{"title":"History, historiography, and stories of logical empiricism","authors":"James Pearson","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00186-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00186-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Histories of philosophy usually incorporate logical empiricism into the story of either analytic philosophy or empiricism. Alan Richardson’s <i>Logical Empiricism as Scientific Philosophy</i> (2023) tells a different story, in which the diverse group of thinkers associated with logical empiricism is united by an attitude rather than a single philosophical methodology or epistemological project. I examine some historiographical consequences of adopting Richardson’s new story, paying particular attention to its significance for our current moment.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142414784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"No need for explanation","authors":"Michael Huemer","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00187-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00187-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In <i>Appearance</i> <i>and Explanation</i>, McCain and Moretti raise three objections to Phenomenal Conservatism: the problem of explaining defeaters, the problem of reflective awareness, and the bootstrapping problem. I address all three problems and then raise three objections to Phenomenal Explanationism: the problem of necessary truths, the problem of unreflective observers, and the problem of excessive flexibility. I conclude that there is no need to supplement Phenomenal Conservatism with Explanationism.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142414815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Epistemic consequentialism as a metatheory of inquiry","authors":"Frederik J. Andersen, Klemens Kappel","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00182-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00182-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The overall aim of this article is to reorient the contemporary debate about epistemic consequentialism. Thus far, the debate has to a large extent focused on whether standard theories of epistemic justification are consequentialist in nature and therefore vulnerable to certain trade-off cases where accepting a false or unjustified belief leads to good epistemic outcomes. We claim that these trade-offs raise an important—yet somewhat neglected—issue about the epistemic demands on inquiry. We first distinguish between two different kinds of epistemic evaluation, viz., <i>backing</i> evaluation and <i>outcome</i> evaluation, and then go on to outline and discuss a consequentialist metatheory about the right combinations of decision procedures to adopt in inquiry. Note that the piece is exploratory in the following sense: we try to explore epistemic evaluation in consequentialist terms, which involves stating a form of epistemic consequentialism, but also pointing to what non-consequentialist alternatives might be. Rather than trying to argue decisively for a particular conclusion, we aim to outline various intricate issues in an underexplored area of theorizing. In the course of doing this, we’ll transpose some well-known themes from discussions of consequentialism in ethics to the current debate about consequentialism in epistemology, e.g., agent-neutrality, options, and side-constraints.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00182-7.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142413137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cautious pragmatism: comments on JeeLoo Liu, “The metaphysical as the ethical”","authors":"Stephen C. Angle","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00181-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00181-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>JeeLoo Liu makes two main arguments in her insightful essay “The metaphysical as the ethical.” First, against claims made by Wing-tsit Chan and others, she demonstrates that Wang Yangming’s metaphysics is not a problematic form of subjective idealism but in fact “aligns with commonsense realism.” Second, against both Chan and Chen Lai, she maintains that Wang does not commit a problematic conflation of fact and value. Instead, Liu shows that Wang can be read along lines very similar to contemporary pragmatist metaphysics, which itself resists a hard distinction between fact and value. This essay offers a range of clarifications and cautions against the background of general agreement and ends with a question about how far we can really push the parallel between Wang and pragmatism.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142412742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Kant on public reason and the linguistic Other","authors":"Huaping Lu-Adler","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00178-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00178-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>On Kant’s account, “public use of reason” is the use that a truth-seeking <i>scholar</i> makes of his reason when he communicates his thoughts <i>in writing</i> to a world of <i>readers</i>. Commentators tend to treat this account as expressing an egalitarian ideal, without taking seriously the limiting conditions—especially the scholarship condition—built into it. In this paper, I interrogate Kant’s original account of public reason in connection with his construction of the “Oriental” as a linguistically and therefore epistemically and culturally inferior Other. I thereby give reasons to worry that Kant’s account is substantively inegalitarian (even if it is nominally egalitarian). I also draw attention to the fact that Kant constructed a linguistic Other against the backdrop of colonialism and from a position of power. This positionality gave what he said about the Other an ideology-forming and world-making effect. In this way, his exclusionary discursive practices—such as depicting the Oriental as an inferior linguistic Other—could have a lasting impact on knowledge production and on the real-world exercise of public reason.