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Asian journal of philosophy最新文献

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Chess and Antirealism 国际象棋与反现实主义
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2023-11-28 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-023-00118-7
Samuel Kahn
{"title":"Chess and Antirealism","authors":"Samuel Kahn","doi":"10.1007/s44204-023-00118-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-023-00118-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this article, I make a novel argument for scientific antirealism. My argument is as follows: (1) the best human chess players would lose to the best computer chess programs; (2) if the best human chess players would lose to the best computer chess programs, then there is good reason to think that the best human chess players do not understand how to make winning moves; (3) if there is good reason to think that the best human chess players do not understand how to make winning moves, then there is good reason to think that the best human theories about unobservables are wrong; therefore, (4) there is good reason to think that the best human theories about unobservables are wrong. The article is divided into three sections. In the first, I outline the backdrop for my argument. In the second, I explain my argument. In the third, I consider some objections.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138468327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The ranges of reasons and creasons 原因和原因的范围
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2023-11-28 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-023-00129-4
Clayton Littlejohn
{"title":"The ranges of reasons and creasons","authors":"Clayton Littlejohn","doi":"10.1007/s44204-023-00129-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-023-00129-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this discussion, we look at three potential problems that arise for Whiting’s account of normative reasons. The first has to do with the idea that objective reasons might have a modal dimension. The second and third concern the idea that there is some sort of direct connection between sets of reasons and the deliberative ought or the ought of rationality. We can see that we might be better served using credences about reasons (i.e., creasons) to characterise any ought that is distinct from the objective ought than possessed or apparent reasons.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138468343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The problem of the spiritual thing 精神方面的问题
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2023-11-27 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-023-00132-9
Carl Mika
{"title":"The problem of the spiritual thing","authors":"Carl Mika","doi":"10.1007/s44204-023-00132-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-023-00132-9","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this response, I briefly consider a Maori philosophy of reaction and disconnection, relating to certain Pakeha New Zealanders’ vehement, sometimes mocking, rejection of Maori spiritual entities (such as the taniwha). While Maori are often publicly reported on as being outraged at this rejection, what is not so widely cited is the concern that many Maori have at the <i>rangirua</i> (fundamentally fragmented) state that these individuals occupy. I suggest that rangirua engages with notions of control, to the extent that the mocking individual is so highly concerned with disavowing the spiritual that implications arise for what is, from a Maori perspective, their wellbeing. Kingsbury argues for a particular kind of reality for the taniwha but not from Maori foundational propositions of existence. Her argument draws from the rules that are credible for analytic philosophy but not so much for a Maori perspective. Nevertheless, within those limitations, she argues well for a notion of taniwha that could make taniwha palatable for those Pakeha individuals.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138468370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On group lies and lying to oneself: comment on Jennifer Lackey’s The Epistemology of Groups 论群体谎言与自我欺骗:评詹妮弗·雷基的《群体认识论》
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2023-11-23 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-023-00128-5
Megan Hyska
{"title":"On group lies and lying to oneself: comment on Jennifer Lackey’s The Epistemology of Groups","authors":"Megan Hyska","doi":"10.1007/s44204-023-00128-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-023-00128-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In <i>The Epistemology of Groups</i>, Jennifer Lackey investigates the conditions for the possibility of groups telling lies. Central to this project is the goal of holding groups, and individuals within groups, accountable for their actions. I show that Lackey’s total account of group phenomena, however, may open up a means by which groups can evade accusations of having lied, thus allowing them to evade responsibility in precisely the way Lackey set out to avoid. Along the way, I also take note of some interesting implications of Lackey’s view: that it makes groups uniquely susceptible to a lack of self-knowledge and that it creates an interesting mechanism by which groups can lie to themselves.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138431687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Modest versus ultra-modest dialetheism 适度与超适度的辩证论
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2023-11-16 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-023-00123-w
T. Parent
{"title":"Modest versus ultra-modest dialetheism","authors":"T. Parent","doi":"10.1007/s44204-023-00123-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-023-00123-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Jc Beall is known for defending modest dialetheism; this is the view that there are dialetheia, but only in the form of “spandrels” arising from otherwise reasonable semantic terminology (e.g., the Liar paradox). Beall regards the view as modest, partly because it adopts a deflationary view of truth, a view where “true” is merely a device of disquotational inference, one which expresses no “substantive property.” Beall supports deflationism by an appeal to Ockham’s razor; however, the premise that “true” is disquotational is found dubious. Nonetheless, we can craft an ultra-modest position which says merely that at least one utterance of “This sentence is not true” uses “true” as a disquotational device, and maintains neutrality on whether it expresses a substantive property. This is sufficient for the existence of at least one dialetheia, and can be justified by appeal to readily observable facts about linguistic usage. The limited scope of the ultra-modest view will be disappointing to formal semanticists hoping to capture the behavior of “true” throughout the language. But the ultra-modest basis gives dialetheism the best hope for wider acceptance in the discipline.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134796608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A causal argument for physicalism 物理主义的因果论证
