直觉和道德现实主义

From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series Pub Date : 2013-11-03 DOI:10.1515/9783110328875.163

Alison Hills

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引用次数: 3

摘要

布莱克本认为，道德属性凌驾于自然属性之上，这对道德现实主义者来说是一个问题，因为他们无法充分解释为什么这种关系成立。在本文中，我澄清了对道德现实主义的监督性反对，并评价了道德现实主义者最近对它的回应。

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SUPERVENIENCE AND MORAL REALISM

Blackburn has argued that moral properties supervene on natural properties and that this is a problem for moral realists, because they cannot adequately explain why this relationship holds. In this paper, I clarify the supervenience objection to moral realism and evaluate recent responses to it from moral realists.

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From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series

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