Asian journal of philosophy最新文献_第7页

On the causal arguments for physicalism 关于物理主义的因果论证

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-04-03 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00156-9

Wenjun Zhang

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Truth in philosophy: a conceptual engineering approach 哲学中的真理：概念工程学方法

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-03-16 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00151-0

Jennifer Nado

{"title":"Truth in philosophy: a conceptual engineering approach","authors":"Jennifer Nado","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00151-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00151-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The focus of this paper will be to examine the implications that a “practical” approach to conceptual engineering might have for the “traditional” conception of philosophy as uncovering truths about phenomena of philosophical interest. In doing so, I will be building on the ideas of a figure that many take to be the first major philosopher to write on conceptual engineering: Rudolf Carnap. Though the current wave of interest in conceptual engineering goes back less than a decade, many conceptual engineers have found precedent for their views in Carnap’s characterization of what he called “explication.” Interestingly, however, not nearly as much attention has been paid to another Carnapian thesis which seems to me to have deep relevance to methodological questions about conceptual engineering. I have in mind here the distinction between internal and external questions proposed in “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” (1950b) and the accompanying claim that external questions lack cognitive content and can be cogently approached only as a matter of pragmatic decision-making. This is the aspect of Carnap’s views upon which I propose to build. I'll first make the case that there is a suggestive similarity between Carnap’s claim that external questions are matters of pragmatic choice and the practical conceptual engineer’s claim that engineering success should be characterized in terms of suitability to a function or purpose. After that, I'll look at potential worries about the Carnapian distinction—including, e.g., the concern that it relies on the analytic/synthetic distinction. Finally, I will propose a somewhat modified and expanded version of the distinction and examine its consequences for the thesis that philosophy aims at discovering truths about phenomena of philosophical interest.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00151-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140236855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Looking across languages: Anglocentrism, cross-linguistic experimental philosophy, and the future of inquiry about truth 跨越语言：盎格鲁中心主义、跨语言实验哲学和探究真理的未来

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-03-13 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00148-9

Jeremy Wyatt, Joseph Ulatowski

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Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu on the principle of sufficient reason 那跋陀罗和瓦苏班杜论充足理由原则

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-03-13 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00142-1

Allison Aitken

{"title":"Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu on the principle of sufficient reason","authors":"Allison Aitken","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00142-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00142-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Canonical defenders of the <i>principle of sufficient reason</i> (PSR), such as Leibniz and Spinoza, are metaphysical foundationalists of one stripe or another. This is curious since the PSR—which says that everything has a ground, cause, or explanation—in effect, denies fundamental entities. In this paper, I explore the apparent inconsistency between metaphysical foundationalism and approaches to metaphysical system building that are driven by a commitment to the PSR. I do so by analyzing how Indian Buddhist philosophers arrive at foundationalist and anti-foundationalist positions motivated by implicit commitments to different versions of the PSR. I begin by introducing the Buddhist <i>principle of dependent origination</i> (<i>pratītyasamutpāda</i>) as a proto-PSR that is restricted to causal explanation. Next, I show how Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika Abhidharma metaphysics is shaped by a qualified commitment to both causal and metaphysical grounding versions of the PSR. I then reveal how Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka metaphysics is driven by an unrestricted and exceptionless commitment to causal and metaphysical grounding versions of the PSR. Finally, I consider how Nāgārjuna’s account may put him in a unique position to respond to a common contemporary objection to the PSR from necessitarianism. I conclude by addressing a competing interpretation on which Nāgārjuna is best understood as an anti-rationalist rather than an uber-rationalist, as I characterize him.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140247085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

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Meta-metaphysics, constructivism, and psychology as queen of the sciences 元形而上学、建构主义和作为科学女王的心理学

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-03-12 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00154-x

James A. Mollison

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Nietzsche as metaphysician but which metaphysics? A response to Justin Remhof 尼采是形而上学家，但又是哪种形而上学？回应贾斯汀-雷姆霍夫

