ERN: SearchPub Date : 2020-02-01DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3566964
Sean Duffy, John Smith
{"title":"An Economist and a Psychologist Form a Line: What Can Imperfect Perception of Length Tell Us About Stochastic Choice?","authors":"Sean Duffy, John Smith","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3566964","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3566964","url":null,"abstract":"Standard choice experiments are hampered by the fact that utility is either unknown or imperfectly measured by experimenters. As a consequence, the inferences available to researchers are limited. By contrast, we design a choice experiment where the objects are valued according to only a single attribute with a continuous measure and we can observe the true preferences of subjects. Subjects have an imperfect perception of the choice objects but can improve the precision of their perception with cognitive effort. Subjects are given a choice set involving several lines of various lengths and are told to select one of them. They strive to select the longest line because they are paid an amount that increases with the length of their choice. Our design allows us to observe the search history, the response times, and make unambiguous conclusions about the optimality of choices. We find a negative relationship between the demanding nature of the choice problems and the likelihood that subjects select the optimal lines. We also find a positive relationship between the demanding nature of the choice problems and the response times. However, we find evidence that suboptimal choices are associated with longer response times than are optimal choices. This result appears to be consistent with Fudenberg, Strack, and Strzalecki (2018). Additionally, our experimental design permits a multinomial discrete choice analysis. Our results suggest that the errors in our data are better described as having a Gumbel distribution rather than a normal distribution. We also observe effects consistent with memory decay and attention. Finally, we find evidence that choices in our experiment exhibit the independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114985718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2020-01-31DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3530526
Michael Choi, Lones Smith
{"title":"Optimal Sequential Search","authors":"Michael Choi, Lones Smith","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3530526","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3530526","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a simple new model of sequential search among finitely many options that fits many economic applications. Each payoff is the sum of a random “known factor” and a “hidden factor”, learned at cost. Weitzman (1979) solved the ex post Pandora’s box problem, given known factors. Ours is the ex ante model for estimation, unconditional on known factors, and so resolves major selection effects. <br><br>1. Search intensifies over time, as one increasingly exercises the current option, recalls a prior one, or quits. If one recalls, earlier options are recalled more often.<br><br>2. We solve a long open question in all search models: which stochastic changes lead one to search longer? Answer: more dispersed payoffs.<br><br>3. The stationary search model poorly approximates search with many options: If the known factor density lacks a thin tail (eg. exponential), the recall chance is boundedly positive with vastly many options.<br><br>4. Search lasts longer with more options. Hence, if low search frictions increase worker applicant pools of firms, vacancy duration increases.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121248976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2019-12-28DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3510680
N. Mammadova
{"title":"Stable Matching Algorithm with Indifferent Preferences in Australian Housing Market: Application of RSD-SR Coupled with TTC","authors":"N. Mammadova","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3510680","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3510680","url":null,"abstract":"If Economics is a vast wardrobe of fashionable theories that hardly ever fit the skeleton of the<br>difficult-to-classify world, then Matching & Mechanism Design is the magical scissors in the<br>invisible hands of the designer who tailor the algorithm garment embellished with strategy<br>proofness, individual rationality, and efficiency in a way to satisfy the current trends of the market. The more strict-preferences revealed by the customer, the more accurate and best-matching look will be snipped by the designer. What if the customers themselves face with the indifferent preferences that make the designer to step beyond the standard economic models and define a never-seen look which works like a charm? The culminating inclination of this paper is to use Random Serial Dictatorship with Squatting Rights harmonized by Top Trading Cycles to achieve STP, Efficiency, and IR as the must-to-have patters of matching algorithm in the design of a look for the tenants with indifferent preferences in Australian Housing Market.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124385647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2019-12-18DOI: 10.25300/misq/2021/16954
Nan Zhang, Heng Xu
