Kemal Kıvanç Aköz , Emre Doğan , Onur Kesten , Danisz Okulicz
{"title":"Stability as right to counsel of choice: A lawyers' matching problem","authors":"Kemal Kıvanç Aköz , Emre Doğan , Onur Kesten , Danisz Okulicz","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.009","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.009","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Judicial systems around the world widely differ in the degree they allow litigants to exercise their right to legal counsel. When litigants are completely free to choose their lawyers and vice versa, blocking pairs between litigants and lawyers must be eliminated leading to stable matchings. In this context, a negative externality arises: a pairing between a stronger lawyer and a litigant conflicts with the interests of the opposing litigant and his lawyer. We show that the existence of a stable matching is guaranteed whenever the case structure is dichotomous and within each class, cases are primarily differentiated by the advantage they give to one of the sides. We characterize conditions under which realized matchings can be rationalized as stable. Stable matchings always lead to negatively assortative lawyer pairings within each class. Agent-optimal stable matchings do not necessarily exist. Stable matchings are always efficient, but may not belong to the core.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"152 ","pages":"Pages 1-22"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143817444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Accountability in Markovian elections","authors":"John Duggan , Jean Guillaume Forand","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study electoral accountability in a dynamic environment with complete information. As our normative benchmark, we take the solution of the dynamic programming problem facing the representative voter as if he chose policy directly. There always exist equilibria in which the congruent politician type, whose policy preferences match those of the voter, is accountable, in the sense that these politicians achieve the idealized benchmark. We demonstrate that challenges to electoral accountability stem from multiple equilibria with undesirable normative properties, and we give examples of novel political failures in a model of dynamic public investment. We do not allow the voter or politicians to commit. Nevertheless, we identify a class of reciprocal equilibria such that voter welfare converges to the normative benchmark, and we give conditions under which non-congruent politician types are asymptotically accountable, for every selection of such equilibria as the players become patient.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"151 ","pages":"Pages 183-217"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143769117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Comparative statics of minimum-cost-spanning-tree games","authors":"Zhibin Tan , Cao Zhigang , Zhengxing Zou","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We conduct a comparative static analysis for the cores of minimum-cost-spanning-tree games. We introduce a new category of cover, termed as the matrix-exact cover. Our investigation underscores the pivotal role played by the matrix-exact cover, in conjunction with the classical irreducible cost matrix. (i) When edge costs experience a decrease, the core remains invariant as long as the costs of all edges are weakly above their respective matrix-exact covers. (ii) When the costs of certain edges do fall below the matrix-exact cover, and simultaneously all edge costs remain weakly above the irreducible costs, the core contracts, forming a proper subset of the original core. (iii) Furthermore, should the costs of some edges continue to decrease and fall below the irreducible costs, the core shifts away from the original core.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"151 ","pages":"Pages 162-182"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143737909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fair division with subjective divisibility","authors":"Xiaohui Bei , Shengxin Liu , Xinhang Lu","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The classic fair division problems assume the resources to be allocated are either divisible or indivisible, or contain a mixture of both, but the agents always have a predetermined and uncontroversial agreement on the (in)divisibility of the resources. In this paper, we propose and study a new model for fair division in which agents have their own <em>subjective divisibility</em> over the goods to be allocated. That is, some agents may find a good to be indivisible and get utilities only if they receive the <em>whole</em> good, while others may consider the same good to be divisible and thus can extract utilities according to the fraction of the good they receive. We investigate fairness properties that can be achieved when agents have subjective divisibility. First, we consider the <em>maximin share (MMS) guarantee</em> and show that the worst-case MMS approximation guarantee is at most 2/3 for <span><math><mi>n</mi><mo>≥</mo><mn>2</mn></math></span> agents and this ratio is <em>tight</em> in the two- and three-agent cases. This is in contrast to the classic fair division settings involving two or three agents. We also give an algorithm that produces a 1/2-MMS allocation for an arbitrary number of agents. Second, we study a hierarchy of envy-freeness relaxations, including EF1M, EFM and EFXM, ordered by increasing strength. While EF1M is compatible with non-wastefulness (an economic efficiency notion), this is not the case for EFM, even for two agents. Nevertheless, an EFXM and non-wasteful allocation always exists for two agents if at most one good is discarded.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"151 ","pages":"Pages 127-147"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143704170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Stable mixing in Hawk–Dove Games under best experienced payoff dynamics","authors":"Srinivas Arigapudi , Yuval Heller","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The hawk–dove game admits two types of equilibria: an asymmetric pure equilibrium, in which players in one population play “hawk” and players in the other population play “dove,” and a symmetric mixed equilibrium, in which hawks are frequently matched against each other. The existing literature shows that when two populations of agents are randomly matched to play the hawk–dove game, then there is convergence to one of the pure equilibria from almost any initial state. By contrast, we show that plausible dynamics, in which agents occasionally revise their actions based on the payoffs obtained in a few trials, often give rise to the opposite result: convergence to one of the interior stationary states.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"151 ","pages":"Pages 148-161"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143737908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Going through the roof: On prices for drugs sold through insurance","authors":"Jurjen Kamphorst , Vladimir A. Karamychev","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies public concern grounds for high prices of drugs treating rare and debilitating diseases. We offer a theory that explains how drug indivisibility, individual budget constraints, and insurance interact to drive up drug prices, especially for drugs treating rare and severe diseases. For a broad range of drug production costs and income distributions, our model predicts that drug prices are either set at their highest levels covered by insurance or inversely related to the prevalence of the disease. In the latter case, producer profits <em>decrease</em> with prevalence. The effect of production costs on prices and profits is non-monotonic.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"151 ","pages":"Pages 218-242"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143786022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Learning in unprofitable games","authors":"Andrea Gaunersdorfer , Josef Hofbauer","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A game is unprofitable if equilibrium payoffs do not exceed the maximin payoff for each player. In an unprofitable game, Nash equilibrium play has been notoriously difficult to justify. For a class of <span><math><mn>3</mn><mo>×</mo><mn>3</mn></math></span> games we analyze whether evolutionary and learning processes lead to Nash play. We find that neither the pure Nash equilibrium nor the pure maximin strategy are stable rest points under the studied dynamics whereas the mixed Nash equilibrium and the quantal response equilibrium may be attractors, repellors or surrounded by periodic orbits.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"151 ","pages":"Pages 108-126"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143697375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An implementation of the general optimal mechanism in Esö and Szentes (2007)","authors":"Dongri Liu , Jingfeng Lu","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.014","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.014","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this paper, we provide an implementation of the optimal mechanism of <span><span>Esö and Szentes (2007)</span></span> for their general environment without assuming constant marginal utility (in the first-stage type) for the buyers. Our implementation is carried out through a three-stage handicap auction. In stage 1, each buyer, knowing his first-stage type, is required to select a handicap menu by paying a menu fee. A higher menu fee would lead to a more favorable handicap menu, which charges a lower handicap fee for every possible handicap level. In stage 2, each buyer, informed of his second-stage signal, is required to select a handicap by paying a handicap fee specified by his early chosen handicap menu. In stage 3, all buyers compete for the object via a second-price auction with handicaps. The highest bidder wins and pays the sum of his chosen handicap and the second-highest bid.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"151 ","pages":"Pages 82-94"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143600579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Obvious manipulations in matching with and without contracts","authors":"R. Pablo Arribillaga , Eliana Pepa Risma","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.013","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.013","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper explores many-to-one matching models, both with and without contracts, where doctors' preferences are private and hospitals' preferences are public and substitutable. It is known that any stable-dominating mechanism –which is either stable or individually rational and Pareto-dominates (from the doctors' perspective) a stable mechanism–, is susceptible to manipulation by doctors. Our study focuses on <em>obvious manipulations</em> and identifies stable-dominating mechanisms that prevent them. Without contracts, we show that any stable-dominating mechanism is not obviously manipulable. However, with contracts, none of these results hold. While we demonstrate that the Doctor-Proposing Deferred Acceptance (DA) Mechanism remains not obviously manipulable, we show that the Hospital-Proposing DA Mechanism and any efficient mechanism that Pareto-dominates the Doctor-Proposing DA Mechanism become (very) obviously manipulable, in the model with contracts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"151 ","pages":"Pages 70-81"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143563583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Auctions with signaling bidders: Optimal design and information disclosure","authors":"Olivier Bos, Martin Pollrich","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.012","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.012","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study optimal auctions in a symmetric private values setting, where bidders have signaling concerns: they care about winning the object and a receiver's inference about their type. Signaling concerns arise in various economic situations such as takeover bidding, charity auctions, procurement and art auctions. We show that auction revenue can be decomposed into the standard revenue from the respective auction without signaling concern, and a signaling component. The latter is the bidders' ex-ante expected signaling value net of an endogenous outside option: the signaling value for the lowest type. The revenue decomposition restores revenue equivalence between different auction designs, provided that the same information about bids is revealed. Revealing information about submitted bids affects revenue via the endogenous outside option. In general, revenue is not monotone in information revelation: revealing more information about submitted bids may reduce revenue. We show that any bid disclosure rule allowing to distinguish whether a bidder submitted a bid or abstained from participation minimizes the outside option, and therefore maximizes revenue.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"151 ","pages":"Pages 95-107"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143621094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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