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-03-10 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00153-y

Tsarina Doyle

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A range of replies 一系列答复

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-03-01 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00152-z

Daniel Whiting

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The metaphysical as the ethical: a pragmatist reading of Wang Yangming’s “The Mind Is the Principle” 作为伦理的形而上学：王阳明 "心即理 "的实用主义解读

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-24 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00149-8

JeeLoo Liu

{"title":"The metaphysical as the ethical: a pragmatist reading of Wang Yangming’s “The Mind Is the Principle”","authors":"JeeLoo Liu","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00149-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00149-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper explores a late-Ming Chinese philosopher Wang Yangming’s (1472–1529) philosophical assertions showcasing the pivotal role that human mind plays in shaping our worldview. Wang Yangming’s view—especially his declaration that <i>the Mind is the Principle</i>—emphasizes that the human mind is the sole foundation of moral principles and that worldly affairs are identified with human ethical practices. This position has been contentious both in his times and among contemporary scholars. While some critics, notably Chen Lai, find Wang’s synthesis of the ethical and the metaphysical realm problematic, others like Wing-tsit Chan view Wang Yangming’s philosophy as verging on subjective idealism. Both Chen and Chan argue that Wang Yangming commits the fallacy of the conflation of fact and value. In this paper, I defend Wang Yangming’s ethics-oriented metaphysics against such criticisms. I will engage a comparative study between Wang Yangming’s perspective and pragmatist metaphysics—a modern philosophical stance which sees metaphysics as intertwining with human ethics and practices. Building upon this comparative study, this paper aims to highlight the intrinsic bond between metaphysics and ethics and to advocate for the centrality of ethics in shaping the very foundation of metaphysical thinking. The conclusion of this paper is that Wang Yangming’s metaphysics aligns with commonsense realism, rather than with subjective idealism. His metaphysics is not a confused worldview that conflates fact with value, nor is it subjective idealism. Instead, it is a metaphysics with the ethical grounding of human engagements and humanistic concerns.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139957296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Revisiting Grace de Laguna’s critiques of analytic philosophy and of pragmatism 重温格蕾丝-德-拉古纳对分析哲学和实用主义的批判

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-21 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00147-w

Joel Katzav

{"title":"Revisiting Grace de Laguna’s critiques of analytic philosophy and of pragmatism","authors":"Joel Katzav","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00147-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00147-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I revisit my paper, ‘Grace de Laguna’s 1909 Critique of Analytic Philosophy’ and respond to the commentary on it. I respond to James Chase and Jack Reynolds by further analysing the difference between speculative philosophy as de Laguna conceived of it and analytic philosophy, by clarifying how her critique of analytic philosophy remains relevant to some of its more speculative forms, and by explaining what justifies the criticism of established opinion that goes along with her rejection of analytic philosophy’s epistemic conservatism. In response to Andreas Vrahimis, I contextualise my reading of de Laguna’s work in 1909. This clarifies her critique of pragmatism, distinguishes it from her critique of epistemically conservative philosophy, and shows that she was not only already aware of the full scope of the latter critique but is likely to have identified the then incipient analytic philosophy as its primary target. Also, contra Vrahimis, her argument is effective against Bertrand Russell’s later, epistemically conservative approach to philosophy. In response to Cheryl Misak, I point out that her argument that de Laguna is, despite herself, a pragmatist rests on a misunderstanding of the differences between pragmatism and idealism, and I show that de Laguna’s main early influences were Herbert Spencer and her teacher, James Edwin Creighton. I further argue that Misak’s rejection of de Laguna’s critique of pragmatism rests on a misrepresentation of the critique.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00147-w.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139958038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Insufficient reasons insufficient to rescue the knowledge norm of practical reasoning: towards a certainty norm 不充分的理由不足以拯救实践推理的知识规范：走向确定性规范

Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-16 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00143-0

J. Vollet

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