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2023-11-16 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-023-00110-1
Lei Zhong
{"title":"A causal argument for physicalism","authors":"Lei Zhong","doi":"10.1007/s44204-023-00110-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-023-00110-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Although physicalism is a dominant position in contemporary philosophy of mind and metaphysics, there are surprisingly very few serious arguments for physicalism, which may contribute to the revival of anti-physicalism in recent decades. In this article, I develop a causal argument for physicalism in general, inspired by the causal argument for reductive physicalism. By comparing each pair of premises, I argue that, while the causal argument for reductive physicalism is controversial, the causal argument for physicalism simpliciter is promising.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134796650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does causation entail emptiness? On a point of dispute between Abhidharma and Madhyamaka 因果关系会导致空性吗?关于阿毗达摩和中观摩卡之间的争论
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2023-11-09 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-023-00121-y
Jan Westerhoff
{"title":"Does causation entail emptiness? On a point of dispute between Abhidharma and Madhyamaka","authors":"Jan Westerhoff","doi":"10.1007/s44204-023-00121-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-023-00121-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The aim of this paper is to assess the relation between causation and the notion of emptiness described in Buddhist philosophy. While the Madhyamaka school argues that some entity’s being caused implies its being empty, some contemporary authors have argued that there is a ‘Humean’ regularity account of causation that can both be understood as a plausible model of the earlier Buddhist Abhidharma account of causation and also block the Madhyamaka inference from causation to emptiness. After describing the Abhidharma account of causation, the ‘Humean’ regularity account and the Madhyamaka argument from causation to emptiness, we assess some ways in which this argument may be developed, with particular focus on the ‘ladder of causation’ and on the Madhyamaka account of time. The debate about the relation between causation and emptiness, it appears, is a facet of a more comprehensive metaphysical debate between a (moderate) foundationalism and a thoroughgoing anti-foundationalism.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134795771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Incoherence, inquiry, and suspension 语无伦次，质疑和悬疑
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2023-11-09 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-023-00126-7
Conor McHugh
{"title":"Incoherence, inquiry, and suspension","authors":"Conor McHugh","doi":"10.1007/s44204-023-00126-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-023-00126-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I consider two possible evidentialist responses to Schmidt. According to the first, all of the reason-giving work in the relevant cases is being done by evidence. According to the second, even if the ‘incoherence fact’ sometimes provides a reason, what it provides a reason for is not a doxastic attitude, or at least not one that is an alternative to belief. I argue that the first response is not satisfying, but the second is defensible.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-023-00126-7.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134795770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Daniel Whiting: Précis of The Range of Reasons 丹尼尔·怀廷:《原因的范围》的实践
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2023-11-03 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-023-00124-9
Daniel Whiting
{"title":"Daniel Whiting: Précis of The Range of Reasons","authors":"Daniel Whiting","doi":"10.1007/s44204-023-00124-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-023-00124-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134795504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Grace Andrus de Laguna’s 1909 critique of pragmatism and absolute idealism: a contextualist response to Katzav 格蕾丝·安德烈斯·德·拉古纳1909年对实用主义和绝对理想主义的批判:对卡扎夫的语境主义回应
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2023-11-02 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-023-00122-x
Andreas Vrahimis
{"title":"Grace Andrus de Laguna’s 1909 critique of pragmatism and absolute idealism: a contextualist response to Katzav","authors":"Andreas Vrahimis","doi":"10.1007/s44204-023-00122-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-023-00122-x","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In a move characteristic of appropriationist approaches to the history of philosophy, Katzav (Asian Journal of Philosophy 2(47):1–26, Katzav, 2023a) argues that Grace Andrus de Laguna had, already in 1909, developed what is effectively a critique of analytic philosophy (as a form of epistemically conservative philosophy). In response to Katzav’s claim, this symposium paper attempts to pay closer attention to the context of de Laguna’s paper. As Katzav also acknowledges, de Laguna was dialogically engaged with two non-analytic tendencies in her contemporary philosophy, namely pragmatism and absolute idealism. More specifically, her target is Dewey’s, 1905 defence of ‘immediatism’ (and, by extension, James’ ‘radical empiricism’), which was put forward in opposition to absolute idealism. In 1909, de Laguna separates ‘immediatism’ from ‘instrumentalism’ as two distinct tendencies within pragmatism, rejecting the former and embracing the latter. By thus situating her critique, I argue that, while successful against Deweyan non-analytic ‘immediatism’ (and possibly also James’s Bergsonist variant of this view), it cannot, without further ado, be charitably interpreted as applicable against Russell’s analytic theory of sense-data.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134795433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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