{"title":"The hiddenness argument and the distinction between philosophy and theology","authors":"Wai-hung Wong","doi":"10.1007/s44204-025-00278-8","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In <i>Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason</i>, Schellenberg extensively discusses theological responses to his hiddenness argument against God’s existence. In his later writings, he draws a sharp distinction between philosophy and theology, excluding theology from the philosophical discussion of hiddenness. I explain why this distinction, as he formulates it, is not clear enough and argue that theology should be excluded from this discussion only in its dogmatic sense. By critically assessing Schellenberg’s assumptions about the boundaries of philosophy and theology and exploring two contrasting conceptions of philosophy, I aim to show that his exclusion of theology implicitly depends on the validity of a particular conception of philosophy.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":93890,"journal":{"name":"Asian journal of philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2025-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Asian journal of philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s44204-025-00278-8","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, Schellenberg extensively discusses theological responses to his hiddenness argument against God’s existence. In his later writings, he draws a sharp distinction between philosophy and theology, excluding theology from the philosophical discussion of hiddenness. I explain why this distinction, as he formulates it, is not clear enough and argue that theology should be excluded from this discussion only in its dogmatic sense. By critically assessing Schellenberg’s assumptions about the boundaries of philosophy and theology and exploring two contrasting conceptions of philosophy, I aim to show that his exclusion of theology implicitly depends on the validity of a particular conception of philosophy.