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Asian journal of philosophy最新文献

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What are virtual items, and are they real? 什么是虚拟物品，它们是真实的吗？
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-06 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00144-z
Rami Ali
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引用次数: 0
What are virtual items, and are they real? 什么是虚拟物品，它们是真实的吗？
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-06 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00144-z
Rami Ali
{"title":"What are virtual items, and are they real?","authors":"Rami Ali","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00144-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00144-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A central debate in the philosophy of virtual reality (VR) focuses on the reality of virtual items. Broadly, there are two main disagreements. Some views accept a metaphysical orientation to VR, and disagree on the reality of virtual items. For instance, David Chalmers (Disputatio 9(46):309-352, 2017, Disputatio 11(55):453-486, 2019, 2022) defends digitalism, the view that virtual items are real digital items. Neil McDonnell &amp; Nathan Wildman (Disputatio 11(55):371-397, 2019), by contrast, defend fictionalism, which maintains that virtual items are unreal fictions. Other views, like Grant Tavinor’s (2021), reject the metaphysical orientation, arguing that focusing on the reality of virtual items is a mistake. In what follows I evaluate these two disagreements. I argue that experiences of virtual items depend on episodes of picture perception. Recognizing this reveals that the current debates are either easily resolved in favor of one view, or are not disagreeing about the reality of virtual items, but about what virtual items are.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139859418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do analytic philosophers in China think differently? A survey and comparative study 中国分析哲学家的思维方式与众不同吗？调查与比较研究
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-05 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00138-x
Su Wu, Jiawei Xu, Hao Zhan, Ruoding Wang, Yucheng Wang, Junwei Huang, Jun You, Jing Zhu
{"title":"Do analytic philosophers in China think differently? A survey and comparative study","authors":"Su Wu, Jiawei Xu, Hao Zhan, Ruoding Wang, Yucheng Wang, Junwei Huang, Jun You, Jing Zhu","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00138-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-024-00138-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"1 9‐10","pages":"1-24"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139805274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do analytic philosophers in China think differently? A survey and comparative study 中国分析哲学家的思维方式与众不同吗？调查与比较研究
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-05 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00138-x
Su Wu, Jiawei Xu, Hao Zhan, Ruoding Wang, Yucheng Wang, Junwei Huang, Jun You, Jing Zhu
{"title":"Do analytic philosophers in China think differently? A survey and comparative study","authors":"Su Wu,&nbsp;Jiawei Xu,&nbsp;Hao Zhan,&nbsp;Ruoding Wang,&nbsp;Yucheng Wang,&nbsp;Junwei Huang,&nbsp;Jun You,&nbsp;Jing Zhu","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00138-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00138-x","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Analytic philosophy has been developing in China for over a century, and philosophers shaped by the analytic tradition have grown into an important philosophical community in China. The views of contemporary analytic philosophers in China on central philosophical issues and their similarities and differences with analytic philosophers in English-speaking countries have not been systematically investigated. Bourget and Chalmers have conducted two large-scale online questionnaire surveys on analytic philosophers in English-speaking countries. Inspired by their studies, a survey on analytic philosophers in China was performed. It is found that philosophers in China had no agreement on most issues. According to the comparative analysis with the results of Bourget and Chalmers’ second survey, there were significant differences in views as well as thinking styles between analytic philosophers in China and English-speaking countries. And these differences may be partially explained by cultural factors and academic environments.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00138-x.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139865191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A range of reasons 一系列原因
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-01-30 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00139-w
Stephen Kearns, Daniel Star
{"title":"A range of reasons","authors":"Stephen Kearns,&nbsp;Daniel Star","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00139-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00139-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Daniel Whiting’s excellent new book,\u0000<i>The Range of Reasons</i> (2022), makes a number of noteworthy contributions to the philosophical literature on reasons and normativity. A good deal has been written on normative reasons, and it is no easy thing to make novel and promising arguments. Yet, this is what Whiting manages to do. We are sympathetic to some of his ideas and critical of others. It makes sense for us to focus on the first half of his book, where Whiting presents two accounts of normative reasons (the first superseded by, although possibly also compatible with, the second). We welcome this opportunity to clarify our own current views on the nature of normative reasons by contrasting them with Whiting’s views.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139591657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Why FDE might be too strong for Beall 为什么对 Beall 来说，FDE 可能太强了
