与人工智能一起工作：对合理集成的分析

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-07-09 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.009

David Lagziel, Yevgeny Tsodikovich

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引用次数: 0

摘要

决策者（DM）使用人工智能代理来估计未知状态，两者都具有信息私有信号。在国家和DM最终评估的条件下，他宁愿人工智能的建议是不正确的，从而肯定自己的优势或分担责任。我们的分析表明，该过程的正确性不是参与者专业水平的单调函数：(i)不太准确的人工智能可能通过减少决策制定者对它的依赖而改善结果，（ii）不太准确的决策制定者可以增强信息聚合，从而获得更好的结果。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Working with AI: An analysis for rational integration

A decision maker (DM) uses an AI agent to estimate an unknown state, for which both possess informative private signals. Conditional on the state and the DM's final assessment, he prefers the AI's recommendations to be incorrect, thus affirming his own superiority or sharing the blame. Our analysis indicates that the correctness of the process is not a monotone function of participants' expertise levels: (i) a less accurate AI may lead to improved outcomes by reducing the DM's reliance on it, and (ii) a less accurate DM can enhance information aggregation leading to a superior result.

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来源期刊

Games and Economic Behavior ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

9.10%

发文量

148

期刊介绍： Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology