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Quantal response equilibrium and rationalizability: Inside the black box 量变反应平衡与合理性：黑箱内部
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2024-03-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.003
Shuige Liu , Fabio Maccheroni
{"title":"Quantal response equilibrium and rationalizability: Inside the black box","authors":"Shuige Liu ,&nbsp;Fabio Maccheroni","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper aims to connect epistemic and behavioral game theory by examining the epistemic foundations of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) in static games. We focus on how much information agents possess about the probability distributions of idiosyncratic payoff shocks, in addition to the standard assumptions of rationality and common belief in rationality. When these distributions are transparent, we obtain a solution concept called <span><math><msup><mrow><mi>Δ</mi></mrow><mrow><mi>p</mi></mrow></msup></math></span>-rationalizability, which includes action distributions derived from QRE; we also give a condition under which this relationship holds true in reverse. When agents only have common belief in the monotonicity of these distributions (for example, extreme value distributions), we obtain another solution concept called <span><math><msup><mrow><mi>Δ</mi></mrow><mrow><mi>M</mi></mrow></msup></math></span>-rationalizability, which includes action distributions derived from rank-dependent choice equilibrium, a parameter-free variant of QRE. Our solution concepts also provide insights for interpreting experimental and empirical data.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"157 ","pages":"Pages 496-515"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140282813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Electoral accountability in the lab 实验室中的选举问责制
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-02-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.008
César Martinelli , Naila C. Sebastián Esandi
{"title":"Electoral accountability in the lab","authors":"César Martinelli ,&nbsp;Naila C. Sebastián Esandi","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a model of electoral accountability, and we test it in a lab setting. As predicted by the model, moral incentives and the desire for reelection interact to deter politicians from accepting bribes early in their careers. Treatments with weaker reelection incentives perform worse in encouraging good initial behavior among politicians, but are more effective in promoting good behavior later on. The probability of voter errors and politicians' intrinsic motivation for good behavior in the final period vary across treatments, with opportunistic behavior being more prevalent in environments with stronger electoral incentives.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"157 ","pages":"Pages 480-495"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147539086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Auction design with ambiguity: Optimality of the first-price auction 模棱两可的拍卖设计：首价拍卖的最优性
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-02-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.001
Sung-Ha Hwang , Youngwoo Koh , Sosung Baik
{"title":"Auction design with ambiguity: Optimality of the first-price auction","authors":"Sung-Ha Hwang ,&nbsp;Youngwoo Koh ,&nbsp;Sosung Baik","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the optimal auction design problem when bidders are ambiguity averse and follow the max-min expected utility model. Each bidder’s set of priors consists of beliefs that are close to the seller’s belief, where “closeness” is defined by a divergence. For a given allocation rule, we show that optimal transfers belong to a specific class of transfers, termed <em>win-lose dependent transfers,</em> in which bidders’ transfers upon winning and losing depend only on their own types but not on their opponents’ type reports. This result effectively reduces the infinite-dimensional problem of identifying an optimal transfer function into a two-dimensional problem of determining two constants-one for winning and another for losing. Solving this reduced problem, we show that among efficient mechanisms without transfers to losing bidders, the first-price auction is optimal, thereby outperforming other auction formats such as the second-price auction. We also discuss how the structure of the set of priors is related to the revenue ranking between the first- and second-price auctions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"157 ","pages":"Pages 298-321"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147384945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Transaction fee mechanisms robust to welfare-increasing collusion 交易费用机制对福利增加合谋的稳健
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-02-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.005
Yotam Gafni , Aviv Yaish
{"title":"Transaction fee mechanisms robust to welfare-increasing collusion","authors":"Yotam Gafni ,&nbsp;Aviv Yaish","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>To allocate transactions to blocks, cryptocurrencies use auction-esque <em>transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs)</em>. A conjecture of Roughgarden (2024) asks whether there is a TFM that is incentive compatible for both users and the miner and is also resistant to a collusion that allows them to jointly increase overall welfare. We resolve this question in the negative for deterministic TFMs, through a comprehensive characterization of designs robust to this form of collusion. For randomized TFMs, we show limits on the efficiency they can achieve.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"157 ","pages":"Pages 351-375"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147384991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the smooth unfolding of bifurcations in quantal-response equilibria 量子响应平衡中分岔的光滑展开
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2023-08-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.011
Adam Harris , Scott McCallum , Michael S. Harré
{"title":"On the smooth unfolding of bifurcations in quantal-response equilibria","authors":"Adam Harris ,&nbsp;Scott McCallum ,&nbsp;Michael S. Harré","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.011","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.011","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We report on the topological structure of logit quantal response equilibria for asymmetric, two-player, two-choice games in normal form, via catastrophe theory<span>. We present three main outcomes: first, a novel, smooth potential function for the underlying dynamics, relative to which logit equilibria arise as stationary points comprising a parameterised hyper-surface; secondly, a proof that all catastrophes within this manifold are of order at most three, i.e. “folds and cusps”; thirdly, discovery of a new topological phenomenon, the “pleated loop”, corresponding to a pair of opposed pitchfork bifurcations. This we exhibit for games, such as Prisoner's Dilemma, that have a unique Nash equilibrium, with multiple logit equilibria for finite precision parameters. These results extend work at the intersection of stochastic decision theory and catastrophe theory with economic games. Their application to the problem of bifurcations in the tracing procedure for logit solutions, proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey, is discussed throughout.</span></div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"157 ","pages":"Pages 535-570"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42913101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Quantal response equilibrium as a structural model for estimation: The missing manual 作为估计的结构模型的量子响应平衡：缺失的手册
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-02-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.008
James R. Bland , Theodore L. Turocy
