Asian journal of philosophy最新文献_第4页

Santa, socials, and secrets: hard cases for epistemic rights 圣诞老人、社交和秘密：知识权利的艰难案例

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-06-26 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00300-z

Étienne Brown, Rebecca Chan

引用次数: 0

Politics: Realism, diagnosis, and disorientation—an interview with Hans Sluga 政治：现实主义、诊断和迷失方向——汉斯·斯拉格访谈

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-06-26 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00297-5

Hans Sluga, Yun Tang

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Radical skepticism and the cognitive mechanics of doubt 激进的怀疑主义和怀疑的认知机制

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-06-26 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00296-6

Christos Kyriacou

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Mnemic scenarios as pictures 用图片来记忆场景

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-06-26 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00288-6

Kristina Liefke

{"title":"Mnemic scenarios as pictures","authors":"Kristina Liefke","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00288-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00288-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper explores the striking conceptual parallel between contemporary accounts of episodic memory (see e.g., Addis, De Brigard, Michaelian) and picture semantics (Abusch, Greenberg, Maier). It argues that picture semantics captures many familiar distinctions from philosophy of memory, while providing some additional—highly useful—tools and concepts (e.g., a mechanism for representation-to-content conversion and a general notion of situation that is independent of a given perspective). The paper uses these tools to (re-)structure and advance debate in contemporary philosophy of memory. Specifically, it (i) shows how these tools can be employed to defend the propositional nature of episodic memory contents, (ii) gives a sophisticated account of non-actual and non-particular episodic memory objects, and (iii) provides a new argument for pluralism about accuracy concepts and standards. Along the way, it defends a liberal version of the pictorial view of mnemic imagery, reveals faithfulness about accuracy as a (very) weak variant of radical authenticism, and explains different intuitions about the possibility of observer-perspective memories from dreams. The paper closes by suggesting, inversely, the import of these applications for picture semantics.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00288-6.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145169265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The nature of scientific justification 科学论证的本质

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-06-18 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00289-5

Haixin Dang

{"title":"The nature of scientific justification","authors":"Haixin Dang","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00289-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00289-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Mikkel Gerken’s book <i>Scientific Testimony</i> is a welcome step in reconnecting contemporary analytic epistemology with the philosophy of science. The central topic of the book—as it says in the title—is testimony, which has been a major area of research for epistemologists for the last couple of decades. Testimony refers to the process by which we can acquire knowledge or justified belief from what others have told us. Roughly speaking, epistemologists agree that testimony is an important source of knowledge but disagree over the exact conditions under which testimony can lead to knowledge. But for philosophers of science, learning from one another and pursuing inquiry collectively is so central to the scientific enterprise that testimony—as epistemologists understand it—was hardly recognized as a distinct phenomenon warranting its own systematic investigation. Rather, philosophers of science have turned their attention primarily to studying much more prosaic instances of knowledge transmission, like science communication or the interface between science and policy. In this commentary, I examine Gerken's characterization of scientific justification and argue for a <i>social</i> concept of scientific justification that arises out of philosophy of science.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00289-5.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145166909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A preservation/generation distinction about memory 关于内存的保存/生成的区别

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-06-14 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00292-w

Kengo Miyazono, Uku Tooming

{"title":"A preservation/generation distinction about memory","authors":"Kengo Miyazono, Uku Tooming","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00292-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00292-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A number of authors, including ourselves, have defended the view (which we call the “generationism about memory”) that memory is a generative, rather than preservative, source of epistemic justification. This paper clarifies the very distinction that the whole debate rests on; i.e. the distinction between preservative sources and generative sources of epistemic justification. Our aim is to present a “substantial” or “demanding” definition of preservative/generative distinction such that the candidate cases that are only superficially generative (including many of the cases that have been presented by other researchers in defence of generationism) do not count as counterexamples to preservationism. After some methodological remarks (Section 2), we propose a preservative/generative distinction, called “PM/GM”, as a first approximation (Section 3). Then, we argue the PM/GM distinction has to be revised in several ways in order to capture generationism in a substantial sense (Sections 4 and 5). Finally, we compare our revised distinction, “PM*/GM*”, with other distinctions in the literature (Section 6).</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00292-w.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145165622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The contemporary scientific progress debate in philosophy of science and empirical evidence on Knowledge That versus Knowledge How in scientific practice 当代科学进步的科学哲学之争与科学实践中“知识是什么”与“知识如何”的经验证据

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-06-11 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00294-8

Moti Mizrahi

{"title":"The contemporary scientific progress debate in philosophy of science and empirical evidence on Knowledge That versus Knowledge How in scientific practice","authors":"Moti Mizrahi","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00294-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00294-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In his comprehensive survey of the contemporary debate over scientific progress in philosophy of science, Rowbottom observes that philosophers of science have mostly relied on interpretations of historical cases from the history of science and intuitions elicited by hypothetical cases as evidence for or against philosophical accounts of scientific progress. Only a few have tried to introduce empirical evidence into this debate, whereas most others have resisted the introduction of empirical evidence by claiming that doing so would reduce the debate to empirical studies of science. In this paper, I set out to show how empirical evidence can be introduced into the scientific progress debate. I conduct a corpus-based, quantitative study whose results suggest that there is a positive linear relationship between <i>knowledge that</i> talk and <i>knowledge how</i> talk in scientific articles. These results are contrary to Niiniluoto’s view according to which there is a clear distinction between scientific progress and technological progress such that <i>knowledge that</i> belongs to the former, whereas <i>knowledge how</i> belongs to the latter.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145164549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Empathic representation 移情的表现

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-06-06 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00291-x

Neil Sinhababu

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Expressivism and early Confucian metaethics 表现主义与早期儒家元伦理学

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-06-04 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00285-9

Frank Saunders Jr.

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Arguing for the aim of science 为科学的目的而争论

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-06-03 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00290-y

Andreas Hüttemann

引用次数: 0