Asian journal of philosophy最新文献_第9页

The metaphysical as the ethical: a pragmatist reading of Wang Yangming’s “The Mind Is the Principle” 作为伦理的形而上学：王阳明 "心即理 "的实用主义解读

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-24 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00149-8

JeeLoo Liu

{"title":"The metaphysical as the ethical: a pragmatist reading of Wang Yangming’s “The Mind Is the Principle”","authors":"JeeLoo Liu","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00149-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00149-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper explores a late-Ming Chinese philosopher Wang Yangming’s (1472–1529) philosophical assertions showcasing the pivotal role that human mind plays in shaping our worldview. Wang Yangming’s view—especially his declaration that <i>the Mind is the Principle</i>—emphasizes that the human mind is the sole foundation of moral principles and that worldly affairs are identified with human ethical practices. This position has been contentious both in his times and among contemporary scholars. While some critics, notably Chen Lai, find Wang’s synthesis of the ethical and the metaphysical realm problematic, others like Wing-tsit Chan view Wang Yangming’s philosophy as verging on subjective idealism. Both Chen and Chan argue that Wang Yangming commits the fallacy of the conflation of fact and value. In this paper, I defend Wang Yangming’s ethics-oriented metaphysics against such criticisms. I will engage a comparative study between Wang Yangming’s perspective and pragmatist metaphysics—a modern philosophical stance which sees metaphysics as intertwining with human ethics and practices. Building upon this comparative study, this paper aims to highlight the intrinsic bond between metaphysics and ethics and to advocate for the centrality of ethics in shaping the very foundation of metaphysical thinking. The conclusion of this paper is that Wang Yangming’s metaphysics aligns with commonsense realism, rather than with subjective idealism. His metaphysics is not a confused worldview that conflates fact with value, nor is it subjective idealism. Instead, it is a metaphysics with the ethical grounding of human engagements and humanistic concerns.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139957296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Revisiting Grace de Laguna’s critiques of analytic philosophy and of pragmatism 重温格蕾丝-德-拉古纳对分析哲学和实用主义的批判

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-21 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00147-w

Joel Katzav

{"title":"Revisiting Grace de Laguna’s critiques of analytic philosophy and of pragmatism","authors":"Joel Katzav","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00147-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00147-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I revisit my paper, ‘Grace de Laguna’s 1909 Critique of Analytic Philosophy’ and respond to the commentary on it. I respond to James Chase and Jack Reynolds by further analysing the difference between speculative philosophy as de Laguna conceived of it and analytic philosophy, by clarifying how her critique of analytic philosophy remains relevant to some of its more speculative forms, and by explaining what justifies the criticism of established opinion that goes along with her rejection of analytic philosophy’s epistemic conservatism. In response to Andreas Vrahimis, I contextualise my reading of de Laguna’s work in 1909. This clarifies her critique of pragmatism, distinguishes it from her critique of epistemically conservative philosophy, and shows that she was not only already aware of the full scope of the latter critique but is likely to have identified the then incipient analytic philosophy as its primary target. Also, contra Vrahimis, her argument is effective against Bertrand Russell’s later, epistemically conservative approach to philosophy. In response to Cheryl Misak, I point out that her argument that de Laguna is, despite herself, a pragmatist rests on a misunderstanding of the differences between pragmatism and idealism, and I show that de Laguna’s main early influences were Herbert Spencer and her teacher, James Edwin Creighton. I further argue that Misak’s rejection of de Laguna’s critique of pragmatism rests on a misrepresentation of the critique.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00147-w.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139958038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Insufficient reasons insufficient to rescue the knowledge norm of practical reasoning: towards a certainty norm 不充分的理由不足以拯救实践推理的知识规范：走向确定性规范

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-16 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00143-0

J. Vollet

引用次数: 0

Insufficient reasons insufficient to rescue the knowledge norm of practical reasoning: towards a certainty norm 不充分的理由不足以拯救实践推理的知识规范：走向确定性规范

