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Information unraveling and limited depth of reasoning 信息不清晰，推理深度有限
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.004
Volker Benndorf , Dorothea Kübler , Hans-Theo Normann
{"title":"Information unraveling and limited depth of reasoning","authors":"Volker Benndorf ,&nbsp;Dorothea Kübler ,&nbsp;Hans-Theo Normann","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Information unraveling is an elegant theoretical argument suggesting that private information is voluntarily and fully revealed in many circumstances. However, the experimental literature has documented many cases of incomplete unraveling and has suggested limited depth of reasoning on the part of senders as a behavioral explanation. To test this explanation, we modify the design of existing unraveling games along two dimensions. In contrast to the baseline setting with simultaneous moves, we introduce a variant where decision-making is essentially sequential. Second, we vary the cost of disclosure, resulting in a 2×2 treatment design. Both sequential decision-making and low disclosure costs are suitable for reducing the demands on subjects' level-<em>k</em> reasoning. The data confirm that sequential decision-making and low disclosure costs lead to more disclosure, and there is virtually full disclosure in the treatment that combines both. A calibrated level-<em>k</em> model makes quantitative predictions, including precise treatment level and player-specific revelation rates, and these predictions organize the data well. The timing of decisions provides further insights into the treatment-specific unraveling process.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 267-284"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145266858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Markovian persuasion with stochastic revelations 随机启示的马尔可夫说服
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.014
Ehud Lehrer , Dimitry Shaiderman
{"title":"Markovian persuasion with stochastic revelations","authors":"Ehud Lehrer ,&nbsp;Dimitry Shaiderman","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.014","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.014","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines information transmission games where the sender knows the realizations of states from a Markov process, but his informational advantage is counteracted by outside, random revelations to the receiver. For very patient players, we characterize the sender's value of the game with outside revelations in terms of the value without outside revelations. Through our characterization, we identify that, in contrast with the sender-receiver games with fixed states, the sender may benefit from being patient: his discounted value of the game may increase as the discount factor grows.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 411-439"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145266865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Stochastic adaptive learning with committed players in games with strict Nash equilibria 严格纳什均衡博弈中有承诺参与者的随机自适应学习
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.011
Naoki Funai
{"title":"Stochastic adaptive learning with committed players in games with strict Nash equilibria","authors":"Naoki Funai","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.011","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.011","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate the convergence properties of an adaptive learning model that overlaps those of stochastic fictitious play learning and experience-weighted attraction learning in normal form games with strict Nash equilibria. In particular, we consider the case in which adaptive players play a game against not only other adaptive players but also committed players, who do not revise their behaviour but follow a fixed (strict Nash equilibrium or corresponding logit quantal response equilibrium) action. We then provide conditions under which the adaptive learning process, the choice probability profile of adaptive players, almost surely converges to the logit quantal response equilibrium that committed players follow. We also provide conditions under which the adaptive learning process of a more general adaptive learning model which overlaps those of payoff assessment learning and delta learning converges to a logit quantal response equilibrium different from the equilibrium that committed players follow with positive probability.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 351-376"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145266862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A concavity in the value of information 信息价值的凹凸性
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.003
Mark Whitmeyer
{"title":"A concavity in the value of information","authors":"Mark Whitmeyer","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A natural way of quantifying the “amount of information” in decision problems yields a globally concave value for information. Another (in contrast, adversarial) way almost never does.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 200-207"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145119424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ambiguous persuasion: An ex-ante formulation 模棱两可的说服：事前提法
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.017
Xiaoyu Cheng
{"title":"Ambiguous persuasion: An ex-ante formulation","authors":"Xiaoyu Cheng","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.017","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.017","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Consider a persuasion game where both the sender and receiver are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (MEU) preferences and the sender can choose an ambiguous information structure. This paper analyzes the game in an ex-ante formulation: the sender first commits to an information structure, and then the receiver best responds by choosing an ex-ante message-contingent action plan. Under this formulation, I show it is never strictly beneficial for the sender to use an ambiguous information structure as opposed to a standard unambiguous one. This result is robust to (i) the players having heterogeneous beliefs over the states, and/or (ii) the receiver having non-MEU, uncertainty-averse preferences. However, it is <em>not</em> robust to the sender having non-MEU preferences.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 149-158"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145061045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Non-isolation, reversals, and social preference 非孤立、逆转和社会偏好
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.016
Paul H.Y. Cheung , Keaton Ellis
