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A continuist formulation of Hirai’s multitimescale interpretation of Bergson’s theory of memory 平井对柏格森记忆理论的多时间尺度解释的连续性表述
IF 0.6
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2026-09-24 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-026-00441-9
Kourken Michaelian, Doudja Boumaza
{"title":"A continuist formulation of Hirai’s multitimescale interpretation of Bergson’s theory of memory","authors":"Kourken Michaelian,&nbsp;Doudja Boumaza","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00441-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00441-9","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The aim of this paper is to answer the question whether Bergson’s theory of memory (BTM)—or, more precisely, Hirai’s multitimescale interpretation of BTM—is compatible with or can be rendered compatible with continuism about memory and future thought. It would appear, at first glance, that the answer to this question is bound to be negative. Continuism, on the one hand, holds that memory and future thought are both forms of imagination and thus that there is no fundamental difference between them. BTM, on the other hand, holds, as Hirai interprets it, that both remembering and future thinking involve constructing an image but that the construction involved in remembering, in particular, targets an experience preserved in pure memory; because there is no future-orientated analogue of pure memory, it would appear that BTM is bound to treat future thoughts as differing fundamentally from the image memories that result from construction in the case of remembering. BTM would therefore appear to be incompatible with continuism. The paper will nevertheless argue that this appearance of incompatibility is misleading: BTM can, in fact, be rendered compatible with continuism if a certain presupposition pertaining to the accessibility of durations located at different timescales is rejected. The thesis of the paper, in short, is that a continuist formulation of Hirai’s multitimescale interpretation of BTM is coherent.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149035106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Hirai’s Bergsonism about episodic memory, situated 平井一夫关于情景记忆的柏格森主义
IF 0.6
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2026-09-17 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-026-00433-9
Christopher Jude McCarroll
{"title":"Hirai’s Bergsonism about episodic memory, situated","authors":"Christopher Jude McCarroll","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00433-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00433-9","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In the introduction to his major work of philosophy, <i>Mind and Matter</i>, Henri Bergson declares that both spirit and matter exist, and that we can determine the precise relation between them through the study of memory. More than a century later, Yasushi Hirai takes up this project and outlines an original and distinct interpretation and development of the Bergsonian approach to episodic memory. Hirai’s approach follows Bergson by offering an account of episodic memory that accepts the <i>preservation-in-itself</i> thesis, namely the idea that past experiences persist in their phenomenal form without relying on any external medium or brain traces. On the Hirai-Bergsonian approach, one reason that memory traces stored in the brain are to be rejected is that episodic remembering has a phenomenal, qualitative character that cannot be explained by traces stored in the brain. In this paper, I focus on providing an account of this phenomenal character of episodic remembering. First, I pose some open questions for Hirai’s Bergsonism, suggesting that some features of remembering seem best explained by appealing to a trace theory rather than the <i>preservation-in-itself</i> thesis. Second, I suggest that the trace theorist can better explain the phenomenology of remembering by appealing to a situated approach. Part of the richness of the phenomenal character of remembering is supplied by people, places, or objects in the present combined with information provided by a trace. This account also helps explain phenomenally impoverished remembering more easily than the Bergsonian account.\u0000</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-026-00433-9.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148987045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Philosophical Buddhism and fundamental reality: a reply to McNabb and Baldwin 哲学佛教与基本现实：对麦克纳布和鲍德温的回答
IF 0.6
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2026-09-09 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-026-00448-2
Joseph E. Blado
{"title":"Philosophical Buddhism and fundamental reality: a reply to McNabb and Baldwin","authors":"Joseph E. Blado","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00448-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00448-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Tyler McNabb and Erik Baldwin argue that (among other Asian traditions) Buddhism is logically consistent with the existence of a fundamental being of the sort in classical theism. They further contend that the Jonang-Zhentong (Shentong) and Jodo Shinshu (Shin) Buddhist traditions endorse that there really is (at least something like) such a fundamental reality. This article is a friendly reply to McNabb and Baldwin. I explicate two issues for their argument—one from a general lack of engagement with Buddhist dialetheic-paraconsistent perspectives, and another from a potential internal inconsistency in their view of fundamental reality. Ultimately, I draw on advancements in contemporary metaontology and higher-order logics to provide helpful resolutions. We begin by considering a concise summary of their argument (section 1). Afterwards, the earlier issues are explicated, and the subsequent outlined resolutions given (section 2). Finally, a central concern is engaged (section 3).</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-026-00448-2.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148927006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the alleged unfruitfulness of Russellian Monism 论所谓的俄国一元论的不结果
