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On the political economy of nonlinear income taxation 论非线性所得税的政治经济学
IF 1.1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-09-01 Epub Date: 2026-08-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.08.002
Marcus Berliant, Miguel Gouveia
{"title":"On the political economy of nonlinear income taxation","authors":"Marcus Berliant,&nbsp;Miguel Gouveia","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.08.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.08.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The political economy setting of voting over general nonlinear income taxes with labor disincentives and information asymmetry in consumer/worker/voter types is considered. Agents do not communicate or coordinate with each other. The economy is the realization of a finite draw from a continuous distribution. The revenue required from a draw is determined by Pareto optimal provision of a public good for that draw. Assuming that the government must meet the revenue requirement for any possible draw, in other words the tax is robust, a majority rule equilibrium is shown to exist at the median voter’s preferred tax function out of this robust set. The key restrictions on utility are additive separability, quasi-linearity, and that utility from the public good is multiplicative in type.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"159 ","pages":"Pages 604-624"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2026-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148934591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the strategyproof allocation of items under a budget constraint 预算约束下的无策略项目分配
IF 1.1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-09-01 Epub Date: 2026-08-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.08.003
Javier Cembrano, Max Klimm, Martin Knaack
{"title":"On the strategyproof allocation of items under a budget constraint","authors":"Javier Cembrano,&nbsp;Max Klimm,&nbsp;Martin Knaack","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.08.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.08.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study a mechanism-design-without-money setting in which a designer is interested in selecting items with maximum total value under a budget constraint. The items, however, are controlled by strategic agents who aim to maximize the total value of their selected items. This setting arises naturally when agencies select projects for funding, retailers choose products to stock, or hospitals schedule MRI scans. A mechanism governing the selection is strategyproof if no agent can benefit by hiding items they control from the mechanism. We are interested in mechanisms that are strategyproof and <em>α</em>-approximate, meaning that they always achieve at least an <em>α</em>-fraction of the optimal value for some <em>α</em> ∈ [0, 1]. First, we give a deterministic mechanism that is 1/<em>ϕ</em><sup>2</sup>-approximate, where 1/<em>ϕ</em><sup>2</sup> ≈ 0.382 is the inverse of the square of the golden ratio. For the special case where all items have unit density, we design a deterministic 1/<em>ϕ</em>-approximate mechanism, where 1/<em>ϕ</em> ≈ 0.618. This result is tight as we show that no deterministic strategyproof mechanism with a better approximation exists. We further give randomized mechanisms with approximation guarantees of 1/2 for the general case and 2/3 for the unit-density case. For both the general and the unit-density settings, no randomized mechanism that is strategyproof in expectation can achieve an approximation guarantee better than <span><math><mrow><mn>1</mn><mo>/</mo><mo>(</mo><mn>5</mn><mi>ϕ</mi><mo>−</mo><mn>7</mn><mo>)</mo><mo>≈</mo><mn>0.917</mn></mrow></math></span>.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"159 ","pages":"Pages 584-603"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2026-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148854139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The effort-maximizing move order in tullock contests 塔洛克竞赛中努力最大化的移动顺序
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-05-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.005
Lei Gao , Jingfeng Lu , Zhewei Wang
{"title":"The effort-maximizing move order in tullock contests","authors":"Lei Gao ,&nbsp;Jingfeng Lu ,&nbsp;Zhewei Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines effort-maximizing move orders in two-player Tullock contests across varying levels of contest accuracy and player asymmetries. Unlike prior work that favors strong-lead sequential formats in lottery contests, our analysis demonstrates that all three formats—strong-lead, weak-lead, and simultaneous—can be optimal in the general Tullock contests. Strong-lead contests are most effective in noisy environments, but lose their advantage as contest accuracy increases. Weak-lead contests may become optimal when the weaker player successfully preempts. Simultaneous-move contests tend to perform better as the players’ ability differences become less severe. Overall, the optimal contest design jointly depends on the contest accuracy levels and relative strengths of the contestants.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"158 ","pages":"Pages 622-629"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148183786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A model of participatory persuasion 参与式说服模式
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-05-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.006
Liuchun Deng , Yufeng Sun
{"title":"A model of participatory persuasion","authors":"Liuchun Deng ,&nbsp;Yufeng Sun","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper introduces the concept of participatory persuasion in autocracies, where regimes use controlled communication to sustain their rule. In an overlapping-generations model of democratization, we show that the regime’s survival can be prolonged when citizens communicate within small circles compared to a setting in which communication is entirely absent. Paradoxically, limited freedom of speech enhances the regime’s persuasion by turning citizens into inadvertent agents of state propaganda. We further extend the analysis to settings with homophily or under state censorship.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"158 ","pages":"Pages 657-683"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148183920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Caps on bids in all-pay contests with identity-dependent externalities 在具有身份依赖外部性的全薪酬竞争中设定出价上限
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-05-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.003
Dan Kovenock , Jian Song , Francesco Trevisan
