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Games and Economic Behavior最新文献

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Differentiating roles of the reference alternative 参考备选方案的不同作用
IF 1.1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-05-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.008
Dan Qin
{"title":"Differentiating roles of the reference alternative","authors":"Dan Qin","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This article explores the behavioral implications of different roles of the reference alternative. We delineate the boundaries of three reference-dependent choice models, each associated with distinct behavioral patterns: the endowment effect model, the loss aversion model, and the reference-dependent shortlisting model. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the intersections of these models correspond to meaningful special cases within each model.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141240587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types 具有相互依赖类型的全酬拍卖中的贝叶斯纳什均衡
IF 1.1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-05-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.007
Ori Haimanko
{"title":"Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types","authors":"Ori Haimanko","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We prove the existence of a behavioral-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with statistically interdependent types (signals) under quite general assumptions on the values, costs and tie-breaking rules. Moreover, the set of equilibria is shown to be the same for any tie-breaking rule used in the auction.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141245000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Belief formation under signal correlation 信号相关性下的信念形成
IF 1.1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-05-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.004
Tanjim Hossain , Ryo Okui
{"title":"Belief formation under signal correlation","authors":"Tanjim Hossain ,&nbsp;Ryo Okui","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper demonstrates the importance of considering incorrect perceptions of variance in characterizing people's belief formation rules when they suffer from correlation neglect. Using laboratory experiments, we elicit posterior beliefs regarding the realization of a random variable where some signals that a subject receives are correlated. Subjects in our experiments consistently neglect correlation and also misperceive signal variance when updating their beliefs. We present behavioral models that illustrate how people who suffer from both biases overvalue strongly correlated signals and undervalue weakly correlated signals relative to Bayesian predictions. Additional experiments provide strong support for such a nuanced impact of correlation neglect on belief updating rules. The estimated model parameters are consistent with subjects showing high levels of correlation neglect and undersensitivity to increases in the true variance. Moreover, we find significant heterogeneity across subjects, with a majority exhibiting correlation neglect combined with variance misperception.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141090718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets 多类型住房市场的类型化顶部交易-周期机制特征
IF 1.1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-05-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.010
Di Feng , Bettina Klaus , Flip Klijn
{"title":"Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets","authors":"Di Feng ,&nbsp;Bettina Klaus ,&nbsp;Flip Klijn","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.010","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.010","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We consider the generalization of the classical Shapley and Scarf housing market model (<span>Shapley and Scarf, 1974</span>) to so-called multiple-type housing markets (<span>Moulin, 1995</span>). Throughout the paper, we focus on strict preferences. When preferences are separable, the prominent solution for these markets is the typewise top-trading-cycles (tTTC) mechanism.</p><p>We first show that for lexicographic preferences, a mechanism is <em>unanimous</em> (or <em>onto</em>), <em>individually rational</em>, <em>strategy-proof</em>, and <em>non-bossy</em> if and only if it is the tTTC mechanism. Second, we obtain a corresponding characterization for separable preferences. We obtain additional characterizations when replacing [<em>strategy-proofness</em> and <em>non-bossiness</em>] with <em>self-enforcing group</em> (or <em>pairwise</em>) <em>strategy-proofness</em>. Finally, we show that for strict preferences, there is no mechanism satisfying <em>unanimity</em>, <em>individual rationality</em>, and <em>strategy-proofness</em>.</p><p>Our characterizations of the tTTC mechanism constitute the first characterizations of an extension of the prominent top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism to multiple-type housing markets.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624000599/pdfft?md5=0ee30d9c980a752692f9e6ac827f71ba&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624000599-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141133680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Folk theorems in repeated games with switching costs 有转换成本的重复博弈中的民间定理
IF 1.1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-05-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.006
Yevgeny Tsodikovich , Xavier Venel , Anna Zseleva
{"title":"Folk theorems in repeated games with switching costs","authors":"Yevgeny Tsodikovich ,&nbsp;Xavier Venel ,&nbsp;Anna Zseleva","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study how switching costs affect the subgame perfect equilibria in repeated games. We show that (i) the Folk Theorem holds whenever the players are patient enough; (ii) the set of equilibrium payoffs is obtained by considering the payoffs of a simple one-shot auxiliary game; and (iii) the switching costs have a negative impact on a player in the infinitely undiscounted repeated game but can be beneficial for him in a finitely repeated game or in a discounted game.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624000745/pdfft?md5=3684eff9cd4db56e069a7d72e2e5087e&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624000745-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141090659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Integrating Raiffa and Nash approaches to bargaining using interim agreements 利用临时协议整合雷法和纳什谈判方法
