{"title":"In defense of Frankfurtian wholeheartedness—comments on Chen Yajun’s Frankfurt’s concept of identification","authors":"Yuanfan Huang","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00258-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00258-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper responds to Chen Yajun’s critique in “Frankfurt’s Concept of Identification.” Frankfurt is well-known for defining free will as second-order volitions that an agent fully endorses wholeheartedly. Chen, however, argues that Frankfurt’s concept of wholeheartedness is problematic for two reasons. First, it fails to offer a clear endpoint in the appeal to higher-order desires to resolve conflicts among second-order desires. Second, wholeheartedness sets an unreasonably high bar for acting freely, as one can still act freely even in a state of halfheartedness or ambivalence. In response, Chen proposes his theory of weak identification, which he claims has certain advantages over Frankfurt’s view. I argue that Frankfurt can address the issue of arbitrariness and that Chen misinterprets Frankfurt’s concept of wholeheartedness. Furthermore, I argue that Chen’s theory faces significant challenges.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143489555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Evidential Pluralism and accounts of establishing","authors":"Michael Wilde","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00252-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00252-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In <i>Evi</i><i>dential Pluralism in the Social Sciences</i>, Yafeng Shan and Jon Williamson do a great job of clarifying, motivating, and defending the commitments of Evidential Pluralism. In this commentary, I will show that one of their clarifications commits Evidential Pluralism to a particular account of establishing. And I will argue that a non-committal account of establishing would better promote the main message of the book.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00252-4.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143480918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Publisher Correction: Internalist reliabilism in statistics and machine learning: thoughts on Jun Otsuka’s Thinking about Statistics","authors":"Hanti Lin","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00251-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00251-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143396515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Should we stop talking about “democracy”? Conceptual abandonment and the perils of political discourse","authors":"Steffen Koch","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00250-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00250-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In his recent book, <i>The Concept of Democracy: An Essay on Conceptual Amelioration and Abandonment</i> (OUP, 2023) Herman Cappelen argues that we should abandon the concept of democracy, and hence stop using the words “democracy” and “democratic.” In the course of developing his arguments for this surprising claim, Cappelen also offers a more general theory of what kind of reasons count in favor of abandoning a concept. In this paper, which is part of a book symposium on Cappelen’s book, I review and criticize both his theory of abandonment and his case for abandoning the concept of democracy. I argue that Cappelen’s abandonment theory is inconclusive and that his case for abandoning the concept of democracy is unconvincing.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00250-6.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143396514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Has Candrakīrti refuted a Humean account of causation?","authors":"Mark Siderits","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00248-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00248-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Mādhyamikas frequently claim that the emptiness of all dharmas follows from the fact that they originate. This claim is in some tension with Madhyamaka’s alleged thesislessness, a stance that seems to entail that there can be no master argument for emptiness—that Madhyamaka can only refute specific formulations of realism about dharmas and cannot offer a definitive refutation of all possible realist positions. It is thus worth investigating whether the argument from origination actually succeeds in establishing emptiness. A crucial part of the argument seeks to show that origination from distinct cause and conditions is incoherent. The argument typically deploys the three-times strategy, relying on the point that effect succeeds cause, and pointing out that the entity <i>h</i> that is alleged to bring about the origination of the entity in question <i>p</i> cannot be said to be a cause—to perform the function of originating—when <i>p</i> does not yet exist, nor when <i>p</i> does exist, and that there is no third time that is somehow intermediate between the two. I assess this and other arguments deployed by Candrakīrti in his defense of the view (MAv 6.103) that all things lack intrinsic nature. In doing so, I try to respond to Westerhoff’s recent criticisms of a regularity theory of causation, a conception meant to evade the difficulties of the ‘power’ conception of causes.