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Search and Learning at a Daily Deals Website 在每日交易网站搜索和学习
ERN: Search Pub Date : 2019-01-19 DOI: 10.1287/MKSC.2019.1156
M. Hu, C. Dang, Pradeep K. Chintagunta
{"title":"Search and Learning at a Daily Deals Website","authors":"M. Hu, C. Dang, Pradeep K. Chintagunta","doi":"10.1287/MKSC.2019.1156","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/MKSC.2019.1156","url":null,"abstract":"We formulate a dynamic model of search and Dirichlet learning to explain consumer behavior at a daily deal website.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127881880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 25
Entrepreneurship, Labor Market Mobility and the Role of Entrepreneurial Insurance 创业、劳动力市场流动性和创业保险的作用
ERN: Search Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3692628
Alexandre Gaillard, Sumudu Kankanamge
{"title":"Entrepreneurship, Labor Market Mobility and the Role of Entrepreneurial Insurance","authors":"Alexandre Gaillard, Sumudu Kankanamge","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3692628","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3692628","url":null,"abstract":"This paper introduces a quantitative model with risky entrepreneurship and search frictions matching the occupational flows between entrepreneurship, paid-employment, and unemployment. We account for the general shape of these flows and key entrepreneurial and labor market features based mostly on micro CPS and SCF data. Using this model, we show that an insurance providing Self-Employment Assistance (SEA) policy mitigates the bias disfavoring self-employment inherent in unemployment insurance programs. Moreover, ability-dependent SEA programs select more productive and wealthier new entrepreneurs out of unemployment. Finally, we show that the interaction between UI design and SEA programs has a significant impact on entrepreneurship.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123083414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Social Risk and Portfolio Choice 社会风险与投资组合选择
ERN: Search Pub Date : 2018-12-04 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2863351
William J. Bazley, Yosef Bonaparte, George M. Korniotis, Alok Kumar
{"title":"Social Risk and Portfolio Choice","authors":"William J. Bazley, Yosef Bonaparte, George M. Korniotis, Alok Kumar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2863351","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2863351","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines whether social discrimination affects the risk perceptions and, subsequently, the investment decisions of individual investors. We conjecture that minority groups such as gays/lesbians, African Americans, and women, who are more likely to experience discrimination, over-estimate their risk exposures (i.e., they experience social risk) and invest more cautiously. Consistent with our conjecture, we find that minorities with high social risk participate less in the stock market and allocate a lower proportion of their wealth to risky assets. These results indicate that non-financial risks, such as social risk, influence financial risk-taking behavior of U.S. households.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"29 21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115426523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Bad News Turned Good: Reversal Under Censorship 坏消息转好:审查下的逆转
ERN: Search Pub Date : 2018-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3284488
A. Smirnov, E. Starkov
{"title":"Bad News Turned Good: Reversal Under Censorship","authors":"A. Smirnov, E. Starkov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3284488","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3284488","url":null,"abstract":"Sellers often have the power to censor the reviews of their products. We explore the effect of these censorship policies in markets where some consumers are unaware of possible censorship. We find that if the share of such “naïve” consumers is not too large, then rational consumers treat any bad review that is revealed in equilibrium as good news about product quality. This makes bad reviews worth revealing and allows the seller to use them to signal his product’s quality to rational consumers. (JEL D82, D83, L15)","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114612568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Existence of Equilibrium in Large Matching Markets With Complementarities 具有互补性的大匹配市场均衡的存在性
ERN: Search Pub Date : 2018-10-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3268884
Eduardo M. Azevedo, J. Hatfield
{"title":"Existence of Equilibrium in Large Matching Markets With Complementarities","authors":"Eduardo M. Azevedo, J. Hatfield","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3268884","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3268884","url":null,"abstract":"In two-sided matching markets with contracts, the existence of stable outcomes can be guaranteed only under certain restrictions on preferences; the typical restriction is that all agents’ preferences are substitutable. We show that, in markets with a continuum of each type of agent, it is only necessary that agents on one side of the market have substitutable preferences to guarantee the existence of a stable outcome. We also consider more general settings with multilateral contracts and no structure on the set of agents, and show that the core is nonempty when there exists a continuum of agents of each type, regardless of agents’ preferences. Finally, we show that in settings with bilateral contracts and transferable utility (but an arbitrary contractual network), the existence of competitive equilibria is guaranteed regardless of agents’ preferences. We also consider large finite markets, showing that each of the three results above holds approximately in the analogous large finite market.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132558873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 53
Multi-Agent Information Acquisition and Sharing 多智能体信息获取与共享
ERN: Search Pub Date : 2018-07-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3221771
Dimitri Migrow, Francesco Squintani