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-01-26 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-023-00133-8
Hitoshi Omori, Jonas R. B. Arenhart
{"title":"Why FDE might be too strong for Beall","authors":"Hitoshi Omori,&nbsp;Jonas R. B. Arenhart","doi":"10.1007/s44204-023-00133-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-023-00133-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In his “The simple argument for subclassical logic,” Jc Beall advances an argument that led him to take <b>FDE</b> as the one true logic (the latter point is explicitly made clear in his “<b>FDE</b> as the One True Logic”). The aim of this article is to point out that if we follow Beall’s line of reasoning for endorsing <b>FDE</b>, there are at least two additional reasons to consider that <b>FDE</b> is too strong for Beall’s purposes. In fact, we claim that Beall should consider another weaker subclassical logic as the logic adequate for his project. To this end, we first briefly present Beall’s argument for <b>FDE</b>. Then, we discuss two specific topics that seem to motivate us to weaken <b>FDE</b>. We then introduce a subsystem that will enjoy all the benefits of Beall’s suggestion.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-023-00133-8.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139594737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Rational belief, epistemic possibility, and the a priori 理性信念、认识论可能性和先验论
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-01-25 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00137-y
Claire Field
{"title":"Rational belief, epistemic possibility, and the a priori","authors":"Claire Field","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00137-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00137-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this paper, I discuss Whiting’s (2021) account of rational belief and discuss some unresolved issues arising from its reliance on epistemic possibility and, by extension, perspective-relative aprioricity.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00137-y.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139597591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Hyperintensional evidence and Bayesian coherence 超强证据和贝叶斯一致性
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-01-22 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-023-00135-6
Ted Poston
{"title":"Hyperintensional evidence and Bayesian coherence","authors":"Ted Poston","doi":"10.1007/s44204-023-00135-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-023-00135-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Bayesian approaches to rationality require that a person’s degrees of belief be coherent. Among other implications, coherence requires that a person has the same degree of belief in every logically equivalent proposition. However, a person can have evidence for a claim without having evidence for all its propositional equivalences. This paper explores this conflict and argues that a person may be perfectly rational by virtue of responding to their evidence, even if their credences are not coherent. The paper also challenges the idea that it is always better to have more coherent credence, highlighting the fundamental role that evidence plays in rational belief.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139523301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Publisher Correction: Précis of The Range of Reasons 出版商更正：理由的范围》摘要
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-01-19 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-023-00136-5
Daniel Whiting
{"title":"Publisher Correction: Précis of The Range of Reasons","authors":"Daniel Whiting","doi":"10.1007/s44204-023-00136-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-023-00136-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142412431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Truth dependence against transparent truth 依赖真相，反对透明真相
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-01-12 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-023-00134-7
Susanna Melkonian-Altshuler
{"title":"Truth dependence against transparent truth","authors":"Susanna Melkonian-Altshuler","doi":"10.1007/s44204-023-00134-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-023-00134-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Beall’s (e.g., 2009, 2021) transparency theory of truth is recognized as a prominent, deflationist solution to the liar paradox. However, it has been neglected by truth theorists who have attempted to show that a deflationist theory of truth can (or cannot) account for <i>truth dependence</i>, i.e., the claim that the truth of a proposition depends on how things described by the proposition are, but how these things are does not depend on the truth of the proposition. Truth theorists interested in truth dependence have, instead, been focused on Horwich’s Minimalism (e.g., 1998). The goal of this paper is twofold. First, I construct what versions of the transparency theory would say about truth dependence. Second, I argue that even the best version of transparent truth ultimately fails to account for truth dependence. On the assumption that accounting for truth dependence is an adequacy condition on any theory of truth, the paper rejects transparency theory as an adequate theory of truth.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139435209","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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