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143184701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The use of large language models as scaffolds for proleptic reasoning","authors":"Olya Kudina, Brian Ballsun-Stanton, Mark Alfano","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00247-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00247-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper examines the potential educational uses of chat-based large language models (LLMs), moving past initial hype and skepticism. Although LLM outputs often evoke fascination and resemble human writing, they are unpredictable and must be used with discernment. Several metaphors—like calculators, cars, and drunk tutors—highlight distinct models for student interactions with LLMs, which we explore in the paper. We suggest that LLMs hold a potential in students’ learning by fostering proleptic reasoning through scaffolding, i.e., presenting a technological accompaniment in anticipating and responding to potential objections to arguments. Here, the technical limitations of LLMs can be reframed as beneficial when fostering anticipatory reasoning. Whether their outputs are accurate or not, evaluating them stimulates learning. LLMs require students to critically engage, emphasizing analytical thinking over mere memorization. This interaction helps solidify knowledge. Additionally, we explore how engaging with LLMs can prepare students for constructive collective discussions and provide first steps in addressing epistemic injustices by highlighting potential research blind spots. Thus, while acknowledging the sociopolitical and ethical complexities of using LLMs in education, we suggest that when used in an informed way, they can promote critical thinking through anticipatory reasoning.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00247-1.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143108191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"AI wellbeing","authors":"Simon Goldstein, Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00246-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00246-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Under what conditions would an artificially intelligent system have wellbeing? Despite its clear bearing on the ethics of human interactions with artificial systems, this question has received little direct attention. Because all major theories of wellbeing hold that an individual’s welfare level is partially determined by their mental life, we begin by considering whether artificial systems have mental states. We show that a wide range of theories of mental states, when combined with leading theories of wellbeing, predict that certain existing artificial systems have wellbeing. Along the way, we argue that there are good reasons to believe that artificial systems can have wellbeing even if they are not phenomenally conscious. While we do not claim to demonstrate conclusively that AI systems have wellbeing, we argue that there is a significant probability that some AI systems have or will soon have wellbeing and that this should lead us to reassess our relationship with the intelligent systems we create.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00246-2.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143108190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Belief beyond reason: a radical relativist hinge epistemology","authors":"Drew Johnson","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00244-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00244-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Hinge epistemology is sometimes thought to have controversial relativist and non-evidentialist commitments. This paper develops and motivates an explicitly relativist and radically non-evidentialist version of hinge epistemology, following and combining aspects of Ashton’s (2019) defense of relativist hinge epistemology and Pritchard’s (2016) defense of a non-epistemic reading of hinge commitments. I argue that radical relativist hinge epistemology shares in a main attraction of hinge epistemology in general, namely, offering a dissolution of closure-based radical skeptical problems. I then motivate RR as a <i>social hinge epistemology</i> by showing that it is particularly well-suited for fruitful applications in topics such as deep disagreement, testimonial injustice, and hermeneutic injustice.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11785599/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143082412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jens Christian Bjerring, Jakob Mainz, Lauritz Munch
{"title":"Deep learning models and the limits of explainable artificial intelligence","authors":"Jens Christian Bjerring, Jakob Mainz, Lauritz Munch","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00238-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00238-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>It has often been argued that we face a trade-off between accuracy and opacity in deep learning models. The idea is that we can only harness the accuracy of deep learning models by simultaneously accepting that the grounds for the models’ decision-making are epistemically opaque to us. In this paper, we ask the following question: what are the prospects of making deep learning models transparent without compromising on their accuracy? We argue that the answer to this question depends on which kind of opacity we have in mind. If we focus on the standard notion of opacity, which tracks the <i>internal</i> complexities of deep learning models, we argue that existing explainable AI (XAI) techniques show us that the prospects look relatively good. But, as it has recently been argued in the literature, there is another notion of opacity that concerns factors <i>external</i> to the model. We argue that there are at least two types of external opacity—link opacity and structure opacity—and that existing XAI techniques can to some extent help us reduce the former but not the latter.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00238-8.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143109959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Keep using “democracy” in political theory","authors":"Mark Pinder","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00239-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00239-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper is a contribution to a symposium on Herman Cappelen’s 2023 book <i>The Concept of Democracy: An Essay on Conceptual Amelioration and Abandonment</i>. In that book, Cappelen develops a theory of abandonment—a theory of why and how to completely stop using particular linguistic expressions—and then uses that theory to argue for the general abandonment of the words “democracy” and “democratic”. In this paper, I critically discuss Cappelen’s arguments for the abandonment of “democracy” and “democratic” in political theory specifically.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00239-1.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143109435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}