ERN: SearchPub Date : 2020-06-12DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3231365
A. Kakhbod, Uliana Loginova, A. Malenko, Nadya Malenko
{"title":"Advising the Management","authors":"A. Kakhbod, Uliana Loginova, A. Malenko, Nadya Malenko","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3231365","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3231365","url":null,"abstract":"We study the optimal size and composition of an advisory committee when shareholders differ in preferences and beliefs and strategically acquire and communicate information. If shareholders and management have similar objectives but disagree due to different beliefs, and information is cheap, the optimal advisory body includes all shareholders. Conversely, if agents have conflicting preferences or information is sufficiently costly, the optimal advisory body is a strict subset of shareholders. Thus, advisory voting (board) is optimal in the former (latter) case. Similar implications hold if the committee also has authority, but unlike purely advisory committees, committees with authority are more diverse.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128895943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2020-05-05DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3047811
Sabrina T. Howell
{"title":"Learning from Feedback: Evidence from New Ventures","authors":"Sabrina T. Howell","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3047811","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3047811","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies how early stage entrepreneurs respond to negative feedback about the quality of their ventures using data from new venture competitions. In some competitions, founders are privately informed of their relative rank but did not know there would be feedback ex-ante. The empirical strategy compares lower and higher ranked losers across competitions in which they did and did not observe their standing. Receiving negative feedback increases average venture abandonment by 13 percent. Differences in responsiveness – for example, in venture risk, venture maturity, and signal precision – are consistent with particular theories about entrepreneurship, including the importance of experimentation.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128948836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2020-04-15DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3468546
Arjada Bardhi
{"title":"Attributes: Selective Learning and Influence","authors":"Arjada Bardhi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3468546","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3468546","url":null,"abstract":"When different stages of the evaluation of a multi-attribute project rest with conflicting economic actors, which attributes are selectively explored and why? We provide a model of attribute sampling in which correlation across attributes is flexibly modeled through Gaussian processes. In the absence of conflict, the optimal sample of attributes maximizes informativeness by balancing out-of-sample extrapolation with correlation within the sample. It depends neither on the prior value of the project nor on the format of sampling. Agency conflict, in contrast, gives rise to distortions. Sampling serves a dual purpose of generating valuable information and influencing the co-player. When influence takes priority, optimal sampling either suppresses informativeness for both players or negatively correlates their interests. Casting site selection as an attribute problem, our framework provides a theoretical rationale for site selection bias in small-scale program evaluation.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125029307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2020-04-03DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3567538
Kenneth N. Matziorinis, Mathieu Provencher
{"title":"Learning-by-Erring: Towards a New View of Rationality in Economics","authors":"Kenneth N. Matziorinis, Mathieu Provencher","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3567538","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3567538","url":null,"abstract":"The cornerstone of mainstream economic theory is the premise of rationality. Humans are assumed to be rational economic agents who, subject to the available information and limited resources, are able to select, among a set of alternatives, the best means to maximize their ends and their individual subjectively defined welfare. This view has been subject to debate and criticism from the earliest days of modern economic thought. Is human action rational or irrational and how successful are economic agents at maximizing individual or collective welfare? In this paper, the authors argue that economic agents are endowed with the capacity for rational thinking but not the ability to maximize their ends, as it is acquired through learning from the mistakes we make in practice. The efficiency of rational decisions is limited to the amount of experience and knowledge we possess when decisions are taken. The authors introduce a learning function describing the rational decision-making process and argue that erring is not trivial but carries significant costs and consequences. Making errors is the price we pay to learn and accumulate valuable new knowledge and human capital. Inherent to the decision-making process is the making of errors which, rather than being trivial, are a valuable opportunity to learn and accumulate knowledge. The rational decision-making process is enhanced from the accumulation of knowledge, which raises the efficiency of our decisions, moving closer to maximizing outcomes, and increases welfare.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116719723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2020-04-01DOI: 10.3386/w26972
Fabian Lange, Theodore Papageorgiou
{"title":"Beyond Cobb-Douglas: Flexibly Estimating Matching Functions with Unobserved Matching Efficiency","authors":"Fabian Lange, Theodore Papageorgiou","doi":"10.3386/w26972","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w26972","url":null,"abstract":"Exploiting results from the literature on non-parametric identification, we make three methodological contributions to the empirical literature estimating the matching function, commonly used to map unemployment and vacancies into hires. First, we show how to non-parametrically identify the matching function. Second, we estimate the matching function allowing for unobserved matching efficacy, without imposing the usual independence assumption between matching efficiency and search on either side of the labor market. Third, we allow for multiple types of jobseekers and consider an “augmented” Beveridge curve that includes them. Our estimated elasticity of hires with respect to vacancies is procyclical and varies between 0.15 and 0.3. This is substantially lower than common estimates suggesting that a significant bias stems from the commonly-used independence assumption. Moreover, variation in match efficiency accounts for much of the decline in hires during the Great Recession.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124037313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2020-04-01DOI: 10.3386/w26963
