{"title":"Valid and invalid causal arguments for physicalism","authors":"Thomas Kroedel","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00192-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00192-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In “A Causal Argument for Physicalism”, Lei Zhong presents an argument for physicalism in general, that is, for the disjunction of reductive physicalism and non-reductive physicalism. Zhong’s argument attempts to show that mental properties are physically acceptable, that is, physical in a wide sense. The crucial assumption of the argument is that physically acceptable effects do not have both sufficient causes that are physically acceptable and simultaneous sufficient causes that are not physically acceptable. I argue that Zhong’s argument is invalid, because the mental can be causally relevant to physically acceptable effects while being neither physically acceptable nor causally sufficient for these effects. I present an alternative argument in the spirit of Zhong’s argument that omits the notion of sufficient causation. I argue that non-physicalists can also resist the alternative argument if they fine-tune their metaphysics of mind.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00192-5.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142409540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Publisher Correction to: Rational belief, epistemic possibility, and the a priori","authors":"Claire Field","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00180-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00180-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00180-9.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142409477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Justification and update","authors":"Jeanne Peijnenburg, David Atkinson","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00193-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00193-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this commentary on Jun Otsuka’s first-rate book, we focus on the difference between justification and update.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00193-4.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142409365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mind, Liangzhi, and Qi in Wang Yangming’s view that “nothing is external to the mind”","authors":"Zemian Zheng","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00194-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00194-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Although I agree with Jeeloo Liu that Wang Yangming is not a subjective idealist, this does not rule other possibilities of idealism. Wang Yangming equates the mind to Dao and equates <i>liangzhi</i> to the Dao of Change. This suggests that the mind is not just a subjective mind. It can denote the all-encompassing universal mind. In his “blossoming tree” dialogue about the theme “nothing is external to the mind,” Wang Yangming alludes to the <i>Book of Change</i>. The underlying idea is that there is an undifferentiated unity before the calculative deliberation divides the subject and object. This idea of oneness also underlies Wang Yangming’s view of <i>qi</i>. I have reservations about using “naturalism” and “realism” to categorize Wang Yangming’s philosophy.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00194-3.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142413894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Is deflationism self-defeating?","authors":"Guanglong Luo","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00195-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00195-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>According to deflationism, truth is insubstantial. Edwards (2018) argues that the deflationist thesis of insubstantiality is incoherent, regardless of how it is characterized. By clarifying the deflationist concepts of reference and truth (and their relations) and addressing the distinction between substantial properties and insubstantial properties within the deflationist framework, we will argue that Edwards’s self-defeating argument is problematic and ultimately unconvincing.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00195-2.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142414100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mary’s cognitive progress","authors":"Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00196-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00196-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Upon her release, Mary gains new knowledge aligned with B-type materialism and property dualism, even though she already possesses knowledge of all the facts and truths related to color and color vision during her time in captivity. I argue that this “cognitive progress” can only be accounted for by the acquisition of a new nonconceptual representation of the color red upon her release. Independently of any concepts, this acquisition already enables her to discriminate all sorts of shades of color within her environment. However, the existence of nonconceptual representations, by itself, is not enough to specify the type of knowledge Mary acquired, obviously. We must add two additional conditions. Firstly, the acquisition of these nonconceptual representations must enrich Mary’s preexisting physical concept of red. Assuming that concepts are mental files, the enrichment takes the form of housing information in analog format, like pictures of the color red. Secondly, by utilizing these enhanced concepts by analog information, Mary can achieve an introspective propositional knowledge. She learns the truth of the crucial proposition: she learns what it is like to experience red.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00196-1.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142412915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The epistemic value of natural theology","authors":"Ataollah Hashemi","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00191-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00191-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>According to certain theories, acquiring knowledge of God does not necessarily depend on philosophical evidence, and a believer is not obligated to rely on philosophical arguments from natural theology to justify their religious convictions. However, it is undeniable that philosophical arguments supporting the existence of God and theodicies possess significant epistemic value. This raises the question: what is the epistemic significance of the intellectual products derived from natural theology if they are not essential for attaining knowledge of God? Drawing upon of distinction between knowledge and understanding as separate epistemic goods, I argue that it is reasonable to assert that arguments for theism and theodicies contribute to religious understanding rather than directly providing knowledge of God. Finally, I enumerate several theoretical advantages that this proposal would offer to the field of religious epistemology.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00191-6.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142412957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The issue that slips under the radar","authors":"Frank Jackson","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00190-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00190-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Michael Pelczar is right that we need an explanation of the regularities in our experiences, and that this means we should reject traditional idealism. His version of phenomenalism might seem to offer the needed explanation, but what seems to be the case is not in fact the case.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00190-7.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142411352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A new problem for Kripkean defenses of origin theses","authors":"Sungil Han","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00185-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00185-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>According to Kripke’s thesis of the necessity of origin, if an object has an origin, it necessarily has that origin. Kripke’s thesis has special cases that we may refer to as “origin theses” when applied to certain types of objects, such as humans and tables. While origin theses have intuitive plausibility, why they are true remains unclear. This paper addresses a prominent line of defense for origin theses. In a celebrated note in <i>Naming and Necessity</i>, Kripke briefly presented an incomplete argument. Advocates of this line of defense attempt to establish origin theses by proposing additional principles with which to complete Kripke’s argument. I call these defenses “Kripkean defenses.” The usual debate in the literature regarding Kripkean defenses has focused on the justifiability of the proposed principles. In this paper, I highlight a neglected issue that arises for Kripkean defenders, even if the debate is assumed to be settled in their favor. I argue that, even if Kripke’s argument is sound, it falls short of establishing origin theses, leaving an inferential gap. How to close the gap is a new problem for Kripkean defenders. My goal in the paper is to offer a solution that I believe is their best hope. If I am right, Kripkean defenders should commit themselves to the Aristotelian view that individuals such as human beings and tables are, in a robust Aristotelian sense, substances with irreducible powers that emerge from the powers of their causal origin.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00185-4.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142410460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Concepts of truth?","authors":"Jamin Asay","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00183-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00183-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A familiar form of alethic pluralism is built on the view that while there is a single concept of truth, there are multiple <i>properties</i> associated with it. A newer form of alethic pluralism develops the view that there are multiple <i>concepts</i> of truth. Importantly, this form of pluralism has been offered an empirical footing, notably in the work of Barnard and Ulatowski, Mizumoto, and Wyatt. My paper offers a critical appraisal of that project: while the appeal to empirical data is a welcome addition to the philosophy of truth, I doubt that it supports conceptual pluralism. First, I argue that there are severe challenges involved in the very formulation of conceptual pluralism about truth: it risks being an incoherent thesis. Once that problem is addressed, I review the empirical data that have been associated with the thesis, and argue that the evidence points not toward a plurality of concepts but rather a plurality of theories and conceptions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00183-6.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142410127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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