{"title":"Caps on bids in all-pay contests with identity-dependent externalities","authors":"Dan Kovenock ,&nbsp;Jian Song ,&nbsp;Francesco Trevisan","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article examines, both theoretically and experimentally, the welfare implications of implementing symmetric bid caps in lobbying competitions. We model lobbying games as lottery contests with two radicals and one centrist, where all players strictly prefer to win. However, if they lose, radicals prefer to lose to a centrist rather than to the opposing radical. We establish the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium and find that, in the absence of a bid cap, radicals may bid aggressively enough to drive the centrist out of the competition, thereby preventing the social welfare-maximizing outcome. Consequently, implementing a bid cap enhances social welfare in two ways: it reduces aggregate expenditure and increases the likelihood of the centrist winning. Our experimental results qualitatively align with the theoretical predictions. However, we also identify and address notable behavioral patterns: in contrast to the vast experimental literature (Sheremeta, 2013) on contests, aggregate bids do not exceed theoretical predictions in all treatments.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"158 ","pages":"Pages 691-716"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148183927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information manipulation of wishful thinkers 一厢情愿的思想者的信息操纵
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-05-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.010
Emel Filiz-Ozbay , Zhenxun Liu
{"title":"Information manipulation of wishful thinkers","authors":"Emel Filiz-Ozbay ,&nbsp;Zhenxun Liu","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.010","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.010","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Digital platforms may manipulate customer reviews to impede other consumers from acquiring accurate information and to increase sales. In a rational inattention setting where consumers acquire information about product quality before making purchasing decisions, we show that the platform has incentives to restrict information acquisition in the presence of consumers with wishful thinking. These biased consumers are unaware of their bias and weigh any good news about the product quality more heavily than a Bayesian consumer. We identify the conditions under which the firm optimally constrains information acquisition, and characterize when competition can alleviate this type of exploitation. Our results extend to a broader class of non-Bayesian rules beyond wishful thinking.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"158 ","pages":"Pages 763-786"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148183919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Delay in social learning 社会学习迟缓
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-05-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.007
Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn
{"title":"Delay in social learning","authors":"Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study a class of social learning games in which players choose whether and when to make an irreversible investment. We ask whether the option value of learning induces delay. Surprisingly, under natural and standard assumptions, delay does not arise in equilibrium. Although waiting even momentarily would yield informative observations, we show that this learning is payoff-irrelevant. As a result, players either invest immediately or not at all.</div><div>Lab rat 1: “Did you get the COVID vaccine yet?”</div><div>Lab rat 2: “Nah, I’m waiting for the results of the human trials.”</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"158 ","pages":"Pages 684-690"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148183926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Competition in persuasion in the attention economy 注意力经济中的说服竞争
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-04-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.04.005
Federico Innocenti
{"title":"Competition in persuasion in the attention economy","authors":"Federico Innocenti","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.04.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.04.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016) show that competition among senders benefits receivers if and only if the information environment is Blackwell-connected. This paper shows that introducing receivers’ limited attention and heterogeneous beliefs can overturn this result. Even in a Blackwell-connected information environment, information revelation may be lower under duopoly than under monopoly. Indeed, limited attention may incentivize receivers to sort into the audiences of like-minded senders. In turn, this adverse sorting can make it optimal for senders to reveal less information.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"158 ","pages":"Pages 815-826"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148241714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cheap talk and lie detection 废话和测谎
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-03-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.007
Hitoshi Sadakane , Yin Chi Tam
{"title":"Cheap talk and lie detection","authors":"Hitoshi Sadakane ,&nbsp;Yin Chi Tam","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study analyzes strategic interactions between cheap talk and lie detection, identifies the receiver-optimal equilibrium under costly lie detection, and evaluates its effectiveness. An informed sender seeks to persuade an uninformed receiver to choose higher actions, while the receiver aims to align the action as closely as possible with the true state. The sender issues a claim about the state, and the receiver then decides whether to incur a cost to inspect the claim’s truthfulness. We show that the receiver-optimal equilibrium partitions the state space into three intervals. Types in the upper interval make precise and truthful claims, which are mimicked by types in the lower interval and are subject to random inspection. Types in the middle interval make a vague claim that is never inspected. We further show that lie detection is more beneficial to the receiver than direct state verification, as it creates incentives for moderate and high types to communicate truthfully.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"158 ","pages":"Pages 787-814"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148241715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Transparency and information acquisition in college admissions 大学招生中的透明度和信息获取
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-05-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.008
Youngwoo Koh , Wooyoung Lim
{"title":"Transparency and information acquisition in college admissions","authors":"Youngwoo Koh ,&nbsp;Wooyoung Lim","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We theoretically and experimentally study centralized college admissions in which colleges evaluate students under a ‘translucent’ admission system and students can learn each college’s suitability through costly information acquisition. In centralized matching via Gale and Shapley’s deferred acceptance algorithm, students decide whether to acquire information before submitting their rank-order lists. However, uncertainty about the final assignment lowers the expected gain from learning, thereby reducing social welfare, compared to a scenario without such uncertainty. Our experiments demonstrate that the welfare loss is greater with more opaque admission systems. The empirical social welfare obtained in our experimental treatments is consistently lower than the theoretical welfare, and we identify non-equilibrium learning as a main contributor.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"158 ","pages":"Pages 717-736"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148183928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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