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Asian journal of philosophy最新文献

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Explaining Phenomenal Explanationism: a précis of Appearance & Explanation: Phenomenal Explanationism in Epistemology 解释现象解释论：《表象与解释》简述：认识论中的现象解释学
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-11-25 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00212-4
Kevin McCain, Luca Moretti
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引用次数: 0
Linguistic diversity, global epistemic injustice, and Kantian public reason: comments on Lu-Adler on Kant’s linguistic Orientalism 语言多样性、全球认识论不公正与康德的公共理性：对卢-阿德勒论康德的语言东方学的评论
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-11-22 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00215-1
Yao Lin
{"title":"Linguistic diversity, global epistemic injustice, and Kantian public reason: comments on Lu-Adler on Kant’s linguistic Orientalism","authors":"Yao Lin","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00215-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00215-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>While I find Huaping Lu-Adler’s excavation of Kant’s long-overlooked linguistic Orientalism both enlightening and thought-provoking, I disagree with her diagnosis of its theoretical and practical relevance. On the one hand, while I agree that Kant’s positionality renders all his writings and teachings presumptively impactful, there is reason to doubt that his peculiar construction of the linguistic Oriental Other had much actual impact on his disciples. On the other hand, while I agree that the Kantian ideal of public reason is inapt for rectifying the linguistic-epistemic injustices of global knowledge production, I disagree on why it is so. In particular, I argue for a shift in theoretical and practical focuses, from linguistic biases and prejudices, to the structural epistemic constraints of linguistic diversity, as well as to other political-structural conditions shaping global knowledge production.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142679674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Correction to: No need for explanation 更正为无需解释
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-11-19 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00208-0
Michael Huemer
{"title":"Correction to: No need for explanation","authors":"Michael Huemer","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00208-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00208-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142672388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What naturalism? great apes, old-fashioned philosophy, an the McDowellian language game 什么自然主义？类人猿、老式哲学和麦克道尔语言游戏
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-11-16 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00217-z
Corijn van Mazijk
{"title":"What naturalism? great apes, old-fashioned philosophy, an the McDowellian language game","authors":"Corijn van Mazijk","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00217-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00217-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The article discusses certain limitations of the “McDowellian language game” and its approach to naturalism, arguing that it remains too detached from contemporary scientific insights on mind and life. I question the relevance of McDowell’s conceptual framework—focusing on concepts like “second nature”, “Bildung”, and “reason” — for addressing empirical, scientifically grounded theories about human nature. As an alternative, I discuss my own interdisciplinary approach, which seeks (among others) to integrate findings from primate studies on gaze following and proto-referential gestures to shed light on the evolution of reason-giving capacities. This approach, situated at the intersection of philosophy and cognitive science, provides a more empirically grounded model for understanding responsiveness to reasons as well as other McDowellian themes.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142645641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Internalist reliabilism in statistics and machine learning: thoughts on Jun Otsuka’s Thinking about Statistics 统计学和机器学习中的内部可靠论：对大塚纯《统计学思考》的思考
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-11-14 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00210-6
Hanti Lin
{"title":"Internalist reliabilism in statistics and machine learning: thoughts on Jun Otsuka’s Thinking about Statistics","authors":"Hanti Lin","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00210-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00210-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Otsuka (2023) argues for a correspondence between data science and traditional epistemology: Bayesian statistics is internalist; classical (frequentist) statistics is externalist, owing to its reliabilist nature; model selection is pragmatist; and machine learning is a version of virtue epistemology. Where he sees diversity, I see an opportunity for unity. In this article, I argue that classical statistics, model selection, and machine learning share a foundation that is reliabilist in an unconventional sense that aligns with internalism. Hence a unification under internalist reliabilism.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142636654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Defending phenomenal explanationism: responses to Fumerton, Huemer, McAllister, Piazza, Steup, and Zhang 为现象解释论辩护：对 Fumerton、Huemer、McAllister、Piazza、Steup 和 Zhang 的回应
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-11-13 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00213-3
Kevin McCain, Luca Moretti
{"title":"Defending phenomenal explanationism: responses to Fumerton, Huemer, McAllister, Piazza, Steup, and Zhang","authors":"Kevin McCain,&nbsp;Luca Moretti","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00213-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00213-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00213-3.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142600702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How the metaphysical and the ethical are intertwined: an organismic response to JeeLoo Liu 形而上学与伦理如何交织：对刘冀鲁的有机回应
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-11-13 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00209-z
Warren G. Frisina
{"title":"How the metaphysical and the ethical are intertwined: an organismic response to JeeLoo Liu","authors":"Warren G. Frisina","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00209-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00209-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00209-z.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142600703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Derivative normativity and logical pluralism 衍生规范性和逻辑多元论
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-11-12 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00214-2
Diego Tajer
{"title":"Derivative normativity and logical pluralism","authors":"Diego Tajer","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00214-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00214-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In a much-discussed article, Gillian Russell claimed that “logic isn’t normative”: according to her, the usual bridge principles for logic are just derived from general principles for truth and falsity, such as “believe the truth” or “avoid falsity.” For example, we ought to believe tautologies just because we ought to believe the truth. Russell argues that this rejection of logical normativity can avoid the collapse objection for logical pluralism, which typically presupposes the normativity. In the last part of his new book <i>Logical Pluralism and Logical Consequence</i>, Erik Stei responds that even if logic is normative in this weak derivative sense, the collapse objection re-emerges. His main point is that the collapse argument can still work even if the bridge principles are derivative (they just need to be true). In this paper I will argue against Stei’s point. I will show that there is a possible strategy which maintains the derivative normativity of logic and provides a non-trivial logical pluralism. The key to my approach is the possibility of having different normative sources for different logics. I will argue that the distinction between classical and relevant logic can be understood in this way.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142600780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Models and monism 模式与一元论
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-11-11 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00216-0
Leon Commandeur
{"title":"Models and monism","authors":"Leon Commandeur","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00216-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00216-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this paper, I critically examine the monist interpretation of the logic-as-model view that Erik Stei puts forth in <i>Logical Pluralism and Logical Consequence</i>. I will argue that, in addition to the three dimensions presented in the book, there is a fourth dimension on which pluralism in logic could arise, namely epistemological pluralism. An example of such a form of pluralism is model pluralism, being the idea that we need multiple models to fully account for the subject matter of logic. Such a form of pluralism is well-recognized and widely acknowledged in (model-based) science. I argue that if we endorse the logic-as-model view, then we should also recognize such a form of model pluralism in logic. While model pluralism is consistent with metaphysical monism — the idea that there is ultimately only one extra-systemic logical consequence relation — it does put pressure on the idea that there is one uniquely best model that fully captures that phenomenon.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00216-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142598794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Seeming and reflective awareness 表象和反思意识
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-11-08 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00205-3
Blake McAllister
{"title":"Seeming and reflective awareness","authors":"Blake McAllister","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00205-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00205-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In Appearance &amp; Explanation, Kevin McCain and Luca Moretti argue that phenomenal explanationism (PE) offers a superior account to phenomenal conservatism (PC) as to why seemings justify. One of their arguments for this position is that PE is in a better position to respond to skepticism than PC, since the latter faces the problem of reflective awareness while the former does not. I deny that PE has any such advantage. To the contrary, I argue that PC offers a superior response to skepticism, especially when it comes to the beliefs of non-reflective agents.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142595303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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