发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Games and Economic Behavior最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Optimal tree contest design and winner-take-all 最优树竞赛设计，赢者通吃
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-02-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.007
Qian Jiao , Zhonghong Kuang , Yiran Liu , Yang Yu
{"title":"Optimal tree contest design and winner-take-all","authors":"Qian Jiao ,&nbsp;Zhonghong Kuang ,&nbsp;Yiran Liu ,&nbsp;Yang Yu","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the effort-maximizing design of multi-stage contests with tree-like architectures, focusing on both contest architecture and prize structure. Given the architecture, we show that the whole budget should be assigned to a single match. This match must be the final if the architecture is symmetric. Moreover, the winner-take-all rule proves to be optimal if the contest organizer can jointly design the architecture and prize structure. To determine the optimal contest architecture, we use dynamic programming and induction to provide a tight upper bound for the optimized total effort level. Our new approach extends the findings of <span><span>Gradstein and Konrad (1999)</span></span>, offering new insights into how the optimal architecture hinges on the noise level of matches.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"151 ","pages":"Pages 1-23"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143473936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The limits of identification in discrete choice 离散选择中辨识的极限
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-02-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.006
Christopher P. Chambers , Christopher Turansick
{"title":"The limits of identification in discrete choice","authors":"Christopher P. Chambers ,&nbsp;Christopher Turansick","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper uncovers tight bounds on the number of preferences permissible in identified random utility models. We show that as the number of alternatives in a discrete choice model becomes large, the fraction of preferences admissible in an identified model rapidly tends to zero. We propose a novel sufficient condition ensuring identification, which is strictly weaker than some of those existing in the literature. While this sufficient condition reaches our upper bound, an example demonstrates that this condition is not necessary for identification. Using our new condition, we show that the classic “Latin Square” example from social choice theory is identified from stochastic choice data.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 537-551"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143453733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The value of and demand for diverse news sources 多样化新闻来源的价值和需求
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-02-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.004
Evan M. Calford , Anujit Chakraborty
{"title":"The value of and demand for diverse news sources","authors":"Evan M. Calford ,&nbsp;Anujit Chakraborty","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the value of and the demand for instrumentally-valuable information in a simple decision environment where signals are transparently polarized. We find that in both information aggregation and acquisition, subjects use sophisticated heuristics to counter the polarization in signals. A minority of subjects (15%) produce precise Bayesian reports, while an additional 59% of subjects produce unbiased reports even when exposed to polarized signals. Subjects placed in a market place of information rarely end up buying polarized signals and instead overwhelmingly opt for diverse information. The demand for diverse information increases as diverse information becomes more valuable and decreases as it becomes more expensive.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"151 ","pages":"Pages 24-41"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143529315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Move orders in contests: Equilibria and winning chances 比赛中的移动顺序：均衡和获胜机会
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-02-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.003
Lei Gao , Jingfeng Lu , Zhewei Wang
{"title":"Move orders in contests: Equilibria and winning chances","authors":"Lei Gao ,&nbsp;Jingfeng Lu ,&nbsp;Zhewei Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies general two-player sequential-move competitions, accommodating a full spectrum of Tullock contest technology and contestants' asymmetry. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a preemptive equilibrium to prevail in both strong-lead and weak-lead contests, and discover a characteristic equation to pin down the players' effort ratio (which fully determines their winning chances) and their effort levels when a non-preemptive equilibrium prevails. We find that while the strong player always has a higher winning chance when moving first, simultaneous moves sometimes maximize the weak player's winning odds. We further allow the move orders endogenous through winning-odd-maximizing coaches' independent choices.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 436-468"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143396021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Nonparametric identification and estimation of the generalized second-price auction 广义二次拍卖的非参数辨识与估计
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-02-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.005
Ksenia Shakhgildyan
{"title":"Nonparametric identification and estimation of the generalized second-price auction","authors":"Ksenia Shakhgildyan","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this paper, I establish the identification and present a nonparametric estimator for the incomplete information generalized second-price auction model. I recover the distribution of the bidders' quality-adjusted valuations from the CDF of the adjusted bids, win outcomes, and click-through rates. Through the Monte Carlo simulations, I evaluate the finite-sample performance of the proposed estimator. Additionally, I compare the estimator of the incomplete information model to the estimator of the misspecified model assuming that adjusted bids are the result of the bidding according to the locally envy-free equilibrium of complete information model.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 480-500"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143396023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Deterrence in networks 网络威慑
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-02-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.001
Leo Bao , Lata Gangadharan , C. Matthew Leister
