{"title":"通货紧缩主义是自取灭亡吗？","authors":"Guanglong Luo","doi":"10.1007/s44204-024-00195-2","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>According to deflationism, truth is insubstantial. Edwards (2018) argues that the deflationist thesis of insubstantiality is incoherent, regardless of how it is characterized. By clarifying the deflationist concepts of reference and truth (and their relations) and addressing the distinction between substantial properties and insubstantial properties within the deflationist framework, we will argue that Edwards’s self-defeating argument is problematic and ultimately unconvincing.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00195-2.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Is deflationism self-defeating?\",\"authors\":\"Guanglong Luo\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s44204-024-00195-2\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>According to deflationism, truth is insubstantial. Edwards (2018) argues that the deflationist thesis of insubstantiality is incoherent, regardless of how it is characterized. By clarifying the deflationist concepts of reference and truth (and their relations) and addressing the distinction between substantial properties and insubstantial properties within the deflationist framework, we will argue that Edwards’s self-defeating argument is problematic and ultimately unconvincing.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":93890,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Asian journal of philosophy\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s44204-024-00195-2.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Asian journal of philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s44204-024-00195-2\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Asian journal of philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s44204-024-00195-2","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
According to deflationism, truth is insubstantial. Edwards (2018) argues that the deflationist thesis of insubstantiality is incoherent, regardless of how it is characterized. By clarifying the deflationist concepts of reference and truth (and their relations) and addressing the distinction between substantial properties and insubstantial properties within the deflationist framework, we will argue that Edwards’s self-defeating argument is problematic and ultimately unconvincing.
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