在可核实的信息下不进行贸易

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-05-30 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.007

Spyros Galanis

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引用次数: 0

摘要

没有任何交易定理考察在何种条件下，代理人不能就根据某种自然状态支付的证券的价值达成一致意见，从而阻止任何相互交易协议。大量的文献研究了没有交易的条件，比如放宽共同先验和共同知识假设，以及允许有限理性或模糊厌恶的代理人。我们通过研究揭示或验证安全的真实价值的代理的私有信息的条件来贡献这一文献。我们认为，这些条件可以在三种不同的环境中提供见解：内幕交易，没有交易的市场中低流动性的联系，以及使用公共区块链和神谕进行交易。

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No trade under verifiable information

No trade theorems examine conditions under which agents cannot agree to disagree on the value of a security which pays according to some state of nature, thus preventing any mutual agreement to trade. A large literature has examined conditions which imply no trade, such as relaxing the common prior and common knowledge assumptions, as well as allowing for agents who are boundedly rational or ambiguity averse. We contribute to this literature by examining conditions on the private information of agents that reveals, or verifies, the true value of the security. We argue that these conditions can offer insights in three different settings: insider trading, the connection of low liquidity in markets with no trade, and trading using public blockchains and oracles.

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来源期刊

Games and Economic Behavior ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

9.10%

发文量

148

期刊介绍： Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology