向知情的卖方提供数据

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-06-11 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.002

Shota Ichihashi , Alex Smolin

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引用次数: 0

摘要

垄断卖方私下不完全了解买方对产品的价值。设计师可以向卖家提供额外的信息，卖家利用这些信息对买家进行价格歧视。我们证明了筛选卖方信息的困难：当买方的价值是二元的时候，除非向所有类型的卖方提供相同的信息，否则无法实现买方剩余和卖方利润的组合。我们用这个结果来描述一系列可实施的福利结果，并证明了买方剩余和效率之间的权衡。

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Data provision to an informed seller

A monopoly seller is privately and imperfectly informed about the buyer's value of the product. A designer can provide the seller with additional information, which the seller uses to price discriminate the buyer. We demonstrate the difficulty of screening the seller's information: When the buyer's value is binary, no combination of buyer surplus and seller profit can be implemented other than those achieved by providing the same information to all seller types. We use the result to characterize the set of implementable welfare outcomes and demonstrate the trade-off between buyer surplus and efficiency.

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来源期刊

Games and Economic Behavior ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

9.10%

发文量

148

期刊介绍： Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology