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Deterrence in networks
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-02-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.001
Leo Bao , Lata Gangadharan , C. Matthew Leister
{"title":"Deterrence in networks","authors":"Leo Bao ,&nbsp;Lata Gangadharan ,&nbsp;C. Matthew Leister","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a deterrence mechanism that utilizes insider information acquired by criminals through customary practices. Under this mechanism, a suspect caught committing a criminal act can nominate a peer who has committed a similar offense, with only the more severe offender facing penalties. Theoretical analyses indicate that, under general conditions, our mechanism drives the best-response dynamic downwards compared to the commonly used regulatory practice of penalizing only the first suspect. Experimental data confirms the mechanism's deterrence effect, but unveils deviations from equilibrium predictions: the deterrence effect is weaker than anticipated and insensitive to network structures summarizing insider knowledge. To understand this, we analyze post-experiment questionnaire responses and find evidence that some participants employ level-k rather than Nash strategies. Structural estimation confirms that the level-k specification better fits the data than Nash. These findings inform policymakers of the potential usefulness and constraints of the peer-informed audit mechanism.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 501-517"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143420224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Complementarity in matching markets and exchange economies
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-02-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.002
Marzena Rostek , Nathan Yoder
{"title":"Complementarity in matching markets and exchange economies","authors":"Marzena Rostek ,&nbsp;Nathan Yoder","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The literature has shown that complementarity places significant structure on outcomes in matching markets and exchange economies. We examine the extent to which this structure, and the economic intuition underlying it, is common across these classes of environments. We show that transferable utility matching markets can be represented as exchange economies in a way that preserves competitive equilibria and gross complementarity. Unlike canonical representations that preserve substitutability, this representation must involve the addition of <em>brokers</em> whenever the matching market is not two-sided. We use our representation results to uncover the relationship (or lack thereof) between existence results in the literature that rely on complementarity, and to give a new existence result for matching markets with imperfectly transferable utility and <em>net</em> complementarity.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 415-435"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143396111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On a mechanism that improves efficiency and reduces inequality in voluntary contribution games
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-02-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.011
Rod Falvey , Tom Lane , Shravan Luckraz
{"title":"On a mechanism that improves efficiency and reduces inequality in voluntary contribution games","authors":"Rod Falvey ,&nbsp;Tom Lane ,&nbsp;Shravan Luckraz","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.011","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.011","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider the class of linear voluntary contribution games under the general assumption of heterogeneous endowments. In this context, we generalize the Galbraith Mechanism (GM) and assess its performance relative to a fixed equal sharing allocation in both theory and experiments. Three main empirical results emerge. First, the GM raises average contributions significantly above those under an equal-shares allocation. Second, the GM simultaneously reduces income inequality as it improves efficiency. Third, a player's contribution and allocation behavior is sensitive to her position in the endowment distribution. In all their decision-making, agents consistently place greater emphasis on absolute contribution levels when they are rich, and on contribution ratios (contributions relative to endowments) when they are poor.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 518-536"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143420225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Occupational segregation in a Roy model with composition preferences
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-02-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.010
Haoning Chen, Miaomiao Dong, Marc Henry, Ivan Sidorov
{"title":"Occupational segregation in a Roy model with composition preferences","authors":"Haoning Chen,&nbsp;Miaomiao Dong,&nbsp;Marc Henry,&nbsp;Ivan Sidorov","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.010","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.010","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a model of labor market sector self-selection that combines comparative advantage, as in the Roy model, and sector composition preference. Two groups choose between two sectors based on heterogeneous potential incomes and group compositions in each sector. Potential incomes incorporate group specific human capital accumulation and wage discrimination. Composition preferences are interpreted as reflecting group specific amenity preferences as well as homophily and aversion to minority status. We show that occupational segregation is amplified by the composition preferences and we highlight a resulting tension between redistribution and diversity. The model also exhibits tipping from extreme compositions to more balanced ones. Tipping occurs when a small nudge, associated with affirmative action, pushes the system to a very different equilibrium, and when the set of equilibria changes abruptly when a parameter governing the relative importance of pecuniary and composition preferences crosses a threshold.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 365-386"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143376618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Two-person bargaining when the disagreement point is private information
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-02-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.012
Eric van Damme , Xu Lang
{"title":"Two-person bargaining when the disagreement point is private information","authors":"Eric van Damme ,&nbsp;Xu Lang","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.012","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.012","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider two-person bargaining problems in which (only) the disagreement payoffs are private information and it is common knowledge that disagreement is inefficient. We show that, in the NTU-case, if the Pareto frontier is linear, the players' interim utilities of an ex post efficient mechanism cannot depend on the disagreement payoffs. If the frontier is non-linear, the result continues to hold when the conflict payoffs are independent, or one player has at most two types. In the TU-case, a similar independence result holds for ex post efficient mechanisms that are individually rational, provided the players' budgets satisfy a certain condition. We discuss implications of these results for axiomatic bargaining theory, surplus extraction by an informed principal and egalitarian mechanisms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 387-400"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143376524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal contracts under interpersonal projection
