{"title":"Why truth matters? Constitutive value and the aim of belief","authors":"Dominik Jarczewski","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00402-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00402-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Chase Wrenn’s <i>The True and the Good</i> defends Strong Virtue Theory on which the apparent value of truth derives from the moral value of truthfulness. On this view, we ought to care about true beliefs not because truth itself is valuable, but because valuing truth manifests a socially beneficial virtue. This paper challenges Wrenn’s Strong Virtue Theory on two fronts. First, it shows that grounding the value of truthfulness on personal or social flourishing cannot avoid an appeal to the value of truth itself. Second, it argues that Wrenn’s appeal to ‘state-given’ reasons and ‘striving play’ analogies faces a motivational and critical deficit, especially in non-ideal epistemic environments shaped by prejudice and polarisation. It then develops an alternative account. Drawing on Sosa-inspired concept of belief as a goal-oriented attempt, it argues that truth has non-instrumental, constitutive epistemic value: it is essential to the aim of belief itself. This preserves a deflationary concept of truth while securing a robust basis for its constitutive epistemic value.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-026-00402-2.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147829792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Understanding in conditions of neutrality: a closer look at its objects","authors":"Miloud Belkoniene","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00410-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00410-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In her article titled ‘A portrait of understanding as a non-factive state’, Sjölin Wirling provides an engaging ‘portrait’ of a type of understanding—termed ‘non-factive objectual understanding’—that inquirers who have yet to settle certain questions concerning a target phenomenon can achieve under particular conditions. This paper investigates whether, in the situations Sjölin Wirling discusses, the relevant epistemic improvements really are improvements in our understanding <i>of</i> phenomena.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147796429","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Physicalism and causal arguments: replies to critics","authors":"Lei Zhong","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00408-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00408-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-026-00408-w.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147796717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sapience without sentience: an inferentialist approach to LLMs","authors":"Ryan Simonelli","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00400-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00400-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Do large language models (LLMs) possess concepts, such that they can be counted as genuinely understanding what they’re saying? In this paper, I approach this question through an inferentialist account of concept possession, according to which one’s possession of a concept is understood in terms of one’s mastery of the inferential role of a linguistic expression. I suggest that training on linguistic data is, in principle, sufficient for mastery of inferential role, and thus, LLMs trained on nothing but linguistic data could, in principle, possess all concepts and thus genuinely understand what they’re saying, even when speaking about such things as colors and tastes, guilt and folly, life and death. This doesn’t mean, however, that they are conscious. I draw a classical distinction between <i>sentience</i> (conscious awareness) and <i>sapience</i> (conceptual understanding) and argue that we might think of LLMs as genuinely possessing the latter without even a shred of the former. In defending this claim, I argue that attributing conceptual understanding to a system is not a matter of describing some specific empirical property that the system shares with us but, rather, as Wilfrid Sellars says, “placing it in the logical space of reasons,” treating it as answerable to calls for reasons, clarifications, corrections, and so on. I claim that we may aptly adopt this attitude towards sufficiently capable LLMs without thereby treating them as conscious subjects.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147796638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Need for secular theodicies?","authors":"Seyyed Mohsen Eslami","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00409-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00409-9","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The problem of evil is a problem for everyone; anyone can wonder about the possibility of there being evil in the world if there is God. However, the problem of evil is typically regarded as a challenge for theism, not atheism. In <i>The Problem of Evil for Atheists</i> (2024), Yujin Nagasawa argues that, contrary to the common picture, there is a problem of evil that challenges atheists as well as theists, and that theists are in a better position to deal with it. After reviewing how this project proceeds, I argue against its success. Nagasawa focuses on a specific version of the problem of evil which appeals to “axiological evil” rather than “deontological evil.” I explain why this is not acceptable—the traditional problem of evil involves both axiological and deontological claims. Therefore, it is dubious whether the problem of evil can be formulated in a way that targets atheism as it does in the case of theism. I suggest that distinguishing three modes of the problem of evil also sheds light on this debate. The problem of evil as a <i>curiosity</i> question is open to everyone, regardless of systemic evil. However, systemic evil makes the <i>decision</i> mode of the problem of evil relevant to everyone, even if it does not raise the <i>challenge</i> mode of the problem in the same way for everyone.