{"title":"Trustworthy AI: responses to commentators","authors":"Christoph Kelp, Mona Simion","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00229-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00229-9","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In ‘Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence’, we develop a novel account of how it is that AI can be trustworthy and what it takes for an AI to be trustworthy. In this paper, we respond to a suite of recent comments on this account, due to J. Adam Carter, Dong-yong Choi, Rune Nyrup, and Fei Song. We would like to thank all four for their thoughtful engagement with our work, as well as the Asian Journal of Philosophy for publishing the symposium on our paper. The game plan for the paper is as follows. We will first briefly rehearse the account and then respond to comments in turn.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00229-9.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142875235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the rationality of the iron rule from an evolutionary game perspective","authors":"Qiaoying Lu","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00233-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00233-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In <i>The Knowledge Machine</i>, Michael Strevens challenges traditional views of the scientific method and defends the “iron rule of explanation.” This commentary introduces an evolutionary game perspective to explore the emergence and sustainability of the iron rule. Modeling the dynamics of theory-competing strategies in a population of theorists demonstrates that whether following the iron rule is rational depends on the frequency of iron-rule players one encounters. The study suggests that the social constraints of localized networks for iron-rule followers are critical factors in transitioning from a philosophical-dispute equilibrium to a scientific-dispute equilibrium.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142845021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A cut-free modal theory of consequence","authors":"Edson Bezerra","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00220-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00220-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The cut-free validity theory <span>(textsf{STV})</span> proposed by Barrio, Rosenblatt, and Tajer suffers from incompleteness with respect to its object language validity predicate. The validity predicate of <span>(textsf{STV})</span> fails in validating some valid inferences of its underlying logic, the Strict Tolerant logic <span>(textsf{ST})</span>. In this paper, we will present the non-normal modal logic <span>(textsf{ST}^{Box Diamond })</span> whose modalities <span>(Box )</span> and <span>(Diamond )</span> capture the tautologies/valid inferences and the consistent formulas of the logic <span>(textsf{ST})</span>, respectively. We show that <span>(textsf{ST}^{Box Diamond })</span> does not trivialize when extended with self-referential devices. We also show that such a solution poses a dilemma. If we extend <span>(textsf{ST}^{Box Diamond })</span> in such a way that it allows iterated modal formulas among its theorems, then the resulting interpretation of <span>(Box )</span> as validity implies that metametainferences of <span>(textsf{ST})</span> behave like classical logic. On the other hand, if we allow these modalities to receive intermediate truth values, we obtain formulas incompatible with the proposed reading of <span>(Box )</span>.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142845022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Disagreement, retraction, and the importance of perspective","authors":"Dan Zeman","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00219-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00219-x","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In the semantic debate about perspectival expressions—predicates of taste, aesthetic and moral terms, epistemic modals, etc.—intuitions about armchair scenarios (e.g., disagreement, retraction) have played a crucial role. More recently, various experimental studies have been conducted, both in relation to disagreement (e.g., Cova, 2012; Foushee and Srinivasan, 2017; Solt, 2018) and retraction (e.g., Knobe and Yalcin, 2014; Khoo, 2018; Beddor and Egan, 2018; Dinges and Zakkou, 2020; Kneer 2021; 2022; Almagro, Bordonaba Plou, and Villanueva, 2023; Marques, 2024), with the aim of establishing a more solid foundation for semantic theorizing. Both these types of data have been used to argue for or against certain views (e.g., contextualism, relativism). In this talk, I discern a common thread in the use of these data and argue for two claims: (i) which perspective is adopted by those judging the armchair scenarios put forward and by the participants in experimental studies crucially matters for the viability of the intended results; (ii) failure to properly attend to this puts recent experimental work at risk. Finally, I consider the case of cross-linguistic disagreement and retraction and assess their importance for the semantic debate about perspectival expressions, as well as for the claim that perspective matters in putting forward the data on which decisions about the right semantic view are made.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00219-x.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142798373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Linguistic Othering and epistemic injustice in philosophy","authors":"Amandine Catala","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00223-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00223-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this symposium piece, I follow Lu-Adler’s lead in scrutinizing the connections between linguistic Othering and prevailing yet exclusionary academic practices of knowledge production, focusing on linguistic epistemic injustice in academia. Specifically, I suggest that in a global academic context marked by sharp inequalities of opportunity due inter alia to linguistic Othering, language often operates as a threefold criterion for knowledge validation and hence for the allocation of credibility and intelligibility. I submit that linguistic selection (i.e., which language is used for knowledge production and transmission), linguistic form (i.e., the way a given language is spoken or written), and linguistic content (i.e., the words or concepts a given language offers and uses to describe and make sense of the world) are all ways in which language can be used to validate or invalidate processes of knowledge production and thereby result in unjust allocations of credibility and intelligibility. I argue that language can thus sometimes function as what I have called elsewhere a “meta-epistemic filter,” which creates an unjust credibility and intelligibility economy by predetermining in a structurally biased way what kinds of epistemic contributions are (made) available or count as admissible or inadmissible in the first place. I close by exploring how we might foster greater linguistic epistemic justice in academia by cultivating meta-linguistic awareness and how this might be facilitated by attending to the role that experiential (as opposed to merely propositional) knowledge might play.