发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Games and Economic Behavior最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
The art of concession in General Lotto games 一般乐透游戏中的让步艺术
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.006
Rahul Chandan , Keith Paarporn , Dan Kovenock , Mahnoosh Alizadeh , Jason R. Marden
{"title":"The art of concession in General Lotto games","authors":"Rahul Chandan ,&nbsp;Keith Paarporn ,&nbsp;Dan Kovenock ,&nbsp;Mahnoosh Alizadeh ,&nbsp;Jason R. Marden","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Can intentionally decreasing one’s own competitive abilities provide strategic benefits in adversarial environments? We investigate whether a competitor can gain an advantage by conceding valuable assets to an opponent under a well studied framework known as General Lotto games. While intuition suggests this cannot be done, we demonstrate that concessions do offer strategic benefits when made correctly. We explore concessions in two settings: 1) General Lotto games, which depict 1-vs.-1 adversarial interactions, and 2) coalitional Lotto games, which depict two independent players competing against a common adversary (2-vs.-1) on non-overlapping contests. Our first result shows that conceding budgetary resources cannot be advantageous in either setting. However, we demonstrate that conceding valuable contests can be beneficial in the coalitional setting, characterizing optimal concessions when they exist. When both independent players in the coalitional setting have the option to concede, we characterize the Nash equilibria that emerge in this strategic scenario.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"155 ","pages":"Pages 89-106"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145418871","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information design in the principal-agent problem 委托代理问题中的信息设计
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.003
Yakov Babichenko , Inbal Talgam-Cohen , Haifeng Xu , Konstantin Zabarnyi
{"title":"Information design in the principal-agent problem","authors":"Yakov Babichenko ,&nbsp;Inbal Talgam-Cohen ,&nbsp;Haifeng Xu ,&nbsp;Konstantin Zabarnyi","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study a variant of the principal-agent problem in which the principal does not directly observe the agent's effort outcome; rather, she gets a signal about the agent's action according to a variable information structure designed by a regulator. We consider both the case of a risk-neutral and of a risk-averse agent, focusing mainly on a setting with a limited liability assumption. We provide a clean characterization for implementability of actions and utility profiles by any information structure, which turns out to be simple thresholds on the utilities. We further study naturally-constrained information structures in which the signal emitted from any action is either the action itself or some actions nearby. We show that the worst implementable welfare deteriorates gracefully as the information structure becomes noisier. In a more general class of signaling constraints, we prove that deciding whether a certain action is implementable is NP-complete.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"155 ","pages":"Pages 55-69"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145323180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
BAR Nash equilibrium and application to blockchain design BAR纳什均衡及其在区块链设计中的应用
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.008
Olga Gorelkina , Rida Laraki , Maxime Reynouard
{"title":"BAR Nash equilibrium and application to blockchain design","authors":"Olga Gorelkina ,&nbsp;Rida Laraki ,&nbsp;Maxime Reynouard","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper presents a novel solution concept, called BAR Nash Equilibrium (BARNE) and applies it to the Verifier's Dilemma, a fundamental problem in the design of blockchain consensus. BARNE extends the Nash Equilibrium (NE) to accommodate interactions among Byzantine, altruistic, and rational agents, known as the BAR setting in the distributed computing literature. We prove the existence of BARNE in a broad class of games and introduce two refinements: global stability and local stability. We demonstrate that in the classical quorum-based blockchain protocol, honestly following the prescribed strategy is not a locally stable BARNE, whereas free-riding is a globally stable BARNE. To address this, we designed a more robust protocol with the same classical guarantees, by incorporating fines and forced errors. Under this new protocol, honesty becomes the unique globally stable BARNE, and free-riding is never a BARNE.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 285-301"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145266859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Political salience, endogenous bandwagoning, and regime resilience 政治突出性、内生从众和政权弹性
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.011
Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch , Steffen Huck , Macartan Humphreys
{"title":"Political salience, endogenous bandwagoning, and regime resilience","authors":"Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch ,&nbsp;Steffen Huck ,&nbsp;Macartan Humphreys","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.011","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.011","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We introduce political salience into a canonical model of attacks against political regimes, as scaling agents' expressive payoffs from taking sides. Equilibrium balances heterogeneous expressive motives with incentives to avoid sanctions by “bandwagoning” with the winning side. We examine comparative statics in political salience, which we characterize in terms of equilibrium stability as well as attack size. A main insight is that when regime sanctions are weak, increases in salience can pose the greatest threat to seemingly safe regimes: ever smaller shocks become sufficient to drastically escalate into full-blown attacks, i.e., the regime becomes less resilient. Stronger regime safeguards not only directly reduce incentives to attack but can overturn these effects, such that increases in salience boost regime resilience. Our results speak to charged debates about democratic resilience, by identifying how safeguards determine when a rise in citizen interest in political action can lead to a threat to democracy.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 79-96"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145020701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategic mobilization of voters 策略性动员选民
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.004
Guy Holburn , Davin Raiha
{"title":"Strategic mobilization of voters","authors":"Guy Holburn ,&nbsp;Davin Raiha","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Organized public demonstrations of voter support for policy issues through rallies and petitions are mechanisms by which interest groups sometimes seek to influence political decision-making. We develop a voter-participation model of an interest group's strategic decision to publicly mobilize supportive voters through either a petition with zero participation cost or through a public rally with positive participation cost. Our model shows that voter mobilization can be influential when elected politicians are sufficiently uncertain about two dimensions of voters' preferences, the breadth of support for the issue and the saliency of the issue. The distribution of voter preferences – defined by the numbers of policy supporters and opposers and election vote-switchers and non-switchers – determines whether low or high participation-cost forms of mobilization are optimal. The model's predictions are consistent with recent mobilization campaigns organized by a range of interest groups, such as firms, environmental activists, and racial justice advocates.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 1-15"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145011141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Who gets the credit? Credit attribution, spillovers, and inefficiency in teams 谁得到了荣誉？团队中的信用归因、溢出效应和低效率
