{"title":"Russellian monism and neutral monism: scrutinizing inscrutables","authors":"Donovan Wishon","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00437-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00437-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper critically examines Haoying Liu’s recent challenge to Russellian monism (RM), often understood as the view that (1) physics describes natural phenomena entirely in structural terms; (2) such phenomena possess intrinsic characters, or quiddities, that constitute or ground what physics describes structurally; and (3) phenomenal consciousness is constituted, at least in part, by such quiddities. Liu argues that RM’s appeal is undermined by the epistemic inaccessibility of quiddities and their combinatory principles, rendering it liable to a historical decline akin to Thomistic hylomorphism. I contend that this critique overstates the degree of mystery inherent in RM. First, drawing on work by Torin Alter and Derk Pereboom (2023), I question whether RM is committed to the claim that physics captures only structural features of reality, thereby reopening the possibility that quiddities may be accessible to empirical or conceptual inquiry. Second, I situate RM within the neutral monist tradition that inspired it, showing how similar views in Ernst Mach and William James treat the fundamental constituents of reality as epistemically accessible. Finally, I revisit Bertrand Russell’s own formulation of neutral monism, arguing that it was intended primarily as a theoretical framework for situating mind and matter in nature rather than a discovery-oriented research program. These considerations suggest that Liu’s objection, while illuminating, does not decisively undermine RM’s philosophical viability.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-026-00437-5.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148750909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Modalists on modal knowledge","authors":"Shih-Hao Liu","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00440-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00440-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In their works, Bueno and Shalkowski, on the one hand, offer critical assessments of dominant modal epistemologies that rely primarily on sources such as intuition, inference to the best explanation, and similarity-based induction. On the other hand, they develop a modest modal epistemology that appeals to plausible inferential principles, knowledge of actuality, and background theoretical knowledge within the metaphysical framework of modalism. In this paper, I argue that their critical assessments of rival accounts are in tension with their own modal epistemology. In other words, the very strategies and criteria they deploy against earlier modal epistemologies ultimately rebound and threaten their own account. For example, the strategy they use in critiquing intuition-based modal epistemology can also be applied to sources such as perception, which should play a central role in their own epistemology. I further argue that this tension pushes them toward a more skeptical position than the one they initially defend. To avoid this outcome, I suggest two possible responses. First, they might reconsider their criticisms and adopt a more liberal modal epistemology that remains open to the very sources of modal knowledge they criticize, such as intuition. Second, they could provide a more detailed account of why the sources they appeal to are exempt from the objections they raise against rival views. However, both responses require additional theoretical work.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148750873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Inquiry, understanding, and the value of philosophy","authors":"Andrew Peet","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00436-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00436-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In her article ‘A portrait of understanding as a non-factive state’ Ylwa Sjölin Wirling (2026) argues for the existence of an important but hitherto unnoticed form of understanding that she calls ‘non-factive objectual understanding’ (or NFOU for short). NFOU is the sort of understanding we have when we grasp the range of possible accounts of a phenomena. I agree with Sjölin Wirling that NFOU is real and that it plays an important role in inquiry. However, I have doubts about whether or not it is a form of <i>non-factive</i> understanding, and also about whether it is a form of <i>objectual</i> understanding. Indeed, I suggest that by progressing inquiry and acquiring NFOU we may weaken our objectual understanding of the target phenomenon of inquiry. This is a potentially worrying conclusion for philosophy and related subjects where NFOU is often the best we can hope for.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-026-00436-6.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148750910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Animal suffering from Rabbi Moses to Aquinas and beyond","authors":"James Dominic Rooney","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00438-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00438-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In the <i>Guide</i>, Maimonides argues that Providence pertains to irrational animals only in terms of their species. This claim is criticized later by Thomas Aquinas for implying that Providence does not pertain immediately to singular individuals. While Aquinas’ approach is arguably not as distinct from Maimonides as might appear, Aquinas does not address what seems to be the Maimonides’ motivation: that animals suffer blamelessly and cannot benefit from their suffering. Aquinas’ approach to the place of non-human animals in Providence appears to be lacking, as he apparently holds a principle that animals are valuable only in terms of their usefulness to human life, and that natural evils (including the suffering of animals) are instrumentally necessary for biological goods. There are well-known reasons in the literature to question whether these responses are satisfactory. My paper will outline a theodicy for animal suffering that moves beyond Aquinas and Maimonides, but incorporates elements from the theories of both, arguing that animal suffering has a role in God’s Providence where the life of each animal is of intrinsic value, and where their suffering was not necessary for biological life. Rather, their suffering takes on a sacrificial aspect in a fallen world harmed by idolatry.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-026-00438-4.