Stable Matching Algorithm with Indifferent Preferences in Australian Housing Market: Application of RSD-SR Coupled with TTC

If Economics is a vast wardrobe of fashionable theories that hardly ever fit the skeleton of the
difficult-to-classify world, then Matching & Mechanism Design is the magical scissors in the
invisible hands of the designer who tailor the algorithm garment embellished with strategy
proofness, individual rationality, and efficiency in a way to satisfy the current trends of the market. The more strict-preferences revealed by the customer, the more accurate and best-matching look will be snipped by the designer. What if the customers themselves face with the indifferent preferences that make the designer to step beyond the standard economic models and define a never-seen look which works like a charm? The culminating inclination of this paper is to use Random Serial Dictatorship with Squatting Rights harmonized by Top Trading Cycles to achieve STP, Efficiency, and IR as the must-to-have patters of matching algorithm in the design of a look for the tenants with indifferent preferences in Australian Housing Market.