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Industry-optimal Information in the Search Market 搜索市场中的行业最优信息
ERN: Search Pub Date : 2021-10-03 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3935299
Ju Hu
{"title":"Industry-optimal Information in the Search Market","authors":"Ju Hu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3935299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3935299","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the welfare effects of information in a sequential consumer search environment. Consumers search in the market and observe a noisy signal about the match value upon being matched with a firm, based on which they make their purchasing decisions. We construct the class of conditional unit-elastic demand signal distributions such that every equilibrium that can possibly arise under a feasible signal distribution can be achieved by a signal distribution within this class, based on which we investigate the industry-optimal information in this market. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that lower search cost promotes competition and reduces industry surplus, we find that the optimal industry surplus is strictly increasing as the search cost decreases. We also characterize the industry-optimal signal distribution for a large class of value distributions.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129932633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Mobile App Adoption and Its Differential Impact on Consumer Shopping Behavior 移动应用的采用及其对消费者购物行为的不同影响
ERN: Search Pub Date : 2021-09-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3727035
Sulin Ba, Shu He, Shun-Yang Lee
{"title":"Mobile App Adoption and Its Differential Impact on Consumer Shopping Behavior","authors":"Sulin Ba, Shu He, Shun-Yang Lee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3727035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3727035","url":null,"abstract":"The mobile application (app) market is one of the fastest growing markets in recent years. In this study, we investigate how app adoption changes customers’ hotel booking behaviors using a dataset of around 16,000 randomly selected customers’ hotel booking and stay information from one of the largest hotel chains in China. Our analyses find that customer purchase frequency and total sales increased after app adoption. Additional investigation shows that customers’ search behaviors also evolved post-adoption. Specifically, customers tended to book rooms earlier and select options with less discount, which indicates that app users reduced their search intensity after app adoption. We further investigate the differential impact of mobile app adoption on sales, taking into account consumer heterogeneity in price sensitivity and purchase frequency. We find that both price sensitive and insensitive customers increased the number of bookings, and they tended to book earlier post-adoption. Furthermore, price sensitive customers on average booked more expensive rooms with less discount after app adoption, suggesting that these customers likely decreased their search effort. In terms of hotel stay frequency, app adoption increased low-frequency customers’ purchase frequency but did not have any significant effect on high-frequency customers. These analyses provide a more nuanced view of how mobile apps change consumer search and purchase behaviors. Our findings have important managerial implications. With a better understanding of customer behaviors, firms can provide incentives to customers who are more likely to be affected by mobile app adoption.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127222471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Does Airbnb Reduce Matching Frictions in the Housing Market? Airbnb能减少住房市场的配对摩擦吗?
ERN: Search Pub Date : 2021-09-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3923826
Abdollah Farhoodi, Nazanin Khazra, P. Christensen
{"title":"Does Airbnb Reduce Matching Frictions in the Housing Market?","authors":"Abdollah Farhoodi, Nazanin Khazra, P. Christensen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3923826","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3923826","url":null,"abstract":"There is growing concern about the impact of the home-sharing markets on housing affordability, yet the underlying mechanisms are not well-studied. We use a theoretical model to provide key results on the mechanisms through which home-sharing can improve the quality of matches between buyers and sellers in the housing market. We then test these predictions empirically using daily Airbnb data for the entire U.S. and a novel shift-share approach. We find that an increase in Airbnb increases house prices, reduces total sales, increases for-sales inventory, increases sellers' time on the market, and reduces the probability of selling a house. The empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that Airbnb has reduced matching frictions in the housing market. We then examine heterogeneous responses to Airbnb using Generalized Random Forest (GRF). Consistent with our theoretical model, results from the GRF model indicate that locations with a less elastic housing supply respond more to the Airbnb growth.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"115 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122745090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
A Model of Retail Banking and the Deposits Channel of Monetary Policy 零售银行模式与货币政策存款渠道
ERN: Search Pub Date : 2021-08-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3902336
Michael Choi, G. Rocheteau
{"title":"A Model of Retail Banking and the Deposits Channel of Monetary Policy","authors":"Michael Choi, G. Rocheteau","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3902336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3902336","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a dynamic, search-theoretic model of bank deposit and loan markets where relationships are bilateral, the demand for liquid assets is microfounded, and consumers are privately informed about their liquidity needs. As the policy rate rises, the deposit spread widens, and aggregate deposits shrink, in accordance with the deposits channel documented in Drechsler et al. (2017). We investigate how the transmission mechanism is affected by market structure and FinTech advances, e.g., online banking, big data. The relation between transmission and market power depends on the source of variation of the latter.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129352297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Optional Intermediaries and Pricing Restraints 可选中介和定价限制
ERN: Search Pub Date : 2021-07-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3825163
Chang Liu, Fengshi Niu, Alexander White
{"title":"Optional Intermediaries and Pricing Restraints","authors":"Chang Liu, Fengshi Niu, Alexander White","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3825163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3825163","url":null,"abstract":"When a platform is an optional intermediary, should it require price coherence, i.e., that sellers charge the same price to the platform’s users as they charge their direct customers? If the platform does this, how will it affect consumers’ and overall welfare? In a model leveraging insight from the study of third-degree price discrimination, we show that, when demand has flexible curvature, a markup-versus-volume tradeoff arises that governs the platform’s choice. When sellers’ profits are concave enough, the platform prefers to let them charge separate prices. However, when it does require price coherence, there is a drawing-in effect, geared towards low-valuation platform users, which can make this policy surprisingly appealing for consumers.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124900094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The Microstructure of the U.S. Housing Market: Evidence from Millions of Bargaining Interactions 美国住房市场的微观结构:来自数百万讨价还价互动的证据