IF 0.6
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2026-09-07 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-026-00447-3
Tung-Ying Wu
{"title":"On the alleged unfruitfulness of Russellian Monism","authors":"Tung-Ying Wu","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00447-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00447-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In “Russellian Monism: Ignorance and Prospects,” Haoying Liu (2026) contends that Russellian Monism (RM) is a theoretically sterile framework, incapable of informing empirical inquiry. Liu’s central thesis rests on the ignorance hypothesis: because the intrinsic quiddities postulated by RM are fundamentally inscrutable, they offer no explanatory purchase for scientific research. By drawing a historical analogy to Thomistic Hylomorphism (TH), Liu suggests that just as TH was discarded for its explanatory vacuity, RM should likewise be abandoned. While accepting Liu’s characterization of RM for the sake of argument, this paper identifies four critical flaws in his position. First, Liu’s argument relies on the thesis of Ramseyan Humility that paradoxically implies we know quiddities ground physical structures while maintaining they are unknowable. Second, even granting epistemic ignorance of fundamental entities, one may still theoretically understand the mechanisms by which these entities necessitate observable phenomena. Third, it is unclear whether RM is intended by its proponents to function as a guide for empirical research, rather than a metaphysical solution to the hard problem. Finally, the analogy between RM and TH falters, as the two frameworks exhibit significant functional and conceptual dissimilarities that Liu fails to address.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148927212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Confidence in “knowing as”? A joyful engagement with The Joy of Chinese Philosophy 对“知道是”的信心？愉快地阅读《中国哲学之乐》
IF 0.6
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2026-09-02 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-026-00445-5
Ai Yuan
{"title":"Confidence in “knowing as”? A joyful engagement with The Joy of Chinese Philosophy","authors":"Ai Yuan","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00445-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00445-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper argues that while Michael Beaney offers a persuasive reconstruction of “knowing as,” his account relies on a form of epistemic confidence that is derived largely from Mohist notions of visual and objectual knowledge, which, however, sits uneasily with the Zhuangzian emphasis on epistemic indeterminacy and perspectival humility. First, this paper shows Beaney’s important claim that knowledge must be understood as a plural concept rather than one dominated by “knowledge as justified true belief.” I then examine his formulation of “knowing as” and its reliance on visual analogy. Finally, I argue that the Zhuangzi uses the contextual and situational nature of perspective not to secure confidence in knowing, but to unsettle it, thereby locating epistemic value in the capacity to change perspectives rather than in confidence about the process of knowing.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148926633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dölpopa, Shentong Buddhism, and the three jewels: an analytic-friendly analysis Dölpopa，神通佛教，和三宝：分析友好的分析
IF 0.6
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2026-08-31 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-026-00442-8
Joseph E. Blado
{"title":"Dölpopa, Shentong Buddhism, and the three jewels: an analytic-friendly analysis","authors":"Joseph E. Blado","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00442-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00442-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In philosophical Buddhism, a prominent view is that the “Buddhist Jewels” are helpful for achieving nirvana. These jewels include the Buddha, the Dharma (fundamental teaching), and the Sangha (the community of believers). In the medieval Buddhist philosopher Dölpopa’s <i>Jonang-Shentong</i> Buddhism, these jewels though are somehow mysteriously identical to one another—despite each having different features. This paper outlines an analytic-friendly analysis of the Buddhist jewels according to Dölpopa’s Shentong tradition by drawing on recent advancements in plural logic and analytic metaphysics. We begin by outlining the general metaphysics of Shentong Buddhism and the puzzles that arise regarding the Jewels (Section 1). Afterwards, relevant background in plural logic and contemporary metaphysics is covered (Section 2), a subsequent analysis of the Jewels is given (Section 3), and finally, a few worries are engaged (Section 4).</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-026-00442-8.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148928122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Brownian motion comes to nought: a critique of C.D. Brown’s Russellian physicalist solution to the hard problem of consciousness 布朗运动化为乌有：对布朗对意识难题的罗素式物理主义解决方案的批判
IF 0.6
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2026-08-11 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-026-00435-7
Itay Shani
