Asian journal of philosophy最新文献_第2页

Peterson’s gradualist hypothesis 彼得森的渐进主义假说

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-08-22 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00320-9

Erik Carlson

引用次数: 0

Aggregation, trade-offs, and uncertainties in AI wellbeing 人工智能福祉的聚合、权衡和不确定性

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-08-22 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00318-3

Jiwon Kim

{"title":"Aggregation, trade-offs, and uncertainties in AI wellbeing","authors":"Jiwon Kim","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00318-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00318-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper examines how, if artificial agents are capable of wellbeing, their wellbeing should be compared and aggregated alongside human wellbeing. Building on arguments from Goldstein and Kirk-Giannini, who suggest that some AI systems may possess wellbeing, I explore the moral implications of this possibility. Rather than reinventing debates in population ethics, this paper adapts and extends them to the context of AI wellbeing. I analyse three major approaches to wellbeing aggregation: symmetric methods, which treat human and AI wellbeing as equally significant; uncertainty-responsive methods, which discount AI wellbeing due to ontological, temporal, or identity uncertainty; and constraint-based views, which impose categorical constraints on trading off human wellbeing for AI gains. These approaches are tested against thought experiments involving classic problems, such as the repugnant conclusion, infinitarian paralysis, and fanaticism. While utilitarian approaches risk endorsing troubling consequences when AI wellbeing scales indefinitely, constraint-based views may underweight the wellbeing of AI. A distinctive finding is that our intuitions shift depending on whether a human or an AI is a welfare subject. This reveals a potential asymmetry in our intuitive judgments, suggesting that species identity may itself be a morally salient feature that future theories of AI wellbeing should address. I conclude that uncertainty-responsive approaches, particularly those combining ontological, temporal, and identity-based discounting, offer a promising middle path that incorporates AI wellbeing into our moral calculus without letting it disproportionately outweigh human wellbeing in aggregation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00318-3.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144891502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Nietzsche on the decadence of philosophers: an alternative to the skeptical reading 尼采论哲学家的颓废：怀疑论阅读的另一种选择

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-08-18 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00315-6

M. Zulnoorain

{"title":"Nietzsche on the decadence of philosophers: an alternative to the skeptical reading","authors":"M. Zulnoorain","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00315-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00315-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>It has been argued by Brian Leiter that Nietzsche denies the reality of value on skeptical grounds, i.e., due to the historical failure of philosophers to reach rational consensus on value judgments, despite being well-situated epistemic observers. This paper argues that textual evidence strongly conflicts with this reading in three ways. Firstly, Nietzsche does not see philosophers as well-situated epistemic observers of value given their dogmatic refusal to undertake a diagnostic comparison of their values as “types” of “symptoms” based on their relationship to the presuppositions of “life”: values which are “healthy” and “true” and those which are “decadent” and “false.” Secondly, Nietzsche attributes the historical failure of philosophers to converge on healthy and true values (instinctive-natural values) to their negation of such value in favor of decadent and false values (decadent-moral values), and he explains this negation in terms of the personal and epistemic inadequacies of the philosophers themselves as valuing agents. Thirdly, this alternative explanation better coheres with the primary textual evidence for Leiter’s value skepticism wherein Nietzsche agrees with the Sophists in rejecting the dialectical justification of value because it signified the negation of instinctive-natural value among the Greeks, and not because of a failure to reach philosophical consensus. The paper concludes with the proposition that this alternative explanation for Nietzsche’s anti-realism about decadent-moral values is not one that precludes the possibility of value realism.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00315-6.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144861444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

How pictorial are mnemic scenarios? 助记情景有多形象？

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-08-18 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00307-6

Tony Cheng

引用次数: 0

Summary of phenomenalism: a metaphysics of chance and experience 现象学综述：机会与经验的形而上学

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-08-13 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00313-8

Michael Pelczar

引用次数: 0

Kantian ethics and the dutilitarian compromise 康德伦理学与功利主义的妥协

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-08-13 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00310-x

