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Games and Economic Behavior最新文献

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Who gets the credit? Credit attribution, spillovers, and inefficiency in teams 谁得到了荣誉？团队中的信用归因、溢出效应和低效率
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-09-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.005
Saltuk Ozerturk , Huseyin Yildirim
{"title":"Who gets the credit? Credit attribution, spillovers, and inefficiency in teams","authors":"Saltuk Ozerturk ,&nbsp;Huseyin Yildirim","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine team incentives in environments with positive spillovers and rewards based on ex-post public credit for collective success. Compared to the ex-ante efficient credit allocation that maximizes the team's overall payoff, ex-post credit distorts individual incentives: higher-ability or lower-cost agents receive excessive credit and overexert effort when spillovers are low, but are under-credited and insufficiently motivated when spillovers are high. To address these inefficiencies, organizations may optimally limit spillovers by restricting peer communication or reducing transparency in teamwork. Moreover, concerns about credit-sharing can deter agents from inviting collaborators or selecting the most capable partners when leading projects.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 246-266"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145220902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A concavity in the value of information 信息价值的凹凸性
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-09-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.003
Mark Whitmeyer
{"title":"A concavity in the value of information","authors":"Mark Whitmeyer","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A natural way of quantifying the “amount of information” in decision problems yields a globally concave value for information. Another (in contrast, adversarial) way almost never does.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 200-207"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145119424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Teams formation: Efficiency and approximate fairness 团队组成：效率和近似公平
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-09-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.002
Anna Bogomolnaia , Artem Baklanov , Elizaveta Victorova
{"title":"Teams formation: Efficiency and approximate fairness","authors":"Anna Bogomolnaia ,&nbsp;Artem Baklanov ,&nbsp;Elizaveta Victorova","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A set of <em>kn</em> indivisible items is to be allocated to <em>n</em> agents; each agent has to get exactly <em>k</em> items, and agents have additive utilities over bundles. Can one find an efficient and approximately fair allocation? In this setting, we introduce new notions of approximate fairness, based on exchange of two single objects, and compare them to the “traditional” ones based on disregarding one object.</div><div>Our model and new fairness properties are insensitive to positive affine transformations of utilities, hence, there is no need for a separate treatment of “goods”, “bads”, and “mixed objects”. A famous Round Robin rule fares very well on all fairness accounts, but fails efficiency, while rules based on collective welfare maximization (like Nash or Leximin) cannot guarantee fairness, except on several special sub-domains (two agents, identical valuations, or binary utilities). EFx and PROPx still appear too strong. Traditional notions of approximate fairness do not allow for more positive results either.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 226-245"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145159408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Approximately fair and population consistent budget division via simple payment schemes 通过简单的支付方案大致公平和人口一致的预算划分
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-09-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.001
Haris Aziz, Patrick Lederer, Xinhang Lu, Mashbat Suzuki, Jeremy Vollen
{"title":"Approximately fair and population consistent budget division via simple payment schemes","authors":"Haris Aziz,&nbsp;Patrick Lederer,&nbsp;Xinhang Lu,&nbsp;Mashbat Suzuki,&nbsp;Jeremy Vollen","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In approval-based budget division, a budget needs to be distributed to some candidates based on the voters' approval ballots over these candidates. In the pursuit of a simple, consistent, and approximately fair rule for this setting, we introduce the maximum payment rule (<span><math><mi>MP</mi></math></span>). Under this rule, each voter controls a part of the budget and, in each step, the corresponding voters allocate their entire budget to the candidate approved by the largest number of voters with non-zero budget. We show that <span><math><mi>MP</mi></math></span> meets our criteria as it satisfies monotonicity and a demanding population consistency condition and gives a 2-approximation to a fairness notion called average fair share (AFS). Moreover, we generalize <span><math><mi>MP</mi></math></span> to the class of sequential payment rules and prove that it is the most desirable rule within this class: nearly all other sequential payment rules fail monotonicity while offering only small improvements in the approximation ratio to AFS.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 208-225"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145159409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Material incentives and effort choice: Evidence from an online experiment across countries 物质激励和努力选择：来自各国在线实验的证据
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-09-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.015
Elwyn Davies , Marcel Fafchamps
{"title":"Material incentives and effort choice: Evidence from an online experiment across countries","authors":"Elwyn Davies ,&nbsp;Marcel Fafchamps","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.015","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.015","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We conduct an interactive online experiment framed as an employment contract. Subjects from the US, India, and Africa are matched within and across countries. Employers make a one-period offer to a worker who can either decline or choose a high or low effort. The offer is restricted to be from a variable set of possible contracts. High effort is always efficient. Some observed choices are well predicted by self-interest, but others are better explained by conditional reciprocity or intrinsic motivation. Subjects from India and Africa follow intrinsic motivation and provide high effort more often. US subjects are more likely to follow self-interest and reach a less efficient outcome on average, but workers earn slightly more. We find no evidence of stereotypes across countries. Individual characteristics and stated attitudes toward worker incentives do not predict the behavioral differences observed between countries, consistent with cultural differences in the response to labor incentives.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 175-199"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145097109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Non-isolation, reversals, and social preference 非孤立、逆转和社会偏好
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-09-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.016
Paul H.Y. Cheung , Keaton Ellis
