Games and Economic Behavior最新文献

Justified-envy-minimal efficient mechanisms for priority-based matching 基于优先级匹配的合理嫉妒最小有效机制

IF 1 3区经济学

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.003

Hyukjun Kwon , Ran I. Shorrer

引用次数: 0

Bayesian inference for Quantal Response Equilibrium in normal-form games 正则型对策中量子反应平衡的贝叶斯推理

IF 1 3区经济学

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2023-05-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.005

James R. Bland

引用次数: 0

An experimental study of prisoners' dilemma and stag hunt games played by teams of players 囚徒困境与团队猎鹿博弈的实验研究

IF 1 3区经济学

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-02-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.009

Jeongbin Kim , Thomas R. Palfrey

{"title":"An experimental study of prisoners' dilemma and stag hunt games played by teams of players","authors":"Jeongbin Kim , Thomas R. Palfrey","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.009","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.009","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We compare behavior in six variations of prisoners' dilemma and stag hunt games played by 5-member teams to behavior in the same games played by individuals. The experimental design<span> is informed by a theory of team equilibrium that generates hypotheses about systematic differences between teams and individuals in these games. We also compare three different team collective choice procedures: majority rule; majority rule preceded by a poll; and majority rule preceded by chat. In all six games, we observe significant bandwagon effects that drive consensus in the poll and chat treatments, but voting procedures have no significant effects on team decision frequencies except for the poll treatment of the stag hunt games. Surprisingly, teams do not always defect more than individuals. In prisoners' dilemma games with higher incentives to cooperate, teams cooperate more than individuals. A one-parameter logit specification of the team equilibrium model provides a good fit to the prisoners' dilemma data across all treatments. Teams coordinate more successfully than individuals in the stag hunt games. Additional data are gathered using Amazon Mechanical Turk, including data for much larger (25-member) teams. The observed MTurk behavior differs quantitatively from laboratory behavior, but with similar qualitative comparative statics.</span></div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"157 ","pages":"Pages 395-417"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147538220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Equilibrium cycle: A “Dynamic” equilibrium 均衡周期：一种“动态”均衡

IF 1 3区经济学

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-02-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.007

Tushar Shankar Walunj , Shiksha Singhal , Veeraruna Kavitha , Jayakrishnan Nair

引用次数: 0

Quantal response equilibrium with a continuum of types: Characterization and nonparametric identification 具有连续类型的量响应平衡：表征和非参数识别

IF 1 3区经济学

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-03-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.002

Evan Friedman , Duarte Gonçalves

引用次数: 0

Adapting stable matchings to evolving preferences 使稳定的匹配适应不断变化的偏好

IF 1 3区经济学

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-02-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.006

Robert Bredereck , Jiehua Chen , Dušan Knop , Junjie Luo , Rolf Niedermeier

{"title":"Adapting stable matchings to evolving preferences","authors":"Robert Bredereck , Jiehua Chen , Dušan Knop , Junjie Luo , Rolf Niedermeier","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Adaptivity to changing environments and constraints is key to success in modern society. We address this principle by proposing “incrementalized versions” of <span>Stable Marriage</span> and <span>Stable Roommates</span>, asking what the computational cost is of adapting an existing stable matching after agents’ preferences have changed. We additionally require that the new stable matching should not deviate too much from the old one. After formalizing these incremental versions, we provide a comprehensive computational complexity landscape of <span>Incremental Stable Marriage</span> and <span>Incremental Stable Roommates</span>. To this end, we exploit the parameters “degree of change” in the input (difference between old and new preference profile) and in the output (difference between old and new stable matching). We obtain both hardness and tractability results. In particular, with ties in preferences, both problems remain computationally intractable even under minimal preference changes, whereas with strict preferences, both become (fixed-parameter) tractable, regardless of the extent of preference changes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"157 ","pages":"Pages 322-350"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147384946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Strategy vs. direct-response method: evidence from a large online experiment on simple social dilemmas 策略与直接反应法：来自简单社会困境的大型在线实验的证据

IF 1 3区经济学

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.010

Marcus Roel , Zhuoqiong Chen

引用次数: 0

Timing and skewness of information revelation: Evidence on information structures and compound lotteries 信息披露的时代性与偏度：基于信息结构与复合彩票的证据

IF 1 3区经济学

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.005

Enrico Diecidue , Thomas Langer , Sven Nolte , Sebastian Riedmiller , Judith C. Schneider

{"title":"Timing and skewness of information revelation: Evidence on information structures and compound lotteries","authors":"Enrico Diecidue , Thomas Langer , Sven Nolte , Sebastian Riedmiller , Judith C. Schneider","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In a series of three experiments, we investigate intrinsic preferences for timing and skewness of information resolution in a “compound lottery” (CL) and “information structure” (IS) environment. In the first experiment, we rule out predeterminedness of the outcome, i.e., realization before making the decision, as a driver of different timing preferences between the environments. In the second experiment, we show that skewness preferences in a two-outcome setting differ between the two environments. In the third comprehensive experiment, we integrate all three dimensions (timing, skewness, and environment) into a three-outcome setting, which allows a rigorous treatment of skewness. With respect to timing, participants prefer to receive information early in both environments. In case of a gradual resolution, participants strictly prefer positively skewed information in the IS environment, but symmetric information in the CL environment. Our results show that skewness and environment must be jointly taken into account when studying preferences for information resolution.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"157 ","pages":"Pages 109-124"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146079349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Quantal response equilibrium and rationalizability: Inside the black box 量变反应平衡与合理性：黑箱内部

IF 1 3区经济学

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2024-03-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.003

Shuige Liu , Fabio Maccheroni

{"title":"Quantal response equilibrium and rationalizability: Inside the black box","authors":"Shuige Liu , Fabio Maccheroni","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper aims to connect epistemic and behavioral game theory by examining the epistemic foundations of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) in static games. We focus on how much information agents possess about the probability distributions of idiosyncratic payoff shocks, in addition to the standard assumptions of rationality and common belief in rationality. When these distributions are transparent, we obtain a solution concept called <span><math><msup><mrow><mi>Δ</mi></mrow><mrow><mi>p</mi></mrow></msup></math></span>-rationalizability, which includes action distributions derived from QRE; we also give a condition under which this relationship holds true in reverse. When agents only have common belief in the monotonicity of these distributions (for example, extreme value distributions), we obtain another solution concept called <span><math><msup><mrow><mi>Δ</mi></mrow><mrow><mi>M</mi></mrow></msup></math></span>-rationalizability, which includes action distributions derived from rank-dependent choice equilibrium, a parameter-free variant of QRE. Our solution concepts also provide insights for interpreting experimental and empirical data.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"157 ","pages":"Pages 496-515"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140282813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Electoral accountability in the lab 实验室中的选举问责制

IF 1 3区经济学

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-02-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.008

César Martinelli , Naila C. Sebastián Esandi

引用次数: 0