Asian journal of philosophy最新文献_第4页

Coastlines, consequence, and collapse 海岸线，后果和崩溃

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-03-01 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00256-0

Christopher Blake-Turner

{"title":"Coastlines, consequence, and collapse","authors":"Christopher Blake-Turner","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00256-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00256-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. Stei assumes that the correctness of a logic is a matter of the relation between the formal validity of a logical theory and extra-theoretic validity. I reject the assumption, on the grounds that it’s not clear that extratheoretic validity can be determined independently of formal validity. I formulate instead <i>quietist logical pluralism</i>, which is quietist with respect to the nature of extra-theoretic validity and its relation to formal validity. Because of this, quietist logic pluralism needs a different correctness criterion for logic: correctness is a matter of a logic’s having normative upshot for deductive reasoning. I argue that this approach has the advantage of resisting the collapse of logical pluralism into monism. In particular, I suggest that deductive reasoning has two distinct roles, one with respect to the coherence of our attitudes and another with respect to how our attitudes are based on one another. I give two different normative principles that correspond to these roles; doing so requires abandoning the idea that normative bridge principles are universally quantified over all logics. That idea has been inherited from MacFarlane, but it’s not clear why the pluralist should accept it, as long as she can avoid giving principles that are ad hoc. By tying the principles to crucial roles of deductive reasoning, I aim to avoid both ad hockery and collapse.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143527626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Against phenomenalism 针对现象论

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-02-28 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00255-1

Brian Cutter

引用次数: 0

Evidential Pluralism and accounts of establishing 证据的多元性和建立的记录

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-02-25 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00252-4

Michael Wilde

引用次数: 0

In defense of Frankfurtian wholeheartedness—comments on Chen Yajun’s Frankfurt’s concept of identification 为法兰克福的全心全意辩护——评陈亚军的法兰克福认同观

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-02-25 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00258-y

Yuanfan Huang

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Publisher Correction: Internalist reliabilism in statistics and machine learning: thoughts on Jun Otsuka’s Thinking about Statistics 出版商更正：统计学和机器学习中的内部可靠论：对大塚纯《关于统计学的思考》的思考

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-02-12 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00251-5

Hanti Lin

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Should we stop talking about “democracy”? Conceptual abandonment and the perils of political discourse 我们应该停止谈论“民主”吗？概念放弃和政治话语的危险

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-02-12 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00250-6

Steffen Koch

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Has Candrakīrti refuted a Humean account of causation? 坎德拉基尔提是否反驳了休谟的因果论？

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-02-04 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00248-0

Mark Siderits

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引用次数: 0

The use of large language models as scaffolds for proleptic reasoning 使用大型语言模型作为预见性推理的框架

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00247-1

Olya Kudina, Brian Ballsun-Stanton, Mark Alfano

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引用次数: 0

AI wellbeing AI wellbeing

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00246-2

Simon Goldstein, Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini

引用次数: 0

Belief beyond reason: a radical relativist hinge epistemology 超越理性的信仰：激进的相对主义铰链认识论。

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-01-31 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00244-4

Drew Johnson

引用次数: 0