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-16 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00143-0

Jacques-Henri Vollet

引用次数: 0

The logics of a universal language 通用语言的逻辑

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-15 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00140-3

Eduardo Alejandro Barrio, Edson Bezerra

{"title":"The logics of a universal language","authors":"Eduardo Alejandro Barrio, Edson Bezerra","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00140-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00140-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Semantic paradoxes pose a real threat to logics that attempt to be capable of expressing their own semantic concepts. Particularly, Curry paradoxes seem to show that many solutions must change our intuitive concepts of truth or validity or impose limits on certain inferences that are intuitively valid. In this way, the logic of a universal language would have serious problems. In this paper, we explore a different solution that tries to avoid both limitations as much as possible. Thus, we argue that it is possible to capture the naive concepts of truth and validity without losing any of the valid inferences of classical logic. This approach is called the Buenos Aires plan. We present the logic of truth and validity, <span>(mathsf {STTV}_{omega })</span> based on the hierarchy of logics <span>(textsf{ST}_{omega })</span>, whose validity predicate has the same semantic conditions as the material conditional. We argue that <span>(mathsf {STTV}_{omega })</span> is capable of blocking the problematic results while keeping the deductive power of classical logic as much as possible and offering an adequate semantic theory. On the other hand, one could object that it is not possible to reason with <span>(mathsf {STTV}_{omega })</span> because it is not closed under its logical principles. We respond to this objection and argue that the local characterization of validity shows how to make inferences using the logic <span>(textsf{ST}_{omega })</span>.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139834657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The logics of a universal language 通用语言的逻辑

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-15 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00140-3

E. Barrio, Edson Bezerra

引用次数: 1

Comments on Daniel Whiting’s the range of reasons 对丹尼尔-怀廷的《原因的范围》的评论

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-14 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00141-2

Miriam Schleifer McCormick

引用次数: 0

Comments on Daniel Whiting’s the range of reasons 对丹尼尔-怀廷的《原因的范围》的评论

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-14 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00141-2

Miriam Schleifer McCormick

引用次数: 0

Hegel, Beall, and the logic of Vereinigung 黑格尔、比厄尔和 Vereinigung 的逻辑

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-12 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00145-y

Elena Ficara

引用次数: 0

Hegel, Beall, and the logic of Vereinigung 黑格尔、比厄尔和 Vereinigung 的逻辑

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-12 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00145-y

Elena Ficara

{"title":"Hegel, Beall, and the logic of Vereinigung","authors":"Elena Ficara","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00145-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00145-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In 2023, Beall and Ficara present what they call Hegelian conjunctions. A Hegelian conjunction is a true conjunction of contradictory opposites in which the conjuncts, separately taken, are untrue and for which simplification fails. The analysis in Beall & Ficara History and Philosophy of Logic 44 (2) 119-131, 2023 is important for various reasons. First, for overcoming the deleterious state of estrangement between two ways of conceiving and practicing logic, the “dialectical” or “continental” and the “analytical” one. Second, for strengthening a new, promising way of conceiving conjunction in paraconsistency (d’Agostini Synthese 199, 6845 6874, 2021). Yet it needs an enlargement, mainly in two dimensions, a hermeneutical and a logical one. The former concerns the textual basis used by Beall and Ficara for motivating their account (the focus of their analysis is a small part of the early Hegelian fragment on <i>Vereinigung</i> – unification/conjunction). The latter is the semantics proposed by Beall and Ficara. In this paper, I focus on the first dimension, in the conviction that the condition for making the chief formal characteristics of dialectics (the logical dimension) clearer is a grasp of the Hegelian fragment in its entirety and complexity. The fragment is crucial for thinking about the logic, metaphysics and epistemology of true contradictions. Yet it counts as obscure. My aim is to make its content more accessible, and to present its relevance for conjunctive paraconsistency.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00145-y.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139783401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0