{"title":"Between truth and authenticity in episodic memory: the case for veridicalism","authors":"Christopher Jude McCarroll, Denis Perrin","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00328-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00328-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>What are the accuracy conditions of episodic memories? On a standard view introduced by Bernecker (2010), there are two accuracy conditions that an episodic memory must meet: truth and authenticity. An episodic memory is true if it is accurate with regard to the remembered event; an episodic memory is authentic if it is accurate with regard to one’s original experience of this event. Recently, however, this standard authenticist view has been put under pressure by theorists who claim that the authenticity condition should be abandoned. Here, we provide a response to this recent anti-authenticist trend, which we call veridicalism. Veridicalism offers a moderate reply to worries about authenticity and offers an original account of the content of episodic memory. We claim that both truth and authenticity can be accuracy conditions for our memories, but their inclusion depends on the content of memory, which in turn depends on the context of remembering. To vindicate this veridicalist claim, we contribute both to the authenticity debate, by showing that recent anti-authenticist arguments fail, and to the delineation debate, by arguing that the content of episodic memories is delineated in a context-sensitive way, which thereby motivates the moderate character of our authenticism.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00328-1.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145210434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From reasons for emotion to reasons for belief and back","authors":"Catherine Rioux","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00330-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00330-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This discussion of Miriam Schleifer McCormick’s book, <i>Belief as Emotion</i>, focuses on two key aspects of Schleifer McCormick’s view. I examine the picture of emotions and their fittingness conditions that emerges from the book, especially the claim that belief’s formal object as an emotion is accuracy and what this entails for belief’s world-directedness. I then turn to the central normative move Schleifer McCormick makes in suggesting that viewing belief as an emotion allows us to license right-kind, practical reasons for belief. I raise questions about this move, which lead us back to a reflection on belief’s formal object. I close with a methodological point, touching briefly on the chapter on trust.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145210435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A note on temporal phenomenology and belief formation","authors":"Giuliano Torrengo","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00329-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00329-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this paper, I offer a commentary on the recent article “The moving open future, temporal phenomenology, and temporal passage,” focusing on the <i>temporally aperspectival hypothesis</i>. According to it, the widely shared belief in robust passage is due to a low-level perceptual mechanism involving awareness of temporally aperspectival perceptions being replaced over time. I interpret the phenomenology at play as ambiguous between an inward-directed awareness (focused on the renewal of experiences themselves) and an outward-directed interpretation (focused on the renewal of what we experience). Following in part some suggestions by the authors, I argue that this duality, combined with the influence of passage-friendly language and metaphors, may explain the observed distribution between those who do and do not believe in robust temporal passage. I also suggest that distinguishing between two related but distinct beliefs—the Priorian Belief in external robust passage and a Husserlian Belief in the internal renewal of experience—could clarify the 70%–30% split in intuitions about temporal passage documented by X-phi studies.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00329-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145210946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Adam Leite’s antitheoretical methodology","authors":"Hilary Kornblith","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00332-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00332-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Adam Leite defends a response to skepticism in his <i>How to Take Skepticism Seriously</i> which, he argues, is a product of an antitheoretical methodology. This paper examines what a commitment to such a methodology might involve and argues that such an approach is not defensible.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145090437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Comments on Miriam Schleifer McCormick’s Belief as Emotion","authors":"Aliosha Barranco Lopez","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00333-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00333-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this paper, I examine Miriam Schleifer McCormick’s novel theory that belief is fundamentally an emotion, combining cognitive and conative elements. I focus on three key aspects of Schleifer McCormick’s view: that the formal object of belief is accuracy rather than truth, that some disputed mental states (such as political ideologies) are genuine beliefs, and that belief requires a commitment that is compatible with doubt. I raise three concerns with these elements of Schleifer McCormick’s theory. First, accuracy as the formal object of belief does not explain variations in belief intensity as Schleifer McCormick contends it would. Second, one can defend doxasticism about political ideology more economically without adopting the Belief as Emotion view. Third, the relationship between commitments and beliefs requires further clarification regarding their ontological priority within Schleifer McCormick’s framework.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145078871","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Objective overall resemblance","authors":"Dan Marshall","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00327-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00327-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>What is it for <i>y</i> to be objectively qualitatively overall at least as similar to <i>x</i> as <i>z</i> is? This paper defends a version of the following answer: it is for <i>y</i> to be at least as similar to <i>x</i> as <i>z</i> is in every qualitative respect. On the version defended in this paper, this analysis arguably entails that it is possible for some things to objectively qualitatively resemble each other more than they do other things. However, it also arguably entails that, given how the world contingently is, many things (if not all things) are incomparable in objective qualitative resemblance, where <i>y</i> and <i>z</i> are so incomparable to <i>x</i> iff: (i) it is not the case that <i>y</i> is at least as objectively qualitatively similar to <i>x</i> as <i>z</i> is, and (ii) it is not the case that <i>z</i> is at least as objectively qualitatively similar to <i>x</i> as <i>y</i> is.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00327-2.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145090452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Inferential collective self-knowledge","authors":"Lukas Schwengerer","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00324-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00324-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I develop an inferential account of collective self-knowledge. Starting with the assumption that groups have (at least propositional) attitudes I look at desiderata for any account of collective self-knowledge of such attitudes. Any such account has to explain the features that group avowals have in our ordinary linguistic practice. Moreover, any account ought to be compatible with as many views of group attitudes as possible. I propose a new account that looks at attitude-forming processes of groups as evidence for collective self-knowledge. It is based on forward-looking inferences in contrast to the backwards-looking conception commonly found in inferential accounts of self-knowledge in individuals. I then show that groups have a minimal form of privileged and peculiar access to their own attitudes because they have easy access to their own production of attitudes as evidence.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00324-5.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145073720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Expressivism and the agreement account of expression","authors":"St.John Lambert","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00326-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00326-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>According to expressivism, normative sentences express desire-like states of mind. But what is the expression relation? In this paper, I defend an underexplored account of the expression relation that I call ‘the agreement account’. I begin by identifying three constraints that an expressivist account of expression must satisfy. I then argue that extant accounts of the expression relation fail to satisfy these constraints. I then outline the agreement account of expression, according to which a sentence S expresses a mental state M if and only if and because M is part of the agreement conditions of S. I defend this account against objections and conclude that the agreement account is a promising expressivist account of expression.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145073870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Buddhist accounts of episodic memory: a constructivist approach","authors":"Ching Keng","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00322-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00322-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper asks two questions about episodic memory and seeks the answers from the Buddhist tradition. The two questions are: (1) Are both non-conceptual and conceptual contents stored in episodic memory? (2) Does episodic memory change over time? Following the Buddhist notion that episodic memory is a type of cognition that has a past cognition as its cognitive object. I first lay out a Buddhist model of cognition, and then depict the basic structure of episodic memory and how it is stored in the mental continuum, before I investigate how the Buddhist tradition might respond to the two questions. My answers to them are: (1) The content of episodic memory contains both non-conceptual and conceptualized elements; the conceptualized elements may help reinforce the memory; (2) episodic memory undergoes constant changes, in two respects. First, for retrieved memory, since every retrieval comes with new co-arising mental concomitants, it also reshapes the memory. Second, for episodic memory that remains dormant, it still undergoes constant changes. Namely, when one associates relevant experience in general with thoughts about their desirable or undesirable aspects or results, that episodic memory becomes stronger or weaker accordingly. With the above conclusions, this paper echoes the idea of “constructive memory” proposed by Tulving and others.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145028217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correction to: Arguing for the aim of science","authors":"Andreas Hüttemann","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00323-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00323-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00323-6.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144934641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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