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Asian journal of philosophy最新文献

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Frege’s principle of logical parsimony, the indispensability of “ξ = ζ” in Grundgesetze, and the nature of identity 弗雷格的逻辑简约原则，《概论》中“ξ = ζ”的不可或缺性，以及同一性的本质
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-03-21 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00245-3
Matthias Schirn
{"title":"Frege’s principle of logical parsimony, the indispensability of “ξ = ζ” in Grundgesetze, and the nature of identity","authors":"Matthias Schirn","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00245-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00245-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In Section 2, I analyze Frege’s principle of logical and notational parsimony in his opus magnum <i>Grundgesetze der Arithmetik</i> (vol I, 1893, vol. II, 1903). I argue <i>inter alia</i> that in order to carry out the proofs of the more important theorems of cardinal arithmetic and real analysis in <i>Grundgesetze</i> Frege’s identification of the truth-values the True and the False with their unit classes in <i>Grundgesetze</i> I, §10 need not be raised to the lofty status of an axiom. Frege refrains from doing this but does not provide any reason for his restraint. In Section 3, I argue that he considered the primitive function-name “<i>ξ</i> = <i>ζ</i>” indispensable in pursuit of his logicist project. I close with remarks on the nature of identity. I suggest that there is no need to interpret identity in a non-standard fashion in order to render it logically palatable and scientifically respectable. </p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00245-3.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143667910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
An evaluation of Schellenberg’s arguments regarding divine hiddenness and the no-delay condition concerning relationship with God 谢伦伯格关于神的隐蔽性和关于与神的关系的不延迟条件的论证的评价
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-03-21 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00269-9
Andrew Ter Ern Loke
{"title":"An evaluation of Schellenberg’s arguments regarding divine hiddenness and the no-delay condition concerning relationship with God","authors":"Andrew Ter Ern Loke","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00269-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00269-9","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper demonstrates that Schellenberg is mistaken about the burden of proof concerning his Divine Hiddenness Argument against the existence of God and that his argument is unsound. In particular, I explain that Schellenberg has failed to refute the possibility that there is no non-resistant nonbeliever who would end up not having a relationship with the perfect God who knows of good reasons for the delay in starting the relationship even if we do not know what those reasons are. I also explain that Schellenberg has failed to refute the possibility that God delays the starting of the relationship for the purpose of achieving a deeper relationship for the good of the creature in a way that respects the creaturely free will. Given that the Divine Hiddenness Argument is unsound, it should not be a hindrance to believing in God and having a relationship with God.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00269-9.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143667909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Are current AI systems capable of well-being? 当前的人工智能系统有能力实现幸福吗？
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-03-15 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00265-z
James Fanciullo
{"title":"Are current AI systems capable of well-being?","authors":"James Fanciullo","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00265-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00265-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Recently, Simon Goldstein and Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini have argued that certain existing AI systems are capable of well-being. They consider the three leading approaches to well-being—hedonism, desire satisfactionism, and the objective list approach—and argue that theories of these kinds plausibly imply that some current AI systems are capable of welfare. In this paper, I argue that the leading versions of each of these theories do not imply this. I conclude that we have strong reason to doubt that current AI systems are capable of well-being.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00265-z.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143621995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Non-realist cognitivism, partners-in-innocence, and No dilemma 非现实主义认知主义，无罪伙伴，无两难
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-03-15 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00268-w
Evan Jack, Mustafa Khuramy
{"title":"Non-realist cognitivism, partners-in-innocence, and No dilemma","authors":"Evan Jack,&nbsp;Mustafa Khuramy","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00268-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00268-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Non-Realist Cognitivism is a meta-ethical theory that is supposedly objectionably unclear. Recently, Farbod Akhlaghi (2022) has provided a novel exposition of Parfit’s Non-Realist Cognitivism that employs truthmaker theory to clarify it. He illustrates that such clarification leads the non-realist cognitivist into a dilemma: either the theory has to accept truthmaker maximalism, rendering the theory inconsistent, or it has to let go of truthmaking altogether. He also attempts to undercut a “partners-in-innocence” strategy that the non-realist cognitivist utilizes to motivate the key assumption of Non-Realist Cognitivism: that normative truths are truthmaker gaps. In this paper, we do three things in reply to Akhlaghi. First, we show how most of his attempts to disqualify candidate partners-in-innocence fail, or at best miss the point. Second, we provide a case for a partner-in-innocence Akhlaghi never covers, though inadvertently mentions. Third, we outline how the non-realist cognitivist could reply to Akhlaghi’s dilemma in a way that allows Non-Realist Cognitivism to come out unscathed.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00268-w.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143621994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Précis of Thinking About Statistics 关于统计的思考
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-03-12 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00259-x
