{"title":"Contracting with heterogeneous researchers","authors":"Han Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the design of contracts that incentivize a researcher to conduct a costly experiment, extending the work of <span><span>Yoder (2022)</span></span> from binary states to a general state space. The cost is private information of the researcher. When the experiment is observable, we find the optimal contract and show that higher types choose more costly experiments, but not necessarily more Blackwell informative ones. When only the experiment result is observable, the principal can still achieve the same optimal outcome if and only if a certain monotonicity condition with respect to types holds. Our analysis demonstrates that the general case is qualitatively different than the binary one, but that the contracting problem remains tractable.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 278-294"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Homophily and infections: Static and dynamic effects","authors":"Matteo Bizzarri , Fabrizio Panebianco , Paolo Pin","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyze the effect of homophily in the diffusion of a harmful state between two groups of agents that differ in immunization rates. Homophily has a very different impact on the steady state infection level (that is increasing in homophily when homophily is small, and decreasing when high), and on the cumulative number of infections generated by a deviation from the steady state (that, instead, is decreasing in homophily when homophily is small, and increasing when high). If immunization rates are endogenous, homophily has the opposite impact on the infection level of the two groups. However, the sign of the group-level impact is reversed if immunization is motivated by infection risk or peer pressure. If motivations are group-specific, homophily can decrease immunization in both groups.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 235-259"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Asymptotic full revelation in cheap talk with many senders","authors":"Oleg Rubanov","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I construct an equilibrium in a cheap talk game with multiple senders that converges to full revelation exponentially fast as the number of senders increases. The senders' biases can be relatively large (comparable to the size of the state space) and have any signs. The equilibrium is robust to replacement noise and exists even if the senders can send only two types of messages.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 191-196"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The optimality of (stochastic) veto delegation","authors":"Xiaoxiao Hu , Haoran Lei","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyze the optimal delegation problem between a principal and an agent, assuming that the latter has state-independent preferences. We demonstrate that if the principal is more risk-averse than the agent toward non-status quo options, an optimal mechanism is a <em>veto mechanism</em>. In a veto mechanism, the principal uses veto (i.e., maintaining the status quo) to balance the agent's incentives and does not randomize among non-status quo options. We characterize the optimal veto mechanism in a one-dimensional setting. In the solution, the principal uses veto only when the state surpasses a critical threshold.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 215-234"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar , Jorge Bruno , Renaud Foucart , Sonali SenGupta
{"title":"Efficient public good provision between and within groups","authors":"Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar , Jorge Bruno , Renaud Foucart , Sonali SenGupta","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We generalize the model of <span><span>Gallice and Monzón (2019)</span></span> to incorporate a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their observation of an incomplete sample of past contributions. We show that full cooperation between and within groups is possible with self-interested players on a fixed horizon. Position uncertainty implies the existence of an equilibrium where groups of players conditionally cooperate in the hope of influencing further groups. Conditional cooperation implies that each group member is pivotal, so that efficient simultaneous provision within groups is an equilibrium.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 183-190"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ideological consistency and valence","authors":"Enriqueta Aragonès , Dimitrios Xefteris","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study electoral competition between two win-motivated candidates, considering that voters care both about the valence and the ideological consistency of the competing candidates. When valence asymmetries are not too large we find a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which (i) platform polarization (i.e. the distance between the candidates' policy proposals) is solely determined by the strength of preferences for consistency, and (ii) the expected policy outcome may move to the right as the valence of the leftist candidate increases. When valence differences are large, a mixed equilibrium emerges: the high-valence left-wing candidate chooses a moderate right policy and the low-valence right-wing candidate responds, usually, with an extreme right position and, occasionally, with a moderate left one. Our analysis provides novel insights regarding candidates' flip-flopping incentives, and parties' motives to nominate low-quality candidates.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 160-182"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149648","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Corrigendum to: “Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests”","authors":"Zhonghong Kuang, Hangcheng Zhao, Jie Zheng","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Two privately informed contestants compete in a contest, and the organizer ex-ante designs a public anonymous disclosure policy to maximize the contestants’ total effort. We fully characterize ridge distributions, under which the organizer achieves the first-best outcome in equilibrium: the allocation is efficient, and the entire surplus goes to the organizer. When the prior is a mixture of a ridge distribution and a perfectly correlated distribution, the first-best outcome is achievable by a signal that solely generates ridge distributions as posteriors.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Page 197"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Supermodularity and incentive reversal in teams","authors":"Svetlana Boyarchenko , Dominika Machowska , Iryna Topolyan","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper takes a new look at the issue of incentive reversal in (strategic) team games, by relying on supermodularity techniques. In a setting with no contractual possibilities, we provide minimal sufficient conditions for one or both players to supply less effort in exogenously more productive environments, at the two extremal Nash equilibria. Unlike the existing literature, the analysis does not utilize concavity and other unnecessary assumptions and explicitly takes into account existence and possible multiplicity of pure-strategy Nash equilibria. We derive respective sufficient conditions for strong and weak incentive reversal for asymmetric games under strategic complementarity and substitutability respectively. We also consider incentive reversal for a broad class of symmetric games. These parsimonious conditions allow for a more transparent intuitive interpretation of the results.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 93-105"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the efficiency of queueing in dynamic matching markets","authors":"Laura Doval , Balázs Szentes","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.019","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.019","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study a two-sided dynamic matching market where agents arrive randomly. An arriving agent is immediately matched if agents are waiting on the other side. Otherwise, the agent decides whether to exit the market or join a queue to wait for a match. Waiting is costly: agents discount the future and incur costs while they wait. We characterize the equilibrium and socially optimal queue sizes under first-come, first-served. Depending on the model parameters, equilibrium queues can be shorter or longer than efficiency would require them to be. Indeed, socially optimal queues may be unbounded, even if equilibrium queues are not. By contrast, when agents only incur flow costs while they wait, equilibrium queues are typically longer than socially optimal ones (cf. <span><span>Baccara et al., 2020</span></span>). Unlike one-sided markets, the comparison between equilibrium and socially optimal queues in two-sided markets depends on agents' time preferences.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 106-130"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem","authors":"Shurojit Chatterji , Jordi Massó , Shigehiro Serizawa","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.017","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.017","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where multiple private goods have to be assigned to a set of agents with entitlements and where preferences display satiation. We show that if the rule is in addition tops-only, same-sided and individually rational with respect to the entitlements, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as multi-dimensional single-peakedness relative to the entitlements). We also provide a converse of this main finding. It turns out that this domain coincides with the one already identified in a general set up with public goods. We relate the domain of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences relative to the entitlements to well-known restricted domains with private goods under which non-trivial and strategy-proof rules do exist.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 48-70"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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