IF 1.1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-05-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.003
Kalyan Chatterjee , Rakesh Chaturvedi
{"title":"Integrating Raiffa and Nash approaches to bargaining using interim agreements","authors":"Kalyan Chatterjee ,&nbsp;Rakesh Chaturvedi","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Raiffa's solution to the bargaining problem, outlined in <span>Luce and Raiffa (1957)</span>, is the point where the <em>negotiation curve</em> - a sequence of points that constitute step-by-step improvements from the status quo in the feasible payoff space - meets (possibly in the limit) the efficient boundary of the feasible region. A bargaining model with interim agreements yields a negotiation curve in equilibrium (in the spirit of Raiffa), and as the bargaining frictions disappear, the Raiffa path of payoffs converges to the Nash solution.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141068838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market 双边匹配市场的公平与竞争
IF 1.1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-05-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.001
Helmut Bester
{"title":"Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market","authors":"Helmut Bester","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders' fairness attitudes. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market frictions. But, when these frictions become negligible, the equilibrium approaches the Walrasian competitive equilibrium, independently of the traders' inequity aversion. Fairness may yield a Pareto improvement; but also the contrary is possible. Overall, the market implications of fairness are very different from its effects in isolated bilateral bargaining.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624000691/pdfft?md5=c7f8096ab846e8c46e886d9f2d56ffb5&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624000691-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141073311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Efficiency and maximality in anonymous two-sided economies 匿名双面经济中的效率与最大化
IF 1.1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-05-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.003
Nabil Afodjo , Roland Pongou
{"title":"Efficiency and maximality in anonymous two-sided economies","authors":"Nabil Afodjo ,&nbsp;Roland Pongou","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study efficiency and maximality in anonymous two-sided economies, where each agent only cares about trading with a desired number of partners from the opposite side. For both homogeneous and heterogeneous economies, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition that ensures the efficiency of all pairwise stable matchings. In addition, we provide a sufficient condition for maximality in heterogeneous economies. These conditions have implications for the design of anonymous markets that function optimally without the continuous intervention of a social planner.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141043291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Aggregating inconclusive data sets 汇总无结论的数据集
IF 1.1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-05-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.011
Gabrielle Gayer , Ehud Lehrer , Dotan Persitz
{"title":"Aggregating inconclusive data sets","authors":"Gabrielle Gayer ,&nbsp;Ehud Lehrer ,&nbsp;Dotan Persitz","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.011","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>An administrator is provided with data collected by several practitioners. These data may include inconclusive observations. The administrator is required to form a frequency distribution on the states of nature that would be approved by external auditors as long as it is compatible with the available information. We state a novel result on the compatibility of a probability with a finite set of capacities. We use this result to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the compatibility of the administrator's frequency distribution with the data collected by the practitioners, according to two auditing criteria.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140951936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the manipulability of allocation rules through endowment augmentation 论通过禀赋增强分配规则的可操纵性
IF 1.1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-05-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.012
William Thomson
{"title":"On the manipulability of allocation rules through endowment augmentation","authors":"William Thomson","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.012","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We formulate and study the requirement on an allocation rule that no agent should be able to benefit by artificially augmenting their endowment. This can be either through simply exaggeration or through a transfer of resources from outside of the current trading partners, resources that have to be returned after the rule is applied and the agent has received their assignment. We show that the Walrasian rule is not “augmentation-proof” even on standard domains. More seriously, no efficient selection from the individual-endowments lower bounds correspondence, or from the no-envy correspondence, or from the egalitarian-equivalent correspondence is augmentation-proof. These impossibilities hold even when preferences are homothetic, and even if the agent cannot augment their endowment by more than an arbitrarily small proportion of the resources they truly own.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140951937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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