ERN: SearchPub Date : 2019-09-14DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3374847
Georgy Artemov
{"title":"Assignment Mechanisms: Common Preferences and Information Acquisition","authors":"Georgy Artemov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3374847","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3374847","url":null,"abstract":"I study costly information acquisition in a two-sided matching problem, such as matching applicants to schools. Applicant's utility is a sum of common and idiosyncratic components. The idiosyncratic component is unknown to applicants but can be learned at a cost. When applicants are assigned using an ordinal strategy-proof mechanism, too few acquire information, generating a significant welfare loss. Affirmative action and other realistic policies may lead to a Pareto improvement. As incentives to acquire information differ across mechanisms, ignoring such incentives may lead to incorrect welfare assessments, for example, in comparing a popular Immediate Assignment and an ordinal strategy-proof mechanism.<br>","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126365956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2019-07-31DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3231378
C. Cao, David Gempesaw, Timothy T. Simin
{"title":"Information Choice, Uncertainty, and Expected Returns","authors":"C. Cao, David Gempesaw, Timothy T. Simin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3231378","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3231378","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We investigate how information choices affect equity returns and risk. Building on an existing theoretical model of information and investment choice, we estimate a learning index that reflects the expected benefits of learning about an asset. High learning index stocks have lower future returns and risk compared to low learning index stocks. Analysis of a conditional asset pricing model, long-run patterns in returns and volatilities, other measures of information flow, and the information environment surrounding earnings announcements reinforce our interpretation of the learning index. Our findings support the model’s predictions and illustrate a novel empirical measure of investor learning.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129003239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2019-07-22DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3434339
P. Landry
{"title":"Keywords, Limited Consideration, and Organic Product Listings: A Duopoly Model","authors":"P. Landry","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3434339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3434339","url":null,"abstract":"This paper theoretically investigates the competitive effects of digital keyword search (DKS) in an organic (unsponsored) search market. In the model, sellers can decide which keyword(s) to include in their product listings (a common, but normally unmodeled real-world decision), while consumers only consider buying from sellers whose listings are revealed by their searched keyword(s). The analysis focuses on two structural changes brought about by DKS, wider listing and wider querying, which refer (respectively) to the ways in which DKS makes it easier for sellers to index their listings to multiple keywords and for consumers to search multiple keywords. According to the analysis, wider listing expands the market, lowers prices, and increases consumer surplus, with ambiguous effects on profits. “Slightly wider” querying reinforces these effects, but “much wider” querying can lead sellers to strategically omit a relevant keyword from their listing, undoing the effects of wider listing on sales, prices, consumer surplus, and profits. New implications concerning the interaction of sellers’ pricing and keyword-selection decisions, their dependence on various platform-specific characteristics, and the effects of “autocategorization” algorithms are also addressed.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131149594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2019-07-18DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3422019
Janina Kleinknecht, Daniel Würtenberger
{"title":"Short-Term Effects of Managerial Turnover on Performance and Effort: Evidence from the German Bundesliga","authors":"Janina Kleinknecht, Daniel Würtenberger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3422019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3422019","url":null,"abstract":"Current research on (managerial) turnover mainly focuses on performance changes and is ambiguous with respect to the results. Yet, the literature agrees that short-term performance changes are induced by opposing effects. Specifically, a turnover leads to an information loss that might influence the staffing of positions negatively and incentives to exhibit effort positively. In order to identify the predominant effect and how it affects overall short-term performance, we employ a new measure of effort and different degrees of information loss. Therefore, we analyse within-season coach turnovers of professional soccer teams in the German Bundesliga, using a generalized version of the synthetic control method. In order to take into account low and high information loss, we differentiate between insider and outsider successors. Insiders might staff positions better while outsiders might be able to elicit higher effort. Our results are in line with these expectations: a turnover leads to an increase in players' effort, but only in case of an outsider coach, both, insider and outsider, improve performance.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125932728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2019-07-01DOI: 10.3386/W26065
Rute Martins Caeiro
{"title":"From Learning to Doing: Diffusion of Agricultural Innovations in Guinea-Bissau","authors":"Rute Martins Caeiro","doi":"10.3386/W26065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W26065","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the role of social networks in the diffusion of knowledge and adoption of cultivation techniques, from trainees to the wider community, in the context of an extension project in Guinea-Bissau. In order to test for social learning, we exploit a detailed census of households and social connections across different dimensions. More precisely, we make use of a village photo directory in order to obtain a comprehensive and fully mapped social network dataset. We find evidence that agricultural information spreads across networks from project participants to non-participants, with different networks having different importance. The most relevant connection is found to be between the network of people from which individuals would ‘borrow money’. We are also able to disentangle the relative importance of weak and strong ties: in our context, weak ties are as important in the diffusion of agricultural knowledge as strong ties. Despite positive diffusion effects in knowledge, we found limited evidence of network effects in adoption behavior. Finally, using longitudinal network data, we document improvements in the network position of treated farmers over time.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121050479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2019-05-06DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3203973
J. Chung, Pradeep K. Chintagunta, S. Misra
