Asian journal of philosophy最新文献

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Do geometrical diagrams resemble geometrical objects?
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00267-x
Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia
{"title":"Do geometrical diagrams resemble geometrical objects?","authors":"Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00267-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00267-x","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Geometrical diagrams represent their subjects partially through visual resemblance. I defend this hypothesis against a critique by Panza, who argues that historical evidence indicates that the objects of Euclidean Geometry derive at least some of their spatial features from Euclidean diagrams. However, it is a widespread intuition that resemblance-based depictions reproduce the visual features of their subjects. Therefore, according to Panza, Euclidean diagrams cannot be resemblance-based. I will argue that this common intuition is misguided. As long as the depiction and its subject resemble each other visually, it does not matter which one comes first. Thus, for Euclidean diagrams to be resemblance-based, it is irrelevant whether they reproduce the visual features of geometrical objects, or vice versa, as long as they resemble each other. To support my argument, I will outline a resemblance-based account of depiction that does not assume that the visual appearance of depictions is derived from the visual appearance of their subjects.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00267-x.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143740796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Overlap, overdetermination, and the necessity of origin
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-03-31 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00257-z
Adam Russell Murray
{"title":"Overlap, overdetermination, and the necessity of origin","authors":"Adam Russell Murray","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00257-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00257-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Proponents of the necessity of material origins hold roughly that an entity’s originating matter could not have been radically different from its actual originating matter. Sungil Han defends the considerably stronger position that an entity’s originating matter could not have been at all different from its actual originating matter. I raise some worries for Han’s key premise as it pertains to biological origins, and discuss certain methodological limitations of Han’s project as it pertains to the origins of artifacts.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143740827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Précis
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-03-27 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00270-2
J. L. Schellenberg
{"title":"Précis","authors":"J. L. Schellenberg","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00270-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00270-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This article summarizes my work on the hiddenness argument, with careful attention to alternative formulations of the argument and how its central moves are best interpreted.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143716708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Frege’s principle of logical parsimony, the indispensability of “ξ = ζ” in Grundgesetze, and the nature of identity
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-03-21 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00245-3
Matthias Schirn
{"title":"Frege’s principle of logical parsimony, the indispensability of “ξ = ζ” in Grundgesetze, and the nature of identity","authors":"Matthias Schirn","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00245-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00245-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In Section 2, I analyze Frege’s principle of logical and notational parsimony in his opus magnum <i>Grundgesetze der Arithmetik</i> (vol I, 1893, vol. II, 1903). I argue <i>inter alia</i> that in order to carry out the proofs of the more important theorems of cardinal arithmetic and real analysis in <i>Grundgesetze</i> Frege’s identification of the truth-values the True and the False with their unit classes in <i>Grundgesetze</i> I, §10 need not be raised to the lofty status of an axiom. Frege refrains from doing this but does not provide any reason for his restraint. In Section 3, I argue that he considered the primitive function-name “<i>ξ</i> = <i>ζ</i>” indispensable in pursuit of his logicist project. I close with remarks on the nature of identity. I suggest that there is no need to interpret identity in a non-standard fashion in order to render it logically palatable and scientifically respectable. </p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00245-3.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143667910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
An evaluation of Schellenberg’s arguments regarding divine hiddenness and the no-delay condition concerning relationship with God
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-03-21 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00269-9
Andrew Ter Ern Loke
{"title":"An evaluation of Schellenberg’s arguments regarding divine hiddenness and the no-delay condition concerning relationship with God","authors":"Andrew Ter Ern Loke","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00269-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00269-9","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper demonstrates that Schellenberg is mistaken about the burden of proof concerning his Divine Hiddenness Argument against the existence of God and that his argument is unsound. In particular, I explain that Schellenberg has failed to refute the possibility that there is no non-resistant nonbeliever who would end up not having a relationship with the perfect God who knows of good reasons for the delay in starting the relationship even if we do not know what those reasons are. I also explain that Schellenberg has failed to refute the possibility that God delays the starting of the relationship for the purpose of achieving a deeper relationship for the good of the creature in a way that respects the creaturely free will. Given that the Divine Hiddenness Argument is unsound, it should not be a hindrance to believing in God and having a relationship with God.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00269-9.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143667909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Are current AI systems capable of well-being?
