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Rationalizing sharing rules 合理化分享规则
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-09-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.018
Karol Flores-Szwagrzak, Lars Peter Østerdal
{"title":"Rationalizing sharing rules","authors":"Karol Flores-Szwagrzak,&nbsp;Lars Peter Østerdal","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.018","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.018","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A partnership can yield a return—a loss or a profit relative to the partners' investments. How should the partners share the return? We identify the sharing rules satisfying classical properties (symmetry, consistency, and continuity) and avoiding arbitrary bounds on a partner's share. We show that any such rule can be rationalized in the sense that its recommendations are aligned with those maximizing a separable welfare function. Among these rules, we characterize those formalizing different notions of proportionality and, in particular, a convenient subclass specified by a single inequality aversion parameter. We also explore when a rule can be rationalized by a more general welfare function. Our central results extend to a wider class of resource allocation problems.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 97-118"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145020702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Naive analytics: The strategic advantage of algorithmic heuristics 朴素分析：算法启发式的战略优势
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-09-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.009
Ron Berman , Yuval Heller
{"title":"Naive analytics: The strategic advantage of algorithmic heuristics","authors":"Ron Berman ,&nbsp;Yuval Heller","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.009","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.009","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study interactions with uncertainty about demand sensitivity that is estimated by analytics algorithms. In our solution concept (1) firms choose seemingly optimal strategies based on estimates from possibly biased analytics algorithms, and (2) the levels of biases form best replies to one another. In equilibrium the firms' algorithms overestimate advertising effectiveness, as observed empirically, which causes advertisers to overspend. In price competitions firms also underestimate price elasticities and set prices too high. In games with strategic complements (substitutes), profits induced by such “naive analytics” equilibria Pareto dominate (are dominated by) those induced by the Nash equilibrium.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 62-78"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145020700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Trial plans as a means of price discrimination 作为价格歧视手段的试点计划
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-08-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.010
Ramtin Salamat
{"title":"Trial plans as a means of price discrimination","authors":"Ramtin Salamat","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.010","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.010","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>When consumers differ in both their valuations and their likelihood of being well-matched with the product, the seller can benefit from offering trial plans as persuasion instruments to the extent of full surplus extraction. In the presence of picky consumers, those skeptical about product quality but willing to pay a premium if the product meets their standards, offering a menu of trials allows the seller to screen consumers and extract more surplus. If consumers with a higher valuation for a well matched product are more skeptical and consumers' expected valuation is an increasing and concave function of their probability of being well-matched, the seller can extract the full surplus by offering a menu of trial plans. This rationale for trials differs from others in the literature which are based on risk aversion or high marginal cost.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 679-701"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144912682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Costly waiting in dynamic contests: Theory and experiment 动态竞争中的等待成本：理论与实验
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-08-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.008
Jian Song , Daniel Houser
{"title":"Costly waiting in dynamic contests: Theory and experiment","authors":"Jian Song ,&nbsp;Daniel Houser","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We extend the <em>war of attrition</em> by studying three-period dynamic contest games. In our game, players can either fight against their opponents at the last period or can fight at any period. Waiting is costly. We focus on the role of waiting costs and show that the value of waiting costs is a key factor in determining the type of equilibrium in such dynamic contests. Specifically, when players are allowed to fight only at the last period, as waiting costs increase, contests end earlier, battles are less likely to occur, and the weaker player in a pair is more likely to flee. When allowing players to fight at any time, the pure-strategy Bayesian equilibrium does not exist under sufficiently high waiting costs. A lab experiment verifies most key features of our model in scenarios where players are allowed to fight only at the last period. However, unlike theoretical predictions, we find that as waiting costs increase, the duration of contests and the frequency of battles fail to drop as significantly as theory predicted. In the case where players are allowed to fight at any period, we observe a substantial increase in the frequency of battles, accompanied by a dramatic reduction in the duration of contests compared to the format where players are limited to fighting during the last period. We find evidence of suboptimal behavior among players in both contest formats.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 645-678"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144912681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Core stability and strategy-proofness in hedonic coalition formation problems with friend-oriented preferences 具有朋友导向偏好的享乐联盟形成问题的核心稳定性和策略抗扰性
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-08-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.007
Bettina Klaus , Flip Klijn , Seçkin Özbilen
{"title":"Core stability and strategy-proofness in hedonic coalition formation problems with friend-oriented preferences","authors":"Bettina Klaus ,&nbsp;Flip Klijn ,&nbsp;Seçkin Özbilen","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study hedonic coalition formation problems with friend-oriented preferences; that is, each agent has preferences over his coalitions based on a partition of the set of agents, except himself, into “friends” and “enemies” such that (E) adding an enemy makes him strictly worse off and (F) adding a friend together with a set of enemies makes him strictly better off. Friend-oriented preferences induce a so-called friendship graph where vertices are agents and directed edges point to friends.</div><div>We show that the partition associated with the strongly connected components (SCC) of the friendship graph is in the strict core. We then prove that the SCC mechanism, which assigns the SCC partition to each hedonic coalition formation problem with friend-oriented preferences, satisfies a strong group incentive compatibility property: <em>group strategy-proofness</em>. Our main result is that on any “rich” subdomain of friend-oriented preferences, the SCC mechanism is the only mechanism that satisfies <em>core stability</em> and <em>strategy-proofness</em>.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 16-52"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145011138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Incentivizing variety in innovation contests with specialized suppliers 在与专业供应商的创新竞赛中鼓励多样化
