Asian journal of philosophy最新文献

{"title":"Not agreement but understanding. Davidson, Viveiros de Castro, and the lived experience view on cross-linguistic disagreement","authors":"Julia J. Turska","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00280-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00280-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this article, I discuss two perspectives on cross-linguistic disagreement and propose a third. Specifically, I examine Davidson’s rejection of the possibility of incommensurability of conceptual schemes and Viveiros de Castro’s anthropological perspective that highlights radical differences, seeing translation as a form of equivocation. I motivate this interdisciplinary pairing of thinkers with the importance of philosophical discourse’s engagement in the empirically informed debates on interpretative pluralism, in line with Viveiros de Castro’s ontological anthropology. Through a critical analysis, I scrutinize Davidson’s theory’s trouble with accounting for interpretative asymmetry and Viveiros de Castro’s stance for promoting the representational view on interpretation. As a central outcome of this examination, I synthesize these critiques to propose an alternative approach rooted in the phenomenological account of language and pragmatism. This perspective upholds interpretative pluralism, while rejecting the notions of strong incommensurability and relativism, thereby preserving the potential for meaningful cross-linguistic dialogue.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00280-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143865577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"McDowell’s new position and the problem of generality: a contribution to Cheng’s analysis on the notion of conceptuality","authors":"Daniel Debarry","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00272-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00272-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper engages with Tony Cheng’s view on John McDowell’s notion of “conceptuality.” In chapter 7 of his <i>John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity</i>, Cheng offers some reasons why one should drop the idea that concepts play a central role in McDowell’s project. According to Cheng, McDowell’s shift from a propositional to a non-propositional view of perceptual content gives one the opportunity to abandon the controversial idea of perceptual experiences having a conceptual nature. McDowell’s new position indeed admits non-conceptual content. However, Cheng’s thesis misses one point. Although he is correct in saying that according to McDowell’s new position, the <i>objects</i> of perceptual experiences no longer exhibit a conceptual nature, McDowell insists that perceptual experiences still involve conceptual <i>contents</i>. In this paper, I argue that McDowell’s distinction between <i>objects</i> and <i>contents</i> of experience is central to his new view on the philosophical nature of perceptual experiences. To show the significance of this distinction, I start with a closer look at the relationship between the so-called “Travis-McDowell Debate” and McDowell’s more recent reading of Kant. <i>Pace</i> Cheng, I then argue that the contents of experience are still conceptual, according to McDowell, for the <i>particular cases of experience</i> and the <i>general ways for things to be</i> have the same <i>grammar</i>. In the end, I present some obstacles to McDowell’s idea that generalities can figure in particular cases of experience. More than a critique, I aim to give a contribution to Cheng’s discussions on the notion of “conceptuality.”</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00272-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143865578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Objective scientific standards and the function of science","authors":"Alexander Bird","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00273-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00273-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I consider and reject Darrell Rowbottom’s arguments that there are no objective standards in science.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143856474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Global philosophy of religion and the supernatural practical response to the problem of evil: In conversation with Yujin Nagasawa","authors":"Roberto Di Ceglie","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00279-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00279-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In his book <i>The Problem of Evil for Atheists</i>, Yujin Nagasawa argues that the problem of evil is not a challenge for theists alone. He also argues that theism, which usually implies supernaturalism, responds to the problem more successfully than atheism and non-theism, which usually imply naturalism. All of this is advanced from the perspective of a project of global philosophy of religion, that is, an attempt to bring Western philosophy of religion into interaction with other philosophical traditions. In my contribution to this book symposium, I intend to deepen some aspects of Nagasawa’s reflections. First, I identify relevant convergences in the West with Eastern traditions regarding the importance of a practical and existential, rather than merely theoretical, response to the problem of evil. Second, I use these convergences to support, in a way different from his own, the author’s thesis that supernaturalism has an advantage over naturalism in responding to the problem.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143840492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Selective uptake: What is the challenge about?","authors":"Inmaculada de Melo-Martin","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00271-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00271-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Sometimes, people who generally trust scientific testimony fail to accept scientific testimony concerning select, and equally well-warranted, scientific hypotheses. This problem is what Gerken calls “the challenge of selective uptake.” I argue here that it is unclear whether Gerken’s selective uptake of scientific testimony really occurs or how serious this problem actually is.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143835616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The hiddenness argument and the distinction between philosophy and theology","authors":"Wai-hung Wong","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00278-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00278-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In <i>Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason</i>, Schellenberg extensively discusses theological responses to his hiddenness argument against God’s existence. In his later writings, he draws a sharp distinction between philosophy and theology, excluding theology from the philosophical discussion of hiddenness. I explain why this distinction, as he formulates it, is not clear enough and argue that theology should be excluded from this discussion only in its dogmatic sense. By critically assessing Schellenberg’s assumptions about the boundaries of philosophy and theology and exploring two contrasting conceptions of philosophy, I aim to show that his exclusion of theology implicitly depends on the validity of a particular conception of philosophy.