Franchise Fairs: A Relevant Signal in Franchise Choice in Social Activity

L. Mastrangelo, Esther Calderón-Monge, Pilar Huerta-Zavala
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Potential franchisees encounter difficulties in gaining knowledge about a franchise before embarking on their first start-up venture. For this reason, it is necessary to research which information signals help potential franchisees choose the franchise chains with which they wish to enter into business. Working within the framework of signaling theory, this study’s aim is to analyze the relationship between franchise choice and brand, price and participation in franchise fairs. The dynamic signaling model deployed to achieve the study´s aim draws on panel data methodology. This methodology allows us to analyze franchise chains over the period in which their parent franchises were using signaling to reveal information about their quality to potential franchisees. The results show that franchise fairs and up-front entry fees influence franchisee´s decisions. Therefore, it is concluded that potential franchisees prefer to garner information directly from franchise fairs, as opposed to heeding the other signals under study, and that when macroeconomic variables are exerting a strong influence on potential franchisees, up-front entry fees also constitute a signal that they consider. Finally, the managerial implications of the study are that franchise chains seeking franchisees should participate in franchise fairs to ensure that they are among the chosen franchises. Additionally, a franchisor should appropriately manage up-front entry fees as a signal, especially during periods of economic turmoil and recession.
特许经营交易会:社会活动中特许经营选择的相关信号
潜在的特许经营商在开始他们的第一次创业之前,在获得特许经营知识方面遇到了困难。因此,有必要研究哪些信息信号可以帮助潜在的特许经营者选择他们希望开展业务的特许经营连锁店。在信号理论的框架下,本研究的目的是分析特许经营选择与品牌、价格和特许经营交易会的参与之间的关系。为实现研究目标而部署的动态信号模型借鉴了面板数据方法。这种方法使我们能够分析特许经营连锁店在其母公司特许经营使用信号向潜在加盟商透露其质量信息期间的情况。结果表明,特许经营交易会和预支入会费影响加盟商的决策。因此,我们得出的结论是,潜在的特许经营商更愿意直接从特许经销会中获取信息,而不是关注正在研究的其他信号。当宏观经济变量对潜在的特许经营商产生强烈影响时,预付入场费也构成了他们考虑的一个信号。最后,本研究对管理的启示是,寻求加盟商的特许经营连锁店应该参加特许经营博览会,以确保他们是被选中的特许经营企业之一。此外,特许人应适当管理预付费,将其作为一种信号,尤其是在经济动荡和衰退时期。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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