{"title":"探究与对话:格律诗的规范和美德","authors":"Leonardo Flamini","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00274-y","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Recently, philosophers have shown an increasing interest in the normativity of inquiry. For example, they discuss which doxastic or epistemic state makes an inquiry permissible or impermissible. Moreover, since our inquiries are typically considered goal-directed activities that aim at answering questions, philosophers have offered general principles to capture their instrumental normativity. However, it is notable that these principles – being general – lack specificity: They do not tell us how we should specifically behave to conduct an effective inquiry. The primary goal of this paper is to provide a first formulation of more specific norms of inquiry. To further this goal, I will consider the prominent theory of conversation promoted by Roberts (Roberts, C. (1996). Information Structure: Towards an Integrated Theory of Formal Pragmatics. In J. Yoon & A. Kathol, OSU Working Papers in Linguistics, vol. 49: Papers in Semantics (pp. 91–136). The Ohio State University., Roberts, C. (2006). Context in Dynamic Interpretation. In L. R. Horn & G. Ward (Eds.), The Handbook of Pragmatics (pp. 197–220). Blackwell Publishing. 10.1002/9780470756959.ch9), which describes conversation as an instance of inquiry. Based on this perspective and the idea that Grice’s maxims (Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and Conversation. In P. Cole & J. L. Morgan. (Eds.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 3, Speech Acts (pp. 41–58). Academic Press.) individuate the norms of effective conversation, I will reformulate Gricean maxims in zetetic norms and argue for their intuitive appeal in regulating our inquiries. Moreover, I will point out how these “Gricean zetetic norms” can be fruitful in opening new lines of research about the zetetic domain. In particular, I will show how they can be used to identify and ground the existence of some zetetic virtues – virtues of inquiry: Zetetic parsimony, reliability, focus, and lucidity. Finally, I discuss how compatible these “Gricean zetetic virtues” are with the intellectual virtues we can find in the epistemological literature.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2025-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00274-y.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Inquiry and conversation: Gricean zetetic norms and virtues\",\"authors\":\"Leonardo Flamini\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s44204-025-00274-y\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Recently, philosophers have shown an increasing interest in the normativity of inquiry. For example, they discuss which doxastic or epistemic state makes an inquiry permissible or impermissible. Moreover, since our inquiries are typically considered goal-directed activities that aim at answering questions, philosophers have offered general principles to capture their instrumental normativity. However, it is notable that these principles – being general – lack specificity: They do not tell us how we should specifically behave to conduct an effective inquiry. The primary goal of this paper is to provide a first formulation of more specific norms of inquiry. To further this goal, I will consider the prominent theory of conversation promoted by Roberts (Roberts, C. (1996). Information Structure: Towards an Integrated Theory of Formal Pragmatics. In J. Yoon & A. Kathol, OSU Working Papers in Linguistics, vol. 49: Papers in Semantics (pp. 91–136). The Ohio State University., Roberts, C. (2006). Context in Dynamic Interpretation. In L. R. Horn & G. Ward (Eds.), The Handbook of Pragmatics (pp. 197–220). Blackwell Publishing. 10.1002/9780470756959.ch9), which describes conversation as an instance of inquiry. Based on this perspective and the idea that Grice’s maxims (Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and Conversation. In P. Cole & J. L. Morgan. (Eds.