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Games and Economic Behavior最新文献

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Status quo bias with choice overload 选择过多的现状偏见
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-11-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.012
Jiaqi Yang
{"title":"Status quo bias with choice overload","authors":"Jiaqi Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.012","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.012","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper proposes a model that parsimoniously captures evidence on status quo bias, the reference effect and choice overload. Choice overload is behaviorally defined as an increase in intensity of status quo bias when the menu enlarges. Our decision maker follows a two-step procedure by first limiting consideration to the alternatives that weakly dominate the status quo according to a menu-dependent list of attributes, and then maximizing preference over this subset with tie breaking in favor of the status quo. Choice overload is generated by the key feature that the list of attributes is increasing in menu size. An axiomatic characterization and three applications are provided. In particular, a policy maker has to nudge the agent through a series of small changes in her choice problems. An incumbent firm can deter entry by exploiting choice overload, while an entrant firm can introduce new product more efficiently using information on attention.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"149 ","pages":"Pages 170-186"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142746460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
School choice with farsighted students 有远见的学生选择学校
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-11-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.010
Ata Atay , Ana Mauleon , Vincent Vannetelbosch
{"title":"School choice with farsighted students","authors":"Ata Atay ,&nbsp;Ana Mauleon ,&nbsp;Vincent Vannetelbosch","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.010","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.010","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism may not belong to any farsighted stable set. Hence, the TTC mechanism provides an assignment that is not only Pareto efficient but also farsightedly stable. Moreover, looking forward three steps ahead is already sufficient for stabilizing the matching obtained from the TTC. In addition, we show that variations of TTC that improve in terms of no justified envy are farsightedly stable, but may require more farsightedness on behalf of students.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"149 ","pages":"Pages 148-163"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142746458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Axiomatic bargaining theory: New wine from old bottles 公理讨价还价理论：旧瓶装新酒
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-11-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.009
Dominik Karos , Shiran Rachmilevitch
{"title":"Axiomatic bargaining theory: New wine from old bottles","authors":"Dominik Karos ,&nbsp;Shiran Rachmilevitch","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.009","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.009","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Five classical and uncontroversial axioms—symmetry, weak Pareto optimality, restricted monotonicity, midpoint domination, and superadditivity—characterize a bargaining solution. It assigns to each player their midpoint, that is, the <em>n</em>-th share of their utopia point, and equally divides what remains.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"149 ","pages":"Pages 112-117"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142721655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Boundedness of the range of a strategy-proof social choice function 无策略社会选择函数范围的有界性
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-11-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.013
Shigehiro Serizawa , John A. Weymark
{"title":"Boundedness of the range of a strategy-proof social choice function","authors":"Shigehiro Serizawa ,&nbsp;John A. Weymark","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.013","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.013","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>For the provision of <span><math><mi>m</mi><mo>≥</mo><mn>1</mn></math></span> divisible public goods, relatively weak restrictions on the domain of a strategy-proof social choice function are identified that ensure that its range is bounded. Domain restrictions are also identified for which strategy-proofness implies that the range and the option sets of a social choice function are compact. To illustrate the usefulness of these results, it is shown how a theorem about generalized median voter schemes due to Barberà, Massó, and Serizawa can be established without their assumption that the range of a social choice function is compact provided that the tops of the preferences are not restricted to be finite.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"149 ","pages":"Pages 164-169"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142746459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal private payoff manipulation against commitment in extensive-form games 广泛形式博弈中针对承诺的最优私人报酬操纵
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-11-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.008
Yurong Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Yuhao Li
{"title":"Optimal private payoff manipulation against commitment in extensive-form games","authors":"Yurong Chen,&nbsp;Xiaotie Deng,&nbsp;Yuhao Li","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Stackelberg equilibrium describes the optimal strategies of a player, when she (the leader) first credibly commits to a strategy. Her opponent (the follower) will best respond to her commitment. To compute the optimal commitment, a leader must learn enough follower's payoff information. The follower can then potentially provide fake information, to induce a different final game outcome that benefits him more than when he truthfully behaves.</div><div>We study such follower's manipulation in extensive-form games. For all four settings considered, we characterize all the inducible game outcomes. We show the polynomial-time tractability of finding the optimal payoff function to misreport. We compare the follower's optimal attainable utilities among different settings, with the true game fixed. In particular, one comparison shows that the follower gets no less when the leader's strategy space expands from pure strategies to behavioral strategies. Our work completely resolves this follower's optimal manipulation problem on extensive-form game trees.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"149 ","pages":"Pages 118-147"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142721656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Understanding dynamic interactions 了解动态互动
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-11-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.010
Konrad Grabiszewski , Alex Horenstein
{"title":"Understanding dynamic interactions","authors":"Konrad Grabiszewski ,&nbsp;Alex Horenstein","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.010","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.010","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Dealing with a problem consists of understanding and solving. While there is vast literature analyzing problem solving, this article focuses on understanding. The problems subjects deal with are finite dynamic games with complete and perfect information. Understanding involves comprehending the relationships between choices and their consequences. The same backward-induction problem is presented using two distinct representations: tree and non-tree. The crucial difference between them is that the relevant connections between choices and consequences are directly provided in a tree but must be identified in a non-tree. Our study comprises 27 pairs of tree/non-tree interactions with a varying depth. We measure and analyze understanding by looking at success in understanding and the effort it involves. Our subjects struggle with understanding, even more so than solving. Greater depth increases the cognitive effort of understanding and, simultaneously, lowers the success rate in understanding.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"149 ","pages":"Pages 96-111"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142700914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Local public good equilibrium 地方公益均衡
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-11-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.007
Nathan W. Chan , Anne van den Nouweland
{"title":"Local public good equilibrium","authors":"Nathan W. Chan ,&nbsp;Anne van den Nouweland","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We extend ratio equilibrium to local public good economies by defining Local Public Good Equilibrium (LPGE). We employ “share functions” for individual agents that allow easy comparisons of consumption utility, both across consumption bundles and across jurisdiction memberships. Share functions furthermore aggregate for parsimonious calculation of equilibrium public good provision within each potential jurisdiction, allowing us to establish a link with hedonic games and deploy results from that literature. We demonstrate in examples how this enables us to show LPGE existence for a far wider class of economies than prior work seeking to extend ratio equilibrium to local public good economies. In particular, we demonstrate LPGE existence with heterogeneous agents, a finite number of agents and jurisdictions, endogenous jurisdictional revenues and expenditures, and robustness against coalitional deviations. LPGE admits wide-ranging jurisdiction structures, and we demonstrate how it can generate results on sorting that have attracted interest in the extant literature.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"149 ","pages":"Pages 32-42"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142700960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The economics of excuses: Job market cheap talk with pre-employment tests 借口经济学就业市场上的 "职前测试 "廉价言论
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-11-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.006
Ran Weksler , Boaz Zik
{"title":"The economics of excuses: Job market cheap talk with pre-employment tests","authors":"Ran Weksler ,&nbsp;Boaz Zik","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In the job market, managers typically use pre-employment tests to evaluate a candidate's value. Candidates often respond by claiming, in a non-verifiable way, that circumstances not related to their value impair their ability to perform well in the test and, thus, render the test an unreliable source of information. We term such cheap-talk claims <em>excuses</em>. We show that if the candidate's expected performance in the test sufficiently depends on skills orthogonal to the candidate's value, the candidate may credibly use excuses despite the candidate's transparent motives. In equilibrium, excuses lead to a low prior belief about the candidate's value that is later accompanied by a lenient update process of the test's outcomes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"149 ","pages":"Pages 56-64"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142700911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Regularized Bayesian best response learning in finite games 有限博弈中的正规化贝叶斯最佳响应学习
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-11-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.005
Sayan Mukherjee , Souvik Roy
{"title":"Regularized Bayesian best response learning in finite games","authors":"Sayan Mukherjee ,&nbsp;Souvik Roy","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We introduce the notion of regularized Bayesian best response (RBBR) learning dynamic in heterogeneous population games. We obtain such a dynamic via perturbation by an arbitrary lower semicontinuous, strongly convex regularizer in Bayesian population games with finitely many strategies. We provide a sufficient condition for the existence of rest points of the RBBR learning dynamic, and hence the existence of regularized Bayesian equilibrium in Bayesian population games. These equilibria are shown to approximate the Bayesian equilibria of the game for vanishingly small regularizations. We also explore the fundamental properties of the RBBR learning dynamic, which includes the existence of unique solutions from arbitrary initial conditions, as well as the continuity of the solution trajectories thus obtained with respect to the initial conditions. Finally, as applications to the above theory, we introduce the notions of Bayesian potential and Bayesian negative semidefinite games and provide convergence results for such games.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"149 ","pages":"Pages 1-31"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142700918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Seemingly baseless discrimination 看似毫无根据的歧视
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-11-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.003
Maciej Dudek
{"title":"Seemingly baseless discrimination","authors":"Maciej Dudek","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We show that rational profit maximizing firms can find it optimal to wage discriminate against females even though females and males are identical in all respects. Specifically, we argue that a pay gap can emerge naturally as discrimination against females, in the first place, can endogenously affect the elasticity of labor supply and can make the supply of labor of males less elastic and the supply of labor of females more elastic. Furthermore, we note that once this endogenous change in elasticity emerges it in fact makes discrimination optimal and allows discrimination to materialize in equilibrium. Moreover, we show that discrimination against females is detrimental to the overall welfare and in addition it negatively affects wages of males. Consequently, we argue that an equal pay mandate would benefit both genders as in our model there is no tension between females and males, but there is an endogenous extraction of surplus from workers by employers. The key mechanism described in the paper extends naturally to the product markets and can serve as rationalization of the prevalent pink-tax.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"149 ","pages":"Pages 43-55"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142700910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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