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Condorcet-consistent choice among three candidates 孔多塞，三个候选人中的一致选择
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-06-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.005
Felix Brandt , Chris Dong , Dominik Peters
{"title":"Condorcet-consistent choice among three candidates","authors":"Felix Brandt ,&nbsp;Chris Dong ,&nbsp;Dominik Peters","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A voting rule is a Condorcet extension if it returns a candidate that beats every other candidate in pairwise majority comparisons whenever one exists. Condorcet extensions have faced criticism due to their susceptibility to variable-electorate paradoxes, especially the reinforcement paradox (<span><span>Young and Levenglick, 1978</span></span>) and the no-show paradox (<span><span>Moulin, 1988b</span></span>). In this paper, we investigate the susceptibility of Condorcet extensions to these paradoxes for the case of exactly three candidates. For the reinforcement paradox, we establish that it must occur for every Condorcet extension when there are <em>at least eight</em> voters and demonstrate that certain refinements of maximin—a voting rule originally proposed by <span><span>Condorcet (1785)</span></span>—are immune to this paradox when there <em>are at most seven</em> voters. For the no-show paradox, we prove that the <em>only</em> homogeneous Condorcet extensions immune to it are refinements of maximin. We also provide axiomatic characterizations of maximin and two of its refinements, Nanson's rule and leximin, highlighting their suitability for three-candidate elections.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 113-130"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144263719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
“Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: Beneficence cannot be extorted” - Comment “自愿最后通牒博弈中的均衡博弈：仁慈不能被勒索”-评论
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-05-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.009
Austin Brooksby , Jacob Meyer , Lucas Rentschler , Vernon Smith , Robbie Spofford
{"title":"“Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: Beneficence cannot be extorted” - Comment","authors":"Austin Brooksby ,&nbsp;Jacob Meyer ,&nbsp;Lucas Rentschler ,&nbsp;Vernon Smith ,&nbsp;Robbie Spofford","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.009","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.009","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div><span><span>Smith and Wilson (2018)</span></span> argue that behavior in the ultimatum game may be due to the typical implementation, in which players are not given the opportunity to opt out of the game. Using insights from <span><span>Smith (1759)</span></span>, they suggest that making play voluntary would increase rates of equilibrium play. They conducted an augmented ultimatum game where the responder first decides whether to participate, and compare their experimental data to stylized facts from the literature, reporting “far higher rates of equilibrium play...than heretofore reported”. However, they do not run standard versions of the ultimatum game as a control. To ensure their interpretation is warranted, we conducted experiments of both their augmented game and an analogous standard ultimatum game. In our data, rates of equilibrium play were not higher in the augmented game. Thus, we find no support for the primary conclusion of <span><span>Smith and Wilson (2018)</span></span>.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 67-93"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144254384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
No trade under verifiable information 在可核实的信息下不进行贸易
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-05-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.007
Spyros Galanis
{"title":"No trade under verifiable information","authors":"Spyros Galanis","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>No trade theorems examine conditions under which agents cannot agree to disagree on the value of a security which pays according to some state of nature, thus preventing any mutual agreement to trade. A large literature has examined conditions which imply no trade, such as relaxing the common prior and common knowledge assumptions, as well as allowing for agents who are boundedly rational or ambiguity averse. We contribute to this literature by examining conditions on the private information of agents that reveals, or verifies, the true value of the security. We argue that these conditions can offer insights in three different settings: insider trading, the connection of low liquidity in markets with no trade, and trading using public blockchains and oracles.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 1-9"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144222433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimizing successive incentives: Rewarding the past or motivating the future? 优化连续激励：奖励过去还是激励未来？
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-05-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.006
Jens Gudmundsson , Jens Leth Hougaard , Juan D. Moreno-Ternero , Lars Peter Østerdal
{"title":"Optimizing successive incentives: Rewarding the past or motivating the future?","authors":"Jens Gudmundsson ,&nbsp;Jens Leth Hougaard ,&nbsp;Juan D. Moreno-Ternero ,&nbsp;Lars Peter Østerdal","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study sequential processes where agents create value through costly and uncertain investments, with success triggering further investment decisions by others. Our paper focuses on designing optimal allocation rules that distribute the total value generated among agents, balancing the recognition of past contributions with incentives for future investments. We prove the existence of equilibrium in the game induced by any such rule and identify a unique investment profile that maximizes the overall expected welfare in the sequential process. This profile can be supported in equilibrium by a simple rule. Additionally, we show that there is a unique investment profile maximizing the initiator's expected payoff and provide a method for the initiator to design a rule supporting it. We extend the model to scenarios where agents' investments are constrained by the value generated within the process. Our findings demonstrate that relatively simple reward structures that prioritize short-term incentives can effectively achieve long-term systemic goals.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 10-29"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144241154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bargaining with binary private information 用二进制私有信息讨价还价
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-05-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.008
Francesc Dilmé
{"title":"Bargaining with binary private information","authors":"Francesc Dilmé","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines bargaining between a seller and a buyer with a binary private valuation. The seller offers a price to the buyer in each period. We explicitly construct the complete equilibrium set via an induction argument both for the finite and infinite horizon cases. When the horizon is finite and the probability of a high buyer valuation is large, the seller consistently charges a high price, resulting in trade bursts at the outset and deadline, with constant trade rates in between. We also show that the seller may be worse off when the low buyer's valuation increases and that the buyer may be better off when the seller has commitment than when not. We relate our results to previous findings on bargaining with two-sided offers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"152 ","pages":"Pages 423-442"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144169231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A taste for variety 对变化的喜好
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-05-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.003
Galit Ashkenazi-Golan , Dominik Karos , Ehud Lehrer
{"title":"A taste for variety","authors":"Galit Ashkenazi-Golan ,&nbsp;Dominik Karos ,&nbsp;Ehud Lehrer","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A decision maker repeatedly chooses one of a finite set of actions. In each period, the decision maker's payoff depends on a fixed basic payoff of the chosen action and the frequency with which the action has been chosen in the past. We analyze optimal strategies associated with three types of evaluations of infinite payoffs: discounted present value, the limit inferior, and the limit superior of the partial averages. We show that when the first two are the evaluation schemes (and the discount factor is sufficiently high), a stationary strategy can achieve the best possible outcome. However, for the latter evaluation scheme, a stationary strategy can achieve the best outcome only if all actions that are chosen with strictly positive frequency by an optimal stationary strategy have the same basic payoff.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"152 ","pages":"Pages 396-422"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144106975","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The matching problem with linear transfers is equivalent to a hide-and-seek game 线性转移的匹配问题相当于一个捉迷藏的游戏
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-05-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.004
A. Galichon , A. Jacquet
{"title":"The matching problem with linear transfers is equivalent to a hide-and-seek game","authors":"A. Galichon ,&nbsp;A. Jacquet","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Matching problems with linearly transferable utility (LTU) generalize the well-studied transferable utility (TU) case by relaxing the assumption that utility is transferred one-for-one within matched pairs. We show that LTU matching problems can be reframed as nonzero-sum hide-and-seek games between two players, thus generalizing a result from <span><span>von Neumann</span></span>. The underlying linear programming structure of TU matching problems, however, is lost when moving to LTU. These results draw a new bridge between non-TU matching problems and the theory of bimatrix games, with consequences notably regarding the computation of stable outcomes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"152 ","pages":"Pages 333-344"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144069877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Upstream reciprocity in the battle of good vs evil 善恶之战中的上游互惠
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-05-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.013
Luis Avalos-Trujillo
{"title":"Upstream reciprocity in the battle of good vs evil","authors":"Luis Avalos-Trujillo","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.013","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.013","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Upstream reciprocity, known colloquially as “pay-it-forward”, is reciprocating an act of kindness to an unrelated third party. “Negative upstream reciprocity” means reciprocating an unkind act to an unrelated third party. The present research proposes an experimental test of upstream reciprocity and contrast between its two forms. Survey questions on trust and gratitude complement the study. Results show evidence of positive upstream reciprocity but against its negative counterpart. Subjects pay forward even after being helped by a computer, indicating that the effect is self-referential. Results extend psychological theories of gratitude by showing that gratitude functions as a “buffer” or “regulator” against the impact of help or harm in social interactions. Results align with the social interaction principles described by Adam Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, informing our understanding of the observed behavior.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"152 ","pages":"Pages 371-395"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144069879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Endogenous limits on veto power in dynamic bargaining 动态议价中否决权的内生限制
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-05-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.014
Ravideep Sethi , Ewout Verriest
{"title":"Endogenous limits on veto power in dynamic bargaining","authors":"Ravideep Sethi ,&nbsp;Ewout Verriest","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.014","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.014","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider an infinitely repeated legislative bargaining model with a dynamically evolving status quo. Three players, one of whom is permanently endowed with veto power, must split a fixed budget in each period. Despite her additional power, the veto player cannot always asymptotically extract the full surplus. The non-veto players endogenously prevent each other's expropriation when they are patient and have high initial allocations in the unique stationary, symmetric, stage-undominated, coalition-proof Markov perfect equilibrium. Further, we show that veto power and higher recognition probability may be strategic substitutes rather than complements. We also provide an intuition behind selfish egalitarianism between non-veto players. Our technique of employing coalition-proofness and iteratively generating a new equilibrium with novel predictions sheds light on the divergence in recent literature on the value of veto power and may be useful in other environments.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"152 ","pages":"Pages 345-370"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144069878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The motivated memory of noise 对噪音的记忆
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-05-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.011
Jeanne Hagenbach , Nicolas Jacquemet , Philipp Sternal
{"title":"The motivated memory of noise","authors":"Jeanne Hagenbach ,&nbsp;Nicolas Jacquemet ,&nbsp;Philipp Sternal","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.011","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.011","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a two-stage experiment in which people receive feedback about their relative intelligence. This feedback is a noisy message reminded at every stage, so that subjects cannot forget this ego-relevant information. Instead, we exogenously vary whether the informativeness of the message is reminded in the second stage. We investigate how this treatment variation affects the informativeness reported by subjects, and their posterior beliefs about their intelligence. We show that subjects report informativeness in a self-serving way: subjects with negative messages report that these messages are significantly less informative in the absence of reminder than with it. We also show that the lack of reminder about message informativeness allows subjects to keep a better image of themselves. These results are confirmed by complementary treatments in which we decrease messages informativeness: subjects tend to inflate the informativeness of positive messages that should now be interpreted as bad news.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"152 ","pages":"Pages 257-275"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143942277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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