{"title":"Multi-Agent Information Acquisition and Sharing","authors":"Dimitri Migrow, Francesco Squintani","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3221771","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3221771","url":null,"abstract":"How should a manager optimally choose transfers to incentivize multiple agents both to collect and to share costly information? To answer this question we study a simple model with a principal and two agents. The agents can obtain costly signals and communicate with each another via non-verifiable messages (cheap talk). A principal offers a contract which is separable in the performances of the agents. We characterize the optimal transfers and show a surprising result that for sufficiently correlated information and not too high costs of information acquisition an agent's optimal transfer should depend mainly on the performance of the other agent.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114436379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Optimal Voting Rules in Committee Search 委员会搜索中的最优投票规则
ERN: Search Pub Date : 2018-07-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3208838
Vincent Mak
{"title":"Optimal Voting Rules in Committee Search","authors":"Vincent Mak","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3208838","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3208838","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze a discrete-time search problem in which committee members inspect alternatives sequentially over a finite search horizon. A collective decision to stop searching and accept the current alternative is reached when it is supported by a threshold number of individual votes. We investigate optimal voting rules that maximize the committee’s expected welfare. If future utilities are not too heavily time discounted, then the optimal threshold number of votes for an alternative to be accepted is non-decreasing in the length of the search horizon; but if the discount factor is too low, then the optimal threshold number of votes could decrease in the length of the search horizon. Our conclusions are consistent with previous studies on infinite-horizon search. Our results are driven by a tension between committee welfare and individual strategies of accepting mediocre alternatives to avoid adverse mutual vetoing in the future.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131148036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What Makes Dealers Central? Evidence from Credit Interdealer Networks 什么使经销商成为中心?来自信贷同业网络的证据
ERN: Search Pub Date : 2018-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3031668
Benjamin Munyan, Sumudu W. Watugala
{"title":"What Makes Dealers Central? Evidence from Credit Interdealer Networks","authors":"Benjamin Munyan, Sumudu W. Watugala","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3031668","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3031668","url":null,"abstract":"We present a novel method for identifying the effect of search costs, risk appetite, and skill in explaining the differences between core and periphery dealers in the U.S. corporate bond market. Using a hand-constructed dataset that matches the trading activity of credit dealers in corporate bonds and positions from trading in CDS markets, we investigate the interdealer network structure at the bond-issuer level across both markets. We analyze the mean, volatility, and skewness of market-making returns to test theoretical predictions on dealer centrality and the distribution of their profit. Bond dealer centrality is associated with greater skill and risk appetite. More central dealers appear to have significantly less negative skewness in their trading returns, indicative of their ability to avoid bad trades. Bond underwriters, who have a search advantage, exhibit even less negative skewness, but lower mean and volatility of profits. Taken together, the moments of trading returns reveal a dealer's role in a market. These findings inform our understanding of regulatory policies such as the Volcker rule which target dealer trading in OTC markets.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128764771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Hysteresis in price efficiency and the economics of slow moving capital 价格效率的滞后性与慢动资本经济学
ERN: Search Pub Date : 2018-05-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3181409
James Dow, Jungsuk Han, F. Sangiorgi
{"title":"Hysteresis in price efficiency and the economics of slow moving capital","authors":"James Dow, Jungsuk Han, F. Sangiorgi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3181409","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3181409","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Will arbitrage capital flow into markets experiencing shocks, mitigating adverse effects on price efficiency? Not necessarily. In a dynamic model with privately informed capital-constrained arbitrageurs, price efficiency plays a dual role, determining both the profitability of new arbitrage and the ability to close existing positions profitably. An adverse shock to efficiency lengthens arbitrage duration, effectively reducing the amount of arbitrage capital available for new positions. If this falls below a critical mass, arbitrage capital flows out, amplifying the impact on price efficiency. This creates endogenous regimes: temporary shocks can trigger “hysteresis,” a persistent shift in price efficiency.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127605856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11
The Effect of Big Data on Recommendation Quality. The Example of Internet Search 大数据对推荐质量的影响。互联网搜索的例子
ERN: Search Pub Date : 2018-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3149323
Maximilian Schaefer, Geza Sapi, Szabolcs Lorincz
{"title":"The Effect of Big Data on Recommendation Quality. The Example of Internet Search","authors":"Maximilian Schaefer, Geza Sapi, Szabolcs Lorincz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3149323","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3149323","url":null,"abstract":"Are there economies of scale to data in internet search? This paper is first to use real search engine query logs to empirically investigate how data drives the quality of internet search results. We find evidence that the quality of search results improve with more data on previous searches. Moreover, our results indicate that the type of data matters as well: personalized information is particularly valuable as it massively increases the speed of learning. We also provide some evidence that factors not directly related to data such as the general quality of the applied algorithms play an important role. The suggested methods to disentangle the effect of data from other factors driving the quality of search results can be applied to assess the returns to data in various recommendation systems in e-commerce, including product and information search. We also discuss the managerial, privacy, and competition policy implications of our findings.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124571346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 57
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