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Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems 比例广义索赔问题的稳定分区
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.011
{"title":"Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.011","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.011","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We consider a set of agents who have claims on an endowment that is not large enough to cover all claims. Agents can form coalitions but a minimal coalition size <em>θ</em> is required to have positive coalitional funding that is proportional to the sum of the claims of its members. We analyze the structure of stable partitions when coalition members use well-behaved rules to allocate coalitional endowments, e.g., the well-known constrained equal awards rule (CEA) or the constrained equal losses rule (CEL). For continuous, (strictly) resource monotonic, and consistent rules, stable partitions with (mostly) <em>θ</em>-size coalitions emerge. For CEA and CEL we provide algorithms to construct such a stable partition formed by (mostly) <em>θ</em>-size coalitions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001088/pdfft?md5=4447f2ea13f6435b6667d2d4841f301a&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624001088-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142099241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Failing to utilize potentially effective focal points: Prominence can stymie coordination on distinct actions 未能利用潜在的有效联络点：突出重点会妨碍协调不同的行动
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-08-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.010
{"title":"Failing to utilize potentially effective focal points: Prominence can stymie coordination on distinct actions","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.010","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.010","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Are people skillful in utilizing potential focal points? We find a class of situations for which the answer is negative: the presence of prominent actions appears to stymie the use of distinct actions for coordination. Across several experimental games, we consistently observe that players readily coordinate on a categorically distinct action when all available actions are non-prominent but not when some actions are prominent. For instance, given the action set {Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan, Tianjin}, most players select the Chinese city Tianjin. Yet, given {Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, Tianjin}, they are roughly equally likely to select either American president and unlikely to select Tianjin, and given {Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, Shanghai}, their choices are distributed approximately uniformly. The observation that prominence stymies reliance on distinctiveness informs cognitive hierarchy and team reasoning theories of how people recognize focality.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001040/pdfft?md5=fc4dcefe3318a3e5901246329c7860ee&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624001040-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142311032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Manipulating the outcome of stable marriage and roommates problems 操纵稳定婚姻和室友问题的结果
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-08-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.010
{"title":"Manipulating the outcome of stable marriage and roommates problems","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.010","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.010","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The stable marriage and stable roommates problems have been extensively studied due to their applicability in various real-world scenarios. However, it might happen that no stable solution exists, or stable solutions do not meet certain requirements. In such cases, one might be interested in modifying the instance so that the existence of a stable outcome with the desired properties is ensured. We focus on three different modifications.</p><p>1. In the stable roommates problem, we show that finding a smallest subset of agents whose removal results in an instance with a stable matching is NP-complete if the capacities are greater than one, or the deleted agents must belong to a fixed subset of vertices. We further show that analogous results hold for the stable marriage problem when one would like to achieve the existence of a stable and perfect matching through the deletion of vertices.</p><p>2. We investigate how to modify the preferences of the agents as little as possible so that a given matching becomes stable. The deviation of the new preferences from the original ones can be measured in various ways; here, we concentrate on the <span><math><msub><mrow><mi>ℓ</mi></mrow><mrow><mn>1</mn></mrow></msub></math></span>-norm. We show that, assuming the Unique Games Conjecture, the problem cannot be approximated within a factor smaller than 2. By relying on bipartite-submodular functions, we give a polynomial-time algorithm for the bipartite case. We also show that a similar approach leads to a 2-approximation for general graphs.</p><p>3. Last, we consider problems where the preferences of agents are not fully prescribed, and the goal is to decide whether the preference lists can be completed so that a stable matching exists. We settle the complexity of several variants, including cases when some of the edges are required to be included or excluded from the solution.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S089982562400109X/pdfft?md5=fd8f84e7ed1804aaab1d9b7dda1d6a55&pid=1-s2.0-S089982562400109X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142086498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The motive matters: Experimental evidence on the expressive function of punishment 动机很重要：关于惩罚表达功能的实验证据
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-08-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.004
{"title":"The motive matters: Experimental evidence on the expressive function of punishment","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The literature on punishment and prosocial behavior has presented conflicting findings. In some settings, punishment crowds out prosocial behavior and backfires; in others, however, it promotes prosociality. We examine whether the punisher's motives can help reconcile these results through a novel experiment in which the agent's outcomes are identical in two environments, but in one the pre-emptive punishment scheme is self-serving (i.e., potentially benefits the punisher), while in the other it is other-regarding (i.e., potentially benefits a third party). We find that self-serving punishment reduces the social stigma of selfish behavior, while other-regarding punishment does not. Self-serving punishment is thus less effective at encouraging compliance and is more likely to backfire. We further show that the normative message is somewhat weaker when punishment is less costly for the punisher. Our findings have implications for the design of punishment mechanisms and highlight the importance of the punisher's motives in expressing norms.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001143/pdfft?md5=016fe472bdbf9f3cc6a02cb91f1cc78f&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624001143-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142230313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information 不完全信息下的私人信号和快速产品采用
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-08-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.009
