Asian journal of philosophy最新文献_第3页

Précis of Unsettled Thoughts. A Theory of Degrees of Rationality and Replies to Commentators 未定思想的实践。理性程度理论及其对评论者的回应

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-08-07 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00308-5

Julia Staffel

引用次数: 0

Illusions of memory: what referential confabulation can tell us about remembering 记忆的幻觉：参照虚构能告诉我们关于记忆的什么

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-07-25 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00305-8

James Openshaw

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引用次数: 0

Memory as the origin of the past: a developmental and conceptual refinement of the dependency thesis 记忆是过去的起源：依赖性论题的发展和概念上的改进

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-07-24 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00306-7

Yasushi Hirai

{"title":"Memory as the origin of the past: a developmental and conceptual refinement of the dependency thesis","authors":"Yasushi Hirai","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00306-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00306-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper aims to refine the dependency thesis, which posits that episodic memory is necessary for acquiring the concept of pastness. By incorporating the hybrid concept thesis, which holds that pastness involves an irreducible experiential component, and the communicability constraint, which states that such experiential content cannot be acquired purely through linguistic or inferential means, this paper argues that pastness cannot be fully explained by relational properties alone. Developmental psychological evidence suggests that temporal cognition progresses in stages, with an early categorical sense of pastness emerging before the ability to structure time sequentially. At this early stage, individuals lack the capacity for time-place indexing, which reinforces the need for direct experiential access in forming the concept of the past. This structured framework clarifies why empirical objections—such as amnesia cases used to challenge the necessity of episodic memory—fail to undermine the dependency thesis. While patients with episodic memory loss retain some relational understanding of time, their concept of pastness remains indirectly dependent on the episodic memory of others. Similarly, critiques arguing that episodic memory is not sufficient for past concept formation conflate different stages of cognitive development, overlooking the necessity of early direct experiential awareness. By integrating philosophical and psychological insights, this paper provides a structured argument for the specific way in which episodic memory contributes to our understanding of time.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145168403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Bird’s Knowing Science: on cases of scientific progress 伯德的《认识科学》：以科学进步为例

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-07-23 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00304-9

Maren Bräutigam

引用次数: 0

Responses to criticisms 对批评的回应。

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-07-21 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00302-x

Yafeng Shan, Jon Williamson

引用次数: 0

Response to critics 对批评的回应

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-07-14 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00303-w

Alan Richardson

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Unless we have faces: love, evaluation, and nonresistant nonbelief 除非我们有面孔：爱、评价和不抗拒的不信

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-07-14 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00298-4

Benny Mattis

{"title":"Unless we have faces: love, evaluation, and nonresistant nonbelief","authors":"Benny Mattis","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00298-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00298-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper presents a theistic reply to J. L. Schellenberg’s Hiddenness Argument, which frames the existence of “nonresistant nonbelief”—that is, lack of belief in God which is not due to any resistance on the part of the nonbeliever—as evidence against theism. After reviewing some previous theistic responses to the Hiddenness Argument, I elaborate and build upon Schellenberg’s philosophical methodology, particularly emphasizing a distinction between divine loving and divine valuing. Loving is properly directed toward actual persons as such and presupposes the existence of the beloved, but valuing is properly directed toward possible persons as such and chooses the existence of the beloved. Building on this distinction, I argue that God would value and therefore create persons such as those who exist in our actual world, including nonresistant nonbelievers (i.e., persons who exist in a state of nonresistant nonbelief at some point during the course of their lives). My reasoning is based on the notion that most persons who exist in our actual world are properly valuable; we may discover their value by way of human experience, but God would value such persons even prior to their existence. After formulating an objection to the Hiddenness Argument and a counter-argument in favor of theism, I close with another review of prior literature, explaining how this paper’s reasoning overcomes some of the problems faced by previous theistic responses to the Hiddenness Argument.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00298-4.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145165307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Precis of Evidential Pluralism in the Social Sciences 社会科学证据多元论的要点。

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-07-10 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00301-y

Yafeng Shan, Jon Williamson

引用次数: 0

Physical nature lives! Naturalism facing scientism and the continental phenomenological tradition 物质的自然是有生命的！面对科学主义和大陆现象学传统的自然主义

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-07-07 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00295-7

Lok-Chi Chan, Kuei-Chen Chen

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引用次数: 0

Skeptical doubt, principal bases, and heuristics and rational norms 怀疑论的怀疑，主要依据，启发式和理性规范

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-06-30 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00299-3

Jonathan Ichikawa

引用次数: 0