{"title":"Approaching taniwha with more care: a response to Heather Dyke, Carl Mika, and Krushil Watene","authors":"Justine Kingsbury","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00425-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00425-9","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Taniwha pūrakau are traditional narratives about powerful water beings (taniwha) in te ao Māori (the Māori world). In “Taking Taniwha Seriously” (TTS), I suggested that non-Māori might take a first step in the direction of taking taniwha seriously by focusing on a readily comprehensible feature of taniwha <i>pūrākau</i>: the way in which they encode information about natural hazards (Hikuroa, 2016, 2019). This might be a precursor to a deeper understanding of taniwha in particular and of <i>te ao Māori</i> more generally. Heather Dyke’s commentary on TTS helps to make ontological sense of the position I put forward in TTS; Carl Mika’s and Krushil Watene’s commentaries endorse the aims of TTS while pointing out some limitations of the way in which I pursued them and, in Watene’s case, proposing alternatives. Informed by these commentaries, in this response, I suggest some ways forward that better acknowledge the relationality of te ao Māori and the impossibility of thinking about taniwha, and in particular, taniwha as indicators of natural hazards, in isolation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-026-00425-9.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148465606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Précis of property versatility and copredication","authors":"David Liebesman, Ofra Magidor","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00424-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00424-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This is a précis of our book <i>Property Versatility and Copredication</i> (OUP 2025) for a book symposium.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148465493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Russellian Monism or Hylomorphism?","authors":"Ivan V. Ivanov","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00427-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00427-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Liu (2026) has argued that Russellian Monism offers an unpromising response to the Mind-Body Problem. His criticism is based on a comparison among Russellian Monism and Thomistic Hylomorphism. By refining the comparison, I suggest a distinctive hylomorphist response to the Problem. On that basis, I conclude that, unlike Russellian Monism, Hylomorphism holds a real promise to do better than both Physicalism and Dualism.\u0000</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148465495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moral uncertainty in the Anthropocene: moral circle and precautionary animism","authors":"Paolo Pecere","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00426-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00426-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper develops a normative framework for expanding moral considerability under conditions of ecological crisis and epistemic uncertainty. Building on <i>The Moral Circle</i>, I begin from the claim that a non-negligible probability of moral status is sufficient to generate moral reasons for inclusion. I argue that the force of Sebo’s philosophical argument is significantly strengthened when situated within the conditions of the Anthropocene. Ongoing biodiversity loss and the risk of irreversible ecological damage introduce an asymmetry of moral error: underestimating the moral significance of nonhuman beings may lead to permanent losses, whereas overestimation typically incurs reversible costs. This asymmetry supports a precautionary expansion of moral concern. The paper then brings this framework into dialogue with anthropological accounts of animism, interpreted not as a metaphysical doctrine but as a relational epistemology in which nonhumans are treated as subjects within networks of interaction. Finally, I examine recent legal developments recognizing rivers and ecosystems as rights-bearing entities, arguing that these can be understood as institutional responses to moral uncertainty. On this basis, I propose the notion of “precautionary animism”: a normative stance that, without endorsing animist ontology, adopts its practical orientation under conditions of uncertainty and ecological risk. This framework aims to integrate moral philosophy, anthropology, and environmental law into a unified account of non-anthropocentric ethics in the Anthropocene.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-026-00426-8.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148465494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Has the hard problem of consciousness been solved?","authors":"Christopher Devlin Brown","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00422-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00422-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of determining the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and the brain. The problem is hard because there are strong independent arguments, respectively, pushing toward and against the view that consciousness is entirely physical. Physicalism is an elegant view of reality which seems to be the best metaphysics of science and is supported by the causal closure argument concerning the causal role of mentality in the physical world. Yet it seems that a complete scientific account of consciousness, which would explain why it arises and allow anyone with enough scientific knowledge to infer all of its features, is impossible. Russellian physicalism has been proposed as a way out of this impasse. This view posits nonmental categorical properties which are both left out of science and which are necessary to ground consciousness and, in this way, seems to satisfy the motivations of both physicalists and nonphysicalists. If Russellian physicalism is coherent and can satisfy all serious nonphysicalist intuitions, then the hard problem is solved, since nonphysicalist options could be taken off the table in favor of only considering Russellian physicalism (which satisfies nonphysicalist intuitions) or some sort of physicalist error theory (which explains why nonphysicalist intuitions are misguided). Here, I will defend this position and argue that Russellian physicalism can satisfy all serious nonphysicalist intuitions, including intuitions underlying standard antiphysicalist epistemic arguments and intuitions underlying the “no-gap” argument concerning indeterminacy of consciousness. I will also argue that other nonphysicalist intuitions are not philosophically serious. </p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148380300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Books, schools, and restaurants","authors":"Brian Weatherson","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00423-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00423-x","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This is a contribution to a symposium on David Liebesman and Ofra Magidor’s book <i>Property Versatility and Copredication</i>. It was originally presented, in compressed version, at the 2026 Eastern APA. I agree with their big picture metaphysical view, but quibble at four points about its application to social metaphysics. First, Liebesman and Magidor argue that abstract objects can have paradigmatically physical properties like being on shelves. I agree, and suggest they should accept the converse claim, that physical objects can have properties usually associated with abstracta. Second, I argue that there are several puzzles about how their view applied to books of variable granularity, like multi-volume works, or volumes containing several books. Third, I argue (against their preferred view of schools) that schools can come in different levels of granularity. Finally, I argue that ‘restaurant’ and ‘coffee shop’ can sometimes pick out physical objects. Liebesman and Magidor argue that these terms don’t pick out buildings, and I agree. But, I claim, they do sometimes pick out physical locations.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-026-00423-x.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148380275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Naturalism and phenomenology: comments on Chan and Chen","authors":"Søren Overgaard","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00421-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00421-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Chan and Chen suggest that it is possible to articulate both a phenomenology-friendly naturalism and a naturalism-friendly phenomenology, thus creating a space for overlap and dialogue between the two traditions. While I applaud Chan and Chen’s efforts, I suggest in this discussion piece that their paper leaves many important questions unanswered. My discussion focuses on Chan and Chen’s motto and their characterisation of naturalism.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-026-00421-z.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148323773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Must Heidegger embrace dialetheism?","authors":"Maciej Czerkawski","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00418-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00418-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In <i>Heidegger and the Contradiction of Being</i>, Filippo Casati argues that Heidegger has powerful reasons to accept as well as to reject the ontological difference (understood unrestrictedly as the thesis that Being is not a being in any sense), that he meets the trouble he thus faces by conceding that some contradictions are true (and thus embracing dialetheism), and, finally, that his philosophy remains cogent for all that. I outline two concerns for this project: first, with two philosophical arguments that, in Casati’s view, support the thesis of the ontological difference understood in the unrestricted fashion, and, secondly, with Casati’s assumption that Heidegger understands the ontological difference in this way, drawing here on recent work of Kris McDaniel and my own.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-026-00418-8.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148323383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Attitude authority in the age of AI","authors":"Benjamin Winokur","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00420-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00420-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Might artificial intelligence (AI) be highly reliable, now or in the conceivable future, at detecting your current attitudes, such as your beliefs and desires? If so, should people listen to you, or to AI, when trying to know your attitudes? The latter possibility threatens our long-standing practices of regarding each person as the ultimate authority about her attitudes. Disquieting as this threat may seem, I argue that it will not come to pass, at least when it comes to those attitudes that you determine for yourself through your judgements about what is true, desirable, or worthy of pursuit. This is because AI cannot determine your attitudes for you in this way, and because this capacity for attitudinal self-determination grounds your authority over these attitudes.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148323020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hayate Shimizu, Anna Puzio, Kamil Mamak, David J. Gunkel
{"title":"Who belongs in the moral circle? AI systems and the limits of inclusion","authors":"Hayate Shimizu, Anna Puzio, Kamil Mamak, David J. Gunkel","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00416-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00416-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper offers a relational response to Jeff Sebo’s <i>The Moral Circle</i> and its moral-expansionist framework under conditions of uncertainty. While Sebo argues that we should consider not only which beings matter but which beings might matter, and extends this precautionary logic to animals, AI systems, and other marginal cases, we argue that this framework leaves underexamined the standpoint from which moral-circle expansion is undertaken. A relational approach does not reject the importance of avoiding moral exclusion. Rather, it reframes the question by asking what it means to “expand” the moral circle in the first place, how moral circles are historically and socially constituted, and who has the authority to draw and redraw their boundaries. On this view, moral significance does not arise solely from intrinsic properties such as sentience, agency, or welfare capacity, but also from the relations, institutions, practices, and power structures through which beings become ethically salient. We therefore ask not simply whether AI belongs within the moral circle, but how the very framing of inclusion is shaped when AI systems are in view. We argue that Sebo’s critique of human exceptionalism remains partially constrained by a human standpoint that continues to administer inclusion. The paper concludes that the ethical challenge posed by AI is not only to determine whether artificial systems belong within the moral circle, but also to examine how moral relations are formed, mediated, and governed in increasingly complex sociotechnical worlds.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148281826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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