均衡与社会规范

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-09-08 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.014

Robert M. Anderson , Haosui Duanmu

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引用次数: 0

摘要

Richter和Rubinstein（2020）开发了一种新的社会规范模型，在许多经济情况下，社会规范在管理个人行为方面发挥着至关重要的作用。我们提出了里克特-鲁宾斯坦模型的推广，允许无限代理空间，个性化的选择集，外部性和不可传递的偏好。此外，我们还研究了可行帕累托效率曲线的社会福利性质，并举例说明了我们的结果在中央计划经济、瓦尔拉斯交换经济和社会规范形成等方面的适用性。

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Equilibrium and social norms

Richter and Rubinstein (2020) developed a novel model for social norms, which play an essential role in governing individual behavior in many economic situations. We present a generalization of the Richter-Rubinstein model allowing for an infinite agent space, individualized sets of alternatives, externalities, and intransitive preferences. In addition, we study social welfare properties of feasible Pareto efficient profiles and illustrate the applicability of our results in examples including a centrally planned economy, the classical Walrasian exchange economy, and the formation of social norms.

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来源期刊

Games and Economic Behavior ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

9.10%

发文量

148

期刊介绍： Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology