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Phenomenal explanationism and non-inferential justification 现象解释论和非推理论证
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-10 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00204-4
Tommaso Piazza
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引用次数: 0
Separating McDowell’s two Myths of the Given - or on how to best explain the conceptuality of the space of reasons 区分麦克道尔的两个 "既定神话"--或如何最好地解释理由空间的概念性
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-09 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00203-5
Johan Gersel
{"title":"Separating McDowell’s two Myths of the Given - or on how to best explain the conceptuality of the space of reasons","authors":"Johan Gersel","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00203-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00203-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In his book, <i>John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity</i>, Tony Cheng argues that recent changes to McDowell’s theory of perceptual justification should lead him to accept that experiences possess non-conceptual content. In this paper, I take issue with Cheng’s conclusion. Instead, I argue that McDowell should adopt Travis’s position, where experiences aren’t taken to possess content at all. I argue that we can distinguish two separate Myths of the Given in McDowell’s writings. While McDowell often seamlessly moves from one to the other, I argue that it is difficult to see how he can justify this due to his recent alterations to his position. I argue that if we reject one Myth and retain the other, then McDowell can both hold on to a version of his view that the space of reasons is the space of the conceptual, all the while he accepts Travis’s arguments to the effect that experiences are devoid of content. Finally, I consider some arguments McDowell might present against accepting Travis’s position. While these objections do not convince me, what is notable about them is that, if they are sound, then they will equally count against Cheng’s intermediary position where non-conceptual contents are ascribed to experiences. Hence, I conclude that there are no grounds on which McDowell can reasonably endorse that experiences possess non-conceptual contents. Either he should stick to his conceptualism, or he should follow Travis and reject that experiences possess contents at all.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00203-5.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142410897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Evidential pluralism in the social sciences: What can be established in case study research? 社会科学中的证据多元化：案例研究中能确立什么？
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-08 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00199-y
Rosa W. Runhardt
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引用次数: 0
Problems for phenomenal explanationism 现象解释论的问题
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-08 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00202-6
Matthias Steup
{"title":"Problems for phenomenal explanationism","authors":"Matthias Steup","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00202-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00202-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I raise several problems for Phenomenal Explanationism, which McCain and Moretti intend to be a fusion of Evidentialism and Phenomenal Conservatism. I argue that the view is actually a non-conservative, credentialist view. Unlike conservatism, it does not allow for immediate justification. I also argue that the view has trouble accounting for justification coming from background knowledge. Finally, I argue that the view runs into the problem of equally good explanations.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142410792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Laozian metaethics 老庄元伦理学
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-07 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00198-z
Jason Dockstader
{"title":"Laozian metaethics","authors":"Jason Dockstader","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00198-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00198-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper contributes to the emerging field of comparative metaethics by offering a reconstruction of the metaethical views implicit to the Daoist classic, the <i>Laozi</i> 老子 or <i>Daodejing</i> 道德經. It offers two novel views developed out of the <i>Laozi</i>: one-all value monism and moral trivialism. The paper proceeds by discussing Brook Ziporyn’s reading of the <i>Laozi</i> in terms of omnipresence and irony, and then applies his reading to moral properties like values and names (<i>ming</i> 名). The paper emboldens Ziporyn’s monistic tendencies in order to claim that the <i>Laozi</i> not only treats the Dao as an omnipresent value, but also as the one value that <i>is</i> all values. I call this view one-all value monism. I then argue that, in terms of moral epistemology, one-all value monism entails moral trivialism, the view that all moral judgments are true. I conclude by emphasizing the therapeutic motivation for holding such apparently outrageous metaethical views. The paper thus defends the basic claim that there is a point at which Ziporyn’s omnipresence and irony become monism and true contradiction, and that further exploring the consequences of these inevitable transitions leads to the discovery of novel metaethical views.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142410450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What are collective epistemic reasons and why do we need them? 什么是集体认识论理由，我们为什么需要它们？
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-05 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00197-0
Anne Schwenkenbecher
{"title":"What are collective epistemic reasons and why do we need them?","authors":"Anne Schwenkenbecher","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00197-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00197-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00197-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142410105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Kant, the scholarship condition, and linguistic racialization: comments on Lu-Adler’s Kant on Public Reason and the Linguistic Other 康德、学术条件与语言种族化：对 Lu-Adler 的《康德论公共理性与语言他者》的评论
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-03 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00200-8
J. Colin McQuillan
{"title":"Kant, the scholarship condition, and linguistic racialization: comments on Lu-Adler’s Kant on Public Reason and the Linguistic Other","authors":"J. Colin McQuillan","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00200-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00200-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this response to Lu-Adler’s “Kant on Public Reason and the Linguistic Other,” I summarize the restrictions the scholarship condition imposes on the public use of reason in Kant’s essay “What is Enlightenment?” I then agree that Lu-Adler identifies an even more radical set of restrictions on the public use of reason, confirming that Kant is not the liberal egalitarian he is often supposed to be by intellectual historians, historians of philosophy, and Kant scholars. After that, I suggest that what Lu-Adler calls “the construction of a linguistic other” in Kant’s lectures on logic and anthropology can also be understood as “Kantian linguistic racialization.” I close with a short reflection on how we should respond to Kant’s illiberal, inegalitarian, linguistic racism.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142409600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Valid and invalid causal arguments for physicalism 物理主义的有效和无效因果论证
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-02 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00192-5
Thomas Kroedel
{"title":"Valid and invalid causal arguments for physicalism","authors":"Thomas Kroedel","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00192-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00192-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In “A Causal Argument for Physicalism”, Lei Zhong presents an argument for physicalism in general, that is, for the disjunction of reductive physicalism and non-reductive physicalism. Zhong’s argument attempts to show that mental properties are physically acceptable, that is, physical in a wide sense. The crucial assumption of the argument is that physically acceptable effects do not have both sufficient causes that are physically acceptable and simultaneous sufficient causes that are not physically acceptable. I argue that Zhong’s argument is invalid, because the mental can be causally relevant to physically acceptable effects while being neither physically acceptable nor causally sufficient for these effects. I present an alternative argument in the spirit of Zhong’s argument that omits the notion of sufficient causation. I argue that non-physicalists can also resist the alternative argument if they fine-tune their metaphysics of mind.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00192-5.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142409540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Publisher Correction to: Rational belief, epistemic possibility, and the a priori 出版商更正为：理性信念、认识论可能性和先验论
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-02 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00180-9
Claire Field
{"title":"Publisher Correction to: Rational belief, epistemic possibility, and the a priori","authors":"Claire Field","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00180-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00180-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00180-9.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142409477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Justification and update 理由和更新
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-01 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00193-4
Jeanne Peijnenburg, David Atkinson
{"title":"Justification and update","authors":"Jeanne Peijnenburg,&nbsp;David Atkinson","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00193-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00193-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this commentary on Jun Otsuka’s first-rate book, we focus on the difference between justification and update.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00193-4.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142409365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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