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147738846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Virtue, value, and true beliefs: solving Wrenn’s problem of truth","authors":"Timothy Perrine","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00406-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00406-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Wrenn introduces a Problem of Truth. The problem is that two natural views about truth are at odds. The first is that truth confers value on beliefs; the second is that insofar as truth has an essence it is just saying things are as they are. But saying things are as they are does not appear to be a normative property; so how could it be a property that confers value on beliefs? Wrenn’s solution is to abandon the idea that truth confers value on beliefs. Nonetheless, he accepts that true beliefs are valuable. He argues that their value derives from a virtue, namely, the virtue of Truthfulness. My aim here is to investigate Wrenn’s Problem of Truth and his proposed solution. I argue that his solution fails because it runs afoul of the “wrong-reason” problem. I provide my own solution to the Problem of Truth on which conferring value is an essential property of truth, but not part of its essence. And lastly, I explore Wrenn’s implicit views about virtue and value, suggesting that they are at odds with a traditional view.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-026-00406-y.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147738031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Indexicality isn’t a problem for naturalists","authors":"Frank Jackson","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00407-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00407-x","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Lok‑Chi Chan and Kuei‑Chen Chen are right that we need to find versions of naturalism and of phenomenology that can live together. They are also right that the indexicality of phenomenology does not reveal that naturalism is incomplete, but do not detail why this is the case. I offer the needed detail.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-026-00407-x.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147737490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Replies to Hazlett and Volpe","authors":"Jakob Ohlhorst","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00405-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00405-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper responds to Allan Hazlett’s critique that hinge epistemology falls victim to the wrong kind of reason challenge. Further, it responds to Giorgio Volpe’s concerns regarding hinge epistemology as it is presented in <i>Trust Responsibly</i>.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-026-00405-z.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147737521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How to make progress in moral theory? The limits of Gradualist Dutilitarianism","authors":"Christian Seidel","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00404-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00404-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>According to the Gradualist Dutilitarian Project, the moral theory that we have most reason to adopt in order to make progress in moral philosophy emanates from a conjunction of two claims: (1) Dutilitarianism, the claim that what makes an action right or wrong depends on both consequences and deontological concerns; and (2) Gradualism, the view that moral rightness and wrongness come in degrees. Peterson’s argument for the Gradualist Dutilitarian Project is based on the Conditional Rescue Claim, which states that <i>if</i> you believe in Dutilitarianism, <i>then</i> you ought to believe in Gradualism — because Gradualism is necessary to make Dutilitarianism internally coherent when faced with a challenging result developed within an Arrowian framework. I will argue that the argument for the Conditional Rescue Claim fails. By carefully distinguishing between two ways of individuating theories, as well as between theories and classes of theories, the apparent incompatibility between the Arrowian result and the guiding idea of Dutilitarianism (as being a compromise) disappears.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-026-00404-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147643031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Consciousness externalism and bodily experiences in dreams","authors":"Wang Shuaixiang","doi":"10.1007/s44204-026-00397-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-026-00397-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>As a novel approach to the hard problem of consciousness, externalist theories posit that conscious experiences are partially or entirely constituted by extracranial processes or properties. However, such approaches face significant explanatory challenges when accounting for dreaming experiences, which appear—based on both common-sense understanding and the prevailing paradigm in neuroscience—to be entirely endogenous phenomena originating within the brain. Riccardo Manzotti’s radical externalist theory of consciousness, which asserts that conscious experiences are nothing more than extracranial objects existing in the environment, offers an intriguing solution to the dream problem by proposing that dreaming consists essentially in delayed perceptual experiences. However, this article argues that Manzotti’s proposal does not provide a fully satisfactory resolution, as it fails to account for the bodily experiences reported in the dreams of individuals with congenital physical impairments. Furthermore, it is contended that such dream-based bodily experiences also pose substantial difficulties for the internalist framework of neuroscience, which regards conscious experience as exclusively rooted in intracranial neural activity. In light of this theoretical impasse, this article tentatively proposes a sketchy alternative: Manzotti’s radical externalist proposal—that conscious experience is wholly situated in spacetime external to the brain—requires critical revision. Specifically, it is necessary to acknowledge that neural activities within the brain play a partial constitutive role in the formation of conscious experience.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147642716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
