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Conditional cooperation under uncertainty: The social description-experience gap 不确定条件下的合作：社会描述-经验差距
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-05-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.012
Orestis Kopsacheilis , Dennie van Dolder , Ozan Isler
{"title":"Conditional cooperation under uncertainty: The social description-experience gap","authors":"Orestis Kopsacheilis ,&nbsp;Dennie van Dolder ,&nbsp;Ozan Isler","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.012","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.012","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Conditional cooperation is typically studied in experimental settings where the behavior of others is known to subjects. In this study, we examine conditional cooperation under uncertainty. Using a novel experimental design, we exogenously manipulate the likelihood that a subject's partner in a Prisoner's Dilemma will cooperate. Information about the partner's cooperation is either presented descriptively or learned through experiential sampling. We observe a description-experience gap: subjects are more likely to cooperate under experience than under description when their partner's probability of cooperation is low, while the opposite holds when it is 50% or higher. This result contrasts with expectations deriving from the individual choice literature, where rare events are typically underweighted in experience-based decisions. We find that the gap we observe is driven by conditional cooperators being less responsive to social information acquired experientially than to that acquired descriptively. Furthermore, we show that stronger priors held by subjects under social uncertainty compared to individual uncertainty can account for the disparity with the individual choice literature.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"152 ","pages":"Pages 241-256"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143922740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Core thresholds of symmetric majority voting games 对称多数投票博弈的核心阈值
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-05-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.009
Takaaki Abe
{"title":"Core thresholds of symmetric majority voting games","authors":"Takaaki Abe","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.009","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.009","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider a committee that consists of n members with one person one vote approving a proposal if the number of affirmative votes from the members reaches threshold k. Which threshold k between 1 and n is “stable” for the committee? We suppose that if a new threshold k' proposed by some committee members obtains k or more affirmative votes, then the new threshold replaces the current one. Assuming that each member has preferences for the set of possible thresholds, we analyze which threshold meets the stability requirements of the core and stable sets. In addition, based on our stability study, we argue that a committee needs to employ two distinct thresholds: one for ordinary issues and another just for threshold changes. To embody this idea, we propose a method, called the constant threshold method, and show that our method always generates a nonempty refinement of the core. We also provide an axiomatic characterization of our method.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"152 ","pages":"Pages 199-215"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143912900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Borda rule and arrow's independence condition in finite societies 有限社会中的Borda法则与arrow独立条件
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-04-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.008
Guy Barokas , Shmuel Nitzan
{"title":"Borda rule and arrow's independence condition in finite societies","authors":"Guy Barokas ,&nbsp;Shmuel Nitzan","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In his refined characterization of the Borda rule, Maskin (2025; forthcoming in the <em>Journal of Political Economy</em>) significantly employs the assumption of a continuum of voters. He concludes by posing an important open question about the possible extension of the characterization result to the case of finitely many voters. This note provides a positive response to this question, based on a novel axiom that conveys the normative appeal of continuity when applied to a discrete setting, namely, that the social rule is not overly sensitive to a small change in voters' preferences.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"152 ","pages":"Pages 175-180"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143868550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Polarizing persuasion 偏振说服
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-04-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.007
Axel Anderson , Nikoloz Pkhakadze
{"title":"Polarizing persuasion","authors":"Axel Anderson ,&nbsp;Nikoloz Pkhakadze","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We introduce an equilibrium model of polarizing communication between a sender and two receivers. The sender's payoff is a function of the receivers' beliefs on a binary payoff relevant variable. All agents share a common prior about this variable. But we assume disagreement about a second binary variable, which enters no utility functions. We characterize the joint distribution of receiver posterior beliefs on the payoff relevant variable that can be implemented. An immediate consequence of this characterization is that the sender's payoff is non-decreasing in the prior disagreement between the two receivers. We measure <em>polarization</em> as the sender's expectation of the absolute difference between the receivers' posterior beliefs on the payoff relevant variable, and solve for the maximum polarization across all message services. Given extreme prior disagreement between the receivers, we solve for the optimal message service when the sender has monotone payoffs that are bi-concave or bi-convex.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"152 ","pages":"Pages 181-198"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143868551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Lying in persuasion 谎言说服
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-04-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.006
Zhaotian Luo , Arturas Rozenas
{"title":"Lying in persuasion","authors":"Zhaotian Luo ,&nbsp;Arturas Rozenas","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study how the speaker acquires information when they can misrepresent it in communication with the audience. In a binary action setup, we characterize the speaker's optimal information design and the parametric conditions under which the acquired information is disclosed truthfully. When the players' preferences are sufficiently misaligned, the speaker uses the same information structure as when they could not lie, and they communicate that information truthfully. By contrast, when the players' preferences are sufficiently aligned, the speaker chooses a different information structure that generates more persuasive beliefs and induces lying in equilibrium. The speaker's loss of welfare due to the lack of commitment power is more pronounced when lies are harder to detect.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"152 ","pages":"Pages 93-112"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143845307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Democratic regulation of AI in the workplace 对工作场所的人工智能进行民主监管
