Brown Book. There students are already invited to imagine such a language as ‘the entire system of communication of a tribe in a primitive state of society’. But whether we can imagine this is not something that can be taken for granted. It turns out that the linguistic competence required for the operation of a ‘primitive’ language involves rather more than perhaps Wittgenstein realized, at least if its users are to be regarded as engaged in a rational activity, and not merely as humanoid counterparts to Pavlov’s dogs. As presented by Wittgenstein, the simplified semiology of such languages is a hindrance, rather than a help, to understanding the more complex semiology typical of human linguistic communication.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125754850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Showing and Self-Presentation of Experiences – Some Philosophical Cases","authors":"J. Marek","doi":"10.1515/9783110330571.103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330571.103","url":null,"abstract":"Intentional experiences — like all experiences (i.e. conscious mental occurrences, “Erlebnisse” in German) — “show themselves”, as Wittgenstein put it, or “present themselves”, as Alexius Meinong dubbed it. This kind of showing or self-presentation is not a saying; it does not need the intermediary of a representation of its own. In other words, we are conscious of our experiences without considering them, without observing them. Meinong saw a mark of the mental therein and similarly did Wittgenstein when he tried to characterize psychological verbs (“believe”, “see”, “pain”, “fear”, for example). For psychological verbs may express the mental state explicitly without expressing (assertive) information about it. Philosophical cases like the so-called Moore’s paradox (“I don’t believe it’s raining, but as a matter of fact it is”) can be interpreted in the light of the above-mentioned distinction between showing and saying and between selfpresentation and “other-presentation”, respectively. Moore’s paradox is not a paradox of the logic of propositions [Logik des Satzes], it is a paradox of the logic of assertions [Logik der Behauptung], already Wittgenstein said. Logical structure, deducibility, and consistency cannot be reduced solely to propositions. Not only propositions but also assertions, questions, imperatives, wishes and even feelings are accessible to logic. In this sense, the distinction between showing and saying also helps us to understand how value judgments work according to emotivism. Emotivists claim that value judgments can be interpreted as expressions of a complex of beliefs and — in the final analysis — of (collective) emotions. As there is not only a logic of propositions, the emotivists’ claim does not preclude that value judgments can figure in valid arguments.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130227022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Zur Performativität des Narrativen: Vorüberlegungen zu einer performativen Narratologie","authors":"Alexandra Strohmaier","doi":"10.1515/9783110330571.77","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330571.77","url":null,"abstract":"Im Unterschied zu Positionen der pragmatischen Narratologie, deren Pramissen sich auf Austins Trichotomie lokutionar / illokutionar / perlokutionar zuruckfuhren lassen, sucht dieser Beitrag, Austins initiale Performativ/konstativ-Unterscheidung als theoretischen Ausgangspunkt fur eine performanz- bzw. performativitatstheoretische Profilierung der Narratologie nutzbar zu machen. Die Annahme einer (je)der Narration immanenten per¬formativen Dimension in Anschluss an poststrukturalistische Revisionen der Austinschen Theoriebildung eroffnet, wie gezeigt werden soll, neue Perspektiven fur die Untersuchung der Wirkmachtigkeit narrativer Formen und Verfahren. Das theoretische und methodische Potential einer Integration performanztheoretischer Ansatze (poststrukturalistischer Pro¬venienz) und narratologischer Ansatze (strukturalistischer Provenienz) soll dabei konkret am Beispiel der in der klassischen Erzahlforschung (zugunsten der Kategorie Zeit) margi¬nalisierten Kategorie des Raumes vorgefuhrt werden. Die Adaptierung handlungstheoreti¬scher Ansatze der Raumtheorie fur die kulturwissenschaftliche Narratologie erlaubt es, den Fokus von der Frage nach der Reprasentation auf die nach der Konstitution des Raumes (in dem/durch den Akt der Narration) zu verschieben. Der gemeinhin als naturlich gegeben (und als in der Narration lediglich re-prasentiert) gedachte Raum wird auf seine narrrative Konstituierung hin untersucht.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131913693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Harmony Chapter","authors":"J. Schulte","doi":"10.1515/9783110330571.123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330571.123","url":null,"abstract":"§§428-65 of Philosophical Investigations (PI) deal with questions that suggest themselves when one tries to understand the idea of 'harmony between thought and reality' (§429). If we follow various commentators in regarding this part of the book as a 'chapter' dealing with aspects of the notion of harmony, or agreement, between thought and reality, we shall soon run up against a number of difficulties of interpretation. Many of these difficulties, I want to claim, are due to the fact that this part of the book is in a sense the earliest: nearly all its remarks go back to manuscripts written in the early 1930ies. But when, around 1945, Wittgenstein tried to put together the last version of PI he reassembled these remarks to form the familiar chapter on harmony. The main question I want to discuss in this paper is whether Wittgenstein's attempt to join together old remarks to form a new chapter can be regarded as a success. Of course, to answer this question we need to have an idea of what to count as a 'success', and this in turn involves many exegetical questions. So, in a way what looks like a fairly external question about the origin of this part of PI is bound to lead to substantial questions of interpretation and can ultimately be seen to raise the recurrent issue of the unity of the Investigations.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133781893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}