{"title":"Sosa’s virtue account vs. responsibilism","authors":"Xingming Hu","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00170-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00170-x","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I first present a brief interpretation of Sosa’s virtue epistemology by showing how it is arguably better than Goldman’s process reliabilism, why Sosa distinguishes between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge, and how Sosa’s recent account of knowing full well can deal with pragmatic encroachment. Then, I raise two worries about Sosa’s account: (a) Sosa’s claim that one might have animal knowledge without knowing reflectively or knowing full well implies that one’s true belief might manifest <i>both</i> competence and luck, which seems to pose a challenge to Sosa’s solution to the Gettier problem; (b) intellectual virtue or competence does not seem to be a necessary condition for knowledge: there are cases where one knows without possessing the relevant intellectual virtue or competence. Finally, I suggest a responsibilist account of knowledge and show how it can not only handle the cases that pose a problem for Sosa’s account but also explain our intuitions about different grades of knowledge.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141271363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On Beall’s contradictory Christology and beyond","authors":"Filippo Casati, Naoya Fujikawa","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00165-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00165-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>According to Conciliar Christology, Christ has a divine nature and a human nature. This dual nature of Christ leads us to face many apparent inconsistencies: For example, it seems to follow that He is both immutable and mutable (and, therefore, not immutable). This long-standing issue in Christology has been called the fundamental problem of Christology. Recently, Jc Beall has proposed a novel approach to the fundamental problem: <i>contradictory</i> Christology, that is, Christology which takes those apparent inconsistencies as genuinely contradictory. This paper examines Beall’s contradictory Christology by comparing it with James Anderson’s version of consistent Christology. Such a comparison highlights an important assumption of Beall’s contradictory Christology, that is, the language used to state the fundamental problem is <i>univocal</i>. ‘Immutable’ is, thus, used in the same <i>literal</i> sense in both `Christ is immutable’ and `Christ is not immutable’. On the one hand, this assumption has a good reason given the human nature of Christ. On the other hand, we follow Anderson in showing that the view that `immutable’ is <i>equivocal</i> has a good reason too. For there is an established theological tradition according to which, when we speak about the divine, our language is <i>analogical</i>. In light of those considerations, this paper presents a semantic explication of how the predicates used to state the fundamental problem are <i>both</i> literal and analogical. The proposed semantics treats those predicates as cases of multiple denotations and shows that the apparent inconsistencies are genuinely contradictory, but in a different way from Beall’s contradictory Christology.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00165-8.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142414972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The truth conditions of sentences with referentially used definite descriptions","authors":"Wenqi Li","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00167-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00167-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Keith Donnellan’s distinction between the attributive and referential uses of definite descriptions has spurred debates regarding the truth conditions of the utterance “the F is G” with definite descriptions used referentially. In this article, I present a semantic account of referential descriptions, grounded in the contextual factors of the utterance, including the speaker’s intention and presupposition as well as the interlocutor’s recognition of them. This account is called the IPR-semantic account, according to which the speaker’s intention (I) and presupposition (P) and the interlocutor’s recognition (R) jointly determine whether “the F” in an utterance “the F is G” is used referentially or attributively, and the meaning of “the F” is determined by whether it is used referentially or attributively. Moreover, I argue that the meaning of the referential description “the F” is the intended object <i>e</i>, embodied with a property H that has prompted the speaker to presuppose that <i>e</i> is F and to intend to use “the F” to refer to <i>e</i>, as well as the interlocutor to recognize the presupposition and intention. According to the IPR-semantic account, the utterance “the F is G” with “the F” used referentially expresses a singular proposition, namely, that <i>e</i> is G, and it is true if and only if the intended object <i>e</i> is G. Additionally, I argue that the IPR-semantic account not only surpasses some alternative semantic accounts but also outperforms Kripke’s pragmatic account.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140969560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Parfitian or Buddhist reductionism? Revisiting a debate about personal identity","authors":"Javier Hidalgo","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00166-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00166-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Derek Parfit influentially defends reductionism about persons, the view that a person’s existence just consists in the existence of a brain and body and the occurrence of a series of physical and mental events. Yet some critics, particularly Mark Johnston, have raised powerful objections to Parfit’s reductionism. In this paper, I defend reductionism against Johnston. In particular, I defend a radical form of reductionism that Buddhist philosophers developed. Buddhist reductionism can justify key features of Parfit’s position, such as the claims that personal identity is not what matters and can also be indeterminate. Furthermore, Buddhist reductionism can avoid Johnston’s objections to Parfit’s reductionism. I conclude that reductionists have good reasons to favor Buddhist reductionism over Parfit’s version.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00166-7.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140979143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Frankfurt’s concept of identification","authors":"Chen Yajun","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00168-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00168-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Harry Frankfurt had insightfully pointed out that an agent acts freely when he acts in accord with the mental states with which he identifies. The concept of identification rightly captures the ownership condition (something being one’s really own), which plays a significant role in the issues of freedom and moral responsibility. For Frankfurt, identification consists of one’s forming second-order volitions, endorsing first-order desires, and issuing in his actions wholeheartedly. An agent not only wants to φ but also fully embraces his desire to φ (and φ). Frankfurt’s official theory above encounters some serious problems, especially since it is believed that his concept of wholehearted identification is too strong to be necessary for freedom. In this paper, I propose that we can uncouple identification from wholeheartedness and thus get two different senses of identification: weak identification and strong identification. Then, I argue that this distinction does a better job than Frankfurt’s official theory. On the one hand, weak identification is enough for ownership and freedom and thus more promising than strong identification; on the other hand, this distinction has an attractive implication that it fits well with our intuition about the degree of freedom and responsibility.