Asian journal of philosophy最新文献_第10页

Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu on the principle of sufficient reason 那跋陀罗和瓦苏班杜论充足理由原则

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-03-13 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00142-1

Allison Aitken

{"title":"Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu on the principle of sufficient reason","authors":"Allison Aitken","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00142-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00142-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Canonical defenders of the <i>principle of sufficient reason</i> (PSR), such as Leibniz and Spinoza, are metaphysical foundationalists of one stripe or another. This is curious since the PSR—which says that everything has a ground, cause, or explanation—in effect, denies fundamental entities. In this paper, I explore the apparent inconsistency between metaphysical foundationalism and approaches to metaphysical system building that are driven by a commitment to the PSR. I do so by analyzing how Indian Buddhist philosophers arrive at foundationalist and anti-foundationalist positions motivated by implicit commitments to different versions of the PSR. I begin by introducing the Buddhist <i>principle of dependent origination</i> (<i>pratītyasamutpāda</i>) as a proto-PSR that is restricted to causal explanation. Next, I show how Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika Abhidharma metaphysics is shaped by a qualified commitment to both causal and metaphysical grounding versions of the PSR. I then reveal how Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka metaphysics is driven by an unrestricted and exceptionless commitment to causal and metaphysical grounding versions of the PSR. Finally, I consider how Nāgārjuna’s account may put him in a unique position to respond to a common contemporary objection to the PSR from necessitarianism. I conclude by addressing a competing interpretation on which Nāgārjuna is best understood as an anti-rationalist rather than an uber-rationalist, as I characterize him.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140247085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Meta-metaphysics, constructivism, and psychology as queen of the sciences 元形而上学、建构主义和作为科学女王的心理学

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-03-12 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00154-x

James A. Mollison

引用次数: 0

Nietzsche as metaphysician but which metaphysics? A response to Justin Remhof 尼采是形而上学家，但又是哪种形而上学？回应贾斯汀-雷姆霍夫

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-03-10 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00153-y

Tsarina Doyle

引用次数: 0

A range of replies 一系列答复

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-03-01 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00152-z

Daniel Whiting

引用次数: 0

The metaphysical as the ethical: a pragmatist reading of Wang Yangming’s “The Mind Is the Principle” 作为伦理的形而上学：王阳明 "心即理 "的实用主义解读

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-24 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00149-8

JeeLoo Liu

{"title":"The metaphysical as the ethical: a pragmatist reading of Wang Yangming’s “The Mind Is the Principle”","authors":"JeeLoo Liu","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00149-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00149-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper explores a late-Ming Chinese philosopher Wang Yangming’s (1472–1529) philosophical assertions showcasing the pivotal role that human mind plays in shaping our worldview. Wang Yangming’s view—especially his declaration that <i>the Mind is the Principle</i>—emphasizes that the human mind is the sole foundation of moral principles and that worldly affairs are identified with human ethical practices. This position has been contentious both in his times and among contemporary scholars. While some critics, notably Chen Lai, find Wang’s synthesis of the ethical and the metaphysical realm problematic, others like Wing-tsit Chan view Wang Yangming’s philosophy as verging on subjective idealism. Both Chen and Chan argue that Wang Yangming commits the fallacy of the conflation of fact and value. In this paper, I defend Wang Yangming’s ethics-oriented metaphysics against such criticisms. I will engage a comparative study between Wang Yangming’s perspective and pragmatist metaphysics—a modern philosophical stance which sees metaphysics as intertwining with human ethics and practices. Building upon this comparative study, this paper aims to highlight the intrinsic bond between metaphysics and ethics and to advocate for the centrality of ethics in shaping the very foundation of metaphysical thinking. The conclusion of this paper is that Wang Yangming’s metaphysics aligns with commonsense realism, rather than with subjective idealism. His metaphysics is not a confused worldview that conflates fact with value, nor is it subjective idealism. Instead, it is a metaphysics with the ethical grounding of human engagements and humanistic concerns.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139957296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Revisiting Grace de Laguna’s critiques of analytic philosophy and of pragmatism 重温格蕾丝-德-拉古纳对分析哲学和实用主义的批判

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-21 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00147-w

Joel Katzav

{"title":"Revisiting Grace de Laguna’s critiques of analytic philosophy and of pragmatism","authors":"Joel Katzav","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00147-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00147-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I revisit my paper, ‘Grace de Laguna’s 1909 Critique of Analytic Philosophy’ and respond to the commentary on it. I respond to James Chase and Jack Reynolds by further analysing the difference between speculative philosophy as de Laguna conceived of it and analytic philosophy, by clarifying how her critique of analytic philosophy remains relevant to some of its more speculative forms, and by explaining what justifies the criticism of established opinion that goes along with her rejection of analytic philosophy’s epistemic conservatism. In response to Andreas Vrahimis, I contextualise my reading of de Laguna’s work in 1909. This clarifies her critique of pragmatism, distinguishes it from her critique of epistemically conservative philosophy, and shows that she was not only already aware of the full scope of the latter critique but is likely to have identified the then incipient analytic philosophy as its primary target. Also, contra Vrahimis, her argument is effective against Bertrand Russell’s later, epistemically conservative approach to philosophy. In response to Cheryl Misak, I point out that her argument that de Laguna is, despite herself, a pragmatist rests on a misunderstanding of the differences between pragmatism and idealism, and I show that de Laguna’s main early influences were Herbert Spencer and her teacher, James Edwin Creighton. I further argue that Misak’s rejection of de Laguna’s critique of pragmatism rests on a misrepresentation of the critique.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00147-w.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139958038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Insufficient reasons insufficient to rescue the knowledge norm of practical reasoning: towards a certainty norm 不充分的理由不足以拯救实践推理的知识规范：走向确定性规范

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-16 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00143-0

J. Vollet

引用次数: 0

Insufficient reasons insufficient to rescue the knowledge norm of practical reasoning: towards a certainty norm 不充分的理由不足以拯救实践推理的知识规范：走向确定性规范

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-16 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00143-0

Jacques-Henri Vollet

引用次数: 0

The logics of a universal language 通用语言的逻辑

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-15 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00140-3

Eduardo Alejandro Barrio, Edson Bezerra

{"title":"The logics of a universal language","authors":"Eduardo Alejandro Barrio, Edson Bezerra","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00140-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00140-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Semantic paradoxes pose a real threat to logics that attempt to be capable of expressing their own semantic concepts. Particularly, Curry paradoxes seem to show that many solutions must change our intuitive concepts of truth or validity or impose limits on certain inferences that are intuitively valid. In this way, the logic of a universal language would have serious problems. In this paper, we explore a different solution that tries to avoid both limitations as much as possible. Thus, we argue that it is possible to capture the naive concepts of truth and validity without losing any of the valid inferences of classical logic. This approach is called the Buenos Aires plan. We present the logic of truth and validity, <span>(mathsf {STTV}_{omega })</span> based on the hierarchy of logics <span>(textsf{ST}_{omega })</span>, whose validity predicate has the same semantic conditions as the material conditional. We argue that <span>(mathsf {STTV}_{omega })</span> is capable of blocking the problematic results while keeping the deductive power of classical logic as much as possible and offering an adequate semantic theory. On the other hand, one could object that it is not possible to reason with <span>(mathsf {STTV}_{omega })</span> because it is not closed under its logical principles. We respond to this objection and argue that the local characterization of validity shows how to make inferences using the logic <span>(textsf{ST}_{omega })</span>.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139834657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The logics of a universal language 通用语言的逻辑

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-15 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00140-3

E. Barrio, Edson Bezerra

引用次数: 1