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 3, Speech Acts (pp. 41–58). Academic Press.) individuate the norms of effective conversation, I will reformulate Gricean maxims in zetetic norms and argue for their intuitive appeal in regulating our inquiries. Moreover, I will point out how these “Gricean zetetic norms” can be fruitful in opening new lines of research about the zetetic domain. In particular, I will show how they can be used to identify and ground the existence of some zetetic virtues – virtues of inquiry: Zetetic parsimony, reliability, focus, and lucidity. Finally, I discuss how compatible these “Gricean zetetic virtues” are with the intellectual virtues we can find in the epistemological literature.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":93890,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Asian journal of philosophy\",\"volume\":\"4 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-04-04\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00274-y.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Asian journal of philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s44204-025-00274-y\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Asian journal of philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s44204-025-00274-y","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
最近,哲学家们对探究的规范性表现出越来越浓厚的兴趣。例如,他们讨论哪一种谬论或认知状态使得一项研究是允许的或不允许的。此外,由于我们的调查通常被认为是目标导向的活动,旨在回答问题,哲学家们提供了一般原则来捕捉他们的工具规范性。然而,值得注意的是,这些原则是一般性的,缺乏特异性:它们没有告诉我们应该如何具体地进行有效的调查。本文的主要目标是提供一个更具体的调查规范的第一个公式。为了进一步实现这一目标,我将考虑罗伯茨(Roberts, C.(1996))提出的著名的对话理论。信息结构:走向形式语用学的整合理论。In J. Yoon &;A. Kathol,俄勒冈州立大学语言学工作论文,卷49:语义学论文(第91-136页)。俄亥俄州立大学。罗伯茨,C.(2006)。动态解释中的语境。在L. R. Horn &;G.沃德(编辑),语用学手册(第197-220页)。Blackwell Publishing. 10.1002/9780470756959.ch9),该书将对话描述为查询的实例。基于这一观点和想法,格赖斯的格言(格赖斯,h.p.(1975)。逻辑和对话。在P. Cole &;j·l·摩根。(编),句法和语义,卷3,言语行为(第41-58页)。学术出版社)将有效对话的规范个性化,我将在探究规范中重新表述格里塞格言,并论证它们在规范我们的探究方面的直觉吸引力。此外,我将指出这些“格里塞式的探究规范”如何在开启探究领域的新研究路线方面取得丰硕成果。特别是,我将展示如何使用它们来识别和确立一些探究性美德的存在:探究性美德:探究性的简约、可靠、专注和清晰。最后,我讨论了这些“格莱斯式的探究美德”与我们在认识论文献中可以找到的智力美德是如何兼容的。
Inquiry and conversation: Gricean zetetic norms and virtues
Recently, philosophers have shown an increasing interest in the normativity of inquiry. For example, they discuss which doxastic or epistemic state makes an inquiry permissible or impermissible. Moreover, since our inquiries are typically considered goal-directed activities that aim at answering questions, philosophers have offered general principles to capture their instrumental normativity. However, it is notable that these principles – being general – lack specificity: They do not tell us how we should specifically behave to conduct an effective inquiry. The primary goal of this paper is to provide a first formulation of more specific norms of inquiry. To further this goal, I will consider the prominent theory of conversation promoted by Roberts (Roberts, C. (1996). Information Structure: Towards an Integrated Theory of Formal Pragmatics. In J. Yoon & A. Kathol, OSU Working Papers in Linguistics, vol. 49: Papers in Semantics (pp. 91–136). The Ohio State University., Roberts, C. (2006). Context in Dynamic Interpretation. In L. R. Horn & G. Ward (Eds.), The Handbook of Pragmatics (pp. 197–220). Blackwell Publishing. 10.1002/9780470756959.ch9), which describes conversation as an instance of inquiry. Based on this perspective and the idea that Grice’s maxims (Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and Conversation. In P. Cole & J. L. Morgan. (Eds.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 3, Speech Acts (pp. 41–58). Academic Press.) individuate the norms of effective conversation, I will reformulate Gricean maxims in zetetic norms and argue for their intuitive appeal in regulating our inquiries. Moreover, I will point out how these “Gricean zetetic norms” can be fruitful in opening new lines of research about the zetetic domain. In particular, I will show how they can be used to identify and ground the existence of some zetetic virtues – virtues of inquiry: Zetetic parsimony, reliability, focus, and lucidity. Finally, I discuss how compatible these “Gricean zetetic virtues” are with the intellectual virtues we can find in the epistemological literature.