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148750681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The happy fish dialogue and the struggle for epistemic agency","authors":"Philippe Brunozzi","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00432-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00432-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This discussion of Michael Beaney’s <i>The Joy of Chinese Philosophy</i> pursues two aims. The first is to draw attention to a dimension of the happy fish dialogue in the <i>Zhuangzi</i> that has passed unnoticed in the literature: non-ideal epistemic agency. The second is to show that this dimension lends additional support to Beaney’s interpretation, given that his reading proves well suited to making sense of it.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148614608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Subjectivity, Russellian physicalism, and the hard problem","authors":"Zijian Zhu","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00434-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00434-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Christopher Brown argues that Russellian physicalism can solve the hard problem of consciousness by reconciling physicalism with non-physicalist intuitions. In this paper, I challenge this claim. I argue that Russellian physicalism cannot satisfactorily accommodate intuitions about the subjectivity of conscious experience. I distinguish two conceptions of subjectivity, epistemic and experiential, and argue that Russellian physicalism lacks explanatory usefulness with respect to both. On this basis, I reconstruct Thomas Nagel’s argument against physicalism in a form that cannot be easily deflected by Russellian physicalism. I conclude with some general remarks on the relationship between subjectivity and the hard problem.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148614540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Aesthetic reasons to deal with ugliness","authors":"Kiyohiro Sen","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00431-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00431-x","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Ugly things are everywhere—a vulgar dress, a messy room, a gaudy performance, or an awkward pronunciation. Like beautiful items, ugly items give us aesthetic reasons to respond in some way. One natural explanation for this reason-giving nature is that ugliness matters because displeasure matters. In this paper, however, I argue that aesthetic reasons to deal with ugliness cannot be reduced to hedonistic reasons to minimize displeasure and require an alternative explanation. Displeasure-based accounts fail to explain the fact that even an insensitive subject, who feels no displeasure toward an ugly item, might still have a good reason to deal with it. I argue that ugliness matters not only because displeasure matters, but also because defects matter. Defects, understood as features that render items as deviating from relevant norms, ground a specific kind of ugliness: relative ugliness. By appealing to the ideas of natural normativity and its derivation, I demonstrate that anyone has reason to minimize defects underlying such an ugliness.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148465723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A recent defense of proper functionalism: reply to Tolly","authors":"Wai-Tat Lau","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00430-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00430-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>“Warrant” is the property that, in sufficient degree, turns true belief into knowledge. Plantinga proffers various cases in order to show that the accounts of warrant that do not invoke the notion of design-plan are inadequate whereas one of the main theses of Jeffrey Tolly’s article “Swampman: A Dilemma for Proper Functionalism” is to show that a more robust reliability condition can take Plantinga’s problem cases into account. In this paper, I will show that the reliability condition that Tolly formulates <i>cannot</i> accommodate Plantinga’s problem cases.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148465821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Justifying our universe with humans","authors":"Austin McGrath","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00428-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00428-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The final paragraph of Derek Parfit’s <i>On What Matters: Volume 2</i> reads: “What now matters most is that we avoid ending human history. If there are no rational beings elsewhere, it may depend on us and our successors whether it will all be worth it, because the existence of the Universe will have been on the whole good.” Why focus on rationality? I’ll sketch some reasons for and against the idea that the continued existence of rational beings likely leads to a universe that ought to be—a justified universe—and conclude the idea is plausible. I’ll also argue the reason we have to justify the universe isn’t just a reason we may have to make it better, and that a universe that ought to be requires a new kind of normative reason—an existential kind.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148465708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Temporal passage: a Chinese perspective","authors":"Peter Finocchiaro, Tian Xie, Tuxun Deng","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00429-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00429-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Hodroj, Latham, and Miller (2024) conducted a study to test whether the Moving Open Future Hypothesis (MOFH) is a viable explanation for why people represent time as robustly passing. Their study failed to find any significant associations that supported MOFH. Our attempt to replicate their study in a Chinese context found different results. As we explain in this paper, both our replication study and a follow-up study found that the judgments of Chinese participants aligned with what MOFH predicts. Thus, we suggest that it is too soon to abandon MOFH in favor of alternative explanations. Furthermore, we suggest that the viability of MOFH as an explanation might be relative to a cultural context. More specifically, MOFH posits inferential connections between beliefs about the future and beliefs about the passage of time. The reliability of those connections might depend on how much experience people have entertaining them. For instance, people embedded in a culture with strong fate-based reasoning might be better at reasoning about a merely subjectively open future. </p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148465520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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