{"title":"Brownian motion comes to nought: a critique of C.D. Brown’s Russellian physicalist solution to the hard problem of consciousness","authors":"Itay Shani","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00435-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00435-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>After offering an analysis of the hard problem and a classification of the main strategies for solving or dissolving it, I argue that Brown’s proposed solution to the problem suffers from several major deficiencies. First, Brown avoids the hard problem altogether, while targeting a different problem of his own making. Second, he excludes from consideration those intuitions that are most relevant to the problem as originally conceived and are potentially most damaging to his own approach, by wrongly classifying them as question-begging. Third, the intuitions which he judges to be the most relevant for solving the hard problem are, as a matter of fact, entirely insufficient either to solve the problem directly or to furnish it with a proper dissolution. Fourth, his argument in favor of the superiority of Russellian physicalism over its non-physicalist rivals is based on equivocation. Rather than standing up to the hard problem, Brown buries it under the rags.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148751862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Mapping (very) social epistemology 映射（非常）社会认识论
IF 0.6
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2026-08-08 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-026-00444-6
Neil Levy
{"title":"Mapping (very) social epistemology","authors":"Neil Levy","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00444-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00444-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A map of a debate or conceptual domain is a representation that allows us to see the relationship between some of its elements. A good map can increase our understanding of the debate. In this paper, I offer a very partial map of some elements of social epistemology. I argue that social epistemology can be divided into more kinds than previously recognized and that these kinds are interestingly different from one another. I use the distinctions drawn to make further distinctions, arguing that some instances of social epistemology that seem to be examples of non-ideal social epistemology should instead be seen as examples of ideal theory.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-026-00444-6.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148751400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Two truths and one aporia: a Madhyamaka model of agency in dialogue with Western philosophy of action 两个真理和一个不安：中观模式与西方行动哲学的对话
IF 0.6
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2026-08-08 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-026-00443-7
Denis S. Ushakov
{"title":"Two truths and one aporia: a Madhyamaka model of agency in dialogue with Western philosophy of action","authors":"Denis S. Ushakov","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00443-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00443-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This article explicates the Madhyamaka model of agency without a substantial subject. Drawing on Abhidharma, Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka, and the commentarial tradition (Candrakīrti), it reconstructs the conceptual apparatus that enables purposeful practice while simultaneously denying the ontological reality of the “I.” The central thesis is that the doctrine of the two truths (satya-dvaya) should be interpreted not as an ontological hierarchy but as operational dualism of descriptive levels: the subject is posited functionally—as a working hypothesis and skillful means (upāya)—yet not substantially. The article systematically introduces the concept of self-abolishing teleology, a goal-directedness aimed at the exhaustion of the subjective position itself. This model is juxtaposed with Western strategies of subject-decentration (Wittgenstein, Derrida, Dennett). A fundamental distinction emerges: Western philosophy confines itself to theoretical diagnosis of the illusion of the “I,” whereas Buddhism offers practical therapy that transforms the very stream of consciousness. The conclusion addresses the possibility of a secular adaptation of this model and its significance for contemporary philosophy of action.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148751015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What is the greatest being? Comparing western and eastern concepts of ultimate reality 什么是最伟大的存在？比较东西方终极实在的概念
IF 0.6
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2026-08-06 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-026-00439-3
Hans Van Eyghen
{"title":"What is the greatest being? Comparing western and eastern concepts of ultimate reality","authors":"Hans Van Eyghen","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00439-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00439-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The idea of the greatest (possible) being or perfect being features prominently in the ontological argument for God’s existence and perfect being theology. The greatest being is commonly conceived as a being with various omni-properties (e.g., omniscience, omnibenevolence, omnipotence and omnipresence). Non-Western traditions include very different accounts of ultimate reality, like the Dào or Brahman. In some traditions, these are regarded as the greatest or perfect being. The paper investigates whether non-Western accounts hold better cards to be regarded as the greatest or perfect being.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-026-00439-3.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148750889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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