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.005
Saltuk Ozerturk , Huseyin Yildirim
{"title":"Who gets the credit? Credit attribution, spillovers, and inefficiency in teams","authors":"Saltuk Ozerturk ,&nbsp;Huseyin Yildirim","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine team incentives in environments with positive spillovers and rewards based on ex-post public credit for collective success. Compared to the ex-ante efficient credit allocation that maximizes the team's overall payoff, ex-post credit distorts individual incentives: higher-ability or lower-cost agents receive excessive credit and overexert effort when spillovers are low, but are under-credited and insufficiently motivated when spillovers are high. To address these inefficiencies, organizations may optimally limit spillovers by restricting peer communication or reducing transparency in teamwork. Moreover, concerns about credit-sharing can deter agents from inviting collaborators or selecting the most capable partners when leading projects.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 246-266"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145220902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Equilibrium and social norms 均衡与社会规范
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.014
Robert M. Anderson , Haosui Duanmu
{"title":"Equilibrium and social norms","authors":"Robert M. Anderson ,&nbsp;Haosui Duanmu","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.014","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.014","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div><span><span>Richter and Rubinstein (2020)</span></span> developed a novel model for social norms, which play an essential role in governing individual behavior in many economic situations. We present a generalization of the Richter-Rubinstein model allowing for an infinite agent space, individualized sets of alternatives, externalities, and intransitive preferences. In addition, we study social welfare properties of feasible Pareto efficient profiles and illustrate the applicability of our results in examples including a centrally planned economy, the classical Walrasian exchange economy, and the formation of social norms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 119-128"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145049195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Evidence games: Lying aversion and commitment 证据游戏：谎言厌恶和承诺
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.009
Elif B. Osun, Erkut Y. Ozbay
{"title":"Evidence games: Lying aversion and commitment","authors":"Elif B. Osun,&nbsp;Erkut Y. Ozbay","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.009","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.009","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The voluntary disclosure literature suggests that in evidence games, where the informed sender chooses which pieces of evidence to disclose to the uninformed receiver who determines their payoff, commitment does not matter, as there is a theoretical equivalence between the optimal mechanism and the game equilibrium outcomes. In this paper, we experimentally investigate whether the optimal mechanism and the game equilibrium outcomes coincide in a simple evidence game. Contrary to the theoretical equivalence, our results indicate that outcomes diverge and that commitment changes the outcomes. Our experimental results are in line with the predictions of a model that accounts for lying-averse agents.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 329-350"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145266861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Material incentives and effort choice: Evidence from an online experiment across countries 物质激励和努力选择：来自各国在线实验的证据
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.015
Elwyn Davies , Marcel Fafchamps
{"title":"Material incentives and effort choice: Evidence from an online experiment across countries","authors":"Elwyn Davies ,&nbsp;Marcel Fafchamps","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.015","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.015","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We conduct an interactive online experiment framed as an employment contract. Subjects from the US, India, and Africa are matched within and across countries. Employers make a one-period offer to a worker who can either decline or choose a high or low effort. The offer is restricted to be from a variable set of possible contracts. High effort is always efficient. Some observed choices are well predicted by self-interest, but others are better explained by conditional reciprocity or intrinsic motivation. Subjects from India and Africa follow intrinsic motivation and provide high effort more often. US subjects are more likely to follow self-interest and reach a less efficient outcome on average, but workers earn slightly more. We find no evidence of stereotypes across countries. Individual characteristics and stated attitudes toward worker incentives do not predict the behavioral differences observed between countries, consistent with cultural differences in the response to labor incentives.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 175-199"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145097109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Rationalizing sharing rules 合理化分享规则
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.018
Karol Flores-Szwagrzak, Lars Peter Østerdal
{"title":"Rationalizing sharing rules","authors":"Karol Flores-Szwagrzak,&nbsp;Lars Peter Østerdal","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.018","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.018","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A partnership can yield a return—a loss or a profit relative to the partners' investments. How should the partners share the return? We identify the sharing rules satisfying classical properties (symmetry, consistency, and continuity) and avoiding arbitrary bounds on a partner's share. We show that any such rule can be rationalized in the sense that its recommendations are aligned with those maximizing a separable welfare function. Among these rules, we characterize those formalizing different notions of proportionality and, in particular, a convenient subclass specified by a single inequality aversion parameter. We also explore when a rule can be rationalized by a more general welfare function. Our central results extend to a wider class of resource allocation problems.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"154 ","pages":"Pages 97-118"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145020702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：604180095
Book学术官方微信
小红书