{"title":"A multi-timescale interpretation of Bergson’s theory of pure memory","authors":"Yasushi Hirai","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00446-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00446-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper, based on Hirai (2022), proposes a “Multi-Timescale” (MTS) interpretation of Henri Bergson’s theory of pure memory (mémoire pure). The main focus is Bergson’s Preservation-in-Itself Thesis (PII), the claim that past experiences persist without relying on stored neural traces. Traditional trace-based memory theories are criticized by Bergson for neglecting the phenomenal component of remembering and failing to account for genuine temporal extension. To address these issues, I introduce a concept of “Trans-Timescale” (TTS) systems, characterized by multiple coexisting timescales ranging from perceptual immediacy to an individual’s lifespan. In such a framework, experiences preserved at longer timescales remain contemporaneous with shorter timescales, thereby explaining the direct phenomenological connection to the past. This approach positions Bergson’s theory as a genuine alternative to contemporary trace-based and simulationist models of memory. By systematically reconstructing Bergson’s arguments within an MTS framework, this paper seeks to provide a coherent philosophical and empirical grounding for pure memory, opening avenues for dialogue between Bergson’s philosophy and contemporary theories of memory.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-026-00446-4.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149234729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sosa, dream ontology, and dream scepticism","authors":"Chris Atkinson, Kengo Miyazono","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00460-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00460-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Ernest Sosa defends an imagination model of dreams. His main motivation for doing so is to avoid dream scepticism—the eternal sceptical concern that we cannot have knowledge of the external world, given that we might be dreaming. In this paper, we argue that Sosa’s appeal to an imagination model of dreams does not, in fact, allow him to avoid dream scepticism. This is because, even if we accept an imagination model of dreams, we should still accept that deceptive beliefs can enter into dreams. To make the point, we develop two lines of thought. The first draws on the imagination literature. We argue that since the imagination <i>in general</i> does not operate entirely independently of our belief forming mechanisms, we should not suppose that it does so <i>in the particular case</i> of dreaming. And second, we appeal to the empirical literature on <i>sleep-dependent memory consolidation</i> to suggest that there are also empirical reasons to think that beliefs can form and update in dreams.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149189585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"You idiot","authors":"Eugene Chislenko","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00459-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00459-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Imagine that Einstein falls for a scam, losing a week’s salary, and his wife Mileva says: “You idiot!” This seems like blame for an epistemic failure rather than a moral one. Is there such a thing as epistemic blame, and if so, what is it? Cameron Boult’s book <i>Epistemic Blame</i> develops a conception of epistemic blame as a kind of relationship modification. Some critics think this conception cannot distinguish blaming from excusing. I argue that the concern about excuses is an instance of a much broader problem: how to distinguish blame from excusing, forgiving, impersonal responses, and non-blaming ways of holding accountable. Relationship-centered views of all kinds of blame tend to define blame too broadly, folding in many non-blaming reactions. Taking “You idiot” as a paradigm case can help us articulate what kind of response can count as distinctively epistemic blame: a response that focuses on the blamed person as a locus of fault.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-026-00459-z.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149189830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Against speech liberalism for generative AI","authors":"Tamara Dobler","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00454-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00454-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Speech liberalism holds that the linguistic output of generative AI is continuous with human speech and should therefore be treated as meaningful in broadly the same way. Strong versions of this view take the fluent behaviour of chatbots to justify attributing genuine linguistic and cognitive agency, while nevertheless advocating caution when questions of moral or legal responsibility arise. I argue that this gives too much evidential weight to successful conversational interaction, where speaker intentions largely recede into the background. Once AI-generated speech contributes to serious harm, however, those intentions become central. More broadly, the paper challenges a way of theorising about AI speech that builds classifications of linguistic agency primarily from successful conversational interaction. I develop two independent but complementary arguments. The first is ethical–legal. I argue that classifying chatbot output as speech is not normatively neutral: within existing free-speech doctrine, it risks generating responsibility and liability gaps in cases of AI-mediated harm. The second is epistemic. I argue that the behavioural evidence supporting strong speech liberalism is systematically distorted by anthropomorphic bias, reinforced by AI design practices. The paper concludes that theories of AI speech should not be built exclusively from successful conversational exchanges and that, until a broader evidential case is made, a more conservative approach to AI speech is warranted in high-stakes contexts.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-026-00454-4.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149132267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A model for “AI”-relevant vulnerability","authors":"Niël Conradie, Jakob Ohlhorst","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00456-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00456-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The recent growth in discussions of “artificial intelligence” has been accompanied by a proportional growth in the discussion of vulnerability <i>of</i> and <i>to</i> “artificial intelligence”. Meanwhile, the concept of vulnerability has not seen any deeper analysis adequate to capture all of the newly discussed phenomena. Popular conceptions of vulnerability either lack the necessary normative force to make it morally relevant, or they are limited to vulnerability to harms, which would exclude a range of entities that we would ordinarily consider to be vulnerable. To address these challenges, we propose a normative functionalist account of vulnerability: A system is vulnerable just in case it is sensitive to the disruption of its weakly valuable functions. We develop and defend this account, explicating what we understand by functions, their disruption, and how they are weakly valuable. We conclude by illustrating our account by applying it to a range of cases from the domain of “AI”-applications regarding individual agents, social institutions, and ecosystems.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-026-00456-2.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149132131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Chinese account of luck","authors":"Kok Yong Lee","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00452-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00452-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The terms “luck” and its cognates are ambiguous between a reading closely related to fortune and a reading closely related to chance. This ambiguity is theoretically significant in two respects. First, it motivates a distinction between what I call “fortunate luck” and “chancy luck.” Second, it invites an analysis of luck through the lens of languages unrelated to English, and in particular Mandarin. Analyzing the Mandarin counterparts of “luck” reveals that fortunate luck consists in the idea of the natural course of things, while chancy luck relies on the idea of coincidence. I call these “the no-intervention account” and “the coincidence account” respectively and “the Chinese account” collectively. I argue that the Chinese account is theoretically preferable to the modal and lack-of-control accounts, as it is immune to several counterexamples that afflict the latter.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149132325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Against mysterian Russellian monism: commentary on Brown and Liu","authors":"Sam Coleman","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00450-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00450-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I argue that the combined effect of the papers by Brown and Liu is to enhance the credentials and prospects of non-mysterian forms of Russellian monism such as panpsychism and panqualityism, at the expense of mysterian views like Brown’s ‘Russellian physicalism’.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149133213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Coming to know anything as philosophy","authors":"Fons Dewulf","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00458-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00458-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I make explicit how Michael Beaney’s The Joy of Chinese Philosophy is a reflexive book: its subject matter, the happy fish dialogue, and the overarching goal in discussing that subject are the same. Both the dialogue and the book, I argue, present a performative argument in favor of roaming beyond the confines of one’s own given perspective. In both cases the strength of the performative argument depends on the credibility of a crucial analogy. I point out that the analogy used by Beaney in the book hinges on certain familiar characteristics of analytic philosophy being retrofitted onto the happy fish dialogue, and I question whether this analogy can be maintained in the face of contextualist interpretations of the Zhuangzi. I use this case to present an overall methodological puzzle about comparative philosophy: what is the point at which the fusion of intellectual horizons becomes senseless to create? I argue that this is a question, not only for Beaney, but equally a question that arises from within the happy fish dialogue itself.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-026-00458-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149132672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The arch-paradox of the self: Nāgārjuna, Śaṅkara, and the dissolution of personal identity in light of Lurianic withdrawal","authors":"Bharath Sriraman","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00457-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00457-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper contends that the paradoxes of the self identified by Nāgārjuna and Śaṅkara are not competing solutions but structurally homologous instantiations of a single recurring form: a primordial withdrawal that enables the very individuation whose dissolution both philosophers prescribe. Drawing on the “paradox theodicy” framework developed in comparative work on Lurianic Kabbalah and Advaita Vedānta, it argues that Nāgārjuna’s anātman (non-self) and Śaṅkara’s māyā-generated jīva (illusory individual self) are twin movements within a single dialectical structure—the self must first arise as apparent entity, through a withdrawal whose formal shape parallels Luria’s tzimtzum, before it can be recognized as dependently originated or superimposed appearance. Using Priest’s inclosure schema, extended here to self-referential ontological arguments, the paper demonstrates that both positions generate arch-paradoxes of identical formal structure, then employs the Lurianic withdrawal-rupture-repair triad as a formal comparator to show that their disagreement concerns the ontological status of the withdrawal event, not its formal place within the structure. The analysis closes by considering how contemporary discussions of consciousness fragmentation in technologically mediated environments might illustrate both paradoxes—suggesting that what appears as a historical Buddhist-Hindu disagreement is better understood as a divergence in soteriological emphasis within a shared structure of self-negating necessity. We are careful throughout to specify in which sense each tradition treats individuation as “necessary” and to mark the limits of the Lurianic comparison.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149133020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Causal contribution, sufficiency, and related notions","authors":"Joshua Goh","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00453-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00453-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Much has been suggested to depend on causal contribution. Most prominently, it’s been suggested that, for some outcome, how morally responsible you are depends (<i>inter alia</i>) on how causally involved you were. The suggestion will be that for, say, the rising of Earth’s seas, you are less responsible than Chevron’s CEO, partly because you’ve contributed less to its causing. Other phenomena purported to be causally dependent in this way include certain types of liability and explanation. That said, the literature on the relation between causation and moral responsibility has unearthed the following issue: seemingly, there are multiple notions of causal contribution, and we must (occasionally) decide if one such notion is most relevant for attributions of moral responsibility. In response, some have recently argued that the most morally relevant notion of causal contribution concerns how close causes came to being individually sufficient for their outcomes. After adding a consideration of my own in favor of that view, I’ll argue that we’re nonetheless far from a full account of how moral responsibility and causal contribution relate, since there are multiple conceptions of “closeness to individual sufficiency,” and we must (occasionally) decide if one such conception is most morally relevant.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149035104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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