{"title":"Estimation of Sequential Search Model","authors":"J. Chung, Pradeep K. Chintagunta, S. Misra","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3203973","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3203973","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a new likelihood-based estimation method for the sequential search model. By allowing search costs to be heterogeneous across consumers and products, we can directly compute the joint probability of the search sequence and the purchase decision when consumers are searching for the idiosyncratic preference shocks in their utility functions. Under this procedure, one recursively makes random draws for each dimension that requires numerical integration to simulate the probabilities associated with the purchase decision and the search sequence under the sequential search algorithm. We then present details from an extensive simulation study that compares the proposed approach with existing estimation methods recently used for sequential search model estimation, viz., the kernel-smoothed frequency simulator (KSFS) and the crude frequency simulator (CFS). In the empirical application, we apply the proposed method to the Expedia dataset from Kaggle which has previously been analyzed using the KSFS estimator and the assumption of homogeneous search costs. We demonstrate that the proposed method has a better predictive performance associated with differences in the estimated effects of various drivers of clicks and purchases, and highlight the importance of the heterogeneous search costs assumption even when KSFS is used to estimate the sequential search model. Lastly, from a managerial perspective, we show that sorting products by their expected utilities can enhance consumer welfare and increase the number of transactions.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127984411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2019-04-17DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3009125
M. Delis, Panagiotis K. Staikouras, C. Tsoumas
{"title":"Supervisory Enforcement Actions and Bank Deposits","authors":"M. Delis, Panagiotis K. Staikouras, C. Tsoumas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3009125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3009125","url":null,"abstract":"We assess the effect of formal enforcement actions against banks for safety and soundness reasons on punished banks’ deposits, and then examine whether this effect is caused by demand-side or supply-side forces. To this end, we use hand-collected data on enforcement actions, and bank-quarter data on deposits and other bank characteristics from 2000 through 2014. Our results show that total deposits at punished banks decrease by 8.5% in the post-enforcement year, with uninsured deposits declining by 14.5% and insured deposits falling by 7.4%. We also find that the deposit decline is predominantly caused by demand-side forces, that is, by punished banks’ decision to curtail the asset side of their balance sheet.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128714039","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2019-04-12DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3370851
Tian Li, Hongtao Zhang
{"title":"Sharing Demand Information Under Bounded Wholesale Pricing","authors":"Tian Li, Hongtao Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3370851","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3370851","url":null,"abstract":"The extant research on supply chain information sharing under wholesale pricing often assumes a model where the manufacturer can unilaterally set any wholesale price, and the retailer decides retail quantity or price while taking the wholesale price as given. Whereas this model may actually reflect the relative market power in some situations, it misses out on certain win-win opportunities that could arise from information sharing. When the demand information shared by the retailer is used by the manufacturer to set a more advantageous wholesale price for its own benefit only, the double marginalization effect will often be exacerbated to the detriment of the retailer and even to the supply chain as a whole. Anticipating this consequence, the retailer will cautiously keep its information within its own realm of operations and forego the potential improvement that could result from sharing information with the upstream manufacturer. We propose and analyze a new wholesale pricing mechanism that promotes information sharing between a relatively weaker retailer and a more powerful manufacturer such that both parties become better off. The key feature of the new mechanism is an extra stage of interaction, which happens before the retailer's information sharing decision: at the very outset the manufacturer voluntarily proposes an upper bound and promises not to raise the wholesale price above this bound if the retailer agrees to share information. We show why this new mechanism can be a win-win for a single supply chain and for competing channels.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126788627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2019-03-11DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2932441
Qi Li
{"title":"Securitization and Liquidity Creation in Markets with Adverse Selection","authors":"Qi Li","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2932441","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2932441","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides an information-based theory of tranching, a practice in which sellers slice a financial asset into debt securities with different seniority. I use the price posting framework to analyze asset-backed security markets with adverse selection and find that tranching is a robust equilibrium outcome. Tranching decomposes the asset into “information insensitive” and “information sensitive” components. The expected cash flow of the information insensitive component is independent of the seller's private signal, whereas the expected cash flow of the information sensitive component varies with the signal. When buyers are restricted to trade shares of assets, they have to purchase both components proportionally. Tranching, however, allows buyers to disproportionately purchase the information insensitive component. As a result, buyers are less concerned about adverse selection, and total trading volume in the market increases. My model also generates testable predictions on the liquidity of individual debt securities: the selling probability of a debt security increases in its seniority, which is observable to buyers, yet decreases with its performance, which is ex-ante unobservable to buyers; these predictions are supported by my empirical analysis of the non-agency MBS market.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114891797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2019-01-27DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3335872
Chloe Lee, Wen Long, María J. Luengo‐Prado, Bent E. Sørensen
{"title":"Selective Bargain Hunting. A Concise Test of Rational Consumer Search","authors":"Chloe Lee, Wen Long, María J. Luengo‐Prado, Bent E. Sørensen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3335872","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3335872","url":null,"abstract":"A model of the allocation of time between work, leisure, and price-search for different goods predicts that consumers spend relatively more time searching for better prices of goods of which they consume relatively more. Using scanner data, we confirm empirically that consumers pay lower (higher) prices for goods that they buy more (less) of than other consumers.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125890412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}