Asian journal of philosophy最新文献_第5页

Knowledge, algorithmic predictions, and action 知识、算法预测和行动

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-21 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00172-9

Eleonora Cresto

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It is not just ‘the opposite of jealousy’: a Buddhist perspective on the emotion of compersion in consensually non-monogamous relationships 这不仅仅是 "嫉妒的反面"：从佛教的角度看自愿非一夫一妻制关系中的 "聚合 "情绪

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-17 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00171-w

Hin Sing Yuen, Luu Zörlein, Sven Walter

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Transparency as morally and politically corrupting 透明度在道德和政治上的腐蚀性

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-17 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00169-4

Jimmy Alfonso Licon

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Heuristics in philosophy 哲学中的启发式

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-15 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00174-7

Timothy Williamson

{"title":"Heuristics in philosophy","authors":"Timothy Williamson","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00174-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00174-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This article argues that heuristics play a key role in philosophy, in generating both our verdicts on proposed counterexamples to philosophical theories and philosophical paradoxes. Heuristics are efficient ways of answering questions, quick and easy to use, but imperfectly reliable. They have been studied by psychologists and cognitive scientists such as Gigerenzer and Kahneman, but their relevance to philosophical methodology has not been properly recognized. Several heuristics are discussed at length. The <i>persistence heuristic</i> can be summarized in the slogan ‘Small changes don’t matter’. Without it, updating would present an intractable problem for both natural and artificial intelligence. But our reliance on the persistence heuristic also makes us vulnerable to paradoxes of vagueness. <i>Disquotational heuristics</i> of various kinds are considered. They play central roles in our ascriptions of truth, falsity, and belief, but they also generate semantic paradoxes such as the Liar and Frege puzzles about coreference. The use of an additive heuristic for combining reasons is also discussed. Our reliance on fallible heuristics in philosophy does not make philosophical knowledge impossible, just as our reliance on fallible heuristics in perception does not make perceptual knowledge impossible. Nevertheless, it should motivate us to take a more critical attitude to our data. By identifying and analyzing the heuristics on which we rely, we may be able to work out where they make us most vulnerable to error.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00174-7.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141336191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

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Madhyamaka and Ontic Structural Realism 偈颂与本体结构现实主义

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-12 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00146-x

Toby Friend

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Thoughts on Jun Otsuka’s Thinking about Statistics – the Philosphical Foundations 对大塚淳《统计学的思考--哲学基础》的思考

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-03 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00173-8

elliott sober

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Sosa’s virtue account vs. responsibilism 索萨的美德论与责任论

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-03 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00170-x

Xingming Hu

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On Beall’s contradictory Christology and beyond 论比奥尔自相矛盾的基督论及其他

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-05-29 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00165-8

Filippo Casati, Naoya Fujikawa

{"title":"On Beall’s contradictory Christology and beyond","authors":"Filippo Casati, Naoya Fujikawa","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00165-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00165-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>According to Conciliar Christology, Christ has a divine nature and a human nature. This dual nature of Christ leads us to face many apparent inconsistencies: For example, it seems to follow that He is both immutable and mutable (and, therefore, not immutable). This long-standing issue in Christology has been called the fundamental problem of Christology. Recently, Jc Beall has proposed a novel approach to the fundamental problem: <i>contradictory</i> Christology, that is, Christology which takes those apparent inconsistencies as genuinely contradictory. This paper examines Beall’s contradictory Christology by comparing it with James Anderson’s version of consistent Christology. Such a comparison highlights an important assumption of Beall’s contradictory Christology, that is, the language used to state the fundamental problem is <i>univocal</i>. ‘Immutable’ is, thus, used in the same <i>literal</i> sense in both `Christ is immutable’ and `Christ is not immutable’. On the one hand, this assumption has a good reason given the human nature of Christ. On the other hand, we follow Anderson in showing that the view that `immutable’ is <i>equivocal</i> has a good reason too. For there is an established theological tradition according to which, when we speak about the divine, our language is <i>analogical</i>. In light of those considerations, this paper presents a semantic explication of how the predicates used to state the fundamental problem are <i>both</i> literal and analogical. The proposed semantics treats those predicates as cases of multiple denotations and shows that the apparent inconsistencies are genuinely contradictory, but in a different way from Beall’s contradictory Christology.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00165-8.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142414972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

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The truth conditions of sentences with referentially used definite descriptions 带有指代性定语描述的句子的真实条件

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-05-16 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00167-6

Wenqi Li

{"title":"The truth conditions of sentences with referentially used definite descriptions","authors":"Wenqi Li","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00167-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00167-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Keith Donnellan’s distinction between the attributive and referential uses of definite descriptions has spurred debates regarding the truth conditions of the utterance “the F is G” with definite descriptions used referentially. In this article, I present a semantic account of referential descriptions, grounded in the contextual factors of the utterance, including the speaker’s intention and presupposition as well as the interlocutor’s recognition of them. This account is called the IPR-semantic account, according to which the speaker’s intention (I) and presupposition (P) and the interlocutor’s recognition (R) jointly determine whether “the F” in an utterance “the F is G” is used referentially or attributively, and the meaning of “the F” is determined by whether it is used referentially or attributively. Moreover, I argue that the meaning of the referential description “the F” is the intended object <i>e</i>, embodied with a property H that has prompted the speaker to presuppose that <i>e</i> is F and to intend to use “the F” to refer to <i>e</i>, as well as the interlocutor to recognize the presupposition and intention. According to the IPR-semantic account, the utterance “the F is G” with “the F” used referentially expresses a singular proposition, namely, that <i>e</i> is G, and it is true if and only if the intended object <i>e</i> is G. Additionally, I argue that the IPR-semantic account not only surpasses some alternative semantic accounts but also outperforms Kripke’s pragmatic account.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140969560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Parfitian or Buddhist reductionism? Revisiting a debate about personal identity 帕菲特主义还是佛教还原论？重温关于个人身份的辩论

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-05-14 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00166-7

Javier Hidalgo

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