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-04-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.004
Jaideep Roy , Bibhas Saha
{"title":"Democratic regulation of AI in the workplace","authors":"Jaideep Roy ,&nbsp;Bibhas Saha","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>When artificial intelligence (AI) displaces lower-skilled workers with higher intensity, electoral democracies may slow down automation in fear of unemployment and voter resentment. Using a Downsian model of elections where parties promise to limit automation and redistribute automation surplus, we show that when automation is highly productive democracies implement maximum automation, making all workers vulnerable to redundancy and distribute the entire surplus among the working population. Majority of the workers are gainers in the sense that their expected earnings exceed their (pre-automation) wage. When the automation surplus is low, democracies restrict automation and protect the high-skilled workers (including the median-skilled worker) but redistribute nothing to the vulnerable workers. Here, because of no compensation for redundancy all vulnerable workers become losers as their expected earnings fall below their basic wage. For highly productive automation, democracies achieve the first best worker welfare but otherwise may over- or under-provide automation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"152 ","pages":"Pages 113-132"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143855972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal grading contests 最优评分竞赛
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-04-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.005
Sumit Goel
{"title":"Optimal grading contests","authors":"Sumit Goel","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the design of effort-maximizing grading schemes between agents with private abilities. Assuming agents derive value from the information their grade reveals about their ability, we find that more informative grading schemes induce more competitive contests, i.e., contests with greater inequality across prizes. In the contest framework, we investigate the effect of manipulating individual prizes and increasing competition on expected effort, identifying conditions on ability distributions and cost functions under which these transformations may encourage or discourage effort. Our results suggest that more informative grading schemes encourage effort when agents of moderate ability are highly likely, and discourage effort when such agents are unlikely.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"152 ","pages":"Pages 133-149"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143859759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Social image, observer identity, and crowding up 社会形象，观察者身份，和拥挤
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-04-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.003
Yamit Asulin , Yuval Heller , Nira Munichor , Ro'i Zultan
{"title":"Social image, observer identity, and crowding up","authors":"Yamit Asulin ,&nbsp;Yuval Heller ,&nbsp;Nira Munichor ,&nbsp;Ro'i Zultan","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>People behave more pro-socially when observed by others. We develop a theoretical model incorporating social distance between agent and observer and test its predictions in a field experiment with 670 high-school students. The experiment manipulated the observer's identity (friend, acquaintance, or none) and capped personal rewards. Observability increased effort, and personal rewards enhanced above-threshold effort when effort was observable. Among young adolescents, these effects were stronger when observed by an acquaintance rather than a friend. While partly exploratory, our findings suggest a positive correlation between social distance and social-image effects.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"152 ","pages":"Pages 37-54"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143825325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Lone wolves just got lonelier 孤狼只会变得更孤独
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-04-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.010
Esteban Peralta
{"title":"Lone wolves just got lonelier","authors":"Esteban Peralta","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.010","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.010","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper shows that, within familiar environments with transferable utilities, the set of unmatched agents is the same across all allocations that are stable in markets with one-sided incomplete information. The result does not hold in markets without transfers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"152 ","pages":"Pages 55-61"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143834634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Network stability under limited foresight 有限预见下的网络稳定性
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-04-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.002
P. Jean-Jacques Herings , Abhimanyu Khan
{"title":"Network stability under limited foresight","authors":"P. Jean-Jacques Herings ,&nbsp;Abhimanyu Khan","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a decision-theoretic and cognitive-hierarchy based notion of network stability by examining the decision-making nodes' incentives to change the structure of a network by establishing/dissolving links in between them. While evaluating the desirability of initiating such changes, each node internalizes, to the extent of its limited foresight, the effect of further changes that may be induced thereafter. The nodes may exhibit heterogeneity in their level of foresight, and coalitions of nodes may collectively alter the network structure. We define a limited foresight stable set as our stability concept. The primary characteristic of this set, which always exists and is unique, is that the process of link additions/deletions always leads to networks in this set. This set may vary with both the extent and heterogeneity of the nodes' foresight, and with the possibility of coalitional deviations – so, we present “tight” sufficient conditions under which this set is independent of these considerations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"152 ","pages":"Pages 62-92"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143837996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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