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141000905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Contextual approaches to combating fake news: lessons from Thailand","authors":"Siraprapa Chavanayarn","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00162-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00162-x","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The pervasive issue of fake news poses a formidable challenge to knowledge acquisition, further complicated by the difficulty in distinguishing it from legitimate information due to human epistemic limitations. This article argues for the necessity of adopting contextual strategies to effectively combat the spread of fake news. Through a focused examination of COVID-19-related fake news in Thailand, it explores how unique national characteristics can shape tailored approaches to mitigate this problem. The analysis draws on the theoretical insights of David Coady and Regina Rini, advocating for the integration of an open science framework to enhance transparency and public access to information. Despite the potential benefits of an open science culture, the persistence of epistemic vices among the populace may limit its effectiveness in reducing the acceptance of fake news. This article proposes that, instead of using law enforcement or fact-checking organizations, the Thai government and media entities play a critical role in addressing epistemic shortcomings and fostering epistemic virtues. However, it emphasizes that the effectiveness of these approaches is contingent upon their adaptability to the socio-cultural and epistemological context of Thailand. The discussion highlights the importance of recognizing and accommodating these contextual differences in devising strategies against the dissemination of fake news.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141053388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The moving open future, temporal phenomenology, and temporal passage","authors":"Batoul Hodroj, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00157-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00157-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Empirical evidence suggests that people naïvely represent time as dynamical (i.e. as containing robust temporal passage). Yet many contemporary B-theorists deny that it seems to us, in perceptual experience, as though time robustly passes. The question then arises as to why we represent time as dynamical if we do not have perceptual experiences which represent time as dynamical. We consider two hypotheses about why this might be: the temporally aperspectival replacement hypothesis and the moving open future hypothesis. We then empirically test the moving open future hypothesis. According to that hypothesis, we represent the past as objectively fixed and the future open. And we represent that this objective openness moves as events that were open become fixed, such that in doing so, we represent a privileged moving present. We found no evidence for the moving open future hypothesis, which suggests that further investigation of the temporally aperspectival replacement hypothesis is called for. Our results also shed further light on our understanding of the respects in which we represent the future to be open, which, in turn, has implications for our theorising about the open future.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00157-8.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141033302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Legal proof: why knowledge matters and knowing does not","authors":"Andy Mueller","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00163-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00163-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I discuss the knowledge account of legal proof in Moss (2023) and develop an alternative. The unifying thread throughout this article are reflections on the beyond reasonable doubt (BRD) standard of proof. In Section 1, I will introduce the details of Moss’s account and how she motivates it via the BRD standard. In Section 2, I will argue that there are important disanalogies between BRD and knowledge that undermine Moss’s argument. There is however another motivation for the knowledge account: combined with auxiliary claims, that is probabilistic knowledge and moral encroachment, it can provide a general solution to the puzzle of statistical evidence. Section 3 spells out the details. In Section 4, I suggest to combine the knowledge account with pragmatic encroachment, instead of moral encroachment, in order to stay clear of the thorny issues whether corporations have moral rights. In Section 5, I argue that the verdicts of Moss’s account in cases of false justified beliefs and non-luminous knowledge conflict with the BRD standard and thus call for abandoning the account. Based on the social function of the BRD standard, I suggest a replacement for the knowledge account that is also just as potent as a general solution for the puzzle of statistical evidence. While I will grant that knowledge is neither always necessary nor always sufficient for convictions, I will argue that the concept of knowledge nonetheless plays a significant and ineliminable role in legal decision-making.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00163-w.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142414981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The significance of conceptualism in McDowell","authors":"Shao-An Hsu","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00161-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00161-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>To explain perceptual justification, McDowell proposes so-called “conceptualism,” the view that the content of experience is all conceptual. Tony Cheng, in his book, <i>John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity</i> (2021), suggests that McDowell can do without conceptualism. To support his suggestion, Cheng makes several contentions against McDowell’s thesis of the co-extensiveness of conceptuality and rationality. In this commentary, I focus on two most crucial contentions Cheng makes: (i) conceptualism is an extra commitment for explaining perceptual justification and (ii) it can be replaced by a suitable structural constraint on non-conceptual content. First, I clarify McDowell’s co-extensiveness thesis and his conception of the conceptual. Then, based on my clarifications, I defend conceptualism against the two contentions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00161-y.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142414980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Two in one: contradictory Christology without gluts?","authors":"Franca d’Agostini","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00158-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00158-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The central thesis of JC Beall’s paraconsistent Christology is that Christ, being human and divine, is a contradictory being, and a rational Christology can accept it, since logic nowadays does not exclude the possibility of true contradictions. In this paper, I move from Beall’s theory and I present an alternative view. I quote seven statements of the so-called ‘Athanasian Creed’ which synthesizes the results of conciliar Christology. The aim of the Creed is to combat monophysitism by stressing the duplicity and unity of Christ: two (incompatible) natures inseparably joined in only one person. I note that the two-in-one principle, so intended, may be seen as an ancestor of what has been called ‘conjunctive paraconsistency’, whereby there could be true contradictions but contradictories cannot be separately true. I specifically oppose this view to Beall’s idea of Christ’s human divinity (or divine humanity) as a glut, showing that in the conjunctive account, true contradictions do not require any overlapping or joint ascription of truth and falsity.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00158-7.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140672912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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