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142789308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Silencing and world-making: commentary on Lu-Adler’s “Kant on Public Reason and the Linguistic Other”","authors":"Damian Melamedoff-Vosters","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00224-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00224-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this response to Lu-Adler’s article, I focus on her claim that Kant’s positionality gives his theorizing “ideology-forming” and “world-making” power. I explore a way of understanding this idea through speech act theory, and in particular the way in which speech act theory interacts with the phenomenon of silencing. I propose two ways in which Kant’s positionality could give him world-making power. First, Kant (and other scholars) can be in a position of performing the kinds of speech acts that themselves constitute the creation of certain forms of oppression, much in the way in which a legislator can create an oppressive law simply by proclaiming it to be so. Second, Kant can be in a position of creating an illocutionary disabling effect, namely a situation in which Chinese scholars become unable to perform the speech act of assertion in academic contexts.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142778139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction to Current Themes in Epistemology: Asian Epistemology Network","authors":"Davide Fassio, Weng Hong Tang, Ru Ye","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00218-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00218-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This is an introduction to the Topical Collection <i>Current Themes in Epistemology: Asian Epistemology Network</i>.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142757946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"More love troubles: Emma Gordon on biomedical enhancements and love relationships","authors":"Sven Nyholm","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00222-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00222-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In my contribution to this book symposium on Emma Gordon’s book <i>Human Enhancement and Well-Being</i>, I discuss and respond to Gordon’s extensive discussion and criticisms of a skeptical argument regarding the desirability of love enhancements that I presented in a 2015 paper. I start by first explaining the overall project of Gordon’s book, make a general comment about her overall approach (which I am broadly sympathetic with), and then proceed to a detailed discussion of Gordon’s critical engagement with my 2015 argument. I defend my argument against Gordon’s interesting criticisms and argue that Gordon has not defused my skeptical challenge to the desirability of love enhancements, but I also end by identifying key points of agreement between me and Gordon. Specific topics discussed include the distinction between ways of loving and causes of loving, the value of ways of loving and the value of the causes of loving, and whether or not the ideal of robust love attachments can be seen as compatible attachments causally dependent on love enhancements.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00222-2.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142737096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Explaining Phenomenal Explanationism: a précis of Appearance & Explanation: Phenomenal Explanationism in Epistemology","authors":"Kevin McCain, Luca Moretti","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00212-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00212-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this article, we offer a précis of <i>Appearance & Explanation: Phenomenal Explanationism in Epistemology</i>. We explain the central features of our theory of epistemic justification, Phenomenal Explanationism (PE). Further, we describe how PE applies to justification of various kinds and how it solves problems that plague its closest rival, Phenomenal Conservatism (PC).</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00212-4.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142714241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Linguistic diversity, global epistemic injustice, and Kantian public reason: comments on Lu-Adler on Kant’s linguistic Orientalism","authors":"Yao Lin","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00215-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00215-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>While I find Huaping Lu-Adler’s excavation of Kant’s long-overlooked linguistic Orientalism both enlightening and thought-provoking, I disagree with her diagnosis of its theoretical and practical relevance. On the one hand, while I agree that Kant’s positionality renders all his writings and teachings presumptively impactful, there is reason to doubt that his peculiar construction of the linguistic Oriental Other had much actual impact on his disciples. On the other hand, while I agree that the Kantian ideal of public reason is inapt for rectifying the linguistic-epistemic injustices of global knowledge production, I disagree on why it is so. In particular, I argue for a shift in theoretical and practical focuses, from linguistic biases and prejudices, to the structural epistemic constraints of linguistic diversity, as well as to other political-structural conditions shaping global knowledge production.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142679674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}