From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series最新文献_第9页

ACCEPTANCE AS CONDITIONAL DISPOSITION 作为条件处置接受

From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series Pub Date : 2013-11-07 DOI: 10.1515/9783110328851.29

F. Paglieri

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引用次数: 2

ENOUGH WITH THE NORMS ALREADY 规范已经够多了

From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series Pub Date : 2013-11-07 DOI: 10.1515/9783110328851.1

J. Fodor

引用次数: 3

“SUPERVENIENT AND YET NOT DEDUCIBLE”: IS THERE A COHERENT CONCEPT OF ONTOLOGICAL EMERGENCE? “可溯而不可演绎”:存在一个连贯的本体论涌现概念吗?

From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series Pub Date : 2013-11-07 DOI: 10.1515/9783110328851.53

Jaegwon Kim

{"title":"“SUPERVENIENT AND YET NOT DEDUCIBLE”: IS THERE A COHERENT CONCEPT OF ONTOLOGICAL EMERGENCE?","authors":"Jaegwon Kim","doi":"10.1515/9783110328851.53","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110328851.53","url":null,"abstract":"Formulating a concept of emergence which is at least prima facie intelligible and coherent is a significant issue not only because emergence concepts continue to proliferate, attracting much positive attention from some quarters, but also because the idea of emergence is closely related to some of the concepts of central importance in the current debates on the mind-body problem. Early emergence theorists, like C.D. Broad and C. Lloyd Morgan, clearly intended emergence to be an objective phenomenon in the world and conceived of emergent properties as real features of objects with their own distinctive causal powers. This classic conception of emergence is now often called “strong” or “ontological”. According to Broad’s characterization, emergent properties supervene on their “basal” conditions and yet are not deducible from them. The ontological conception of emergence is now contrasted with an “epistemological”, or “weak”, conception according to which properties are emergent in case they are “surprising” and “unexpected” for us, or unpredictable and unknowable from information concerning base-level phenomena. This paper begins with an examination of Broad’s characterization of ontological emergence, which is quite common among writers on emergence. It will be seen that some interesting issues arise from Broad’s approach. I extend my considerations to some recent conceptions of physicalism, reductive explanation, and other related issues.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121038872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

WEAK PHYSICALISM AND SPECIAL SCIENCE ONTOLOGY 弱物理主义与特殊科学本体论

From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series Pub Date : 2013-11-03 DOI: 10.1515/9783110328875.113

J. Ladyman

{"title":"WEAK PHYSICALISM AND SPECIAL SCIENCE ONTOLOGY","authors":"J. Ladyman","doi":"10.1515/9783110328875.113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110328875.113","url":null,"abstract":"Naturalists take science at face value and hence ought to be ontologically committed to the entities posited by the various special sciences. According to the Eleatic principle, causal efficacy is necessary condition for existence. This principle is plausible for concrete entities and so naturalists must attribute genuine causal powers to special science ontologies. However, physicalism is usually taken to require a commitment to the causal completeness of the physical world, and so a generalization of Kim's causal exclusion argument threatens the special sciences with the dilemma of epiphenomenalism versus reductionism. The former is incompatible with the Eleatic principle and so motivates eliminativism about the ontologies of the special sciences, whereas the latter is widely held to be untenable. Hence, there is a tension between physicalism and naturalism. However, ironically among philosophers of physics there is a widespread view that there is no causation in fundamental physics, suggesting the physicalism must be understood without reference to causal completeness. In this paper I argue that a weak form of physicalism can be combined with an independently motivated account of special science ontology to dissolve the generalized causal exclusion problem and harmonise naturalism and physicalism.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126035029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

A PROBLEM AND A SOLUTION FOR NEO-FREGEANISM 新绿色主义的问题和解决方案

From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series Pub Date : 2013-11-03 DOI: 10.1515/9783110328875.289

M. Gabbay

引用次数: 0

SUPERVENIENCE AND MORAL REALISM 直觉和道德现实主义

From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series Pub Date : 2013-11-03 DOI: 10.1515/9783110328875.163

Alison Hills

引用次数: 3

WHAT REDUCTIONISTS BELIEVE IN 简化论者所相信的

From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series Pub Date : 2013-11-03 DOI: 10.1515/9783110328875.153

C. Kanzian

{"title":"WHAT REDUCTIONISTS BELIEVE IN","authors":"C. Kanzian","doi":"10.1515/9783110328875.153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110328875.153","url":null,"abstract":"Ontological reductionism is normally motivated by a sceptical view on what people in their ordinary life assume to be the case in their ordinary world: things like cars, sheep, and human persons, having properties, being related to one another, and remaining the same even if they change. Reductionists want to protect us from taking such a naive view of reality as ontologically serious. Ontology should not reflect upon what normal people mean, but what the basic structures of our world really are. And science - natural science of course - tells us what these basic structures really are. Thus the noblest aim of ontology is to reduce the objects in one's everyday world to the basics presented to us by natural science; respectively to reconstruct these objects from this given basis. In my talk I try to examine ontological reductionism in more detail: How is the label “ontological reductionism” to be understood? Are there common premises shared by the different reductionistic positions? How can we discuss them? – My result will be that reductionistic ontologies assume strong premises, beliefs, I am inclined to say; and these beliefs can be called into question, because of on the one hand ontological and on the other hand methodological or meta-ontological reasons. My focus lies on the reductionistic assumption of ontology as an “a posteriori” discipline; and here especially on the problem of “hypostasizing” models used in physical theories (which normally occurs in a posteriori or “inductive” ontologies). Atoms for instance, understood as material simples, may be useful models for physical interpretations of the material basis of reality; as ontological entities they are simply faulty constructions. – However, my alternative is strict anti-reductionism, for which I finally will give an outline.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124819383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A PROOF OF NOMINALISM: AN EXERCISE IN SUCCESSFUL REDUCTION IN LOGIC 唯名论的证明:逻辑中成功还原的练习

From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series Pub Date : 2013-11-03 DOI: 10.1515/9783110328875.1

J. Hintikka

引用次数: 5

Definite Descriptions: Language, Logic, and Elimination 明确的描述:语言、逻辑和消去

From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series Pub Date : 2013-11-03 DOI: 10.1515/9783110328875.355

N. Gratzl

引用次数: 0

ON THE BENEFITS OF A REDUCTION OF MODAL PREDICATES TO MODAL OPERATORS 关于将模态谓词简化为模态操作符的好处

From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series Pub Date : 2013-11-03 DOI: 10.1515/9783110328875.323

V. Halbach

引用次数: 6