Parag A. Pathak, A. Rees-Jones, Tayfun Sönmez
{"title":"Reversing Reserves","authors":"Parag A. Pathak, A. Rees-Jones, Tayfun Sönmez","doi":"10.3386/w26963","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w26963","url":null,"abstract":"Affirmative action policies are often implemented through reserve systems. In this study, we demonstrate that reserve systems face widespread misunderstanding by the public. This misunderstanding can lead individuals to support policies that ineffectively pursue their interests. To establish these claims, we present 1,013 participants in the Understanding America Study with choices between pairs of reserve systems. Participants are members of the group receiving affirmative action and are financially incentivized to choose the system that maximizes their chance of admission. Using this data, we apply a novel approach to identifying the rate of uptake of different decision rules used by participants. We find that participants rarely use a fully optimal decision rule. In contrast, we find that many choices—40% in our primary estimates—are rationalized by a nearly correct decision rule, with errors driven solely by failing to appreciate the importance of processing order. Failing to account for processing order causes individuals to fail to distinguish between two policies that achieve different degrees of affirmative action: policies that provide nonbinding minimum guarantees of the number of spaces allocated and policies that provide spaces over-and-above what would be allocated absent a reserve. Confusion about the importance of processing order helps to explain otherwise surprising decisions made in field applications of reserve systems. We discuss implications for managers and policy makers who are trying to implement reserve systems and who are accountable to the public. This paper was accepted by Axel Ockenfels, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: The authors thank the National Science Foundation and the Wharton Behavioral Laboratory for financial support. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4669 .","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127311967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2020-03-14DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3554456
T. Ke, Christopher Li, Mikhail Safronov
{"title":"Learning by Choosing: Career Concerns with Observable Actions","authors":"T. Ke, Christopher Li, Mikhail Safronov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3554456","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3554456","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores potential inefficiencies of incomplete contracts in a dynamic career concerns context. In a firm-worker relationship, the worker performs public tasks that have trade-offs between productivity and informativeness. We show that the first-best outcome can be obtained with short-term contracts if the wage can depend on the task choice. This provides an explanation for wage jumps at promotions—the worker is assigned the more productive but less informative task after promotion. If task choice is not contractible, then inefficiency arises: the worker has an endogenous bias toward informativeness, while the firm is biased toward productivity. (JEL D82, D83, D86, J24, J31, M51)","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"255 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123035515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2020-03-12DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3206159
A. Gopalakrishnan, Young-Hoon Park
{"title":"The Impact of Coupons on the Visit-to-Purchase Funnel","authors":"A. Gopalakrishnan, Young-Hoon Park","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3206159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3206159","url":null,"abstract":"Using data from a field experiment, we find that mobile coupons lift revenue primarily by increasing visits to the website rather than through redemption.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126503950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2020-03-01DOI: 10.26085/C3988V
J. Aker, J. Blumenstock, Brian Dillon
{"title":"How Important is the Yellow Pages? Experimental Evidence from Tanzania","authors":"J. Aker, J. Blumenstock, Brian Dillon","doi":"10.26085/C3988V","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26085/C3988V","url":null,"abstract":"Mobile phones reduce the cost of communicating with existing social contacts, but do not eliminate frictions in forming new relationships. We report the findings of a two-sided randomized control trial in central Tanzania, centered on the production and distribution of a \"Yellow Pages\" phone directory with contact information for local enterprises. Enterprises randomly assigned to be listed in the directory receive more business calls, make greater use of mobile money, and are more likely to employ workers. There is evidence of positive spillovers, as both listed and unlisted enterprises in treatment villages experience significant increases in sales relative to a pure control group. Households randomly assigned to receive copies of the directory make greater use their phones for farming, are more likely to rent land and hire labor, have lower rates of crop failure, and sell crops for weakly higher prices. Willingness-to-pay to be listed in future directories is significantly higher for treated enterprises.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115405019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2020-02-18DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3496454
Yi-Chun Chen, Samuel Ho Cher Sien
{"title":"Efficiency of Stable Matching with Two-Sided Incomplete Information","authors":"Yi-Chun Chen, Samuel Ho Cher Sien","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3496454","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3496454","url":null,"abstract":"We study a two-sided job market matching setting with transferable utilities and incomplete information on both sides. We propose a definition of stable matching with two-sided incomplete information. Assume that the workers and firms' premuneration values in a match are strictly monotonic and strictly supermodular in their types; moreover, all of them have common knowledge that the wage is strictly increasing in their types. We show that every stable matching outcome is efficient.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129017201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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