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Games and Economic Behavior最新文献

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From monopoly to competition: When do optimal contests prevail? 从垄断到竞争：最优竞争何时盛行？
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-07-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.001
Xiaotie Deng , Yotam Gafni , Ron Lavi , Tao Lin , Hongyi Ling
{"title":"From monopoly to competition: When do optimal contests prevail?","authors":"Xiaotie Deng ,&nbsp;Yotam Gafni ,&nbsp;Ron Lavi ,&nbsp;Tao Lin ,&nbsp;Hongyi Ling","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study competition among multiple contest designers in a general model. The goal of each contest designer is to maximize the sum of efforts of the contestants participating in their contest. Assuming symmetric contestants, our main result shows that the optimal contests in the monopolistic setting (i.e., those that maximize the sum of efforts in a model with a single contest designer) form an equilibrium in the model with competition. Under a very natural assumption, these contests are dominant, and the equilibrium that they form is unique. Moreover, the equilibria with the optimal contests are Pareto-optimal even when other equilibria emerge. In many natural cases, they also maximize the social welfare. Additional examples show that, with further generalizations of our model, optimal contests no longer prevail. Our results therefore highlight and clarify the borderline between settings in which optimal contests prevail and do not prevail.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 268-293"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144656128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Working with AI: An analysis for rational integration 与人工智能一起工作：对合理集成的分析
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-07-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.009
David Lagziel, Yevgeny Tsodikovich
{"title":"Working with AI: An analysis for rational integration","authors":"David Lagziel,&nbsp;Yevgeny Tsodikovich","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.009","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.009","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A decision maker (DM) uses an AI agent to estimate an unknown state, for which both possess informative private signals. Conditional on the state and the DM's final assessment, he prefers the AI's recommendations to be incorrect, thus affirming his own superiority or sharing the blame. Our analysis indicates that the correctness of the process is not a monotone function of participants' expertise levels: (i) a less accurate AI may lead to improved outcomes by reducing the DM's reliance on it, and (ii) a less accurate DM can enhance information aggregation leading to a superior result.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 254-267"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144614614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Self-serving biases in beliefs about collective outcomes 对集体结果的自我服务偏见
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-07-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.008
Shimon Kogan , Florian H. Schneider , Roberto A. Weber
{"title":"Self-serving biases in beliefs about collective outcomes","authors":"Shimon Kogan ,&nbsp;Florian H. Schneider ,&nbsp;Roberto A. Weber","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Beliefs about collective outcomes play an important role in many contexts. We study biases in the formation of such beliefs. Specifically, we investigate whether self-serving biases in information processing—documented for beliefs about individual outcomes—affect beliefs about collective outcomes. In a first study, we find that people indeed exhibit self-serving biases for collective outcomes, and that such biases are similar to biases for individual outcomes. We also observe that the presence of a market institution for aggregating private information produces, if anything, slightly greater collective self-delusion. In a second study, we investigate the mechanisms driving collective self-delusion and find that anticipatory utility plays a large role, rather than ego-utility considerations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 315-344"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144686405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Watchdog versus yes man: News source and media competition 看门狗与唯唯诺诺者：新闻来源与媒体竞争
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-07-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.007
Daiki Kishishita , Susumu Sato
{"title":"Watchdog versus yes man: News source and media competition","authors":"Daiki Kishishita ,&nbsp;Susumu Sato","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Watchdog journalism, the idea that independent media outlets monitor people in power, can be undermined when the people in power serve as news sources on which the media rely. By developing a model of media competition with a strategic news source, we show that the presence of a news source creates pro-source biases; the coexistence of neutral watchdogs and biased yes men arises as an outcome of mixed strategy equilibrium. This bias can make the presence of a news source harmful to consumers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 233-253"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144556831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Measuring tastes for equity and aggregate wealth behind the veil of ignorance 在无知的面纱背后衡量公平和总财富的品味
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-06-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.005
Jan Heufer , Jason Shachat , Yan Xu
