Su Wu, Jiawei Xu, Hao Zhan, Ruoding Wang, Yucheng Wang, Junwei Huang, Jun You, Jing Zhu
{"title":"Do analytic philosophers in China think differently? A survey and comparative study","authors":"Su Wu, Jiawei Xu, Hao Zhan, Ruoding Wang, Yucheng Wang, Junwei Huang, Jun You, Jing Zhu","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00138-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00138-x","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Analytic philosophy has been developing in China for over a century, and philosophers shaped by the analytic tradition have grown into an important philosophical community in China. The views of contemporary analytic philosophers in China on central philosophical issues and their similarities and differences with analytic philosophers in English-speaking countries have not been systematically investigated. Bourget and Chalmers have conducted two large-scale online questionnaire surveys on analytic philosophers in English-speaking countries. Inspired by their studies, a survey on analytic philosophers in China was performed. It is found that philosophers in China had no agreement on most issues. According to the comparative analysis with the results of Bourget and Chalmers’ second survey, there were significant differences in views as well as thinking styles between analytic philosophers in China and English-speaking countries. And these differences may be partially explained by cultural factors and academic environments.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00138-x.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139865191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A range of reasons","authors":"Stephen Kearns, Daniel Star","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00139-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00139-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Daniel Whiting’s excellent new book,\u0000<i>The Range of Reasons</i> (2022), makes a number of noteworthy contributions to the philosophical literature on reasons and normativity. A good deal has been written on normative reasons, and it is no easy thing to make novel and promising arguments. Yet, this is what Whiting manages to do. We are sympathetic to some of his ideas and critical of others. It makes sense for us to focus on the first half of his book, where Whiting presents two accounts of normative reasons (the first superseded by, although possibly also compatible with, the second). We welcome this opportunity to clarify our own current views on the nature of normative reasons by contrasting them with Whiting’s views.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139591657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why FDE might be too strong for Beall","authors":"Hitoshi Omori, Jonas R. B. Arenhart","doi":"10.1007/s44204-023-00133-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-023-00133-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In his “The simple argument for subclassical logic,” Jc Beall advances an argument that led him to take <b>FDE</b> as the one true logic (the latter point is explicitly made clear in his “<b>FDE</b> as the One True Logic”). The aim of this article is to point out that if we follow Beall’s line of reasoning for endorsing <b>FDE</b>, there are at least two additional reasons to consider that <b>FDE</b> is too strong for Beall’s purposes. In fact, we claim that Beall should consider another weaker subclassical logic as the logic adequate for his project. To this end, we first briefly present Beall’s argument for <b>FDE</b>. Then, we discuss two specific topics that seem to motivate us to weaken <b>FDE</b>. We then introduce a subsystem that will enjoy all the benefits of Beall’s suggestion.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-023-00133-8.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139594737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rational belief, epistemic possibility, and the a priori","authors":"Claire Field","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00137-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00137-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this paper, I discuss Whiting’s (2021) account of rational belief and discuss some unresolved issues arising from its reliance on epistemic possibility and, by extension, perspective-relative aprioricity.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00137-y.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139597591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hyperintensional evidence and Bayesian coherence","authors":"Ted Poston","doi":"10.1007/s44204-023-00135-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-023-00135-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Bayesian approaches to rationality require that a person’s degrees of belief be coherent. Among other implications, coherence requires that a person has the same degree of belief in every logically equivalent proposition. However, a person can have evidence for a claim without having evidence for all its propositional equivalences. This paper explores this conflict and argues that a person may be perfectly rational by virtue of responding to their evidence, even if their credences are not coherent. The paper also challenges the idea that it is always better to have more coherent credence, highlighting the fundamental role that evidence plays in rational belief.