{"title":"Meaninglessness and the ethics of lexical abandonment","authors":"Tristram McPherson","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00241-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00241-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper critically engages with the arguments for the meaninglessness of ‘democracy’ and for abandoning use of that word, in Herman Cappelen’s book <i>The Concept of Democracy</i>. It explaining the distinctive nature of Cappelen’s style of argument for abandoning a word. It argues against Cappelen’s case for the meaninglessness of ‘democracy’ and its cognates. It explores an important unclarity in the sort of ethical thesis Cappelen wants to defend in this book. Finally, it suggests that Cappelen’s argument for abandoning ‘democracy’ retains some force despite the criticisms raised.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00241-7.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142995702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Wisdom, Intellectual Virtue, and Epistemology","authors":"Shane Ryan","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00242-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00242-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper argues that a wise person is an intellectually virtuous person. The intellectual virtue requirement is explained as a necessary condition for wisdom, intuitively the highest epistemic good. This provides an answer to Duncan Pritchard’s question as to the significance of the intellectual virtues for the epistemological project. In other words, the requirement explains why the intellectual virtues are central to the concerns of epistemology. The paper starts by providing an overview of intellectual virtue. An overview of recent analytic philosophical literature on wisdom is set out. This discussion leads to the claim that the wise person understands how to live well. The claim that intellectual virtues are required for understanding how to live well is then examined. The case is made that understanding how to live well in a modally robust way requires possession of the intellectual virtues.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00242-6.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142994732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On concepts of action and behavior as the implicit point of agreement between Enactivism and Radical Behaviorism","authors":"Kohei Yanagawa, Hiroshi Matsui","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00232-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00232-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In psychology, the principle of “Behaviorism” has a negative connotation. The ascription of the philosophical stance as “behaviorist” is usually nuanced with criticism, and those labeled behaviorists often deny it (For example, Gallagher says, “But then, a surprise! Barrett also wants to recruit the behaviorists, and specifically, B. F. Skinner. Is this “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” type of strategy? Can we maintain peace within our own ranks if we mix phenomenologist with behaviorists?” (Gallagher, <i>Philosophical Studies</i>, <i>176</i>(3), 839-851, 2019 p. 841)). However, some recent re-evaluations have rescued Behaviorism by indicating that these arguments were based on a caricatured view. This study further argues a point of agreement in their fundamental concept of “behavior” and “action,” leading to a more productive relationship, in three steps. First, it starts with an overview of the development of Behaviorism. This step identifies that the concept of “behavior” in the sense of contemporary Behaviorism has interactive properties between an agent and the environment instead of mere physical movements, which can be summarized in two key features: modern Behaviorism understands behavior (1) in relation to subsequent events and (2) as inseparable from mental phenomena, which is discussed in usual cognitive science; it also understands mental phenomena as something observable in behaviors (Sect. 1). Next, we demonstrate that some of the distorted criticism of Behaviorism arises due to a lack of understanding of behavior (Sect. 2). It is revealed that the characterization as Behaviorism per se should be value-neutral once the behavior concept is accurately articulated. Finally, Sects. 3 and 4 shed light on the approach taken by enactivists in their treatment of actions, aligning them with the concept of behavior. It will be contended that these theories exhibit the presence of two characteristics previously outlined within Behaviorism.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00232-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142994936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Awareness as an alternative to abandonment? Critical notice of Herman Cappelen’s The Concept of Democracy","authors":"Delia Belleri","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00240-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00240-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Herman Cappelen’s book <i>The Concept of Democracy</i> makes a case for ‘abolitionism’, that is, abandonment of the word ‘democracy’ and related terminology (‘D-words’). Cappelen’s strategy includes a direct argument for abandonment, aiming to show that D-words are meaningless; and an indirect argument, based on a comparison of abandonment with other options (for instance, replacement or amelioration). In this critical notice, I focus on his comparative case, arguing that the competing options and their respective challenges are not so well demarcated—where this negatively affects the abandonment proposal. Furthermore, I present and defend a yet unexplored alternative: awareness. Awareness is a worthy candidate for its little costs and significant benefits in comparison to abandonment, thus deserving consideration alongside the options assessed by Cappelen.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00240-8.