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-08-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.003
Konstantinos Protopappas , David Rietzke
{"title":"Incentivizing variety in innovation contests with specialized suppliers","authors":"Konstantinos Protopappas ,&nbsp;David Rietzke","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the optimal design of an innovation contest where a buyer seeks product variety and faces a moral hazard problem. The suppliers are specialized and may differ in their flexibility to adopt approaches outside their areas of expertise. If the specializations are sufficiently different and suppliers are otherwise symmetric, the buyer attains the first-best with a fixed-prize contest (FPC). If one supplier is inherently advantaged or the specializations are sufficiently close, the first-best is unattainable with an FPC. In all cases, an auction is an optimal contest and implements the first-best, provided the buyer can discriminate within the contest; if not, the buyer may prefer an FPC.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 586-621"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144893464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Statistical inference in games: Stability of pure equilibria 博弈中的统计推断：纯均衡的稳定性
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-08-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.012
Segismundo S. Izquierdo , Luis R. Izquierdo
{"title":"Statistical inference in games: Stability of pure equilibria","authors":"Segismundo S. Izquierdo ,&nbsp;Luis R. Izquierdo","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.012","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.012","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider sampling best response decision protocols with statistical inference in population games. Under these protocols, a revising agent observes the actions of <em>k</em> randomly sampled players in a population, estimates from the sample a probability distribution for the state of the population (using some inference method), and chooses a best response to the estimated distribution. We formulate deterministic approximation dynamics for these protocols. If the inference method is unbiased, strict Nash equilibria are rest points, but they may not be stable. We present tests for stability of pure equilibria under these dynamics. Focusing on maximum-likelihood estimation, we can define an index that measures the strength of each strict Nash equilibrium. In <em>tacit coordination or weakest-link</em> games, the stability of equilibria under sampling best response dynamics is consistent with experimental evidence, capturing the effect of <em>strategic uncertainty</em> and its sensitivity to the number of players and to the cost/benefit ratio.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 622-644"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144902434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Propaganda and conflict 宣传与冲突
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-08-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.006
Petros G. Sekeris
{"title":"Propaganda and conflict","authors":"Petros G. Sekeris","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this article we explore how propaganda relates to conflict initiation. In the presence of propaganda, if conflict is highly destructive, parties invest in armaments to improve their share of the pie at the negotiation table. If conflict is lowly destructive, peace is never reached and arming is implemented to boost the troops' morale and fighting efficiency. For intermediate destruction levels, the game only admits mixed strategy equilibria where peace and conflict occur probabilistically. A world without propaganda Pareto-dominates one where information can be manipulated. Although lowly destructive conflicts are conducive to war, arming can pacify the situation by giving rise to mixed strategy equilibria where peace is played with strictly positive probability. Countries are shown to have incentives to invest in propaganda despite the fact that war will then occur with strictly positive probability.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 569-585"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144887014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategic mobilization of voters 策略性动员选民
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-08-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.004
Guy Holburn , Davin Raiha
{"title":"Strategic mobilization of voters","authors":"Guy Holburn ,&nbsp;Davin Raiha","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Organized public demonstrations of voter support for policy issues through rallies and petitions are mechanisms by which interest groups sometimes seek to influence political decision-making. We develop a voter-participation model of an interest group's strategic decision to publicly mobilize supportive voters through either a petition with zero participation cost or through a public rally with positive participation cost. Our model shows that voter mobilization can be influential when elected politicians are sufficiently uncertain about two dimensions of voters' preferences, the breadth of support for the issue and the saliency of the issue. The distribution of voter preferences – defined by the numbers of policy supporters and opposers and election vote-switchers and non-switchers – determines whether low or high participation-cost forms of mobilization are optimal. The model's predictions are consistent with recent mobilization campaigns organized by a range of interest groups, such as firms, environmental activists, and racial justice advocates.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 1-15"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145011141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Policy gambles and valence in elections 选举中的政策赌博和价码
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-08-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.005
Peter Bils, Federica Izzo
{"title":"Policy gambles and valence in elections","authors":"Peter Bils,&nbsp;Federica Izzo","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study strategic policy experimentation by an incumbent politician when voters care about both policy and the candidates' valence. In our model, the voter does not know the location of her ideal policy and learns via experience, in turn, the officeholder uses policymaking to control voter learning. The incumbent thus faces a trade-off between implementing a policy close to his own ideal point, or one that induces the optimal amount of voter learning to win reelection. In equilibrium, how the incumbent solves the trade-off depends on his expected valence. We find that a trailing incumbent sometimes implements a safer policy than he would absent electoral incentives, despite needing to generate new information to win the election. Furthermore, increasing the incumbent's expected valence (and thus electoral advantage) can motivate him to gamble more in equilibrium. However, this relationship between electoral security and experimentation depends crucially on the amount of uncertainty on the valence dimension.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 523-540"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144865684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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