{"title":"Non-isolation, reversals, and social preference","authors":"Paul H.Y. Cheung ,&nbsp;Keaton Ellis","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.016","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.016","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Recent evidence suggests that non-isolation behavior could significantly impact laboratory experiments using the random problem selection (RPS) payment mechanism through <em>lottery integration</em>. Theoretical work also highlights social preferences that can violate statewise monotonicity, a necessary and sufficient condition for incentive compatibility with the RPS payment mechanism in case of lottery integration. Additionally, non-isolation can influence decisions through non-consequential dynamic concerns. In a series of three simple and parsimonious experiments and three tests, we examine the occurrence of the two kinds of non-isolation and reversal behaviors. We find significant evidence for <em>positive reversal</em> behavior, where subjects are more likely to make a fair choice if there is an alternative possible realization of an unfair outcome (which they chose themselves). In addition, the lower bounds for the prevalence of non-isolation in terms of lottery integration and dynamic non-consequential concern are estimated to be approximately 10% and 20%, respectively.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 159-174"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145097108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ambiguous persuasion: An ex-ante formulation 模棱两可的说服：事前提法
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-09-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.017
Xiaoyu Cheng
{"title":"Ambiguous persuasion: An ex-ante formulation","authors":"Xiaoyu Cheng","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.017","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.017","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Consider a persuasion game where both the sender and receiver are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (MEU) preferences and the sender can choose an ambiguous information structure. This paper analyzes the game in an ex-ante formulation: the sender first commits to an information structure, and then the receiver best responds by choosing an ex-ante message-contingent action plan. Under this formulation, I show it is never strictly beneficial for the sender to use an ambiguous information structure as opposed to a standard unambiguous one. This result is robust to (i) the players having heterogeneous beliefs over the states, and/or (ii) the receiver having non-MEU, uncertainty-averse preferences. However, it is <em>not</em> robust to the sender having non-MEU preferences.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 149-158"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145061045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Equilibrium and social norms 均衡与社会规范
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-09-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.014
Robert M. Anderson , Haosui Duanmu
{"title":"Equilibrium and social norms","authors":"Robert M. Anderson ,&nbsp;Haosui Duanmu","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.014","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.014","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div><span><span>Richter and Rubinstein (2020)</span></span> developed a novel model for social norms, which play an essential role in governing individual behavior in many economic situations. We present a generalization of the Richter-Rubinstein model allowing for an infinite agent space, individualized sets of alternatives, externalities, and intransitive preferences. In addition, we study social welfare properties of feasible Pareto efficient profiles and illustrate the applicability of our results in examples including a centrally planned economy, the classical Walrasian exchange economy, and the formation of social norms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 119-128"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145049195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Interest group information in elections 选举中的利益集团信息
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-09-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.012
Thea How Choon
{"title":"Interest group information in elections","authors":"Thea How Choon","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.012","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.012","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Do interest groups provide information in ways that systematically bias and polarize candidates? I consider a Downsian model where candidates are uncertain about the median voter's preference. Up to two interest groups, completely biased, observe voter preferences in the extremes and send costless messages to candidates. Starting with one interest group, I show all informative equilibria are asymmetric: the interest group “plays favorites” by revealing coarse information to one candidate, causing policy divergence. Informative equilibria exist only if the interest group has sufficiently broad information. With opposing interest groups, this requirement is relaxed. I describe equilibria where each candidate is more sensitive to voter shocks in one tail, leading to policy convergence in the center and divergence in the tails. The presence of interest groups reframes the policy space, demarcating the consensus “moderate” regions from the “extremes”.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 129-148"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145049196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Political salience, endogenous bandwagoning, and regime resilience 政治突出性、内生从众和政权弹性
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-09-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.011
Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch , Steffen Huck , Macartan Humphreys
{"title":"Political salience, endogenous bandwagoning, and regime resilience","authors":"Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch ,&nbsp;Steffen Huck ,&nbsp;Macartan Humphreys","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.011","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.011","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We introduce political salience into a canonical model of attacks against political regimes, as scaling agents' expressive payoffs from taking sides. Equilibrium balances heterogeneous expressive motives with incentives to avoid sanctions by “bandwagoning” with the winning side. We examine comparative statics in political salience, which we characterize in terms of equilibrium stability as well as attack size. A main insight is that when regime sanctions are weak, increases in salience can pose the greatest threat to seemingly safe regimes: ever smaller shocks become sufficient to drastically escalate into full-blown attacks, i.e., the regime becomes less resilient. Stronger regime safeguards not only directly reduce incentives to attack but can overturn these effects, such that increases in salience boost regime resilience. Our results speak to charged debates about democratic resilience, by identifying how safeguards determine when a rise in citizen interest in political action can lead to a threat to democracy.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 79-96"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145020701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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