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Dutilitarianism Dutilitarianism
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-05-19 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00266-y
Martin Peterson
{"title":"Dutilitarianism","authors":"Martin Peterson","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00266-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00266-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Dutilitarianism is the view that the most plausible theory of normative ethics is a compromise between utilitarianism and duty ethics. I discuss several proposals for how to spell out the dutilitarian theory and point out that a version of Arrow's impossibility theorem is applicable: Any attempt to aggregate utilitarianism and duty ethics into a dutilitarian theory will turn either the utilitarian or the deontological theory into a \"dictator theory\" that unilaterally determines the ranking of the hybrid theory, provided that a small number of seemingly plausible conditions are satisfied. However, this does not show that it is impossible to aggregate utilitarianism and duty ethics into a dutilitarian theory; a more plausible conclusion is that dutilitarians must reject one of Arrow's conditions. I argue that dutilitarians should reject the Ordering condition (rather than Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives). If so, clashes between utilitarianism and duty ethics are best understood as cases in which moral rightness and wrongness come in degrees. The article ends by considering a generalization of Arrow's theorem presented by Khmelnitskaya, which has recently been discussed in a different context by Hedden and Nebel. My gradualist approach to dutilitarianism avoids Khmelnitskaya's impossibility theorem in a manner that differs from the solution proposed by Hedden and Nebel.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144084920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reflections on language and charity: a response to Stei’s “Logical Pluralism and Logical Consequence” 语言与慈善的反思——对斯泰“逻辑多元主义与逻辑结果”的回应
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-05-09 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00249-z
Pilar Terrés-Villalonga
{"title":"Reflections on language and charity: a response to Stei’s “Logical Pluralism and Logical Consequence”","authors":"Pilar Terrés-Villalonga","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00249-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00249-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In <i>Logical Pluralism and Logical Consequence</i> (Cambridge University Press, 2023), Erik Stei argues for logical monism, the view that there is exactly one correct logic, in opposition to logical pluralism and logical nihilism. The present review aims to challenge two premisses in the main argument of the volume. First, Stei argues that no version of pluralism based on a plurality of senses of the logical connectives succeeds in proving that logical vocabulary is genuinely plural in the required sense. Second, he also argues that pluralism cannot account for the rivalry between logics, which makes the position less charitable than it claims. I will give arguments against the two premisses after presenting the details of the main argument for monism that we find in the book.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00249-z.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143925627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Scientific progress with an institutional aim 以制度为目标的科学进步
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-04-29 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00282-y
Ilkka Niiniluoto
{"title":"Scientific progress with an institutional aim","authors":"Ilkka Niiniluoto","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00282-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00282-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Darrell Rowbottom has been an active participant in debates about scientific progress. In his recent work, <i>Scientific Progress</i> (2023), he gives a critical summary of the rival proposals and arguments during the last 15 years. But, more interestingly, Rowbottom explains the lack of consensus among philosophers of science by questioning the mainstream view that science is progressive by objective standards. Inspired by J. L. Mackie’s error theory in meta-ethics, he challenges the thesis that science has overarching shared or corporate aims, concluding that the criteria of scientific progress are ultimately local and subjective. This paper evaluates Rowbottom’s argument by defending an institutional account of the aim of science and by separating the aims of science from the standards of its progress. </p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00282-y.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143883709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The painful holiness of the real 真实的痛苦的神圣
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-04-28 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00281-z
Eric Steinhart
{"title":"The painful holiness of the real","authors":"Eric Steinhart","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00281-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00281-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Yujin Nagasawa’s book, <i>The Problem of Evil for Atheists</i>, aims to show how theists, pantheists, axiarchists, and atheists all share a problem. On the one hand, they posit some cherished entity (God, nature, evolution, etc.). On the other hand, this cherished entity either causes or contains suffering, which is apparently incompatible with their cherishing. To solve their problem, these groups can and have turned to holiness. A holy entity can be cherished even if it causes or contains suffering. Hence, their shared solution revolves around a common core, which I link with John Hick’s Real. Nagasawa adds pantheism, axiarchism, and atheism to Hick’s pluralism. By doing this, he strips the Real of residual monotheistic features which might make it idolatrous. For those who oppose idolatry, Nagasawa opens up a vast new territory of religious opportunities.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00281-z.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143879749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Not agreement but understanding. Davidson, Viveiros de Castro, and the lived experience view on cross-linguistic disagreement 不是同意，而是理解。戴维森，Viveiros de Castro，以及跨语言分歧的生活经验观
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-04-24 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00280-0
Julia J. Turska
{"title":"Not agreement but understanding. Davidson, Viveiros de Castro, and the lived experience view on cross-linguistic disagreement","authors":"Julia J. Turska","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00280-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00280-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this article, I discuss two perspectives on cross-linguistic disagreement and propose a third. Specifically, I examine Davidson’s rejection of the possibility of incommensurability of conceptual schemes and Viveiros de Castro’s anthropological perspective that highlights radical differences, seeing translation as a form of equivocation. I motivate this interdisciplinary pairing of thinkers with the importance of philosophical discourse’s engagement in the empirically informed debates on interpretative pluralism, in line with Viveiros de Castro’s ontological anthropology. Through a critical analysis, I scrutinize Davidson’s theory’s trouble with accounting for interpretative asymmetry and Viveiros de Castro’s stance for promoting the representational view on interpretation. As a central outcome of this examination, I synthesize these critiques to propose an alternative approach rooted in the phenomenological account of language and pragmatism. This perspective upholds interpretative pluralism, while rejecting the notions of strong incommensurability and relativism, thereby preserving the potential for meaningful cross-linguistic dialogue.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00280-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143865577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
