Watchdog versus yes man: News source and media competition

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-07-02 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.007

Daiki Kishishita , Susumu Sato

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Watchdog journalism, the idea that independent media outlets monitor people in power, can be undermined when the people in power serve as news sources on which the media rely. By developing a model of media competition with a strategic news source, we show that the presence of a news source creates pro-source biases; the coexistence of neutral watchdogs and biased yes men arises as an outcome of mixed strategy equilibrium. This bias can make the presence of a news source harmful to consumers.

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看门狗与唯唯诺诺者：新闻来源与媒体竞争

如果权力人士成为媒体所依赖的新闻来源，独立媒体监督权力人士的“监督新闻”就会遭到破坏。通过开发具有战略新闻来源的媒体竞争模型，我们表明新闻来源的存在会产生亲源偏见；中立的监督者和有偏见的应声者共存是混合战略均衡的结果。这种偏见会使新闻来源的存在对消费者有害。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Games and Economic Behavior ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

9.10%

发文量

148

期刊介绍： Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology