{"title":"Obvious manipulations in matching with and without contracts","authors":"R. Pablo Arribillaga , Eliana Pepa Risma","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.013","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.013","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper explores many-to-one matching models, both with and without contracts, where doctors' preferences are private and hospitals' preferences are public and substitutable. It is known that any stable-dominating mechanism –which is either stable or individually rational and Pareto-dominates (from the doctors' perspective) a stable mechanism–, is susceptible to manipulation by doctors. Our study focuses on <em>obvious manipulations</em> and identifies stable-dominating mechanisms that prevent them. Without contracts, we show that any stable-dominating mechanism is not obviously manipulable. However, with contracts, none of these results hold. While we demonstrate that the Doctor-Proposing Deferred Acceptance (DA) Mechanism remains not obviously manipulable, we show that the Hospital-Proposing DA Mechanism and any efficient mechanism that Pareto-dominates the Doctor-Proposing DA Mechanism become (very) obviously manipulable, in the model with contracts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"151 ","pages":"Pages 70-81"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143563583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Inefficiency in a frictionless market","authors":"Keith Jin Deng Chan","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.011","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.011","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div><span><span>Gale and Sabourian (2006)</span></span> argue that Markov strategies in dynamic matching and bargaining games accommodate non-competitive behavior: with heterogeneous players, outcomes may be inefficient. In this paper, I show that their corroborating example with four players does not comprise a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). In fact, I show that all MPEs must be efficient in their setting with only four players. Nevertheless, I construct a continuum of inefficient equilibria in a balanced market with six players. Key to the construction is the dispersion of reservation prices to render inefficient trades individually rational, yet sufficient dynamics of continuation payoffs can be supported only with at least six players. Consequently, inefficiencies are driven by the interplay of heterogeneous valuations and strategic uncertainty from the number of players in the market.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"151 ","pages":"Pages 59-69"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143548329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The prevalence of take-it-or-leave-it offers","authors":"Shinsuke Kambe","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.010","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.010","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the effect of the option to exit in finite-horizon, two-person bargaining where players make offers alternatingly and incur fixed costs per period. We show that players use take-it-or-leave-it strategies in the unique equilibrium when there is no discounting. Expecting a low payoff at the next period as a respondent, a proposer would choose to exit after her demand were rejected. This causes her opponent to accept her take-it-or-leave-it offer. This prediction is generically valid even when the division at the final period is exogenously given, and is conditionally true when the cost of bargaining includes discounting.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"151 ","pages":"Pages 42-58"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143534365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Optimal tree contest design and winner-take-all","authors":"Qian Jiao , Zhonghong Kuang , Yiran Liu , Yang Yu","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the effort-maximizing design of multi-stage contests with tree-like architectures, focusing on both contest architecture and prize structure. Given the architecture, we show that the whole budget should be assigned to a single match. This match must be the final if the architecture is symmetric. Moreover, the winner-take-all rule proves to be optimal if the contest organizer can jointly design the architecture and prize structure. To determine the optimal contest architecture, we use dynamic programming and induction to provide a tight upper bound for the optimized total effort level. Our new approach extends the findings of <span><span>Gradstein and Konrad (1999)</span></span>, offering new insights into how the optimal architecture hinges on the noise level of matches.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"151 ","pages":"Pages 1-23"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143473936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The limits of identification in discrete choice","authors":"Christopher P. Chambers , Christopher Turansick","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper uncovers tight bounds on the number of preferences permissible in identified random utility models. We show that as the number of alternatives in a discrete choice model becomes large, the fraction of preferences admissible in an identified model rapidly tends to zero. We propose a novel sufficient condition ensuring identification, which is strictly weaker than some of those existing in the literature. While this sufficient condition reaches our upper bound, an example demonstrates that this condition is not necessary for identification. Using our new condition, we show that the classic “Latin Square” example from social choice theory is identified from stochastic choice data.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 537-551"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143453733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The value of and demand for diverse news sources","authors":"Evan M. Calford , Anujit Chakraborty","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the value of and the demand for instrumentally-valuable information in a simple decision environment where signals are transparently polarized. We find that in both information aggregation and acquisition, subjects use sophisticated heuristics to counter the polarization in signals. A minority of subjects (15%) produce precise Bayesian reports, while an additional 59% of subjects produce unbiased reports even when exposed to polarized signals. Subjects placed in a market place of information rarely end up buying polarized signals and instead overwhelmingly opt for diverse information. The demand for diverse information increases as diverse information becomes more valuable and decreases as it becomes more expensive.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"151 ","pages":"Pages 24-41"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143529315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Move orders in contests: Equilibria and winning chances","authors":"Lei Gao , Jingfeng Lu , Zhewei Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies general two-player sequential-move competitions, accommodating a full spectrum of Tullock contest technology and contestants' asymmetry. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a preemptive equilibrium to prevail in both strong-lead and weak-lead contests, and discover a characteristic equation to pin down the players' effort ratio (which fully determines their winning chances) and their effort levels when a non-preemptive equilibrium prevails. We find that while the strong player always has a higher winning chance when moving first, simultaneous moves sometimes maximize the weak player's winning odds. We further allow the move orders endogenous through winning-odd-maximizing coaches' independent choices.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 436-468"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143396021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Nonparametric identification and estimation of the generalized second-price auction","authors":"Ksenia Shakhgildyan","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this paper, I establish the identification and present a nonparametric estimator for the incomplete information generalized second-price auction model. I recover the distribution of the bidders' quality-adjusted valuations from the CDF of the adjusted bids, win outcomes, and click-through rates. Through the Monte Carlo simulations, I evaluate the finite-sample performance of the proposed estimator. Additionally, I compare the estimator of the incomplete information model to the estimator of the misspecified model assuming that adjusted bids are the result of the bidding according to the locally envy-free equilibrium of complete information model.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 480-500"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143396023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Deterrence in networks","authors":"Leo Bao , Lata Gangadharan , C. Matthew Leister","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a deterrence mechanism that utilizes insider information acquired by criminals through customary practices. Under this mechanism, a suspect caught committing a criminal act can nominate a peer who has committed a similar offense, with only the more severe offender facing penalties. Theoretical analyses indicate that, under general conditions, our mechanism drives the best-response dynamic downwards compared to the commonly used regulatory practice of penalizing only the first suspect. Experimental data confirms the mechanism's deterrence effect, but unveils deviations from equilibrium predictions: the deterrence effect is weaker than anticipated and insensitive to network structures summarizing insider knowledge. To understand this, we analyze post-experiment questionnaire responses and find evidence that some participants employ level-k rather than Nash strategies. Structural estimation confirms that the level-k specification better fits the data than Nash. These findings inform policymakers of the potential usefulness and constraints of the peer-informed audit mechanism.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 501-517"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143420224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Complementarity in matching markets and exchange economies","authors":"Marzena Rostek , Nathan Yoder","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The literature has shown that complementarity places significant structure on outcomes in matching markets and exchange economies. We examine the extent to which this structure, and the economic intuition underlying it, is common across these classes of environments. We show that transferable utility matching markets can be represented as exchange economies in a way that preserves competitive equilibria and gross complementarity. Unlike canonical representations that preserve substitutability, this representation must involve the addition of <em>brokers</em> whenever the matching market is not two-sided. We use our representation results to uncover the relationship (or lack thereof) between existence results in the literature that rely on complementarity, and to give a new existence result for matching markets with imperfectly transferable utility and <em>net</em> complementarity.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 415-435"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143396111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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