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Asian journal of philosophy最新文献

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Models and monism 模式与一元论
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-11-11 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00216-0
Leon Commandeur
{"title":"Models and monism","authors":"Leon Commandeur","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00216-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00216-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this paper, I critically examine the monist interpretation of the logic-as-model view that Erik Stei puts forth in <i>Logical Pluralism and Logical Consequence</i>. I will argue that, in addition to the three dimensions presented in the book, there is a fourth dimension on which pluralism in logic could arise, namely epistemological pluralism. An example of such a form of pluralism is model pluralism, being the idea that we need multiple models to fully account for the subject matter of logic. Such a form of pluralism is well-recognized and widely acknowledged in (model-based) science. I argue that if we endorse the logic-as-model view, then we should also recognize such a form of model pluralism in logic. While model pluralism is consistent with metaphysical monism — the idea that there is ultimately only one extra-systemic logical consequence relation — it does put pressure on the idea that there is one uniquely best model that fully captures that phenomenon.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00216-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142598794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Seeming and reflective awareness 表象和反思意识
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-11-08 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00205-3
Blake McAllister
{"title":"Seeming and reflective awareness","authors":"Blake McAllister","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00205-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00205-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In Appearance &amp; Explanation, Kevin McCain and Luca Moretti argue that phenomenal explanationism (PE) offers a superior account to phenomenal conservatism (PC) as to why seemings justify. One of their arguments for this position is that PE is in a better position to respond to skepticism than PC, since the latter faces the problem of reflective awareness while the former does not. I deny that PE has any such advantage. To the contrary, I argue that PC offers a superior response to skepticism, especially when it comes to the beliefs of non-reflective agents.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142595303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Public reason, Kant, and kantians: comments on Lu-Adler’s Kant on public reason and the linguistic other 公共理性、康德和康德主义者：对 Lu-Adler 的《康德论公共理性和语言的他者》的评论
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-11-05 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00211-5
Yuan Yuan
{"title":"Public reason, Kant, and kantians: comments on Lu-Adler’s Kant on public reason and the linguistic other","authors":"Yuan Yuan","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00211-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00211-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00211-5.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142579528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Comments on appearance and explanation 对外观的评论和解释
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-26 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00207-1
Richard Fumerton
{"title":"Comments on appearance and explanation","authors":"Richard Fumerton","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00207-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00207-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>So as I understand it, the fundamental goal of Kevin McCain and Luca Moretti’s <i>Appearance and Explanation</i> is to offer a <i>unified</i> account of epistemic justification, one that incorporates insights of both phenomenal conservatism and explanationism. One might suppose that one gets the best of both views by employing the phenomenal conservative’s views about the role of appearance in order to get the <i>initial</i> data that needs explaining, while one appeals to explanationism to <i>expand</i> one’s justified beliefs beyond the data provided by appearance. But if I understand the authors, their view may be more complicated than this. While McCain and Moretti defend many views with which I agree in <i>Appearance and Explanation</i>, I’ll focus here on questions and objections. The first concerns the role of appearance in giving one an <i>explanandum</i>. The second concerns the role of appearance in reaching justified beliefs about whether a proposed explanation is better than alternatives.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142518599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Causal inference and inter-world laws 因果推理和世界间法则
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-17 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00206-2
Tung-Ying Wu
{"title":"Causal inference and inter-world laws","authors":"Tung-Ying Wu","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00206-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00206-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Jun Otsuka, in his recent work <i>Thinking About Statistics</i> (2023), undertakes a philosophical investigation of fundamental statistical methodologies, with a particular emphasis on causal inference. In his ontological analysis of causal inference, Otsuka posits that causal analysis, within a given causal model, requires the modification of the underlying probabilistic distribution. This modification, he argues, effectively constitutes a transition between possible worlds. Consequently, Otsuka identifies the objective of causal inference as the discovery of inter-world laws that govern the relationships between these distinct probabilistic models (Otsuka 2023, p.168). Granting Otsuka’s ontological commitments regarding causal and probabilistic models, his interpretation of certain causal analyses as inherently inter-worldly is indeed compelling. This perspective merits particular attention given the prevailing tendency to view such analyses to mere rules for estimating causal effects. While this review does not directly challenge Otsuka’s position, it aims to further explore and contribute to this stimulating concept.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142451013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Phenomenal explanationism and non-inferential justification 现象解释论和非推理论证
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-10 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00204-4
Tommaso Piazza
{"title":"Phenomenal explanationism and non-inferential justification","authors":"Tommaso Piazza","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00204-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00204-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this note, I argue that McCain and Moretti’s account of non-inferential justification is subject to the subjective point of view objection, and that for this reason, it does not provide an internalistically acceptable alternative to the account of this justification supplied by Huemer’s Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). Moreover, I contend that PC’s account is not afflicted by the same problem and that it does not generate the over-intellectualization and regress problem. Finally, contra McCain and Moretti, I argue that the non-inferential justification described by PC does not engender a form of vicious epistemic circularity, and so that it does not raise the reflective awareness problem.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00204-4.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142411220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Separating McDowell’s two Myths of the Given - or on how to best explain the conceptuality of the space of reasons 区分麦克道尔的两个 "既定神话"--或如何最好地解释理由空间的概念性
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-09 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00203-5
Johan Gersel
{"title":"Separating McDowell’s two Myths of the Given - or on how to best explain the conceptuality of the space of reasons","authors":"Johan Gersel","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00203-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00203-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In his book, <i>John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity</i>, Tony Cheng argues that recent changes to McDowell’s theory of perceptual justification should lead him to accept that experiences possess non-conceptual content. In this paper, I take issue with Cheng’s conclusion. Instead, I argue that McDowell should adopt Travis’s position, where experiences aren’t taken to possess content at all. I argue that we can distinguish two separate Myths of the Given in McDowell’s writings. While McDowell often seamlessly moves from one to the other, I argue that it is difficult to see how he can justify this due to his recent alterations to his position. I argue that if we reject one Myth and retain the other, then McDowell can both hold on to a version of his view that the space of reasons is the space of the conceptual, all the while he accepts Travis’s arguments to the effect that experiences are devoid of content. Finally, I consider some arguments McDowell might present against accepting Travis’s position. While these objections do not convince me, what is notable about them is that, if they are sound, then they will equally count against Cheng’s intermediary position where non-conceptual contents are ascribed to experiences. Hence, I conclude that there are no grounds on which McDowell can reasonably endorse that experiences possess non-conceptual contents. Either he should stick to his conceptualism, or he should follow Travis and reject that experiences possess contents at all.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00203-5.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142410897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Evidential pluralism in the social sciences: What can be established in case study research? 社会科学中的证据多元化：案例研究中能确立什么？
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-08 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00199-y
Rosa W. Runhardt
{"title":"Evidential pluralism in the social sciences: What can be established in case study research?","authors":"Rosa W. Runhardt","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00199-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00199-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This article responds to Yafeng Shan and Jon Williamson’s 2022 volume Evidential <i>Pluralism in the Social Sciences</i>, focusing on the applicability of Evidential Pluralism in the field of case study research through the use of examples from political science. The article argues that Shan and Williamson’s guidance on (a) what evidence one needs to establish causation in singular case studies and (b) what one may conclude at the population level once one has done so is lacking in some important respects. Therefore, this article will speak to the wider community of social scientists and methodologists who are sympathetic to using a plurality of evidence in case study research, but who still want guidance of how to do so in a philosophically grounded manner.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00199-y.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142410791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Problems for phenomenal explanationism 现象解释论的问题
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-08 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00202-6
Matthias Steup
{"title":"Problems for phenomenal explanationism","authors":"Matthias Steup","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00202-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00202-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I raise several problems for Phenomenal Explanationism, which McCain and Moretti intend to be a fusion of Evidentialism and Phenomenal Conservatism. I argue that the view is actually a non-conservative, credentialist view. Unlike conservatism, it does not allow for immediate justification. I also argue that the view has trouble accounting for justification coming from background knowledge. Finally, I argue that the view runs into the problem of equally good explanations.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142410792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Laozian metaethics 老庄元伦理学
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2024-10-07 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00198-z
Jason Dockstader
{"title":"Laozian metaethics","authors":"Jason Dockstader","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00198-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-024-00198-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper contributes to the emerging field of comparative metaethics by offering a reconstruction of the metaethical views implicit to the Daoist classic, the <i>Laozi</i> 老子 or <i>Daodejing</i> 道德經. It offers two novel views developed out of the <i>Laozi</i>: one-all value monism and moral trivialism. The paper proceeds by discussing Brook Ziporyn’s reading of the <i>Laozi</i> in terms of omnipresence and irony, and then applies his reading to moral properties like values and names (<i>ming</i> 名). The paper emboldens Ziporyn’s monistic tendencies in order to claim that the <i>Laozi</i> not only treats the Dao as an omnipresent value, but also as the one value that <i>is</i> all values. I call this view one-all value monism. I then argue that, in terms of moral epistemology, one-all value monism entails moral trivialism, the view that all moral judgments are true. I conclude by emphasizing the therapeutic motivation for holding such apparently outrageous metaethical views. The paper thus defends the basic claim that there is a point at which Ziporyn’s omnipresence and irony become monism and true contradiction, and that further exploring the consequences of these inevitable transitions leads to the discovery of novel metaethical views.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142410450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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