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Asian journal of philosophy最新文献

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Evidential pluralism in the social sciences: What can be established in case study research? 社会科学中的证据多元化：案例研究中能确立什么？
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-08 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00199-y
Rosa W. Runhardt
{"title":"Evidential pluralism in the social sciences: What can be established in case study research?","authors":"Rosa W. Runhardt","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00199-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00199-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This article responds to Yafeng Shan and Jon Williamson’s 2022 volume Evidential <i>Pluralism in the Social Sciences</i>, focusing on the applicability of Evidential Pluralism in the field of case study research through the use of examples from political science. The article argues that Shan and Williamson’s guidance on (a) what evidence one needs to establish causation in singular case studies and (b) what one may conclude at the population level once one has done so is lacking in some important respects. Therefore, this article will speak to the wider community of social scientists and methodologists who are sympathetic to using a plurality of evidence in case study research, but who still want guidance of how to do so in a philosophically grounded manner.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00199-y.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142410791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Problems for phenomenal explanationism 现象解释论的问题
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-08 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00202-6
Matthias Steup
{"title":"Problems for phenomenal explanationism","authors":"Matthias Steup","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00202-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00202-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I raise several problems for Phenomenal Explanationism, which McCain and Moretti intend to be a fusion of Evidentialism and Phenomenal Conservatism. I argue that the view is actually a non-conservative, credentialist view. Unlike conservatism, it does not allow for immediate justification. I also argue that the view has trouble accounting for justification coming from background knowledge. Finally, I argue that the view runs into the problem of equally good explanations.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142410792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Laozian metaethics 老庄元伦理学
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-07 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00198-z
Jason Dockstader
{"title":"Laozian metaethics","authors":"Jason Dockstader","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00198-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00198-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper contributes to the emerging field of comparative metaethics by offering a reconstruction of the metaethical views implicit to the Daoist classic, the <i>Laozi</i> 老子 or <i>Daodejing</i> 道德經. It offers two novel views developed out of the <i>Laozi</i>: one-all value monism and moral trivialism. The paper proceeds by discussing Brook Ziporyn’s reading of the <i>Laozi</i> in terms of omnipresence and irony, and then applies his reading to moral properties like values and names (<i>ming</i> 名). The paper emboldens Ziporyn’s monistic tendencies in order to claim that the <i>Laozi</i> not only treats the Dao as an omnipresent value, but also as the one value that <i>is</i> all values. I call this view one-all value monism. I then argue that, in terms of moral epistemology, one-all value monism entails moral trivialism, the view that all moral judgments are true. I conclude by emphasizing the therapeutic motivation for holding such apparently outrageous metaethical views. The paper thus defends the basic claim that there is a point at which Ziporyn’s omnipresence and irony become monism and true contradiction, and that further exploring the consequences of these inevitable transitions leads to the discovery of novel metaethical views.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142410450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What are collective epistemic reasons and why do we need them? 什么是集体认识论理由，我们为什么需要它们？
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-05 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00197-0
Anne Schwenkenbecher
{"title":"What are collective epistemic reasons and why do we need them?","authors":"Anne Schwenkenbecher","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00197-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00197-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00197-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142410105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Kant, the scholarship condition, and linguistic racialization: comments on Lu-Adler’s Kant on Public Reason and the Linguistic Other 康德、学术条件与语言种族化：对 Lu-Adler 的《康德论公共理性与语言他者》的评论
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-03 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00200-8
J. Colin McQuillan
{"title":"Kant, the scholarship condition, and linguistic racialization: comments on Lu-Adler’s Kant on Public Reason and the Linguistic Other","authors":"J. Colin McQuillan","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00200-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00200-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this response to Lu-Adler’s “Kant on Public Reason and the Linguistic Other,” I summarize the restrictions the scholarship condition imposes on the public use of reason in Kant’s essay “What is Enlightenment?” I then agree that Lu-Adler identifies an even more radical set of restrictions on the public use of reason, confirming that Kant is not the liberal egalitarian he is often supposed to be by intellectual historians, historians of philosophy, and Kant scholars. After that, I suggest that what Lu-Adler calls “the construction of a linguistic other” in Kant’s lectures on logic and anthropology can also be understood as “Kantian linguistic racialization.” I close with a short reflection on how we should respond to Kant’s illiberal, inegalitarian, linguistic racism.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142409600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Valid and invalid causal arguments for physicalism 物理主义的有效和无效因果论证