McDowell’s new position and the problem of generality: a contribution to Cheng’s analysis on the notion of conceptuality 麦克道尔的新立场与普遍性问题：对程概念性概念分析的补充
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-04-24 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00272-0
Daniel Debarry
{"title":"McDowell’s new position and the problem of generality: a contribution to Cheng’s analysis on the notion of conceptuality","authors":"Daniel Debarry","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00272-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00272-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper engages with Tony Cheng’s view on John McDowell’s notion of “conceptuality.” In chapter 7 of his <i>John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity</i>, Cheng offers some reasons why one should drop the idea that concepts play a central role in McDowell’s project. According to Cheng, McDowell’s shift from a propositional to a non-propositional view of perceptual content gives one the opportunity to abandon the controversial idea of perceptual experiences having a conceptual nature. McDowell’s new position indeed admits non-conceptual content. However, Cheng’s thesis misses one point. Although he is correct in saying that according to McDowell’s new position, the <i>objects</i> of perceptual experiences no longer exhibit a conceptual nature, McDowell insists that perceptual experiences still involve conceptual <i>contents</i>. In this paper, I argue that McDowell’s distinction between <i>objects</i> and <i>contents</i> of experience is central to his new view on the philosophical nature of perceptual experiences. To show the significance of this distinction, I start with a closer look at the relationship between the so-called “Travis-McDowell Debate” and McDowell’s more recent reading of Kant. <i>Pace</i> Cheng, I then argue that the contents of experience are still conceptual, according to McDowell, for the <i>particular cases of experience</i> and the <i>general ways for things to be</i> have the same <i>grammar</i>. In the end, I present some obstacles to McDowell’s idea that generalities can figure in particular cases of experience. More than a critique, I aim to give a contribution to Cheng’s discussions on the notion of “conceptuality.”</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00272-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143865578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Objective scientific standards and the function of science 客观科学的标准与科学的功能
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-04-21 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00273-z
Alexander Bird
{"title":"Objective scientific standards and the function of science","authors":"Alexander Bird","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00273-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00273-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I consider and reject Darrell Rowbottom’s arguments that there are no objective standards in science.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143856474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Global philosophy of religion and the supernatural practical response to the problem of evil: In conversation with Yujin Nagasawa 全球宗教哲学和对邪恶问题的超自然实践回应：与长泽雄人的对话
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-04-16 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00279-7
Roberto Di Ceglie
{"title":"Global philosophy of religion and the supernatural practical response to the problem of evil: In conversation with Yujin Nagasawa","authors":"Roberto Di Ceglie","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00279-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00279-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In his book <i>The Problem of Evil for Atheists</i>, Yujin Nagasawa argues that the problem of evil is not a challenge for theists alone. He also argues that theism, which usually implies supernaturalism, responds to the problem more successfully than atheism and non-theism, which usually imply naturalism. All of this is advanced from the perspective of a project of global philosophy of religion, that is, an attempt to bring Western philosophy of religion into interaction with other philosophical traditions. In my contribution to this book symposium, I intend to deepen some aspects of Nagasawa’s reflections. First, I identify relevant convergences in the West with Eastern traditions regarding the importance of a practical and existential, rather than merely theoretical, response to the problem of evil. Second, I use these convergences to support, in a way different from his own, the author’s thesis that supernaturalism has an advantage over naturalism in responding to the problem.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143840492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Selective uptake: What is the challenge about? 选择性吸收：挑战是什么？
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-04-15 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00271-1
Inmaculada de Melo-Martin
{"title":"Selective uptake: What is the challenge about?","authors":"Inmaculada de Melo-Martin","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00271-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00271-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Sometimes, people who generally trust scientific testimony fail to accept scientific testimony concerning select, and equally well-warranted, scientific hypotheses. This problem is what Gerken calls “the challenge of selective uptake.” I argue here that it is unclear whether Gerken’s selective uptake of scientific testimony really occurs or how serious this problem actually is.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143835616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The hiddenness argument and the distinction between philosophy and theology 隐匿性论证与哲学和神学的区别
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-04-15 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00278-8
Wai-hung Wong
{"title":"The hiddenness argument and the distinction between philosophy and theology","authors":"Wai-hung Wong","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00278-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00278-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In <i>Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason</i>, Schellenberg extensively discusses theological responses to his hiddenness argument against God’s existence. In his later writings, he draws a sharp distinction between philosophy and theology, excluding theology from the philosophical discussion of hiddenness. I explain why this distinction, as he formulates it, is not clear enough and argue that theology should be excluded from this discussion only in its dogmatic sense. By critically assessing Schellenberg’s assumptions about the boundaries of philosophy and theology and exploring two contrasting conceptions of philosophy, I aim to show that his exclusion of theology implicitly depends on the validity of a particular conception of philosophy.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143835617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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