Games and Economic Behavior最新文献_第10页

Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems 比例广义索赔问题的稳定分区

IF 1 3区经济学

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.011

Oihane Gallo, Bettina Klaus

引用次数: 0

Failing to utilize potentially effective focal points: Prominence can stymie coordination on distinct actions 未能利用潜在的有效联络点：突出重点会妨碍协调不同的行动

IF 1 3区经济学

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-08-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.010

Uri Gneezy, Yuval Rottenstreich

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引用次数: 0

Manipulating the outcome of stable marriage and roommates problems 操纵稳定婚姻和室友问题的结果

IF 1 3区经济学

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-08-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.010

Kristóf Bérczi , Gergely Csáji , Tamás Király

{"title":"Manipulating the outcome of stable marriage and roommates problems","authors":"Kristóf Bérczi , Gergely Csáji , Tamás Király","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.010","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.010","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The stable marriage and stable roommates problems have been extensively studied due to their applicability in various real-world scenarios. However, it might happen that no stable solution exists, or stable solutions do not meet certain requirements. In such cases, one might be interested in modifying the instance so that the existence of a stable outcome with the desired properties is ensured. We focus on three different modifications.</p><p>1. In the stable roommates problem, we show that finding a smallest subset of agents whose removal results in an instance with a stable matching is NP-complete if the capacities are greater than one, or the deleted agents must belong to a fixed subset of vertices. We further show that analogous results hold for the stable marriage problem when one would like to achieve the existence of a stable and perfect matching through the deletion of vertices.</p><p>2. We investigate how to modify the preferences of the agents as little as possible so that a given matching becomes stable. The deviation of the new preferences from the original ones can be measured in various ways; here, we concentrate on the <span><math><msub><mrow><mi>ℓ</mi></mrow><mrow><mn>1</mn></mrow></msub></math></span>-norm. We show that, assuming the Unique Games Conjecture, the problem cannot be approximated within a factor smaller than 2. By relying on bipartite-submodular functions, we give a polynomial-time algorithm for the bipartite case. We also show that a similar approach leads to a 2-approximation for general graphs.</p><p>3. Last, we consider problems where the preferences of agents are not fully prescribed, and the goal is to decide whether the preference lists can be completed so that a stable matching exists. We settle the complexity of several variants, including cases when some of the edges are required to be included or excluded from the solution.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"147 ","pages":"Pages 407-428"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S089982562400109X/pdfft?md5=fd8f84e7ed1804aaab1d9b7dda1d6a55&pid=1-s2.0-S089982562400109X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142086498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information 不完全信息下的私人信号和快速产品采用

IF 1 3区经济学

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-08-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.009

Itai Arieli , Srinivas Arigapudi

引用次数: 0

The motive matters: Experimental evidence on the expressive function of punishment 动机很重要：关于惩罚表达功能的实验证据

IF 1 3区经济学

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-08-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.004

Daniele Nosenzo , Erte Xiao , Nina Xue

{"title":"The motive matters: Experimental evidence on the expressive function of punishment","authors":"Daniele Nosenzo , Erte Xiao , Nina Xue","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The literature on punishment and prosocial behavior has presented conflicting findings. In some settings, punishment crowds out prosocial behavior and backfires; in others, however, it promotes prosociality. We examine whether the punisher's motives can help reconcile these results through a novel experiment in which the agent's outcomes are identical in two environments, but in one the pre-emptive punishment scheme is self-serving (i.e., potentially benefits the punisher), while in the other it is other-regarding (i.e., potentially benefits a third party). We find that self-serving punishment reduces the social stigma of selfish behavior, while other-regarding punishment does not. Self-serving punishment is thus less effective at encouraging compliance and is more likely to backfire. We further show that the normative message is somewhat weaker when punishment is less costly for the punisher. Our findings have implications for the design of punishment mechanisms and highlight the importance of the punisher's motives in expressing norms.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"148 ","pages":"Pages 44-67"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001143/pdfft?md5=016fe472bdbf9f3cc6a02cb91f1cc78f&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624001143-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142230313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Signaling motives in lying games 说谎游戏中的信号动机

IF 1 3区经济学

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-08-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.006

Tilman Fries

引用次数: 0

Can compulsory voting reduce information acquisition? 强制投票能否减少信息获取？

IF 1 3区经济学

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-08-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.005

Linnéa Marie Rohde

引用次数: 0

To Catch a Stag: Identifying payoff- and risk-dominance effects in coordination games 捕捉雄鹿识别协调游戏中的报酬和风险支配效应

IF 1 3区经济学

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-08-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.011

Stephan Jagau

{"title":"To Catch a Stag: Identifying payoff- and risk-dominance effects in coordination games","authors":"Stephan Jagau","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.011","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.011","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Five decades after Harsanyi and Selten's seminal work on equilibrium selection, we remain unable to predict the outcomes of real-life coordination even in simple cases. One reason is that experiments have struggled to quantify the effects of payoff- and risk-dominance and to separate them from context factors like feedback, repetition, and complexity. This experiment is the first to demonstrate that both payoff- and risk-dominance significantly and independently impact coordination decision-making. Three innovations characterize the design: First, payoff- and risk-dominance are disentangled using orthogonal measures of strategic incentives and welfare externalities. Second, a no-feedback, choice-list task format minimizes deviations from one-shot incentives. Third, beliefs about others' behavior are elicited. Strikingly, heterogeneous beliefs across the population rationalize not only reactions to risk dominance but also most reactions to payoff dominance. In addition, deviations from expected-value maximization in specific games suggest a minor role for social projection or other-regarding preferences.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"147 ","pages":"Pages 429-448"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001076/pdfft?md5=f447cf5ceb908eee5b2b27bc76cc4865&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624001076-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142086499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Fair division with two-sided preferences 双面偏好的公平除法

IF 1 3区经济学

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-08-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.008

Ayumi Igarashi , Yasushi Kawase , Warut Suksompong , Hanna Sumita

引用次数: 0

Changing collective action: Nudges and team decisions 改变集体行动：激励和团队决策

IF 1 3区经济学

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-08-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.009

Florian Diekert , Tillmann Eymess

引用次数: 0