From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series最新文献

{"title":"Verschlüsselung in Wittgensteins Nachlass","authors":"Ilse Somavilla","doi":"10.1515/9783110330595.367","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330595.367","url":null,"abstract":"Im Nachlass von Ludwig Wittgestein finden sich an die 450 Stellen, die in verschlusselter Schrift abgefasst sind und in der Rezeption weitverbreitet als „Geheimschrift-Stellen“ bezeichnet werden. Diese teils tagebuchartigen, haufig in Form von Aphorismen oder Fragmenten in den Manuskripten verstreut auftretenden Aufzeichnungen, heben sich von dem in Normalschrift gehaltenen, philosophisch gefuhrten Diskurs ab; sie ragen aus diesem als etwas Eigenstandiges heraus, das mit dem philosophischen Inhalt in keinem unmittelbaren Zusammenhang zu stehen scheint. In ihrer geschlossensten Form finden sich verschlusselte Eintragungen in den Tagebuchern 1914-1916, wo sie sich auf der linken Seite der Manuskripte befinden und als Wittgensteins personliche Tagebucher zu betrachten sind. Wahrend die in Normalschrift gehaltenen philosophischen Aufzeichnungen bereits 1960 ediert sind, blieb der verschlusselte Teil der Tagebucher der Offentlichkeit uber Jahrzehnte hinweg nicht zuganglich. Obwohl seit 1990 nun einzelne Publikationen codierter Aufzeichnungen vorliegen, so wurden diese in ihrer Gesamtheit bis dato weder ediert, noch auf die Hintergrunde untersucht, die Wittgenstein bewogen haben konnten, einen Code zu benutzen. Ebenso wenig ist ihr Stellenwert innerhalb seines philosophischen Werks erforscht. Haufig werden sie als personliche Eintragungen Wittgensteins gewertet, oder als kulturphilosophische Bemerkungen, insbesondere im Hinblick auf ethische und religiose Fragen. Dies trifft jedoch keineswegs auf alle verschlusselten Stellen zu. Anliegen meines Vortrags ist es, anhand von Beispielen an verschlusselten Aufzeichnungen im Nachlass Wittgensteins dem Bezug zum philosophischen Werk sowie der Frage nachzugehen, weshalb er fur bestimmte Bemerkungen einen Code verwendete. Ob er damit eine bestimmte Absicht verfolgte, um u.a. das, woruber er nicht schreiben wollte, auf „verhullte“ Weise darzustellen? Ob diese Bemerkungen vielleicht auch als Beispiel fur seine Sprachphilosophie angesehen werden konnen – insofern er mit ihnen eine bestimmte Funktion von Sprache erfullt sah, die durch wissenschaftliche Dispute nicht erreicht werden kann? – Als eine besondere Art, Sich-Zeigendes von klar Sagbarem zu trennen? Etwa in Form von einer Art poetischer Satze als Gegenpol zu streng philosophischen Argumentationen? Denn nicht nur die Schrift unterscheidet sich von der Normalschrift, auch Inhalt und Form weichen von dem in Normalschrift gehaltenen ab, so dass die Vermutung nahe liegt, Wittgenstein wollte mit dem Code einen bestimmten Texttypus, einen bestimmten Stil, markieren.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114697238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Recognizing the Ground that Lies before us as Ground: McDowell on How to Read Philosophical Investigations","authors":"M. Mcginn","doi":"10.1515/9783110330595.147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330595.147","url":null,"abstract":"John McDowell presents a reading of Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following, which explicitly sets out to absolve Wittgenstein from the charge that he puts forward what McDowell sees as an untenable view, namely, that, when it comes to applying a rule to a new case, what counts as correct is somehow determined by the responses that the members of the relevant speech community are inclined to make. I share all McDowell’s dissatisfactions with the communitarian reading, and I am generally sympathetic with his concern to find a reading of Wittgenstein’s remarks which avoids committing him to a communitarian account of what constitutes the correct result of applying a rule in a new case. However, I have also been impressed by the objection to McDowell’s reading that it simply reinstates a version of the platonism which Wittgenstein’s reflections show to be problematic. My main concern in this paper is to identify where I think McDowell’s reading goes wrong. I argue that his reading, despite its attractions, misrepresents the nature of Wittgenstein’s reflections on rule-following, but that this does not leave the communitarian reading as the only available alternative.