Three questions for Watson's account of epistemic rights

In The Right to Know: Epistemic Rights and Why We Need Them (Routledge, 2021), Lani Watson comprehensively examines the right to know and other epistemic rights, that is, rights to goods such as information, knowledge and truth. These rights, she suggests, play a key role in society today, but we often do not attend to them in the way that we should. She draws our attention to these rights, illustrating their importance using a range of examples from medicine, politics and law, and she articulates a philosophical account of these rights. Her concise but book-length treatment of the topic is clear, accessible and rigorous. This is a considerable achievement, and I find Watson’s treatment of epistemic rights to be illuminating. I do wish she would say more to expand on her discussion of certain points, but overall, she succeeds in her project to shed light on an important but underdiscussed topic. In this critical contribution, I summarize her book and then raise three questions about her discussion. First, does Watson adopt a workable conception of law and morality, given her characterization of who can have epistemic rights? Second, does the law support Watson’s conception of epistemic rights and duties, as she claims it does? Third, does Watson focus on the harm-related rationale for epistemic rights to the apparent exclusion of other rationales?