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Indignation and the evolution of cooperation norms 愤慨与合作规范的演变
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.009
Xueheng Li
{"title":"Indignation and the evolution of cooperation norms","authors":"Xueheng Li","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.009","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.009","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Sociologists and psychologists have long argued that emotions are essential to sustaining social norms. This study examines the role of indignation in upholding cooperation norms within society. I model indignation in a population psychological game and characterize the stochastically stable equilibrium in a noisy best-reply dynamic. The analysis yields two findings. First, indignation can sustain cooperation in the long run, irrespective of whether interactions are global or occur within a fixed local interaction structure. Second, mobility allows individuals to sort into cooperative communities, causing these communities to grow in size and persist under a wider range of conditions. Therefore, mobility fosters stable norms of cooperation and punishment in large human societies. This study is the first to apply stochastic stability to address multiple equilibria in psychological games.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"155 ","pages":"Pages 228-249"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145526268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A dynamic optimization approach to delegation with an application to volunteer contracts 一个动态优化的委托方法与一个应用程序的志愿合同
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.002
Rene Saran
{"title":"A dynamic optimization approach to delegation with an application to volunteer contracts","authors":"Rene Saran","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We present a novel and tractable method that is widely applicable to general delegation problems. Every delegation set is equivalent to an incentive feasible mechanism. We characterize mechanisms with at most finitely many points of discontinuity and prove that the corresponding constrained problem is equivalent to a discrete-time, finite-horizon, dynamic optimization problem. This transformation makes the problem tractable: The dynamic problem is essentially a shortest-path problem that is amenable to different solution methods. By analyzing the dynamic problem, we show that restricting to mechanisms with at most finitely many points of discontinuity broadly entails no loss to the principal and identify a novel sufficient condition for such mechanisms to be optimal. We also provide a numerical method to find an approximately optimal mechanism. Lastly, we illustrate the results in a new delegation model of volunteer contracts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"155 ","pages":"Pages 27-54"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145323181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A maximal domain for weak stochastic dominance strategy-proofness of the extended probabilistic serial correspondence 扩展概率序列对应的弱随机优势策略抗性的极大域
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.001
Kiyong Yun , Youngsub Chun
{"title":"A maximal domain for weak stochastic dominance strategy-proofness of the extended probabilistic serial correspondence","authors":"Kiyong Yun ,&nbsp;Youngsub Chun","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>On the strict preference domain, <span><span>Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001)</span></span> introduce the probabilistic serial rule and show that the rule is <em>weakly stochastic dominance strategy-proof</em>. <span><span>Katta and Sethuraman (2006)</span></span> introduce the extended probabilistic serial correspondence, which generalizes the probabilistic serial rule to the full preference domain. However, this correspondence is not <em>weakly stochastic dominance strategy-proof</em>. In this paper, we introduce a subdomain of the full preference domain, which we call “the sequentially ranked from the top domain,” on which the correspondence is <em>weakly stochastic dominance strategy-proof</em>. In fact, it is a maximal domain on which the three requirements of <em>stochastic dominance efficiency, stochastic dominance envyfreeness,</em> and <em>weak stochastic dominance strategy-proofness</em> are compatible. In addition, on this domain, we provide an axiomatic characterization of it by adapting its characterization on the full preference domain (<span><span>Heo and Yılmaz, 2015</span></span>).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"155 ","pages":"Pages 10-26"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145323182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Non-manipulable house exchange under (minimum) equilibrium prices 在（最低）均衡价格下的不可操纵的房屋交换
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.004
Lars-Gunnar Svensson , Tommy Andersson , Lars Ehlers
{"title":"Non-manipulable house exchange under (minimum) equilibrium prices","authors":"Lars-Gunnar Svensson ,&nbsp;Tommy Andersson ,&nbsp;Lars Ehlers","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider a market with indivisible objects, called houses, and monetary transfers. Each house is initially occupied by one agent and each agent demands exactly one house. The problem is to identify the complete set of direct allocation mechanisms that can be used to reallocate the houses among the agents. On the one hand, for price eq1uilibrium mechanisms, we show that the only non-manipulable mechanism is one with a minimum equilibrium price vector. The result is not true on the classic or the quasi-linear domains, but on reduced domains of preference profiles containing “almost all” profiles in the classic or the quasi-linear domain, respectively. On the other hand, while minimum price equilibrium mechanisms are not necessarily efficient (as prices are not zero), we show that no non-manipulable mechanism Pareto dominates a minimum price equilibrium mechanism, making them constrained efficient in the class of non-manipulable mechanisms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"155 ","pages":"Pages 270-286"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145624168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Exact Nash-like solutions of blockchain gap games b区块链间隙游戏的精确纳什式解决方案
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.008
Mitsunori Noguchi
