发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Asian journal of philosophy最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
What are collective epistemic reasons and why do we need them? 什么是集体认识论理由，我们为什么需要它们？
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-05 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00197-0
Anne Schwenkenbecher
{"title":"What are collective epistemic reasons and why do we need them?","authors":"Anne Schwenkenbecher","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00197-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00197-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00197-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142410105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Kant, the scholarship condition, and linguistic racialization: comments on Lu-Adler’s Kant on Public Reason and the Linguistic Other 康德、学术条件与语言种族化：对 Lu-Adler 的《康德论公共理性与语言他者》的评论
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-03 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00200-8
J. Colin McQuillan
{"title":"Kant, the scholarship condition, and linguistic racialization: comments on Lu-Adler’s Kant on Public Reason and the Linguistic Other","authors":"J. Colin McQuillan","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00200-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00200-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this response to Lu-Adler’s “Kant on Public Reason and the Linguistic Other,” I summarize the restrictions the scholarship condition imposes on the public use of reason in Kant’s essay “What is Enlightenment?” I then agree that Lu-Adler identifies an even more radical set of restrictions on the public use of reason, confirming that Kant is not the liberal egalitarian he is often supposed to be by intellectual historians, historians of philosophy, and Kant scholars. After that, I suggest that what Lu-Adler calls “the construction of a linguistic other” in Kant’s lectures on logic and anthropology can also be understood as “Kantian linguistic racialization.” I close with a short reflection on how we should respond to Kant’s illiberal, inegalitarian, linguistic racism.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142409600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Valid and invalid causal arguments for physicalism 物理主义的有效和无效因果论证
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-02 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00192-5
Thomas Kroedel
{"title":"Valid and invalid causal arguments for physicalism","authors":"Thomas Kroedel","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00192-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00192-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In “A Causal Argument for Physicalism”, Lei Zhong presents an argument for physicalism in general, that is, for the disjunction of reductive physicalism and non-reductive physicalism. Zhong’s argument attempts to show that mental properties are physically acceptable, that is, physical in a wide sense. The crucial assumption of the argument is that physically acceptable effects do not have both sufficient causes that are physically acceptable and simultaneous sufficient causes that are not physically acceptable. I argue that Zhong’s argument is invalid, because the mental can be causally relevant to physically acceptable effects while being neither physically acceptable nor causally sufficient for these effects. I present an alternative argument in the spirit of Zhong’s argument that omits the notion of sufficient causation. I argue that non-physicalists can also resist the alternative argument if they fine-tune their metaphysics of mind.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00192-5.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142409540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Publisher Correction to: Rational belief, epistemic possibility, and the a priori 出版商更正为：理性信念、认识论可能性和先验论
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-02 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00180-9
Claire Field
{"title":"Publisher Correction to: Rational belief, epistemic possibility, and the a priori","authors":"Claire Field","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00180-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00180-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00180-9.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142409477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Justification and update 理由和更新
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-01 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00193-4
Jeanne Peijnenburg, David Atkinson
{"title":"Justification and update","authors":"Jeanne Peijnenburg,&nbsp;David Atkinson","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00193-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00193-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this commentary on Jun Otsuka’s first-rate book, we focus on the difference between justification and update.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00193-4.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142409365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Mind, Liangzhi, and Qi in Wang Yangming’s view that “nothing is external to the mind” 王阳明 "心外无物 "观中的 "心"、"良知 "与 "气"
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-09-26 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00194-3
Zemian Zheng
{"title":"Mind, Liangzhi, and Qi in Wang Yangming’s view that “nothing is external to the mind”","authors":"Zemian Zheng","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00194-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00194-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Although I agree with Jeeloo Liu that Wang Yangming is not a subjective idealist, this does not rule other possibilities of idealism. Wang Yangming equates the mind to Dao and equates <i>liangzhi</i> to the Dao of Change. This suggests that the mind is not just a subjective mind. It can denote the all-encompassing universal mind. In his “blossoming tree” dialogue about the theme “nothing is external to the mind,” Wang Yangming alludes to the <i>Book of Change</i>. The underlying idea is that there is an undifferentiated unity before the calculative deliberation divides the subject and object. This idea of oneness also underlies Wang Yangming’s view of <i>qi</i>. I have reservations about using “naturalism” and “realism” to categorize Wang Yangming’s philosophy.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00194-3.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142413894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Is deflationism self-defeating? 通货紧缩主义是自取灭亡吗？
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-09-26 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00195-2
Guanglong Luo
{"title":"Is deflationism self-defeating?","authors":"Guanglong Luo","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00195-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00195-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>According to deflationism, truth is insubstantial. Edwards (2018) argues that the deflationist thesis of insubstantiality is incoherent, regardless of how it is characterized. By clarifying the deflationist concepts of reference and truth (and their relations) and addressing the distinction between substantial properties and insubstantial properties within the deflationist framework, we will argue that Edwards’s self-defeating argument is problematic and ultimately unconvincing.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00195-2.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142414100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Mary’s cognitive progress 玛丽在认知方面的进步
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-09-21 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00196-1
Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira
{"title":"Mary’s cognitive progress","authors":"Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00196-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00196-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Upon her release, Mary gains new knowledge aligned with B-type materialism and property dualism, even though she already possesses knowledge of all the facts and truths related to color and color vision during her time in captivity. I argue that this “cognitive progress” can only be accounted for by the acquisition of a new nonconceptual representation of the color red upon her release. Independently of any concepts, this acquisition already enables her to discriminate all sorts of shades of color within her environment. However, the existence of nonconceptual representations, by itself, is not enough to specify the type of knowledge Mary acquired, obviously. We must add two additional conditions. Firstly, the acquisition of these nonconceptual representations must enrich Mary’s preexisting physical concept of red. Assuming that concepts are mental files, the enrichment takes the form of housing information in analog format, like pictures of the color red. Secondly, by utilizing these enhanced concepts by analog information, Mary can achieve an introspective propositional knowledge. She learns the truth of the crucial proposition: she learns what it is like to experience red.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00196-1.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142412915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The epistemic value of natural theology 自然神学的认识论价值
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-09-21 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00191-6
Ataollah Hashemi
{"title":"The epistemic value of natural theology","authors":"Ataollah Hashemi","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00191-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00191-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>According to certain theories, acquiring knowledge of God does not necessarily depend on philosophical evidence, and a believer is not obligated to rely on philosophical arguments from natural theology to justify their religious convictions. However, it is undeniable that philosophical arguments supporting the existence of God and theodicies possess significant epistemic value. This raises the question: what is the epistemic significance of the intellectual products derived from natural theology if they are not essential for attaining knowledge of God? Drawing upon of distinction between knowledge and understanding as separate epistemic goods, I argue that it is reasonable to assert that arguments for theism and theodicies contribute to religious understanding rather than directly providing knowledge of God. Finally, I enumerate several theoretical advantages that this proposal would offer to the field of religious epistemology.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00191-6.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142412957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The issue that slips under the radar 被忽视的问题
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-09-11 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00190-7
Frank Jackson
{"title":"The issue that slips under the radar","authors":"Frank Jackson","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00190-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00190-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Michael Pelczar is right that we need an explanation of the regularities in our experiences, and that this means we should reject traditional idealism. His version of phenomenalism might seem to offer the needed explanation, but what seems to be the case is not in fact the case.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00190-7.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142411352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信