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116722094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Beyond the World, Beyond Significant Language","authors":"Nuno Venturinha","doi":"10.1515/9783110330595.387","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330595.387","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, mainly due to the work of Cora Diamond and James Conant, there has been a lively debate around Wittgenstein’s conceptions of ethics and nonsense. However, commentators have tended to focus primarily on the Tractatus, disregarding other important sources. One of them is the “Lecture on Ethics”, where Wittgenstein astonishingly writes that “all [he] wanted to do with [his nonsensical expressions] was just to go beyond the world and that is to say beyond significant language”. In this paper, I shall examine the two handwritten versions of the text, MSS 139a and b, in order to shed light on Wittgenstein’s view. But I shall also look at the related remarks in the third manuscript volume, MS 107, as well 36 as at those recorded by Waismann published in Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle. Particular attention will be paid to Wittgenstein’s comments on Heidegger, which reappear in the so-called “Dictation to Schlick” (D 302).","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123759800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Wittgenstein vs. Rawls","authors":"R. Read","doi":"10.1515/9783110330595.93","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330595.93","url":null,"abstract":"The article is written against a reading of Wittgenstein that can be called a Rawlian or an liberal one.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"160 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116686381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Attending to the Actual Sayings of Things","authors":"L. Hertzberg","doi":"10.1515/9783110330595.125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330595.125","url":null,"abstract":"A variety of views have been attributed to Wittgenstein, by supporters as well as detractors, under the heading “meaning as use” or “use theory of meaning”. In these accounts, the word “use” variously carries the sense of function or of usage. What is in question is sometimes the use of words, sometimes types of sentence, sometimes particular utterances. This variety itself is often overlooked, which may betray a lack of sensitivity to Wittgenstein’s own concerns. Far from putting forward a rival account of meaning, Wittgenstein is steering us away from the idea that the understanding of linguistic communication requires some substantive account of meaning, whether in terms of mental contents, of reference, or of systematic features of the language. His appeals to use are meant to draw our attention to the way our understanding of a person’s words is connected with what the speaker is doing on the particular occasion of speaking. The radical nature of this shift of perspective is often ignored. Even writers who acknowledge the importance of context often retain the idea of an underlying generality. The attempt to combine general rules with recognizing the significance of the particular case, however, leads to incoherence. The logical features of an utterance made in a particular situation cannot be established on the basis of word meanings and language rules. The discussion will be carried out in dialogue with James Conant, Alice Crary, Hans-Johann Glock, Charles Travis and others.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123628312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Self-Knowledge as a Technology of the Self: Foucault and Wittgenstein on the Practice of Philosophy","authors":"Jörg Volbers","doi":"10.1515/9783110330595.111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330595.111","url":null,"abstract":"Eine der Grundgedanken des Wittgenstein'schen Spatwerks ist das Primat der Praxis: Um Worter und Handlungen zu verstehen, ist es unverzichtbar, selbst Teilnehmer an diesen Sprachspielen und ihrer Lebensform zu sein. Aus dieser Position heraus deutet Wittgenstein die philosophische Selbsterkenntnis, die Reflexion auf das eigene Sein und Tun, radikal um. Sie ist fur ihn keine Erkenntnis eines Gegenstandes, sondern eine Form der „Arbeit an Einem selbst“, wie er es nennt. In voller Konsequenz wird das Primat der Praxis auf die philosophische Erkenntnis selbst ausgeweitet: Philosophieren ist demnach kein kognitiver Akt, sondern eine praktische Ubung. Die philosophische Einsicht ist fur Wittgenstein verbunden mit einer auch korperlich gedachten Arbeit an der eigenen Wahrnehmung und an den eigenen Fahigkeiten. Der Vortrag zeigt, dass diese Idee der Philosophie einen doppelten Grund hat. Zum einen ist sie eine systematische Konsequenz aus dem Primat der Praxis, die auch das Denken selbst als Praktik zu begreifen versucht. Dieser Philosophiebegriff reagiert auf ein methodisches Problem, auf das der theoretisch-kognitive Erkenntnisbegriff keine Antwort finden kann. Wittgensteins Philosophieverstandnis steht andererseits in einer Tradition der „geistigen Ubungen“ (Hadot), die von der Antike bis zur fruhen Neuzeit reichte. Mit Foucault formuliert, bestimmt Wittgenstein Philosophie als eine Selbsttechnik, als eine Praxis, die darauf zielt, das Verhaltnis zu sich selbst zu transformieren. Aus dieser Perspektive zeichnet sich ein neues Bild des Philosophierens ab, das diese Praxis ethisch-politisch situiert, ohne sie in diesen Dimensionen aufgehen zu lassen.