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-03-15 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00265-z
James Fanciullo
{"title":"Are current AI systems capable of well-being?","authors":"James Fanciullo","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00265-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00265-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Recently, Simon Goldstein and Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini have argued that certain existing AI systems are capable of well-being. They consider the three leading approaches to well-being—hedonism, desire satisfactionism, and the objective list approach—and argue that theories of these kinds plausibly imply that some current AI systems are capable of welfare. In this paper, I argue that the leading versions of each of these theories do not imply this. I conclude that we have strong reason to doubt that current AI systems are capable of well-being.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00265-z.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143621995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Non-realist cognitivism, partners-in-innocence, and No dilemma
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-03-15 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00268-w
Evan Jack, Mustafa Khuramy
{"title":"Non-realist cognitivism, partners-in-innocence, and No dilemma","authors":"Evan Jack,&nbsp;Mustafa Khuramy","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00268-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00268-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Non-Realist Cognitivism is a meta-ethical theory that is supposedly objectionably unclear. Recently, Farbod Akhlaghi (2022) has provided a novel exposition of Parfit’s Non-Realist Cognitivism that employs truthmaker theory to clarify it. He illustrates that such clarification leads the non-realist cognitivist into a dilemma: either the theory has to accept truthmaker maximalism, rendering the theory inconsistent, or it has to let go of truthmaking altogether. He also attempts to undercut a “partners-in-innocence” strategy that the non-realist cognitivist utilizes to motivate the key assumption of Non-Realist Cognitivism: that normative truths are truthmaker gaps. In this paper, we do three things in reply to Akhlaghi. First, we show how most of his attempts to disqualify candidate partners-in-innocence fail, or at best miss the point. Second, we provide a case for a partner-in-innocence Akhlaghi never covers, though inadvertently mentions. Third, we outline how the non-realist cognitivist could reply to Akhlaghi’s dilemma in a way that allows Non-Realist Cognitivism to come out unscathed.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00268-w.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143621994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Précis of Thinking About Statistics
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-03-12 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00259-x
Jun Otsuka
{"title":"Précis of Thinking About Statistics","authors":"Jun Otsuka","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00259-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00259-x","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This article provides a concise summary of <i>Thinking About Statistics: The Philosophical Foundations</i> (Routledge, 2023), with a focus on the book’s exploration of ontological and epistemological topics.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143594828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Evidential pluralism, epistemic causality and mixed methods research
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-03-10 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00263-1
Erik Weber
{"title":"Evidential pluralism, epistemic causality and mixed methods research","authors":"Erik Weber","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00263-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00263-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this essay, I first reflect on the notion of epistemic causality which, according to Shan and Williamson, complements the idea of evidential pluralism. Then, I shift my attention to mixed methods research. While I agree that evidential pluralism provides a strong philosophical foundation for this approach, I argue that there is an alternative, equally strong foundation that focuses on explanation rather than on evidence.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143583490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Logical empiricism in a historicist framework—something worth caring about?
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-03-06 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00261-3
Elisabeth Nemeth
{"title":"Logical empiricism in a historicist framework—something worth caring about?","authors":"Elisabeth Nemeth","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00261-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00261-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The historicist project that Richardson presents here aims to recover elements of Logical Empiricism that lie not in theorems but in the self-understanding of the actors. The Logical Empiricists had philosophical as well as social and political goals in mind. They were aware that the scientific principles they sought to establish in academic philosophy also influenced the political, social, and cultural spheres. Previous research has worked on the social embedding of Logical Empiricism. By comparison, Richardson proposes the significantly broader framework of “scientific philosophy.” This allows further actors to be taken into account, thus contributing to a better understanding of the self-understanding of the Logical Empiricists. But can this historicist project convince us that Logical Empiricism is “worth caring about”?</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00261-3.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143564406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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