ERN: SearchPub Date : 2016-12-07DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2810329
Bobby Kleinberg, Bo Waggoner, E. Weyl
{"title":"An Online Appendix to 'Descending Price Optimally Coordinates Search'","authors":"Bobby Kleinberg, Bo Waggoner, E. Weyl","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2810329","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2810329","url":null,"abstract":"This online appendix accompanies the paper “Descending Price Optimally Coordinates Search” by the same authors. The main paper is available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2753858.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"335 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123775495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2016-11-19DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2913916
A. Kolotilin, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Andriy Zapechelnyuk, Ming Li
{"title":"Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver","authors":"A. Kolotilin, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Andriy Zapechelnyuk, Ming Li","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2913916","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2913916","url":null,"abstract":"Kolotilin acknowledges financial support from the Australian Research Council. Zapechelnyuk acknowledges financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council (grant no. ES/N01829X/1)","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132503880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2016-11-10DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2867505
Gennaro Bernile, Mengyao Kang
{"title":"Learning to Negotiate Takeovers? The Role of Target CEO Experience","authors":"Gennaro Bernile, Mengyao Kang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2867505","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2867505","url":null,"abstract":"Does a CEO’s experience with mergers matter when her firm becomes a takeover target? We find that shareholders receive higher premiums when their CEO has experience. The evidence suggests this is due to learning rather than innate skills or selection. Consistent with superior negotiation of salient features of takeover offers, experienced target CEOs obtain either safer cash payments or higher premiums as the fraction of cash in the offer decreases. These benefits do not come at the cost of other contractual concessions or inefficiencies in takeover negotiations. Overall, M&A experience is valuable when the CEO’s firm becomes a takeover target.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115150718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2016-10-20DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2924656
Alok Johri, Muhebullah Karimzada
{"title":"Learning Efficiency Shocks, Knowledge Capital and the Business Cycle: A Bayesian Evaluation","authors":"Alok Johri, Muhebullah Karimzada","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2924656","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2924656","url":null,"abstract":"We incorporate shocks to the efficiency with which firms learn from production activity and accumulate knowledge into an otherwise standard real DSGE model with imperfect competition. Using real aggregate data and Bayesian inference techniques, we find that learning efficiency shocks are an important source of observed variation in the growth rate of aggregate output, investment, consumption and especially hours worked in post-war US data. The estimated shock processes suggest much less exogenous variation in preferences and total factor productivity are needed by our model to account for the joint dynamics of consumption and hours. This occurs because learning efficiency shocks induce shifts in labour demand uncorrelated with current TFP, a role usually played by preference shocks. At the same time, knowledge capital acts like an endogenous source of productivity variation in the model. Measures of model fit prefer the specification with learning efficiency shocks.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133430956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2016-10-14DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2830171
Sandro Ambuehl
{"title":"An Offer You Can't Refuse? Incentives Change What We Believe","authors":"Sandro Ambuehl","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2830171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2830171","url":null,"abstract":"Much of economics assumes that higher incentives increase participation in a transaction only because they exceed more people’s reservation price. This paper shows theoretically and experimentally that when information about the consequences is costly, higher incentives also change reservation prices to further increase participation. A higher incentive makes people gather information in a way that is more favorable to participation—as if they were persuading themselves to participate. Hence, incentives change not only what people choose, but also what they believe their choices entail. This result informs the debate about laws around the world that severely restrict incentives for transactions such as organ donation, surrogate motherhood, human egg donation, and medical trial participation. It helps bridge a gap between economists on the one hand and the policy makers and ethicists on the other.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"99 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125236998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2016-10-09DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2770719
Kee-Youn Kang
{"title":"Counterfeiting, Screening and Government Policy","authors":"Kee-Youn Kang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2770719","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2770719","url":null,"abstract":"We construct a search theoretic model of money in which counterfeit money can be produced at a cost, but agents can screen for fake money, also at a cost. Counterfeiting can occur in equilibrium when both costs and the inflation rate are sufficiently low. Optimal monetary policy is the Friedman rule. However, the rationale for the Friedman rule in an economy with circulation of counterfeit money differs from the conventional mechanism that holds in the model when counterfeiting does not occur. We also study optimal anti-counterfeiting policy that determines the counterfeiting cost and the screening cost.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128933803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2016-10-01DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2864563