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142976443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Understanding, knowledge, injustice and the right to know","authors":"Eric Bayruns García","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00237-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00237-9","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Watson’s monograph, The Right to Know: Epistemic Rights and Why We Need Them, clearly, succinctly and deftly introduces the notion of the right to know or epistemic rights to the epistemology literature. She does this partly by connecting the conclusions and theoretical motives of the moral and legal rights literature to the epistemology literature. In part, motivated by this book’s great value, I present two objections to some of the book’s central claims. The first objection is that there is tension between (i) the book’s claim that information distribution is a basic epistemic duty that epistemic rights generate and (ii) the book’s claim that epistemic rights are complied with if subjects receive epistemic goods such as understanding and knowledge that respect their final value. The second objection is that the dyadic nature of Watson’s account of epistemic rights violation does not comport with plausible cases in which non-dominant groups’ epistemic rights have been violated and as a consequence the book’s claim that epistemic rights provide those who wield them an especially forceful rhetorical tool requires further motivation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142976669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Précis of John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity","authors":"Tony Cheng","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00236-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00236-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This is a précis of my recent monograph <i>John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity: Oxford Kantianism Meets Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences</i>. I first describe the key question the book is trying to answer via understanding McDowell’s thinking and the general outline of it. The key question is a Kantian how-possible question, and the outline includes the distinction between first and second nature, the contrast between <i>Cogito</i> and <i>Homo sapience</i>, and how a minded human animal can be a perceiver, knower, thinker, speaker, agent, person, and conceptual <i>cum</i> self-conscious being in the world. I then focus on two key notions of the subtitles—phenomenology and cognitive sciences—and explain how they figure in the text. After that, a chapter-by-chapter summary is provided, albeit selectively. This introductory piece ends with a prediction that McDowell’s works will still be widely discussed in the reasonable distant future.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00236-w.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142939423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Three questions for Watson's account of epistemic rights","authors":"Andy Yu","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00231-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00231-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In <i>The Right to Know: Epistemic Rights and Why We Need Them</i> (Routledge, 2021), Lani Watson comprehensively examines the right to know and other epistemic rights, that is, rights to goods such as information, knowledge and truth. These rights, she suggests, play a key role in society today, but we often do not attend to them in the way that we should. She draws our attention to these rights, illustrating their importance using a range of examples from medicine, politics and law, and she articulates a philosophical account of these rights. Her concise but book-length treatment of the topic is clear, accessible and rigorous. This is a considerable achievement, and I find Watson’s treatment of epistemic rights to be illuminating. I do wish she would say more to expand on her discussion of certain points, but overall, she succeeds in her project to shed light on an important but underdiscussed topic. In this critical contribution, I summarize her book and then raise three questions about her discussion. First, does Watson adopt a workable conception of law and morality, given her characterization of who can have epistemic rights? Second, does the law support Watson’s conception of epistemic rights and duties, as she claims it does? Third, does Watson focus on the harm-related rationale for epistemic rights to the apparent exclusion of other rationales?</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142938704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mind the gap: On negative and positive origin essentialism","authors":"Teresa Robertson Ishii","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00201-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00201-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In “A New Problem for Kripkean Defenses of Origin Theses”, Sungil Han calls attention to a gap between the negative conclusions of arguments for origin essentialism (claims to the effect that a given thing <i>could not</i> originate in a certain way), and the positive conclusions one might hope for (claims to the effect that a given thing <i>must</i> originate in a certain way if it exists at all). Han proposes a way of bridging the gap. While I agree with Han that there is indeed such a gap, there is an important difference in what Han and I take the negative claims of Kripke(ans) to be. As a result, I propose a bridge that is significantly different from his. I argue that my approach is superior to Han’s.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142938703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Transcendental entitlement and reasons for belief","authors":"Allan Hazlett","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00234-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00234-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142939086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A theory of assessability for reasonableness","authors":"Andrew T. Forcehimes","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00230-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00230-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This essay defends an account of what things are assessable for reasonableness and why. On this account, something is assessable for reasonableness if and only if and because it is the functional effect of critical reasoning.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00230-2.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142939085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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