{"title":"Non-isolation, reversals, and social preference","authors":"Paul H.Y. Cheung ,&nbsp;Keaton Ellis","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.016","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.016","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Recent evidence suggests that non-isolation behavior could significantly impact laboratory experiments using the random problem selection (RPS) payment mechanism through <em>lottery integration</em>. Theoretical work also highlights social preferences that can violate statewise monotonicity, a necessary and sufficient condition for incentive compatibility with the RPS payment mechanism in case of lottery integration. Additionally, non-isolation can influence decisions through non-consequential dynamic concerns. In a series of three simple and parsimonious experiments and three tests, we examine the occurrence of the two kinds of non-isolation and reversal behaviors. We find significant evidence for <em>positive reversal</em> behavior, where subjects are more likely to make a fair choice if there is an alternative possible realization of an unfair outcome (which they chose themselves). In addition, the lower bounds for the prevalence of non-isolation in terms of lottery integration and dynamic non-consequential concern are estimated to be approximately 10% and 20%, respectively.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 159-174"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145097108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Unfounded opinion's curse 毫无根据的观点的诅咒
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.012
King King Li , Toru Suzuki
{"title":"Unfounded opinion's curse","authors":"King King Li ,&nbsp;Toru Suzuki","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.012","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.012","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the role of uninformed agents in information aggregation. A group of agents, who may or may not have private information about the state, communicate through a specific communication format and vote to make the correct decision—one that matches an unobservable state—based on majority rule. We analyzed efficient equilibria under simultaneous and sequential communication formats and tested these predictions in the laboratory. When all agents were informed, information was aggregated efficiently regardless of the format. However, when some agents were uninformed, the communication format significantly affected information aggregation. Specifically, although the probability of correct group decisions closely aligned with the rational benchmark under sequential communication, it was significantly lower under simultaneous communication, as unfounded opinions undermined information aggregation. We argue that the positive effect of sequential communication can be attributed to the social facilitation effect.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 396-410"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145266864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Robust price discrimination 强烈的价格歧视
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.006
Itai Arieli , Yakov Babichenko , Omer Madmon , Moshe Tennenholtz
{"title":"Robust price discrimination","authors":"Itai Arieli ,&nbsp;Yakov Babichenko ,&nbsp;Omer Madmon ,&nbsp;Moshe Tennenholtz","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider a model of third-degree price discrimination where the seller's product valuation is unknown to the market designer, who aims to maximize buyer surplus by revealing buyer valuation information. Our main result shows that the regret is bounded by a <span><math><mfrac><mrow><mn>1</mn></mrow><mrow><mi>e</mi></mrow></mfrac></math></span>-fraction of the optimal buyer surplus when the seller has zero valuation for the product. This bound is attained by randomly drawing a seller valuation and applying the segmentation of Bergemann et al. (2015) with respect to the drawn valuation. We show that this bound is tight in the case of binary buyer valuation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 377-395"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145266863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Interest group information in elections 选举中的利益集团信息
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.012
Thea How Choon
{"title":"Interest group information in elections","authors":"Thea How Choon","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.012","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.012","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Do interest groups provide information in ways that systematically bias and polarize candidates? I consider a Downsian model where candidates are uncertain about the median voter's preference. Up to two interest groups, completely biased, observe voter preferences in the extremes and send costless messages to candidates. Starting with one interest group, I show all informative equilibria are asymmetric: the interest group “plays favorites” by revealing coarse information to one candidate, causing policy divergence. Informative equilibria exist only if the interest group has sufficiently broad information. With opposing interest groups, this requirement is relaxed. I describe equilibria where each candidate is more sensitive to voter shocks in one tail, leading to policy convergence in the center and divergence in the tails. The presence of interest groups reframes the policy space, demarcating the consensus “moderate” regions from the “extremes”.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 129-148"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145049196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Teams formation: Efficiency and approximate fairness 团队组成：效率和近似公平
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.002
Anna Bogomolnaia , Artem Baklanov , Elizaveta Victorova
{"title":"Teams formation: Efficiency and approximate fairness","authors":"Anna Bogomolnaia ,&nbsp;Artem Baklanov ,&nbsp;Elizaveta Victorova","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A set of <em>kn</em> indivisible items is to be allocated to <em>n</em> agents; each agent has to get exactly <em>k</em> items, and agents have additive utilities over bundles. Can one find an efficient and approximately fair allocation? In this setting, we introduce new notions of approximate fairness, based on exchange of two single objects, and compare them to the “traditional” ones based on disregarding one object.</div><div>Our model and new fairness properties are insensitive to positive affine transformations of utilities, hence, there is no need for a separate treatment of “goods”, “bads”, and “mixed objects”. A famous Round Robin rule fares very well on all fairness accounts, but fails efficiency, while rules based on collective welfare maximization (like Nash or Leximin) cannot guarantee fairness, except on several special sub-domains (two agents, identical valuations, or binary utilities). EFx and PROPx still appear too strong. Traditional notions of approximate fairness do not allow for more positive results either.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 226-245"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145159408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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