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142412580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The linguistic diversity of truth and correctness judgments and the effect of moral-political factor","authors":"Masaharu Mizumoto","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00179-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00179-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this paper, we will report results of two sets of cross-linguistic studies about truth judgments and correctness judgments by speakers of English and Japanese, which will show a significant influence of a moral-political factor in an utterance on Japanese truth/correctness judgments. Following up Mizumoto (2022), which demonstrated such an effect on Japanese truth judgments and correctness judgments about utterances containing a contrastive conjunction (such as “but”), Study 1 shows the same effect on Japanese correctness judgments about utterances containing a pejorative. Study 2 then shows that a moral-political factor in utterances can affect Japanese truth/correctness judgments about them even if they are simple utterances containing neither a contrastive conjunction nor a pejorative. In conclusion, we will briefly discuss whether this effect is linguistic or psychological, and present three hypotheses: the <i>semantic hypothesis</i>, <i>pragmatic hypothesis</i>, and <i>error theory hypothesis</i>, to account for the data, which we leave open for future studies.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142412552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Existential risk and equal political liberty","authors":"J. Joseph Porter, Adam F. Gibbons","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00177-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00177-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Rawls famously argues that the parties in the original position would agree upon the two principles of justice. Among other things, these principles guarantee equal political liberty—that is, democracy—as a requirement of justice. We argue on the contrary that the parties have reason to reject this requirement. As we show, by Rawls’ own lights, the parties would be greatly concerned to mitigate existential risk. But it is doubtful whether democracy always minimizes such risk. Indeed, no one currently knows which political systems would. Consequently, the parties—and we ourselves—have reason to reject democracy as a requirement of justice in favor of political experimentalism, a general approach to political justice which rules in at least some non-democratic political systems which might minimize existential risk.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00177-4.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142415316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Approximate rationality and ideal rationality","authors":"Snow Zhang","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00164-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00164-9","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>According to approximate Bayesianism, Bayesian norms are ideal norms worthy of approximation for non-ideal agents. This paper discusses one potential challenge for approximate Bayesianism: in non-transparent learning situations—situations where the agent does not learn what they have or have not learnt—it is unclear that the Bayesian norms are worth satisfying, let alone approximating. I discuss two replies to this challenge and find neither satisfactory. I suggest that what transpires is a general tension between approximate Bayesianism and the possibility of “non-ideal” epistemic situations.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00164-9.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142415053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Epistemic benevolence","authors":"Shane Ryan","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00175-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00175-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I make the case that what gets called epistemic paternalism isn’t correctly labelled as such. This mislabelling is problematic for two reasons. First, paternalism in general faces strong challenges to its permissibility. Second, the scope for action of epistemic paternalism is somewhat narrow given the typical concerns of applied epistemology. Having clarified epistemic paternalism and discussed the above considerations, this paper introduces epistemic benevolence. The case is made that the epistemic benevolence-based approach can avoid some of the strong challenges that epistemic paternalism faces and is often more suitable for the concerns of applied epistemology than a paternalist approach. To make these points, first, I make the case for a particular analysis of the epistemic paternalist act and, second, I explain epistemically benevolent acts as acts motivated by a concern for the epistemic welfare of another agent or agents. Given this characterisation, I argue that epistemic benevolence includes epistemic paternalism but extends beyond epistemic paternalism. I consider an objection to epistemic benevolence, which motivates <i>laissez faire</i> epistemic liberalism, a rival theoretical approach. Outlining this alternative serves to provide a further theoretical option relevant for work in applied epistemology. I offer some considerations as to why epistemic benevolence approach should still be favoured.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141661324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Integrating classical Chinese philosophy with (Kantian) pragmatist metaphysics: comments on JeeLoo Liu’s essay","authors":"Sami Pihlström","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00176-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00176-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper is a brief comment on JeeLoo Liu’s interpretation of classical Chinese philosophy, especially Wang Yangming’s (1472–1529) views, in terms of pragmatist metaphysics primarily drawn from William James and Hilary Putnam. Liu’s reading of Wang Yangming both in the context of the Chinese tradition and in relation to pragmatism is most welcome as a novel contribution to comparative and intercultural philosophy. However, in such comparisons, we also have to be careful to avoid anachronistically attributing, e.g., Kantian and/or pragmatist ideas to earlier thinkers coming from a very different cultural context.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00176-5.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141836473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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