{"title":"Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this paper we consider stable matchings subject to assignment constraints. These are matchings that require certain assigned pairs to be included, insist that some other assigned pairs are not, and, importantly, are stable. Our main contribution is an algorithm, based on the iterated deletion of unattractive alternatives (<span><span>Balinski and Ratier, 1997</span></span>; <span><span>Gutin et al., 2023</span></span>), that determines if and when a given list of constraints is compatible with stability. Whenever there is a stable matching that satisfies the constraints, our algorithm outputs all of them (each in polynomial time per solution). This provides market designers with (i) a tool to test the feasibility of stable matchings subject to assignment constraints, and (ii) a tool to implement them when feasible.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142424224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cheap talk with two-sided private information","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies how the transmission of information from a biased expert to a decision maker is affected when the latter has access to an unbiased symmetric private signal. The extra information has two distinct effects on the expert's incentives to communicate. First, there is an <em>information effect</em> that allows the decision maker to choose a better action on expectation. This reduces the implicit cost of transmitting coarse messages and hence hampers communication. Second, there is a <em>risk effect</em> that arises because the extra information introduces uncertainty to the expert. For risk averse experts, this effect increases the cost of sending coarse messages and hence favours communication. I show that the information effect dominates the risk effect, and for any symmetric signal structure there are always sufficiently biased experts for which communication is no longer possible in equilibrium. Moreover, for any bias of the expert, no communication is possible if the signal structure is sufficiently precise. For the uniform signal structure I show that communication decreases with the precision of the signal. Finally, I provide non degenerate examples for which the decision maker's private information cannot make up for the loss of communication implying that the welfare of both agents decreases.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001337/pdfft?md5=88cffbae938e2d6268cfc7bbad689c4f&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624001337-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142257447","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off?","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.012","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.012","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A classic trade-off that school districts face when deciding which matching algorithm to use is that it is not possible to always respect both priorities and preferences. The student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) respects priorities but can lead to inefficient allocations. We identify a new condition on school choice markets under which DA is efficient. Our condition generalizes earlier conditions by placing restrictions on how preferences and priorities relate to one another only on the parts that are relevant for the assignment. Whenever there is a unique allocation that respects priorities, our condition captures all the environments for which DA is efficient. We show through stylized examples and simulations that our condition significantly expands the range of known environments for which DA is efficient. We also discuss how our condition sheds light on existing empirical findings.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142257448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reselling information","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.015","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.015","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Information can be simultaneously consumed, replicated, and sold to others. We study how resale affects a decentralized market for information. Even if the initial seller is an informational monopolist, she captures non-trivial rents from at most a single buyer in any Markovian equilibrium: in the frequent-offer limit, her payoffs converge to 0 once a single buyer buys information. By contrast, there exists a non-Markovian “prepay equilibrium” where payment is extracted from most buyers before information is sold. This prepay equilibrium exploits buyers' ability to resell information and results in the seller achieving (approximately) the same payoff that she would were resale prohibited.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142163348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.014","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.014","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Given a standard myopic process in a coalition formation game, an absorbing set is a minimal collection of coalition structures that is never left once entered through this process. Absorbing sets are an important solution concept in coalition formation games, but they have drawbacks: they can be large and hard to obtain. In this paper, we characterize an absorbing set in terms of a collection consisting of a small number of sets of coalitions that we refer to as a “reduced form” of a game. We apply our characterization to study convergence to stability in several economic environments.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142163347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Measuring socially appropriate social preferences","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper extends the literature on structural estimation of social preferences to account for the desire to adhere to social norms and hide one's true intentions via moral wiggle room. We conduct an experiment to test whether accounting for normatively appropriate behavior allows us to distinguish between preference types who care about outcomes versus adhering to social norms and whether the introduction of moral wiggle room undermines the stability of social preference estimates. We find that social preference estimates are remarkably robust to the inclusion of moral wiggle room. However, the representative agent is strongly motivated by norms and failing to account for this motive in our model causes us to overestimate how much agents care about helping those who are worse off. Using finite mixture models to endogenously identify latent preference types, we replicate previous work finding that the majority of subjects can be classified as strong or moderate altruists when normative concerns are not considered. Accounting for the normative appropriateness of decisions when categorizing participants, however, reveals different motives across types: strong altruists are only marginally concerned with norms while the moderate altruists are highly sensitive to them and, once norms are taken into account, don't care at all about the outcomes of others. Our results thus recast the prior findings in a new light. Rather than the two most common types being strong altruists and moderate altruists, we find that they are better described as strong altruists and norm followers.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142129010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A note on motivated cognition and discriminatory beliefs","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this note, we provide evidence that motivated reasoning can be a source of discriminatory beliefs. We employ a representative survey experiment in which we exogenously manipulate the presence of a need for justification of anti-social behavior towards an out-group. We find that survey participants devalue members of an out-group to justify taking away money from that group. Our results speak to a long-standing debate on the causes of racism and discrimination and suggest an important role of motivated cognition.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142163856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Stability and substitutability in multi-period matching markets","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.013","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.013","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We analyze a multi-period matching market where matching between agents is decided for each time period. To analyze this situation, we embed the situation into the framework of many-to-many matching with contracts where the contract includes the time period at which the matching occurs. While a general stability concept is already defined for the matching with contracts framework, in a multi-period matching model, a stable outcome may not exist when contracts exhibit complementarities across time periods. Thus, we define a weaker stability concept called temporal stability by taking into account the dynamic nature of the model. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a temporally stable outcome, including a corresponding substitutability condition, ordered substitutability, for the multi-period matching model.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001180/pdfft?md5=28f8b4a22e95aa0f981637e8d0b29ffb&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624001180-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142136509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Skewness preferences: Evidence from online poker","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We test for skewness preferences in a large set of observational panel data on online poker games (n=4,450,585). Each observation refers to a choice between a safe option and a binary risk of winning or losing the game. Our setting offers a real-world choice situation with substantial incentives where probability distributions are simple, transparent, and known to the decision-makers. Individuals reveal a strong and robust preference for skewness, which is inconsistent with expected utility theory. The effect of skewness is most pronounced among experienced and unsuccessful players but remains significant in all subsamples that we investigate, in contrast to the effect of variance.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001131/pdfft?md5=195005fd947216177416abd0a7510f94&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624001131-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142099238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: Signaling under behavioral diversity","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We introduce behavioral diversity to an otherwise standard signaling model, in which a fraction of agents choose their signaling actions according to an exogenous distribution. These behavioral agents provide opportunities for strategic low-type agents to successfully emulate higher types in equilibrium, which in turn reduces the cost for strategic high-type agents to separate from lower types. Behavioral diversity thus improves the equilibrium payoffs to all types of strategic agents. The model also exhibits a convergence property, which is intuitively more appealing than the least-cost separating equilibrium of the standard setting.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001106/pdfft?md5=d909ebbd2819e0652be04645a1ef8ed9&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624001106-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142099242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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