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139523301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Publisher Correction: Précis of The Range of Reasons","authors":"Daniel Whiting","doi":"10.1007/s44204-023-00136-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-023-00136-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142412431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Truth dependence against transparent truth","authors":"Susanna Melkonian-Altshuler","doi":"10.1007/s44204-023-00134-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-023-00134-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Beall’s (e.g., 2009, 2021) transparency theory of truth is recognized as a prominent, deflationist solution to the liar paradox. However, it has been neglected by truth theorists who have attempted to show that a deflationist theory of truth can (or cannot) account for <i>truth dependence</i>, i.e., the claim that the truth of a proposition depends on how things described by the proposition are, but how these things are does not depend on the truth of the proposition. Truth theorists interested in truth dependence have, instead, been focused on Horwich’s Minimalism (e.g., 1998). The goal of this paper is twofold. First, I construct what versions of the transparency theory would say about truth dependence. Second, I argue that even the best version of transparent truth ultimately fails to account for truth dependence. On the assumption that accounting for truth dependence is an adequacy condition on any theory of truth, the paper rejects transparency theory as an adequate theory of truth.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139435209","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hegel of the gaps? Truth, falsity and conjunction in Hegelian contradictions","authors":"Luis Estrada-González","doi":"10.1007/s44204-023-00131-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-023-00131-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I offer here a critical assessment of Beall and Ficara’s most recent take on Hegelian contradictions. By interpreting differently some key passages of Hegel’s work, I favor, unlike them, a no-gaps approach which leads to a different logic.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-023-00131-w.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139090577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Swords and diamonds—Thich Nhat Hanh on the law of identity","authors":"Mirja Annalena Holst","doi":"10.1007/s44204-023-00130-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-023-00130-x","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The <i>Diamond Sutra</i> is one of the earliest and most treasured of the <i>Perfection of Wisdom Sutras</i> and had a wide influence on the development of Zen Buddhism. There has been, in recent years, great interest in one particular form of sentences that repeatedly occur in the sutra, sentences of the form “<i>A</i> is not <i>A</i>, therefore it is <i>A</i>”. These sentences display what has been called the “logic of not” or the “logic of affirmation-in-negation”. They are of special interest since they do not only encapsulate one of the central insights of Zen Buddhism, that of nonduality, but at the same time seem to go against one of the most orthodox laws of logic in Western philosophy, the law of identity. This paper discusses the interpretation of these “diamond sentences” by the Vietnamese Zen monk Thich Nhat Hanh. I present Thich Nhat Hanh’s interpretation of the diamond sentences in terms of <i>interbeing</i> and go on to argue that and explain how, on his interpretation, the validity of the law of identity is indeed rejected. Finally, I spell out consequences for formulating a “logic of Zen” and for a related debate about the validity of the law of non-contradiction in Zen.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138468349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Knowledge in real-world contexts: not glamorous, but indispensable","authors":"Patricia Rich","doi":"10.1007/s44204-023-00127-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-023-00127-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>During the past several decades, many epistemologists have argued for and contributed to a paradigm shift according to which knowledge is central to assertion, action, and interaction. This general position stands in sharp contrast to several recently developed accounts regarding specific epistemic contexts. These specific accounts resist applying traditional epistemic norms, including strong knowledge norms, to real-world situations of interest. In particular, I consider recent arguments about the epistemic standards for scientific pronouncements, expert testimony in a political context, and interactive reasoning. I argue, firstly, that knowledge does have a crucial role to play in each case, contrary to appearances. Clarifying the role of knowledge fills gaps in our understanding left open by the existing accounts. Secondly, I show that combining the insights from the knowledge-centric approach and from the more specific accounts provides a new perspective on the open problem of developing an account of knowledge-based decisions. Specifically, I argue that the biggest open problem regarding knowledge-based decisions is not how we respond to uncertainty, but rather how we assess the relevance of our many disparate pieces of knowledge, choosing which to integrate, and how. A strong case emerges for a procedural solution to this part of the problem of how to make knowledge-based decisions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-023-00127-6.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138468364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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