{"title":"Exact Nash-like solutions of blockchain gap games","authors":"Mitsunori Noguchi","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This note challenges the belief that mining processes are too complex for traditional game-theoretic analysis. We provide Nash-like equilibrium solutions for two-player gap games, focusing on the strategic delay of mining rig activation in Bitcoin’s Proof-of-Work (PoW) system. By delaying activation, miners can optimize profits, particularly as transaction fees become a more significant portion of their revenues (Carlsten et al., 2016). Building on the game-theoretic model of Tsabary and Eyal (2018), we offer a rigorous, proof-based analysis of this behavior, highlighting the importance of verifying simulation results through precise mathematical methods. The primary technical contribution of this note is a novel method for deriving closed-form equilibrium solutions for potentially non-differentiable ex-ante expected payoff functions <em>U<sub>i</sub></em>, defined as integrals in which the integrands—representing profit at time <em>t</em>—depend discontinuously on miners’ rig start times <em>s</em>.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"155 ","pages":"Pages 310-320"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145624169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Rankings-dependent preferences: A real goods matching experiment 基于排名的偏好：一个真实的商品匹配实验
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.008
Andrew Kloosterman , Peter Troyan
{"title":"Rankings-dependent preferences: A real goods matching experiment","authors":"Andrew Kloosterman ,&nbsp;Peter Troyan","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate whether preferences for objects received via a matching mechanism are influenced by how highly agents rank them in their reported rank order list. We hypothesize that all else equal, agents receive greater utility for the same object when they rank it higher. The addition of rankings-dependent utility implies that it may not be a dominant strategy to submit truthful preferences to a strategyproof mechanism, and that non-strategyproof mechanisms that give more agents objects they <em>report</em> as higher ranked may increase market welfare. We test these hypotheses with a matching experiment in a strategyproof mechanism, the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD), and a non-strategyproof mechanism, the Boston mechanism. A novel feature of our experimental design is that the objects allocated in the matching markets are real goods, which allows us to directly measure rankings-dependence by eliciting values for goods both inside and outside of the mechanism. The experimental results are mixed, with stronger evidence for rankings-dependence in the RSD treatment than the Boston treatment. We find no differences between the two mechanisms for the rates of truth-telling and the final welfare.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"155 ","pages":"Pages 167-191"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145526270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Group incentive-compatible allocation of discrete resources when ownership is partitioned 当所有权被分割时，离散资源的群体激励相容分配
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.003
Wataru Ishida , Changwoo Park
{"title":"Group incentive-compatible allocation of discrete resources when ownership is partitioned","authors":"Wataru Ishida ,&nbsp;Changwoo Park","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We introduce the problem of allocating objects when society is partitioned into groups of agents, each collectively owning a number of objects equal to its size. We propose a new axiom, called “within-group endowments lower bounds”, which requires that each agent find his assignment at least as desirable as his least preferred object among those owned by the group to which he belongs. We identify and characterize a family of rules satisfying this axiom in addition to efficiency, group strategy-proofness, and group-wise neutrality. We also consider two core notions, the “standard core” and the “exclusion core” (Balbuzanov and Kotowski, 2019). Our finding is that they are independent notions, unlike in traditional ownership structures (e.g., collective, private, and mixed ownership), and that our proposed rules always recommend allocations in their intersection.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"155 ","pages":"Pages 287-309"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145624170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The topology of poker 扑克的拓扑学
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.013
Laurent Bartholdi , Roman Mikhailov
{"title":"The topology of poker","authors":"Laurent Bartholdi ,&nbsp;Roman Mikhailov","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.013","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.013","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We introduce a topological invariant of games, based on homotopy theory, that measures their complexity. We examine it in the context of the “Texas Hold'em” variant of poker, and show that the invariant's value is at least 4. We deduce that evaluating the strength of a pair of cards in Texas Hold'em is an intricate problem, and that even the notion of who is bluffing against whom is ill-defined in some situations. The use of higher topological methods to study intransitivity of multi-player games seems new.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"155 ","pages":"Pages 1-9"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145271441","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Single-crossing dominance: A preference lattice 单交显性：偏好格
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.004
Gregorio Curello , Ludvig Sinander
{"title":"Single-crossing dominance: A preference lattice","authors":"Gregorio Curello ,&nbsp;Ludvig Sinander","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Most comparisons of preferences are instances of <em>single-crossing dominance.</em> We examine the lattice structure of single-crossing dominance, proving characterisation, existence and uniqueness results for minimum upper bounds of arbitrary sets of preferences. We apply these theorems to derive new comparative statics theorems for collective choice and under analyst uncertainty, and to characterise a general ‘maxmin’ class of uncertainty-averse preferences over Savage acts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"155 ","pages":"Pages 70-88"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145364407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Merging-splitting-proofness in financial systems: A characterization result 金融系统的合并-分裂抗扰性：一个表征结果
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.011
Pedro Calleja , Francesc Llerena
{"title":"Merging-splitting-proofness in financial systems: A characterization result","authors":"Pedro Calleja ,&nbsp;Francesc Llerena","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.011","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.011","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this paper, we explore the issue of manipulability in the setting of financial systems by considering two weak forms of immunity: merging-proofness and splitting-proofness. Not surprisingly, splitting-proofness conflicts with basic requirements such as the priority of debt over equity and the limited liability of equity. Remarkably, we provide a comprehensive characterization of the class of bankruptcy rules that gives rise to financial rules that satisfy merging-proofness.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"155 ","pages":"Pages 212-227"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145526269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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