Jun Otsuka
{"title":"Précis of Thinking About Statistics","authors":"Jun Otsuka","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00259-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00259-x","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This article provides a concise summary of <i>Thinking About Statistics: The Philosophical Foundations</i> (Routledge, 2023), with a focus on the book’s exploration of ontological and epistemological topics.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143594828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Evidential pluralism, epistemic causality and mixed methods research 证据多元论、认知因果关系与混合方法研究
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-03-10 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00263-1
Erik Weber
{"title":"Evidential pluralism, epistemic causality and mixed methods research","authors":"Erik Weber","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00263-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00263-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this essay, I first reflect on the notion of epistemic causality which, according to Shan and Williamson, complements the idea of evidential pluralism. Then, I shift my attention to mixed methods research. While I agree that evidential pluralism provides a strong philosophical foundation for this approach, I argue that there is an alternative, equally strong foundation that focuses on explanation rather than on evidence.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143583490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Logical empiricism in a historicist framework—something worth caring about? 历史主义框架下的逻辑经验主义——值得关注的东西？
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-03-06 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00261-3
Elisabeth Nemeth
{"title":"Logical empiricism in a historicist framework—something worth caring about?","authors":"Elisabeth Nemeth","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00261-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00261-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The historicist project that Richardson presents here aims to recover elements of Logical Empiricism that lie not in theorems but in the self-understanding of the actors. The Logical Empiricists had philosophical as well as social and political goals in mind. They were aware that the scientific principles they sought to establish in academic philosophy also influenced the political, social, and cultural spheres. Previous research has worked on the social embedding of Logical Empiricism. By comparison, Richardson proposes the significantly broader framework of “scientific philosophy.” This allows further actors to be taken into account, thus contributing to a better understanding of the self-understanding of the Logical Empiricists. But can this historicist project convince us that Logical Empiricism is “worth caring about”?</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00261-3.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143564406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Scientific progress: normative, but aimless 科学进步：规范，但无目的
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-03-05 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00264-0
Finnur Dellsén
{"title":"Scientific progress: normative, but aimless","authors":"Finnur Dellsén","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00264-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00264-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Does science have any aim(s)? If not, does it follow that the debate about scientific progress is somehow misguided or problematically non-objective? These are two of the central questions posed in Rowbottom’s Scientific Progress. In this paper, I argue that we should answer both questions in the negative. Science probably has no aims, certainly not a single aim; but it does not follow from this that the debate about scientific progress is somehow misguided or problematically non-objective.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00264-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143553934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Replies to critics 对批评的回应
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-03-05 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00260-4
Jun Otsuka
{"title":"Replies to critics","authors":"Jun Otsuka","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00260-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00260-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This is the author’s reply to the critics in the book symposium on <i>Thinking about Statistics: The Philosophical Foundations</i> (Routledge 2023).</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143553935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bioconservatism, enhancement counsellors, and love drugs: commentary on Gordon 生物保守主义、增强心理咨询师和爱情药物：对戈登的评论
Asian journal of philosophy Pub Date : 2025-03-03 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00262-2
Alexandre Erler
{"title":"Bioconservatism, enhancement counsellors, and love drugs: commentary on Gordon","authors":"Alexandre Erler","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00262-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s44204-025-00262-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This commentary on Emma Gordon’s book <i>Human Enhancement and Well-Being</i> explains why, despite my basic agreement with her overall position on the strength of bioconservative objections to enhancement, my thinking differs from hers regarding some aspects of her analysis. I focus in particular on her critique of the hyperagency argument, the authenticity argument, and the inequality argument against enhancement. I then proceed to discuss, in turn, her remarks on enhancement counsellors and on the enhancement of loving relationships, highlighting some issues which I think are worthy of further clarification and exploration. These include the degree to which enhancement counsellors should act as “gatekeepers” when it comes to accessing enhancements, how their role would relate to that of medical professionals, and how exactly some of Gordon’s desiderata should be applied to the enhancement of loving relationships.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-025-00262-2.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143533198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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