{"title":"Reconciling the Paradoxical Findings of Choice Overload Through an Analytical Lens","authors":"Nan Zhang, Heng Xu","doi":"10.25300/misq/2021/16954","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25300/misq/2021/16954","url":null,"abstract":"Too much of a good thing can be harmful. Choice overload, a compelling paradox in consumer psychology, exemplifies this notion with the idea that offering more product options could impede rather than improve consumer satisfaction, even when consumers are free to ignore any available option. After attracting intense interest in the past decades from multiple disciplines, research on choice overload has produced voluminous yet paradoxical findings that are widely perceived as inconsistent even at the meta-analytic level. This paper launches an interdisciplinary inquiry to resolve the inconsistencies on both the conceptual and empirical fronts. Specifically, we identified a surprising butrobust pattern among the existing empirical evidence for the choiceoverload effect and demonstrated through mathematical analysis and extensive simulation studies that the pattern would only likely emerge from one specific type of latent mechanism underlying the moderated choiceoverload effect. The paper discusses the research and practical implications of our findings—namely, the broad promise of analytical meta-analysis (an emerging area for the use of data analytics) and machine learning to address the widely recognized inconsistencies in social and behavioral sciences, and the unique and salient role of the information systems community in developing this new era of meta-analysis.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122187494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2019-11-18DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3489765
R. Greminger
{"title":"Optimal Search and Awareness Expansion","authors":"R. Greminger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3489765","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3489765","url":null,"abstract":"This paper introduces a search problem where a consumer has to first become aware of an alternative, before being able to search it. Initially, the consumer is aware of only a few alternatives. During search, the consumer sequentially decides between searching alternatives he is already aware of and expanding awareness to discover more products. I show that the optimal policy for this search problem is fully characterized by simple reservation values. Moreover, I prove that the purchase outcome of a consumer optimally solving the search problem is equivalent to the consumer simply choosing the product offering the largest value on a predetermined index.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133431836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2019-11-12DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3621481
Itay Kavaler
{"title":"On Uniform Boundedness of Sequential Social Learning","authors":"Itay Kavaler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3621481","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3621481","url":null,"abstract":"In the classical herding model, asymptotic learning refers to situations where individuals eventually take the correct action regardless of their private information. Classical results identify classes of information structures for which such learning occurs. Recent papers have argued that typically, even when asymptotic learning occurs, it takes a very long time. In this paper related questions are referred. The paper studies whether there is a natural family of information structures for which the time it takes until individuals learn is uniformly bounded from above. Indeed, we propose a simple bi-parametric criterion that defines the information structure, and on top of that compute the time by which individuals learn (with high probability) for any pair of parameters. Namely, we identify a family of information structures where individuals learn uniformly fast. The underlying technical tool we deploy is a uniform convergence result on a newly introduced class of `weakly active' supermartingales. This result extends an earlier result of Fudenberg and Levine (1992) on active supermartingales.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134064705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2019-11-12DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3485832
Oghenovo A. Obrimah
{"title":"Absent Agency Problems, Can Conflict Emerge between a Pre-Existing Angel Investor, and an Entering Venture Capitalist?","authors":"Oghenovo A. Obrimah","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3485832","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3485832","url":null,"abstract":"Suppose absence of agency problems in interactions between a representative angel investor who already is invested in a project (a 'pre-existing' angel investor), and a representative `entering' venture capitalist who provides a new infusion of capital into the same project. This study finds that there exist conditions in context of which conflict emerges, and this with possibility of nigh certainty, between the angel investor, and the venture capitalist (VC). Let the 'conditional relative skewness' for a project be evident in the specific location of the project in the distribution of conditional skewness accruing to all projects that are located in the investment opportunity set of the pre-existing angel investor. Conditional on transformation of a project to a higher risk project by an entering VC, the probability of emergence of legitimate conflict is a decreasing function of conditional relative skewness. Refer to this probability as the 'risk-induced probability of conflict'. The risk-induced probability of conflict increases with the extent to which the entering VC is characterized by either of preference for lotteries, or 'information myopia', and asymptotically approaches one. The general equilibrium model shows maintenance of the risk profile that was established prior to participation of the VC ensures non-emergence of conflict between the entering VC, and the pre-existing angel investor.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115378037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2019-10-25DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3480877