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143835617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"X-phi about time: a reply to Hodroj, Latham, and Miller’s “The moving open future, temporal phenomenology, and temporal passage”","authors":"Natalja Deng","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00276-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00276-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Hodroj, Latham, and Miller use X-phi methods to investigate why people tend to represent time as dynamic (i.e., as (robustly) passing), even though, as deflationists maintain, they do not perceive time as passing. More specifically, what the authors investigate is the hypothesis that people believe time is dynamic because they believe the future is objectively open (moving open future hypothesis, MOFH); they find no evidence for the relevant associations. They conclude that a different (temporally aperspectival replacement, TARH) hypothesis based on non-X-phi proposals by Hoerl (Hoerl, 2018) and Sattig (Sattig, 2019a, 2019b) is worth investigating further by X-phi methods. The authors’ empirical methodology in this and other papers is especially welcome given widespread suspicion of purely a priori methods (those of “armchair” or “free-range” metaphysics). Yet, it is not always obvious how best to interpret these kinds of findings. In this reply, I express some worries about the paper’s framing regarding its empirical findings, including their relation to the debate about temporal perception. I also consider whether the responses recorded in these surveys are best interpreted as indicating that people stably (even tacitly) represent time in ways articulated by metaphysicians. I take it to be another facet of the value of X-phi work on time that it raises these interpretative (and related metametaphysical) issues, whose relevance to disputes over proper methodology in the philosophy of time is easy to overlook.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143809243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Universe C and the open future—critical comment on Hodroj, Latham and Miller: The moving open future, temporal phenomenology and temporal passage","authors":"Akiko Frischhut","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00277-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00277-9","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this critical response to Hodroj, Latham and Miller’s article ‘The moving open future, temporal phenomenology and temporal passage’, I contend that the ‘moving open future hypothesis’ has not yet been conclusively disproven. I first raise some methodological concerns, such as the limited sample population and linguistic diversity, which may impact the study’s conclusions. However, my primary critique revolves around vignette Universe C, which implicitly commits to future events existing, thereby undermining the concept of an objectively open future. This approach restricts the understanding of an open future, which should consider the complete absence of future facts. By failing to adequately capture this ‘thicker’ representation of openness, the study does not convincingly establish that there is no link between beliefs in temporal passage and a genuinely open future. Future avenues for research should focus on refining the vignettes to better reflect the nuances of temporal beliefs and investigate the temporally aperspectival replacement hypothesis.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143809132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Inquiry and conversation: Gricean zetetic norms and virtues","authors":"Leonardo Flamini","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00274-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00274-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Recently, philosophers have shown an increasing interest in the normativity of inquiry. For example, they discuss which doxastic or epistemic state makes an inquiry permissible or impermissible. Moreover, since our inquiries are typically considered goal-directed activities that aim at answering questions, philosophers have offered general principles to capture their instrumental normativity. However, it is notable that these principles – being general – lack specificity: They do not tell us how we should specifically behave to conduct an effective inquiry. The primary goal of this paper is to provide a first formulation of more specific norms of inquiry. To further this goal, I will consider the prominent theory of conversation promoted by Roberts (Roberts, C. (1996). Information Structure: Towards an Integrated Theory of Formal Pragmatics. In J. Yoon &amp; A. Kathol, OSU Working Papers in Linguistics, vol. 49: Papers in Semantics (pp. 91–136). The Ohio State University., Roberts, C. (2006). Context in Dynamic Interpretation. In L. R. Horn &amp; G. Ward (Eds.), The Handbook of Pragmatics (pp. 197–220). Blackwell Publishing. 10.1002/9780470756959.ch9), which describes conversation as an instance of inquiry. Based on this perspective and the idea that Grice’s maxims (Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and Conversation. In P. Cole &amp; J. L. Morgan. (Eds.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 3, Speech Acts (pp. 41–58). Academic Press.) individuate the norms of effective conversation, I will reformulate Gricean maxims in zetetic norms and argue for their intuitive appeal in regulating our inquiries. Moreover, I will point out how these “Gricean zetetic norms” can be fruitful in opening new lines of research about the zetetic domain. In particular, I will show how they can be used to identify and ground the existence of some zetetic virtues – virtues of inquiry: Zetetic parsimony, reliability, focus, and lucidity. Finally, I discuss how compatible these “Gricean zetetic virtues” are with the intellectual virtues we can find in the epistemological literature.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00274-y.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143778014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Do geometrical diagrams resemble geometrical objects?","authors":"Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00267-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00267-x","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Geometrical diagrams represent their subjects partially through visual resemblance. I defend this hypothesis against a critique by Panza, who argues that historical evidence indicates that the objects of Euclidean Geometry derive at least some of their spatial features from Euclidean diagrams. However, it is a widespread intuition that resemblance-based depictions reproduce the visual features of their subjects. Therefore, according to Panza, Euclidean diagrams cannot be resemblance-based. I will argue that this common intuition is misguided. As long as the depiction and its subject resemble each other visually, it does not matter which one comes first. Thus, for Euclidean diagrams to be resemblance-based, it is irrelevant whether they reproduce the visual features of geometrical objects, or vice versa, as long as they resemble each other. To support my argument, I will outline a resemblance-based account of depiction that does not assume that the visual appearance of depictions is derived from the visual appearance of their subjects.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00267-x.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143740796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}