ERN: Search Pub Date : 2021-07-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3727150
Haaris Mateen, Franklin Qian, Ye Zhang
{"title":"The Microstructure of the U.S. Housing Market: Evidence from Millions of Bargaining Interactions","authors":"Haaris Mateen, Franklin Qian, Ye Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3727150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3727150","url":null,"abstract":"We study the microstructure of the U.S. housing market using a novel data set comprising housing search and bargaining behavior for millions of interactions between sellers and buyers. We first establish a number of stylized facts, the most prominent being a nearly 50--50 split between houses that sold below final listing price and those that sold above final listing price. Second, we compare observed behavior with predictions from a large theoretical housing literature. Many predictions on the relationship between sales price, time on the market, listing price and atypicality are borne out in the data. However, existing models do not adequately explain the spread of the sales price around the final listing price. Using a modeling strategy that treats listing price changes as revisions of expectations about the sales price, we find sellers under-react to information shocks in estimating the sales price. Last, we find that the bargaining outcomes are influenced by previously undocumented buyers' bid characteristics, e.g., financing contingencies and escalation clauses, that signal a buyer's ability to complete or expedite the transaction. This suggests an important role for buyer bid characteristics, which are not explained by existing theories, in affecting bargaining power and surplus allocation in bilateral bargaining in housing transactions.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"1987 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130712586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Market Microstructure and Informational Efficiency 市场微观结构与信息效率
ERN: Search Pub Date : 2021-06-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3493194
Rafael R. Guthmann, Brian C. Albrecht
{"title":"Market Microstructure and Informational Efficiency","authors":"Rafael R. Guthmann, Brian C. Albrecht","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3493194","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3493194","url":null,"abstract":"The competitive market is informationally efficient; people only need to know prices to implement a competitive allocation. However, the standard formulation of competition neglects any underlying market microstructure; prices, which provide the necessary information, are exogenous. This paper studies the informational efficiency of two explicit market microstructures: search and market-makers. First, we prove that, compared to the competitive equilibrium, a large search economy requires an infinitely larger message space. Second, we prove that an economy with market-makers only needs one more dimension than the competitive process, making it second-best in terms of information but with an explicit model of decentralized price-formation.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124996364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Finding Out Who You Are: A Self-exploration View of Education 发现你是谁:教育观的自我探索
ERN: Search Pub Date : 2021-06-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3861678
Sungmin Park
{"title":"Finding Out Who You Are: A Self-exploration View of Education","authors":"Sungmin Park","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3861678","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3861678","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the value and optimal design of education when the main function of schooling is neither the human capital gain nor signaling but self-exploration. Students start school with different beliefs about their own states: whether they are talented hunters or talented gatherers. Education is a statistical experiment through which students exert effort and become more informed about themselves. In this setting, I find that education is valuable to students because it improves their chances of making the optimal choice of specialization. However, only those sufficiently uncertain about themselves find self-exploration valuable enough to exert the necessary effort. The optimal design of education requires that its information structure has greater power in rejecting the state for which the participating students have comparative disadvantage. This result suggests that it may be counterproductive to design education to persuade students into careers with higher observed productivity.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"122 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123654277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Robust Naïve Learning in Social Networks 稳健Naïve社交网络中的学习
ERN: Search Pub Date : 2021-02-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3791413
Gideon Amir, Itai Arieli, Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, R. Peretz
{"title":"Robust Naïve Learning in Social Networks","authors":"Gideon Amir, Itai Arieli, Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, R. Peretz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3791413","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3791413","url":null,"abstract":"We study a model of opinion exchange in social networks where a state of the world is realized and every agent receives a zero-mean noisy signal of the realized state. It is known from Golub and Jackson that under DeGroot cite{degroot1974reaching} dynamics agents reach a consensus that is close to the state of the world when the network is large. The DeGroot dynamics, however, is highly non-robust and the presence of a single ``stubborn agent'' that does not adhere to the updating rule can sway the public consensus to any other value. We introduce a variant of DeGroot dynamics that we call 1/m-DeGroot. 1/m-DeGroot dynamics approximates standard DeGroot dynamics to the nearest rational number with m as its denominator and like the DeGroot dynamics it is Markovian and stationary. We show that in contrast to standard DeGroot dynamics, 1/m-DeGroot dynamics is highly robust both to the presence of stubborn agents and to certain types of misspecifications.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114080869","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Motivated Beliefs in Coordination Games 协作游戏中的动机信念
ERN: Search Pub Date : 2021-02-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3662734
Snehal Banerjee, Jesse Davis, Naveen Gondhi
{"title":"Motivated Beliefs in Coordination Games","authors":"Snehal Banerjee, Jesse Davis, Naveen Gondhi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3662734","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3662734","url":null,"abstract":"We characterize how wishful thinking affects the interpretation of information in economies with strategic and external effects. While players always choose to exhibit overconfidence in private information, their interpretation of public information depends on how non-fundamental volatility affects payoffs. When volatility increases payoffs, players may endogenously disagree: some under-react to public news, while others overreact. In contrast to rational expectations, public information can increase dispersion in actions while private information can increase aggregate volatility. Our analysis has novel implications for the social value of information and demonstrates how endogenous beliefs can reconcile recent evidence on forecast revisions and information rigidities.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"109 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124065766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
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