{"title":"规范已经够多了","authors":"J. Fodor","doi":"10.1515/9783110328851.1","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"There is a robust philosophical/psychological tradition, dating at least from the associationism of the British empiricists, that seeks to provide a naturalistic and reductionistic account of the semantic/intensional properties of languages and minds. But the received view among ‘analytic’ philosophers, especially those influenced by Wittgenstein, is that this project can’t be carried out; the semantic/intentional is ‘autonomous’ with respect to naturalistic discourse. This talk will discuss three of the standard grounds for this kind of anti-reductionism. I'll argue that none of them is fully convincing; in particular, that the prospects for a causal reduction of linguistic/mental reference are distinctly better than is generally supposed.","PeriodicalId":317292,"journal":{"name":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"ENOUGH WITH THE NORMS ALREADY\",\"authors\":\"J. Fodor\",\"doi\":\"10.1515/9783110328851.1\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"There is a robust philosophical/psychological tradition, dating at least from the associationism of the British empiricists, that seeks to provide a naturalistic and reductionistic account of the semantic/intensional properties of languages and minds. But the received view among ‘analytic’ philosophers, especially those influenced by Wittgenstein, is that this project can’t be carried out; the semantic/intentional is ‘autonomous’ with respect to naturalistic discourse. This talk will discuss three of the standard grounds for this kind of anti-reductionism. I'll argue that none of them is fully convincing; in particular, that the prospects for a causal reduction of linguistic/mental reference are distinctly better than is generally supposed.\",\"PeriodicalId\":317292,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series\",\"volume\":\"40 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2013-11-07\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110328851.1\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"From ontos verlag: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society - New Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110328851.1","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
There is a robust philosophical/psychological tradition, dating at least from the associationism of the British empiricists, that seeks to provide a naturalistic and reductionistic account of the semantic/intensional properties of languages and minds. But the received view among ‘analytic’ philosophers, especially those influenced by Wittgenstein, is that this project can’t be carried out; the semantic/intentional is ‘autonomous’ with respect to naturalistic discourse. This talk will discuss three of the standard grounds for this kind of anti-reductionism. I'll argue that none of them is fully convincing; in particular, that the prospects for a causal reduction of linguistic/mental reference are distinctly better than is generally supposed.