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.009
Kimiyuki Morita , Akitoshi Muramoto , Takeharu Sogo
{"title":"Optimal contracts under interpersonal projection","authors":"Kimiyuki Morita ,&nbsp;Akitoshi Muramoto ,&nbsp;Takeharu Sogo","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.009","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.009","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study a moral hazard model where multiple agents exhibit <em>interpersonal projection bias</em>, perceiving their peers' production states as similar to their own. Each agent's production state is private information. We characterize optimal contracts with limited liability that induce effort from agents in a production state better than a given cutoff. When the cutoff is sufficiently low (high), <em>relative (resp. joint) performance evaluation</em> is optimal if individual outcomes are contractible despite the absence of common shocks and informational or technological externalities. By exploiting agents' biases, the principal reduces expected wages. However, if only joint outcomes are contractible, optimal wages may <em>increase</em> with the degree of projection bias.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 356-364"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143204383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategic commitment to forgo information: Evidence from the lab
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.007
Emanuel Kandel , Yevgeny Mugerman , Eyal Winter
{"title":"Strategic commitment to forgo information: Evidence from the lab","authors":"Emanuel Kandel ,&nbsp;Yevgeny Mugerman ,&nbsp;Eyal Winter","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate subjects’ decisions to forgo costless information in interactive situations through laboratory experiments utilizing both within-subject and between-subjects designs. We created three strategic environments, each with two games: one environment with games of common interests, one with games of conflicting interests, and a third with one game of each type. In each environment, participants were paired and presented with the two games. They were then asked individually to choose whether or not to learn (at no cost) which game was being played. This choice was communicated to the other player before the actual game was played. Our results indicate that subjects understand the potential negative value of information in interactive contexts; specifically, they recognize that forgoing information can induce their counterpart to play more cooperatively. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the observed tendency to forgo information aligns with the predictions of rational behavior.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 401-414"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143379139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Foundation and identification of multi-attribute Shannon entropy
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-01-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.006
David Walker-Jones
{"title":"Foundation and identification of multi-attribute Shannon entropy","authors":"David Walker-Jones","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>By weakening Shannon's original axioms to allow for attributes of the choice environment to differ in their associated learning costs, this paper provides an axiomatic foundation for Multi-Attribute Shannon Entropy, a natural multi-parameter generalization of Shannon Entropy. Sufficient conditions are also provided for a simple dataset that provides a closed-form solution for the Multi-Attribute Shannon Entropy cost function for information by analyzing stochastic choice data produced by a rationally inattentive agent that is picking between pairs of options when relatively few states of the world have a positive probability of being realized.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 334-355"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Why do children pass in the centipede game? Cognitive limitations v. risk calculations
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-01-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.003
Isabelle Brocas , Juan D. Carrillo
{"title":"Why do children pass in the centipede game? Cognitive limitations v. risk calculations","authors":"Isabelle Brocas ,&nbsp;Juan D. Carrillo","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Children and adolescents from 8 to 16 years old play the centipede game in the laboratory, where non-equilibrium behavior (passing) can occur for two reasons: an inability to backward induct (cognitive limitation) or a decision to best respond to the empirical risk and take a measured chance (behavioral sophistication). We find that logical abilities develop gradually. While young participants are (as expected) least likely to perform backward induction, those who do, tend to over-estimate the ability of their peers to behave similarly. With age, participants gradually learn to think strategically and to best respond to their beliefs about others. Overall, the centipede game is an ideal test case for studying the development of abilities, as it disentangles the causes for passing in young children and in teenagers. Interestingly, shrewdness does not transform into earnings, and we document for the first time a game of strategy where payoffs monotonically <em>decrease</em> with age.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 295-311"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149689","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The impact of perceived strength in the war of attrition
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-01-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.001
David P. Myatt
{"title":"The impact of perceived strength in the war of attrition","authors":"David P. Myatt","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In a war of attrition a player's <em>perceived strength</em> is the distribution describing beliefs about her valuation. Small asymmetries in strength have a large effect: in the unique equilibrium of a game with a deadline the war ends quickly (instantly, as the deadline becomes infinite) with a concession by the (perceived) weaker player. The ranking of strength compares hazard rates in the upper tails of the distributions of beliefs; greater uncertainty about a player tends to give her more strength. The results also hold if techniques other than a deadline are used to obtain a unique equilibrium.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 260-277"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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