Chenshuo Sun, Z. Shi, Xiao Liu, A. Ghose, Xueying Li, Feiyu Xiong
{"title":"The Effect of Voice AI on Consumer Purchase and Search Behavior","authors":"Chenshuo Sun, Z. Shi, Xiao Liu, A. Ghose, Xueying Li, Feiyu Xiong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3480877","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3480877","url":null,"abstract":"Voice-activated shopping devices (voice AI), such as Amazon’s Alexa or Alibaba’s Tmall Genie, as a new channel for shopping, are gaining popularity among consumers worldwide. It has become important, therefore, to understand how voice AI adoption affects consumer shopping behaviors. In this paper, we use large-scale archival data containing consumer-level browsing and purchase records from one of the world’s largest online retailer, Alibaba, who has developed and launched its own voice AI product called Tmall Genie to empirically identify our results. The results show that consumers on average spend 23% more and browse 11% more as a result of adopting the voice AI, corresponding to approximately US$ 613 million increase in sales revenue and 12.7 billion more pageviews every year. The effect on purchase is stronger for younger consumers and male, whereas the effect on browsing is more salient for elder consumers and female. We also find that although the positive effect on purchases and pageviews shrink over time, it still remains significant and large after eight weeks. Moreover, the voice channel does not cannibalize other purchase channels (PC and mobile); rather, it has a positive spillover effect on the mobile channel. Lastly, the impact of voice AI adoption on purchase is stronger for products that do not require active search or comparison, such as product categories with low substitutability or high purchase frequency. To summarize, we demonstrate that the adoption of voice AI has enhanced the growth of the digital sales market in the world’s largest e-commerce platform. The findings provide useful implications for both e-commerce companies and businesses that harness voice-assisted shopping.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130585234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2019-10-23DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3474643
Mohamed Mostagir, A. Ozdaglar, James Siderius
{"title":"When is Society Susceptible to Manipulation?","authors":"Mohamed Mostagir, A. Ozdaglar, James Siderius","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3474643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3474643","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a social learning model where agents learn about an underlying state of the world from individual observations as well as from exchanging information with each other. A principal (e.g., a firm or a government) interferes with the learning process in order to manipulate the beliefs of the agents. By utilizing the same forces that give rise to the “wisdom of the crowd” phenomenon, the principal can get the agents to take an action that is not necessarily optimal for them but is in the principal’s best interest. We characterize the social norms and network structures that are susceptible to this kind of manipulation and derive conditions under which a social network is impervious and cannot be manipulated. In the process, we develop a new centrality measure and describe how our model offers insights into designing networks that are resistant to manipulation. This paper was accepted by Gabriel Weintraub, revenue management and market analytics.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131155104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2019-10-20DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3472656
Oghenovo A. Obrimah
{"title":"Absent Imposition of 'Boundary Rationality Conditions', Can Evidence for Pricing of Behavioral Biases of Economic Agents Be Robust?","authors":"Oghenovo A. Obrimah","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3472656","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3472656","url":null,"abstract":"This study unambiguously demonstrates that, absent independent establishment of boundary rationality conditions for stock prices, behavioral axioms, such as overconfidence, overreaction, underreaction, and attribution bias cannot be robustly applied to rationalization of market phenomena that are generated by rational economic agents. This general equilibrium outcome is predicated on predictions of a formal theoretical model. In the model, whenever behavioral biases feasibly can influence market returns, qualitatively, such effects cannot be distinguished from presence, in stock markets, of mixtures of 'sophisticated' and 'naive' economic agents. In this respect, the model establishes that any of, rational components of stock prices, information variables that support presence of mixtures of sophisticated and naive agents within stock markets, or behavioral biases, have feasibility of generation of pattern of stock return momentum and reversals. An important side result is the prediction that behavioral axioms, such as overreaction, and underreaction, which of necessity must have opposite effects on prices, cannot subsist contemporaneously within dichotomous groupings of rational economic agents who invest in stock markets.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114677487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}