{"title":"Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.009","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.009","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper investigates the dynamics of product adoption under incomplete information regarding the product quality. A new agent observes a small sample of product choices within the population and receives a noisy private signal regarding the realized state of the world. Using simple heuristics, the agent estimates both the product quality and the distribution of product choices in the population. The agent then chooses a product that is a best response to this estimate. We show that fast adoption of the optimal product in the population occurs if and only if the strength of the private signal exceeds a certain threshold.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142083772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Signaling motives in lying games 说谎游戏中的信号动机
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-08-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.006
{"title":"Signaling motives in lying games","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper studies the implications of agents signaling their moral type in a lying game. In the theoretical analysis, a signaling motive emerges where agents dislike being suspected of lying and where some lies are more stigmatized than others. The equilibrium prediction of the model can explain experimental data from previous studies, particularly on partial lying, where individuals lie to gain a non-payoff maximizing amount. I discuss the relationship with theoretical models of lying that conceptualize the image concern as an aversion to being suspected of lying and provide applications to narratives, learning, the disclosure of lies, and the selection into lying opportunities.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S089982562400112X/pdfft?md5=51dc81b453723308a175b31568c5b2ef&pid=1-s2.0-S089982562400112X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142083771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Can compulsory voting reduce information acquisition? 强制投票能否减少信息获取？
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-08-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.005
{"title":"Can compulsory voting reduce information acquisition?","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>An election with full turnout is supposed to achieve an outcome that perfectly reflects the majority's preference. This result requires voters to be perfectly informed about their preferences and to vote accordingly. I show that incentivizing participation with an abstention fine does not necessarily incentivize information acquisition. While a small abstention fine always increases information acquisition compared to Voluntary Voting, a high abstention fine that achieves full turnout increases information acquisition only if voting costs are high. If voting costs are low, the opposite is true: Less individuals acquire information under Compulsory Voting with full turnout than under Voluntary Voting.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001118/pdfft?md5=1ebde5200c3cb06bc2d43f23bdcf76a4&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624001118-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142050346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
To Catch a Stag: Identifying payoff- and risk-dominance effects in coordination games 捕捉雄鹿识别协调游戏中的报酬和风险支配效应
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-08-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.011
{"title":"To Catch a Stag: Identifying payoff- and risk-dominance effects in coordination games","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.011","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.011","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Five decades after Harsanyi and Selten's seminal work on equilibrium selection, we remain unable to predict the outcomes of real-life coordination even in simple cases. One reason is that experiments have struggled to quantify the effects of payoff- and risk-dominance and to separate them from context factors like feedback, repetition, and complexity. This experiment is the first to demonstrate that both payoff- and risk-dominance significantly and independently impact coordination decision-making. Three innovations characterize the design: First, payoff- and risk-dominance are disentangled using orthogonal measures of strategic incentives and welfare externalities. Second, a no-feedback, choice-list task format minimizes deviations from one-shot incentives. Third, beliefs about others' behavior are elicited. Strikingly, heterogeneous beliefs across the population rationalize not only reactions to risk dominance but also most reactions to payoff dominance. In addition, deviations from expected-value maximization in specific games suggest a minor role for social projection or other-regarding preferences.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001076/pdfft?md5=f447cf5ceb908eee5b2b27bc76cc4865&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624001076-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142086499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fair division with two-sided preferences 双面偏好的公平除法
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-08-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.008
{"title":"Fair division with two-sided preferences","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study a fair division setting in which participants are to be fairly distributed among teams, where not only do the teams have preferences over the participants as in the canonical fair division setting, but the participants also have preferences over the teams. We focus on guaranteeing envy-freeness up to one participant (EF1) for the teams together with a stability condition for both sides. We show that an allocation satisfying EF1, swap stability, and individual stability always exists and can be computed in polynomial time, even when teams may have positive or negative values for participants. When teams have nonnegative values for participants, we prove that an EF1 and Pareto optimal allocation exists and, if the valuations are binary, can be found in polynomial time. We also show that an EF1 and justified envy-free allocation does not necessarily exist, and deciding whether such an allocation exists is computationally difficult.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001027/pdfft?md5=5131a16c94c8ab5470bdc1f0a6f17d8b&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624001027-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142050342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Changing collective action: Nudges and team decisions 改变集体行动：激励和团队决策
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-08-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.009
{"title":"Changing collective action: Nudges and team decisions","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.009","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.009","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Nudges are widely used and a broad literature documents that they successfully affect individual behavior. However, in most settings where nudges are needed to change collective action, teams – not individuals – determine outcomes. Because team decision making is pervasive, learning whether nudges work with teams in social dilemmas is important, especially when formal enforcement is difficult. Here, we show that a nudge increases team cooperation by 14 to 16 percentage points in a social dilemma among fishing crews at Lake Victoria, Tanzania. The nudge is particularly effective when team decisions are made by a team member with leadership experience. Our findings are a proof of concept that expands the toolkit of empirical researchers and policy makers that address social dilemmas among teams.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001052/pdfft?md5=2ca78064cfc9b9fd393a8609701b2140&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624001052-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142086497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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