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130987533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Normative Conception of Necessity: Wittgenstein on Necessary Truths of Logic, Mathematics and Metaphysics","authors":"P. Hacker","doi":"10.1515/9783110330595.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330595.13","url":null,"abstract":"In this article Peter Hacker elucidate a normative concept of necessety by using  for example a Wittgensteinian analysis.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"2014 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114642030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Wissende und Zweifelnde – Wittgensteins „Doppelangriff“","authors":"A. Weiberg","doi":"10.1515/9783110330595.205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330595.205","url":null,"abstract":"Einer der interessantesten Aspekte in Uber Gewisheit ist Wittgensteins Zuruckweisung sowohl des Mooreschen „Wissens“ als auch des skeptischen Zweifels durch den Hinweis auf eine Gemeinsamkeit des Gebrauchs der Worter „zweifeln“ und „wissen“ und die Forderung nach einer Rechtfertigung nicht nur fur einen Wissensanspruch, sondern ebenso fur die Artikulation eines Zweifels. Wie er hierbei konkret vorgeht, soll im Rahmen des Vortrags naher erlautert werden.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122967728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Rule-Following Problem Problem and Its Solution","authors":"J. Hintikka","doi":"10.1515/9783110330595.57","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330595.57","url":null,"abstract":"The problem of how to follow a rule is logically speaking a question about dependence: What should one choose to do at each stage (say stage number n) depending on n? This question has the same logical form as an experimental question: How does the value y = f(x) of the observed variable y depend on the controlled variable x? Nature’s direct response, i.e. the outcome of the experiment, is a correlation of the values of x and y, as it were a curve on graph paper. But this “reply” does not answer the dependence question unless and until the inquirer knows what the function f is that the curve represents. Thus answering any dependence question involves two conceptually different tasks, not only to find the correlation but also to identify the function that the correlation is determined by. These tasks are largely independent of each other. Even knowing the precise curve does not automatically mean identifying the function whose graph it is. In the rule-following case, one can act in accordance with the rule in each case without being aware of the rule itself. Wittgenstein’s original problem about rules is that of identifying the function rather than acting in accordance with it. The solution lies in recognizing how we identify in actual conceptual (including mathematical) practice different functions (rules).","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125507933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Francis Skinner’s Original Wittgenstein Brown Book Manuscript","authors":"Arthur Gibson","doi":"10.1515/9783110330595.351","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110330595.351","url":null,"abstract":"The majority of the archive is made up of dictation by Wittgenstein, to Skinner, and notes taken by Skinner at Wittgenstein's lectures, with revisions by Wittgenstein. That the former are comparable to the dictations included in von Wright's catalogue raises them to the level of Nachlass material. It could be argued that, since they are in (written) manuscript with quite substantial correction and revision by Wittgenstein, this elevates them above the typescript Blue and Brown books in giving us an insight not 12 only into his thought but also into his methodology. In the light of the archive's illuminating new material, the basis for fresh insights into Wittgenstein's philosophical dictation thought-processes, and his approaches to mathematics, the Skinner archive ranks as one of the most exciting discoveries in Wittgenstein studies since von Wright first published his catalogue of the Nachlass in 1969.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129376803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}