{"title":"Deterrence in networks","authors":"Leo Bao ,&nbsp;Lata Gangadharan ,&nbsp;C. Matthew Leister","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a deterrence mechanism that utilizes insider information acquired by criminals through customary practices. Under this mechanism, a suspect caught committing a criminal act can nominate a peer who has committed a similar offense, with only the more severe offender facing penalties. Theoretical analyses indicate that, under general conditions, our mechanism drives the best-response dynamic downwards compared to the commonly used regulatory practice of penalizing only the first suspect. Experimental data confirms the mechanism's deterrence effect, but unveils deviations from equilibrium predictions: the deterrence effect is weaker than anticipated and insensitive to network structures summarizing insider knowledge. To understand this, we analyze post-experiment questionnaire responses and find evidence that some participants employ level-k rather than Nash strategies. Structural estimation confirms that the level-k specification better fits the data than Nash. These findings inform policymakers of the potential usefulness and constraints of the peer-informed audit mechanism.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 501-517"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143420224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Complementarity in matching markets and exchange economies 市场与交换经济的互补性
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-02-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.002
Marzena Rostek , Nathan Yoder
{"title":"Complementarity in matching markets and exchange economies","authors":"Marzena Rostek ,&nbsp;Nathan Yoder","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The literature has shown that complementarity places significant structure on outcomes in matching markets and exchange economies. We examine the extent to which this structure, and the economic intuition underlying it, is common across these classes of environments. We show that transferable utility matching markets can be represented as exchange economies in a way that preserves competitive equilibria and gross complementarity. Unlike canonical representations that preserve substitutability, this representation must involve the addition of <em>brokers</em> whenever the matching market is not two-sided. We use our representation results to uncover the relationship (or lack thereof) between existence results in the literature that rely on complementarity, and to give a new existence result for matching markets with imperfectly transferable utility and <em>net</em> complementarity.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 415-435"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143396111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On a mechanism that improves efficiency and reduces inequality in voluntary contribution games 在自愿捐款博弈中提高效率和减少不平等的机制
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-02-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.011
Rod Falvey , Tom Lane , Shravan Luckraz
{"title":"On a mechanism that improves efficiency and reduces inequality in voluntary contribution games","authors":"Rod Falvey ,&nbsp;Tom Lane ,&nbsp;Shravan Luckraz","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.011","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.011","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider the class of linear voluntary contribution games under the general assumption of heterogeneous endowments. In this context, we generalize the Galbraith Mechanism (GM) and assess its performance relative to a fixed equal sharing allocation in both theory and experiments. Three main empirical results emerge. First, the GM raises average contributions significantly above those under an equal-shares allocation. Second, the GM simultaneously reduces income inequality as it improves efficiency. Third, a player's contribution and allocation behavior is sensitive to her position in the endowment distribution. In all their decision-making, agents consistently place greater emphasis on absolute contribution levels when they are rich, and on contribution ratios (contributions relative to endowments) when they are poor.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 518-536"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143420225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Occupational segregation in a Roy model with composition preferences 具有成分偏好的Roy模型中的职业隔离
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-02-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.010
Haoning Chen, Miaomiao Dong, Marc Henry, Ivan Sidorov
{"title":"Occupational segregation in a Roy model with composition preferences","authors":"Haoning Chen,&nbsp;Miaomiao Dong,&nbsp;Marc Henry,&nbsp;Ivan Sidorov","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.010","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.010","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a model of labor market sector self-selection that combines comparative advantage, as in the Roy model, and sector composition preference. Two groups choose between two sectors based on heterogeneous potential incomes and group compositions in each sector. Potential incomes incorporate group specific human capital accumulation and wage discrimination. Composition preferences are interpreted as reflecting group specific amenity preferences as well as homophily and aversion to minority status. We show that occupational segregation is amplified by the composition preferences and we highlight a resulting tension between redistribution and diversity. The model also exhibits tipping from extreme compositions to more balanced ones. Tipping occurs when a small nudge, associated with affirmative action, pushes the system to a very different equilibrium, and when the set of equilibria changes abruptly when a parameter governing the relative importance of pecuniary and composition preferences crosses a threshold.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 365-386"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143376618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Two-person bargaining when the disagreement point is private information 当分歧点是私人信息时，两人讨价还价
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-02-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.012
Eric van Damme , Xu Lang
{"title":"Two-person bargaining when the disagreement point is private information","authors":"Eric van Damme ,&nbsp;Xu Lang","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.012","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.012","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider two-person bargaining problems in which (only) the disagreement payoffs are private information and it is common knowledge that disagreement is inefficient. We show that, in the NTU-case, if the Pareto frontier is linear, the players' interim utilities of an ex post efficient mechanism cannot depend on the disagreement payoffs. If the frontier is non-linear, the result continues to hold when the conflict payoffs are independent, or one player has at most two types. In the TU-case, a similar independence result holds for ex post efficient mechanisms that are individually rational, provided the players' budgets satisfy a certain condition. We discuss implications of these results for axiomatic bargaining theory, surplus extraction by an informed principal and egalitarian mechanisms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 387-400"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143376524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：604180095
Book学术官方微信