Ing-Haw Cheng, Alice Hsiaw
{"title":"Distrust in Experts and the Origins of Disagreement","authors":"Ing-Haw Cheng, Alice Hsiaw","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2864563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2864563","url":null,"abstract":"Disagreements about substance and expert credibility often go hand-in-hand and are hard to resolve, even when people share common information, on a wide range of issues ranging from economics, climate change, to medicine. We argue that a learning bias helps explain disagreement in environments such as these where both the state of the world and the credibility of information sources (experts) are uncertain. Individuals with our learning bias overinterpret how much they can learn about two sources of uncertainty from one signal, leading them to over-infer expert quality. People who encounter information or experts in different order disagree about substance because they endogenously disagree about the credibility of each others' experts. Disagreement persists because first impressions about experts have long-lived influences on beliefs about the state. These effects arise even though agents share common priors, information, and biases, providing a theory for the origins of disagreement.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114329647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2016-09-30DOI: 10.5709/CE.1897-9254.215
L. Mastrangelo, Esther Calderón-Monge, Pilar Huerta-Zavala
{"title":"Franchise Fairs: A Relevant Signal in Franchise Choice in Social Activity","authors":"L. Mastrangelo, Esther Calderón-Monge, Pilar Huerta-Zavala","doi":"10.5709/CE.1897-9254.215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5709/CE.1897-9254.215","url":null,"abstract":"Potential franchisees encounter difficulties in gaining knowledge about a franchise before embarking on their first start-up venture. For this reason, it is necessary to research which information signals help potential franchisees choose the franchise chains with which they wish to enter into business. Working within the framework of signaling theory, this study’s aim is to analyze the relationship between franchise choice and brand, price and participation in franchise fairs. The dynamic signaling model deployed to achieve the study´s aim draws on panel data methodology. This methodology allows us to analyze franchise chains over the period in which their parent franchises were using signaling to reveal information about their quality to potential franchisees. The results show that franchise fairs and up-front entry fees influence franchisee´s decisions. Therefore, it is concluded that potential franchisees prefer to garner information directly from franchise fairs, as opposed to heeding the other signals under study, and that when macroeconomic variables are exerting a strong influence on potential franchisees, up-front entry fees also constitute a signal that they consider. Finally, the managerial implications of the study are that franchise chains seeking franchisees should participate in franchise fairs to ensure that they are among the chosen franchises. Additionally, a franchisor should appropriately manage up-front entry fees as a signal, especially during periods of economic turmoil and recession.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127135265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2016-08-15DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2832004
Georg von Graevenitz, C. Helmers, V. Millot, Oliver D N Turnbull
{"title":"Does Online Search Predict Sales? Evidence from Big Data for Car Markets in Germany and the UK","authors":"Georg von Graevenitz, C. Helmers, V. Millot, Oliver D N Turnbull","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2832004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2832004","url":null,"abstract":"We use online search data to predict car sales in the German and UK automobile industries. Search data subsume several distinct search motives, which are not separately observable. We develop a model linking search motives to observable search data and sales. The model shows that predictions of sales relying on observable search data as a proxy for prepurchase search will be biased. We show how to remove the biases and estimate the effect of pre-purchase search on sales. To assist identification of this effect, we use the introduction of scrappage subsidies for cars in 2008/2009 as a quasi-natural experiment. We also show that online search data are (i) highly persistent over time, (ii) potentially subject to permanent shocks, and (iii) correlated across products, but to different extent. We address these challenges to estimation and inference by using recent econometric methods for large N, large T panels.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"212 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130278289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2016-04-01DOI: 10.1093/RESTUD/RDV045
C. Dustmann, A. Glitz, Uta Schönberg
{"title":"Referral-Based Job Search Networks","authors":"C. Dustmann, A. Glitz, Uta Schönberg","doi":"10.1093/RESTUD/RDV045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/RESTUD/RDV045","url":null,"abstract":"This article derives novel testable implications of referral-based job search networks in which employees provide employers with information about potential new hires that they otherwise would not have. Using comprehensive matched employer–employee data covering the entire workforce in one large metropolitan labour market combined with unique survey data linked to administrative records, we provide evidence that workers earn higher wages and are less inclined to leave their firms if they have obtained their job through a referral. These effects are particularly strong at the beginning of the employment relationship and decline with tenure in the firm, suggesting that firms and workers learn about workers' productivity over time. Overall, our findings imply that job search networks help to reduce informational deficiencies in the labour market and lead to productivity gains for workers and firms.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124226432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}