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-02 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00192-5
Thomas Kroedel
{"title":"Valid and invalid causal arguments for physicalism","authors":"Thomas Kroedel","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00192-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00192-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In “A Causal Argument for Physicalism”, Lei Zhong presents an argument for physicalism in general, that is, for the disjunction of reductive physicalism and non-reductive physicalism. Zhong’s argument attempts to show that mental properties are physically acceptable, that is, physical in a wide sense. The crucial assumption of the argument is that physically acceptable effects do not have both sufficient causes that are physically acceptable and simultaneous sufficient causes that are not physically acceptable. I argue that Zhong’s argument is invalid, because the mental can be causally relevant to physically acceptable effects while being neither physically acceptable nor causally sufficient for these effects. I present an alternative argument in the spirit of Zhong’s argument that omits the notion of sufficient causation. I argue that non-physicalists can also resist the alternative argument if they fine-tune their metaphysics of mind.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00192-5.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142409540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Publisher Correction to: Rational belief, epistemic possibility, and the a priori 出版商更正为：理性信念、认识论可能性和先验论
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-02 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00180-9
Claire Field
{"title":"Publisher Correction to: Rational belief, epistemic possibility, and the a priori","authors":"Claire Field","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00180-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00180-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00180-9.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142409477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Justification and update 理由和更新
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-01 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00193-4
Jeanne Peijnenburg, David Atkinson
{"title":"Justification and update","authors":"Jeanne Peijnenburg,&nbsp;David Atkinson","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00193-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00193-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this commentary on Jun Otsuka’s first-rate book, we focus on the difference between justification and update.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00193-4.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142409365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Mind, Liangzhi, and Qi in Wang Yangming’s view that “nothing is external to the mind” 王阳明 "心外无物 "观中的 "心"、"良知 "与 "气"
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-09-26 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00194-3
Zemian Zheng
{"title":"Mind, Liangzhi, and Qi in Wang Yangming’s view that “nothing is external to the mind”","authors":"Zemian Zheng","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00194-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00194-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Although I agree with Jeeloo Liu that Wang Yangming is not a subjective idealist, this does not rule other possibilities of idealism. Wang Yangming equates the mind to Dao and equates <i>liangzhi</i> to the Dao of Change. This suggests that the mind is not just a subjective mind. It can denote the all-encompassing universal mind. In his “blossoming tree” dialogue about the theme “nothing is external to the mind,” Wang Yangming alludes to the <i>Book of Change</i>. The underlying idea is that there is an undifferentiated unity before the calculative deliberation divides the subject and object. This idea of oneness also underlies Wang Yangming’s view of <i>qi</i>. I have reservations about using “naturalism” and “realism” to categorize Wang Yangming’s philosophy.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00194-3.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142413894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Is deflationism self-defeating? 通货紧缩主义是自取灭亡吗？
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-09-26 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00195-2
Guanglong Luo
{"title":"Is deflationism self-defeating?","authors":"Guanglong Luo","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00195-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00195-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>According to deflationism, truth is insubstantial. Edwards (2018) argues that the deflationist thesis of insubstantiality is incoherent, regardless of how it is characterized. By clarifying the deflationist concepts of reference and truth (and their relations) and addressing the distinction between substantial properties and insubstantial properties within the deflationist framework, we will argue that Edwards’s self-defeating argument is problematic and ultimately unconvincing.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00195-2.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142414100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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