{"title":"Précis of John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity","authors":"Tony Cheng","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00236-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00236-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This is a précis of my recent monograph <i>John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity: Oxford Kantianism Meets Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences</i>. I first describe the key question the book is trying to answer via understanding McDowell’s thinking and the general outline of it. The key question is a Kantian how-possible question, and the outline includes the distinction between first and second nature, the contrast between <i>Cogito</i> and <i>Homo sapience</i>, and how a minded human animal can be a perceiver, knower, thinker, speaker, agent, person, and conceptual <i>cum</i> self-conscious being in the world. I then focus on two key notions of the subtitles—phenomenology and cognitive sciences—and explain how they figure in the text. After that, a chapter-by-chapter summary is provided, albeit selectively. This introductory piece ends with a prediction that McDowell’s works will still be widely discussed in the reasonable distant future.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00236-w.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142939423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Three questions for Watson's account of epistemic rights","authors":"Andy Yu","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00231-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00231-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In <i>The Right to Know: Epistemic Rights and Why We Need Them</i> (Routledge, 2021), Lani Watson comprehensively examines the right to know and other epistemic rights, that is, rights to goods such as information, knowledge and truth. These rights, she suggests, play a key role in society today, but we often do not attend to them in the way that we should. She draws our attention to these rights, illustrating their importance using a range of examples from medicine, politics and law, and she articulates a philosophical account of these rights. Her concise but book-length treatment of the topic is clear, accessible and rigorous. This is a considerable achievement, and I find Watson’s treatment of epistemic rights to be illuminating. I do wish she would say more to expand on her discussion of certain points, but overall, she succeeds in her project to shed light on an important but underdiscussed topic. In this critical contribution, I summarize her book and then raise three questions about her discussion. First, does Watson adopt a workable conception of law and morality, given her characterization of who can have epistemic rights? Second, does the law support Watson’s conception of epistemic rights and duties, as she claims it does? Third, does Watson focus on the harm-related rationale for epistemic rights to the apparent exclusion of other rationales?</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142938704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mind the gap: On negative and positive origin essentialism","authors":"Teresa Robertson Ishii","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00201-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00201-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In “A New Problem for Kripkean Defenses of Origin Theses”, Sungil Han calls attention to a gap between the negative conclusions of arguments for origin essentialism (claims to the effect that a given thing <i>could not</i> originate in a certain way), and the positive conclusions one might hope for (claims to the effect that a given thing <i>must</i> originate in a certain way if it exists at all). Han proposes a way of bridging the gap. While I agree with Han that there is indeed such a gap, there is an important difference in what Han and I take the negative claims of Kripke(ans) to be. As a result, I propose a bridge that is significantly different from his. I argue that my approach is superior to Han’s.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142938703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Transcendental entitlement and reasons for belief","authors":"Allan Hazlett","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00234-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00234-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142939086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A theory of assessability for reasonableness","authors":"Andrew T. Forcehimes","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00230-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00230-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This essay defends an account of what things are assessable for reasonableness and why. On this account, something is assessable for reasonableness if and only if and because it is the functional effect of critical reasoning.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00230-2.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142939085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Nietzsche as metaphysician?","authors":"Matthew Meyer","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00228-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00228-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This article provides a critical analysis of Justin Remhof’s attempt to defend the view that Nietzsche is best understood as a metaphysician.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00228-w.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142925689","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Necessities in the old jungle?: On Han’s analysis of the necessity of origin","authors":"Dongwoo Kim","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00235-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00235-x","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I shall discuss Han’s analysis of the necessity of origin theses. His analysis comes in two parts. The negative part argues that well-known Kripkean arguments leave an inferential gap, thus falling short of establishing the necessity of origin theses. The positive part contends that the gap can only be bridged by Aristotelian metaphysics of essence and causation. I shall critically examine both the negative and positive parts of Han’s analysis.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00235-x.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142925688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Précis of logical empiricism as scientific philosophy","authors":"Alan Richardson","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00226-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00226-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><i>Logical Empiricism as Scientific Philosophy</i> offers a new account of the philosophical significance of logical empiricism that relies on the past forty years of literature reassessing the project. It argues that while logical empiricism was committed to empiricism and did become tied to the trajectory of analytic philosophy, neither empiricism nor logical analysis per se was the deepest philosophical commitment of logical empiricism. That commitment was, rather, securing the scientific status of philosophy, bringing philosophy into a scientific conception of the world.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142912829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Non-evidential virtue epistemology: Some queries about cornerstones, epistemic alchemy, and scepticism","authors":"Giorgio Volpe","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00227-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00227-x","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Jakob Ohlhorst’s <i>Trust Responsibly</i> develops a dual process, virtue-theoretic answer to a crucial challenge to hinge epistemology, the so-called “demarcation problem” of distinguishing epistemically good from epistemically bad hinges. The book is packed with insightful ideas about many epistemological issues, offering carefully crafted arguments for a picture of knowledge that merges in an extremely attractive way hinge epistemology, virtue epistemology, and dual process theory. In this contribution to the book symposium on <i>Trust Responsibly</i>, I focus on Ohlhorst’s characterisation of cornerstone propositions, his take on epistemic alchemy, and the internalist credentials of his answer to the sceptical challenge, raising some worries about these aspects of his account.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142905988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cross-linguistic disagreement among different cultures of shame: comparative analysis of Korean and Japanese notions of shame","authors":"Bongrae Seok","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00225-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00225-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Although shame is not listed in Ekman’s (1999) basic emotions, it is recognized by many psychologists as one of the universal human emotions observed across different cultures throughout the world as a secondary self-conscious emotion (self-critical awareness of one’s social reputation) (Tangney et al., in <i>Annual Review of Psychology, 58</i>, 345–372, 2007). However, there are culturally specific forms and words of shame that can pose a serious challenge to cross-linguistic communication. I will categorize different forms of shame and discuss if there exist any incomparable or incompatible notions of shame in Korean and Japanese cultures. I will argue that there are at least three semantic categories in Korean and Japanese words of shame. However, one of the semantic categories of Korean shame words represents a unique notion of shame (an inner sense or disposition of morality) which is not fully or properly translated into the Japanese words of shame. Therefore, shame provides an intriguing case of culturally en-formed emotions, emotions that are developed in particular cultural environments. This type of culturally embedded semantic difference seems to be persistent or perhaps pervasive even between closely related cultures such as Korean and Japanese cultures with many comparable social practices and linguistic characteristics. The current study shows that cultural variance and semantic incomparability (although they do not necessarily demonstrate fundamental cultural relativity or radical incommensurability between different linguistic or conceptual systems) can affect cross-linguistic communication and cause, in certain contexts, cross-linguistic disagreement.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142880509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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