Paul Hurley

{"title":"Kantian ethics and the dutilitarian compromise","authors":"Paul Hurley","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00310-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00310-x","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Martin Peterson explores a compromise between what he characterizes “textbook” Kantian ethics and utilitarianism. But what if the textbook Kantian is not in crucial respects the Kantian; indeed, what if the textbook Kantian’s duty ethics is an ethical theory purged of precisely those elements of Kantian ethical theory that not only eliminate any such drive to compromise, but even demonstrate why the quest for such a compromise might be deeply misguided? In what follows, I will take up just such an alternative interpretation of Kant, focusing in particular upon the version of this interpretation developed by Barbara Herman. I demonstrate first that on this alternative interpretation, Kantian ethical theory, although undeniably an ethics of duty, is not in Peterson’s sense a duty ethics. I then demonstrate that because Kantian ethics thus interpreted does take consequences into account, it need not compromise with utilitarianism to do so. Finally, I argue that this alternative Kantian has reasons to reject utilitarianism as a theory that appeals fundamentally to the wrong rather than the right kinds of reasons, a theory that distorts the quest in ethical theory for good reasons of the right kind.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00310-x.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144832199","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Against epistemic agency 反对认知代理

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-08-12 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00316-5

Pranav Ambardekar

{"title":"Against epistemic agency","authors":"Pranav Ambardekar","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00316-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00316-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The view that agency is central to explaining why actions are subject to moral and prudential norms has considerable appeal. With an agential explanation of epistemic normativity, we would have a unified agential picture of moral, prudential, and epistemic normativity. This paper argues against an agential explanation of epistemic normativity. Prominent proposals about epistemic agency cash the idea out in terms of <i>voluntary agency</i>, <i>reasons-responsiveness</i>, or <i>judgment</i>. I show that each of these proposals faces the following dilemma: either the proposal fails to capture any genuinely explanatory concept of agency or it fails to adequately capture the class of items that are governed by epistemic norms. I suggest that there is reason to think that any account of epistemic agency is likely to face this dilemma. My argument gives us <i>grounds for pessimism</i> about the prospects of an agential explanation of epistemic normativity, and a unified agential picture of all normativity. Furthermore, my paper <i>motivates</i>, without defending, an alternate picture of normativity: the idea that actions and beliefs are two <i>distinct species</i> of a common normative genus. Either there is some other property, apart from agency, which unifies all norm-governed phenomena, or there is no such unifying property at all.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144814336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Closure, counterfactualist causation, and Zhong’s new causal argument for physicalism 封闭，反事实主义的因果关系，以及钟对物理主义的新因果论证

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-08-11 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00312-9

Jessica Wilson

引用次数: 0

Clarifying the metaphysics of pantheism to better assess the threat posed by the problem of evil identified by Nagasawa in The Problem of Evil for Atheists 阐明泛神论的形而上学，以便更好地评估永泽在《无神论者的邪恶问题》中提出的邪恶问题所构成的威胁

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-08-11 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00309-4

Andrei A. Buckareff

引用次数: 0

Justification reporting and the challenge of appropriate simplification 证明报告和适当简化的挑战

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-08-11 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00314-7

Axel Gelfert, Melena Schneider

{"title":"Justification reporting and the challenge of appropriate simplification","authors":"Axel Gelfert, Melena Schneider","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00314-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00314-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Justification Reporting as a mode of science reporting demands that, whenever feasible, science reporters should report appropriate aspects of the nature and strength of scientific justification, or lack thereof, for a reported scientific hypothesis (Gerken 2022). The benefits of such a norm are deemed to be two-fold: First, Justification Reporting is meant to give the audience direct epistemic reasons for accepting the scientific hypothesis; second, it aims at ensuring that audiences do not just absorb scientific claims but also acquire the requisite justifications, thereby promoting better collective understanding of scientific explanations. Yet, by necessity, Justification Reporting must proceed in a simplified manner and should be phrased in layperson’s terms. We argue that the assumption that appropriate simplifications are possible and can be routinely achieved in contexts of science reporting is optimistic and requires further substantiation. In particular, we look at the issue of oversimplification and its epistemic dangers, and argue that, if attempts to render the presentation of scientific justification appropriate to a given target audience overshoot the mark (due to oversimplification or a misleading framing of the issue at hand), Justification Reporting may fall flat and collapse into one of its competitors, Deficit Reporting and Consensus Reporting.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00314-7.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144810870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0