{"title":"不是同意,而是理解。戴维森,Viveiros de Castro,以及跨语言分歧的生活经验观","authors":"Julia J. Turska","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00280-0","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this article, I discuss two perspectives on cross-linguistic disagreement and propose a third. Specifically, I examine Davidson’s rejection of the possibility of incommensurability of conceptual schemes and Viveiros de Castro’s anthropological perspective that highlights radical differences, seeing translation as a form of equivocation. I motivate this interdisciplinary pairing of thinkers with the importance of philosophical discourse’s engagement in the empirically informed debates on interpretative pluralism, in line with Viveiros de Castro’s ontological anthropology. Through a critical analysis, I scrutinize Davidson’s theory’s trouble with accounting for interpretative asymmetry and Viveiros de Castro’s stance for promoting the representational view on interpretation. As a central outcome of this examination, I synthesize these critiques to propose an alternative approach rooted in the phenomenological account of language and pragmatism. This perspective upholds interpretative pluralism, while rejecting the notions of strong incommensurability and relativism, thereby preserving the potential for meaningful cross-linguistic dialogue.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2025-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00280-0.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Not agreement but understanding. Davidson, Viveiros de Castro, and the lived experience view on cross-linguistic disagreement\",\"authors\":\"Julia J. Turska\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s44204-025-00280-0\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>In this article, I discuss two perspectives on cross-linguistic disagreement and propose a third. Specifically, I examine Davidson’s rejection of the possibility of incommensurability of conceptual schemes and Viveiros de Castro’s anthropological perspective that highlights radical differences, seeing translation as a form of equivocation. I motivate this interdisciplinary pairing of thinkers with the importance of philosophical discourse’s engagement in the empirically informed debates on interpretative pluralism, in line with Viveiros de Castro’s ontological anthropology. Through a critical analysis, I scrutinize Davidson’s theory’s trouble with accounting for interpretative asymmetry and Viveiros de Castro’s stance for promoting the representational view on interpretation. As a central outcome of this examination, I synthesize these critiques to propose an alternative approach rooted in the phenomenological account of language and pragmatism. This perspective upholds interpretative pluralism, while rejecting the notions of strong incommensurability and relativism, thereby preserving the potential for meaningful cross-linguistic dialogue.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":93890,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Asian journal of philosophy\",\"volume\":\"4 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-04-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00280-0.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Asian journal of philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s44204-025-00280-0\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Asian journal of philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s44204-025-00280-0","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
在本文中,我讨论了跨语言分歧的两种观点,并提出了第三种观点。具体来说,我研究了戴维森对概念方案不可通约性可能性的拒绝,以及维维罗斯·德·卡斯特罗强调根本差异的人类学观点,将翻译视为一种模棱两可的形式。我鼓励这种跨学科的思想家配对,哲学话语参与关于解释多元主义的经验主义辩论的重要性,与Viveiros de Castro的本体论人类学一致。通过批判性的分析,我仔细研究了戴维森理论在解释不对称性方面的问题,以及维韦罗斯·德·卡斯特罗在促进表征性解释观点方面的立场。作为这项研究的核心成果,我综合了这些批评,提出了一种基于语言和实用主义现象学解释的替代方法。这一观点支持解释性多元主义,同时拒绝强烈不可通约性和相对主义的概念,从而保留了有意义的跨语言对话的潜力。
Not agreement but understanding. Davidson, Viveiros de Castro, and the lived experience view on cross-linguistic disagreement
In this article, I discuss two perspectives on cross-linguistic disagreement and propose a third. Specifically, I examine Davidson’s rejection of the possibility of incommensurability of conceptual schemes and Viveiros de Castro’s anthropological perspective that highlights radical differences, seeing translation as a form of equivocation. I motivate this interdisciplinary pairing of thinkers with the importance of philosophical discourse’s engagement in the empirically informed debates on interpretative pluralism, in line with Viveiros de Castro’s ontological anthropology. Through a critical analysis, I scrutinize Davidson’s theory’s trouble with accounting for interpretative asymmetry and Viveiros de Castro’s stance for promoting the representational view on interpretation. As a central outcome of this examination, I synthesize these critiques to propose an alternative approach rooted in the phenomenological account of language and pragmatism. This perspective upholds interpretative pluralism, while rejecting the notions of strong incommensurability and relativism, thereby preserving the potential for meaningful cross-linguistic dialogue.