{"title":"Quantal response equilibrium as a structural model for estimation: The missing manual","authors":"James R. Bland ,&nbsp;Theodore L. Turocy","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>One of the original objectives of the (logit) quantal response equilibrium (LQRE) model was to provide a method for structural estimation of behavior in games, when behavior deviated from Nash equilibrium predictions. To date, only Chapter 6 of the book on quantal response equilibrium by <span><span>Goeree et al. (2016)</span></span> focuses on how such estimation can be implemented. We build on that chapter to provide here a more detailed treatment of the methodological issues of implementing maximum likelihood estimation of QRE. We compare the equilibrium correspondence and empirical payoff approaches to estimation, and identify some considerations in interpreting the results of those approaches when applied to the same data on the same game. We also provide a more detailed “field guide” to using numerical continuation methods to accomplish estimation, including guidance on how to tailor implementations to games with different structures.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"157 ","pages":"Pages 592-618"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147538217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Endogenous barriers to learning 内生学习障碍
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-06-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.003
Olivier Compte
{"title":"Endogenous barriers to learning","authors":"Olivier Compte","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Building on the idea that lack of experience is a source of errors but that experience should reduce them, we model agents' behavior using a stochastic choice model (logit quantal response), leaving endogenous the accuracy of their choices. In some games, higher accuracy leads to unstable logit-response dynamics. Starting from the lowest possible accuracy, we define the barrier to learning as the maximum accuracy which keeps the logit-response dynamic stable (for all lower accuracies). This defines a limit quantal response equilibrium. We apply the concept to centipede, travelers' dilemma, and 11-20 money-request games and to first-price and all-pay auctions, and discuss the role of strategy restrictions in reducing or amplifying barriers to learning.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"157 ","pages":"Pages 440-463"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147538223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Algorithmic collusion and a folk theorem from learning with bounded rationality 算法合谋与有限理性学习中的一个民间定理
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.012
Álvaro Cartea , Patrick Chang , José Penalva , Harrison Waldon
{"title":"Algorithmic collusion and a folk theorem from learning with bounded rationality","authors":"Álvaro Cartea ,&nbsp;Patrick Chang ,&nbsp;José Penalva ,&nbsp;Harrison Waldon","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.012","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.012","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We prove a Folk theorem when players with bounded rationality learn as they play a repeated potential game. We use a dynamic generalization of smooth fictitious play with bounded <em>m</em>-recall strategies to model learning with bounded rationality that is consistent with learning by algorithms. In a repeated potential game with perfect monitoring, we use this learning model to show that for any feasible and individually rational payoff profile, if players have sufficient recall, are sufficiently patient, and best respond with sufficiently few mistakes, then the players have a non-zero probability of learning an <em>m</em>-recall strategy profile that achieves an average payoff close to the specified payoff profile for an appropriate continuation game. Moreover, the strategy profile learned is an <em>m</em>-recall ϵ-subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game. This finding demonstrates that competition authorities are correct in their concern about algorithmic collusion.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"157 ","pages":"Pages 1-21"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145950324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Privately designed correlated equilibrium 私人设计的相关均衡
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-02-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.010
Guilherme Carmona, Krittanai Laohakunakorn
{"title":"Privately designed correlated equilibrium","authors":"Guilherme Carmona,&nbsp;Krittanai Laohakunakorn","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.010","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.010","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider a setting where each player of a simultaneous-move game privately designs an information structure before playing the game. One of these information structures is chosen at random to determine the distribution of the private messages that players receive. These messages allow players to correlate their actions; however, their private design implies a push from correlated to Nash equilibria. Indeed, the sequential equilibrium payoffs of the extensive-form game with privately designed information structures are correlated equilibrium payoffs of the underlying simultaneous-move game, but not all correlated equilibrium payoffs are sequential equilibrium payoffs. In generic 2-player games, the latter are specific convex combinations of two Nash equilibrium payoffs.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"157 ","pages":"Pages 237-252"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147384942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Algorithms and complexity for computing Nash equilibria in adversarial team games 对抗团队博弈中计算纳什均衡的算法和复杂度
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.006
Ioannis Anagnostides , Fivos Kalogiannis , Ioannis Panageas , Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis , Stephen Mcaleer
{"title":"Algorithms and complexity for computing Nash equilibria in adversarial team games","authors":"Ioannis Anagnostides ,&nbsp;Fivos Kalogiannis ,&nbsp;Ioannis Panageas ,&nbsp;Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis ,&nbsp;Stephen Mcaleer","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div><em>Adversarial team games</em> model multiplayer strategic interactions in which a team of identically-interested players is competing against an adversarial player in a zero-sum game. Such games capture many well-studied settings in game theory, such as congestion games, but go well-beyond to environments wherein the cooperation of one team—in the absence of explicit communication—is obstructed by competing entities; the latter setting remains poorly understood despite its numerous applications. Since the seminal work of Von Stengel and Koller (GEB ‘97), different solution concepts have received attention from an algorithmic standpoint. Yet, the complexity of the standard Nash equilibrium has remained open.</div><div>In this paper, we settle this question by showing that computing a Nash equilibrium in adversarial team games belongs to the class <em>continuous local search (</em><strong>CLS</strong><em>)</em>, thereby establishing <strong>CLS</strong>-completeness by virtue of the recent <strong>CLS</strong>-hardness result of Rubinstein and Babichenko (STOC ‘21) in potential games. To do so, we leverage linear programming duality to prove that any ϵ-approximate stationary strategy for the team can be extended in polynomial time to an <em>O</em>(ϵ)-approximate Nash equilibrium, where the <em>O</em>( · ) notation suppresses polynomial factors. As a consequence, we show that the <em>Moreau envelope</em> of a suitable best response function acts as a <em>potential</em> under certain natural gradient-based dynamics.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"157 ","pages":"Pages 138-152"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147385030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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