{"title":"Measuring tastes for equity and aggregate wealth behind the veil of ignorance","authors":"Jan Heufer ,&nbsp;Jason Shachat ,&nbsp;Yan Xu","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose an instrument to measure individuals' social preferences regarding equity and efficiency behind a veil of ignorance while controlling for idiosyncratic risk preferences. We construct a battery of portfolio and wealth distribution choice problems sharing a common budget set. A given bundle induces the same distribution over an individual's wealth in both problems. The portfolio choice solely reflects an individual's risk attitude, providing a benchmark to evaluate whether their wealth distribution choice exhibits equity or efficiency preferring tastes. Our experiments show clusters of social preference types, which are unexpectedly independent of risk preferences.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 209-232"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144471816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Pricing and information acquisition in networks 网络中的定价与信息获取
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-06-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.006
Yifan Xiong , Guopeng Li , Youze Lang
{"title":"Pricing and information acquisition in networks","authors":"Yifan Xiong ,&nbsp;Guopeng Li ,&nbsp;Youze Lang","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates how a monopolist strategically acquires information from networked consumers with correlated preferences using discriminatory or uniform pricing schemes. Under uniform pricing, the optimal information acquisition problem can be efficiently solved in polynomial time by iteratively selecting consumers with the highest Katz-Bonacich centrality. By contrast, under discriminatory pricing, the problem is generally NP-hard. However, in typical networks, such as complete bipartite, core-periphery, and nested-split networks, the optimal targeted group can be characterized in a straightforward manner: the monopolist simply prioritizes consumers with higher degrees. A comparative analysis shows that the size of the optimal targeted group decreases with information cost but follows an inverted U-shape with respect to preference correlation. Allowing the monopolist to acquire information always reduces welfare under discriminatory pricing, whereas under uniform pricing, the impact is not necessarily negative.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 179-208"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144471815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Gradual matching with affirmative action 逐步与平权行动相匹配
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-06-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.004
Kriti Manocha , Bertan Turhan
{"title":"Gradual matching with affirmative action","authors":"Kriti Manocha ,&nbsp;Bertan Turhan","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies a multi-period college admissions problem where schools' choice rules incorporate affirmative action constraints. Students have the option to either finalize their assignments at the end of each period or participate in subsequent periods with the possibility of updating their rank-ordered lists (ROLs). We show that a gradual matching mechanism makes active students weakly better off (i.e. satisfies monotonicity) if and only if their ROL update rule meets a mild regularity condition. We introduce the notion of gradual stability adapted for multi-period matching mechanisms that account for affirmative action constraints. Furthermore, we show that the gradual stability of a gradual matching mechanism is equivalent to monotonicity in conjunction with the stability of the stage mechanism. Finally, we use our results to analyze the multi-stage mechanism currently used for engineering college admissions in India.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 164-178"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144338899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Contract breach with overconfident expectations: Experimental evidence on reference-dependent preferences 过度自信预期下的契约违约：参考依赖偏好的实验证据
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-06-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.012
Sabine Fischer , Kerstin Grosch
{"title":"Contract breach with overconfident expectations: Experimental evidence on reference-dependent preferences","authors":"Sabine Fischer ,&nbsp;Kerstin Grosch","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.012","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.012","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the effect of agents' overconfident expectations in their production on their contract breach. Drawing on a reference-dependent framework, we theoretically deduce propositions for compliance to agreements where an agent exhibits overconfidence and loss aversion. We further conduct a lab experiment with a multiple-stage design and find that overconfident agents are more likely to breach the contract than non-overconfident agents. Moreover, overconfident agents breach more often and to a greater extent with increasing loss aversion. We also test the impact of a non-deterministic environment (“shock condition”) where payoff misestimation can be masked compared to a deterministic environment (“no-shock condition”). Agents breach more often in the shock condition, but breach extent remains unaffected. Results are mostly in line with the theoretical framework. In a treatment, we manipulate agents' overconfidence exogenously and use it as an instrument to establish causality.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 145-163"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144271798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Data provision to an informed seller 向知情的卖方提供数据
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-06-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.002
Shota Ichihashi , Alex Smolin
{"title":"Data provision to an informed seller","authors":"Shota Ichihashi ,&nbsp;Alex Smolin","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A monopoly seller is privately and imperfectly informed about the buyer's value of the product. A designer can provide the seller with additional information, which the seller uses to price discriminate the buyer. We demonstrate the difficulty of screening the seller's information: When the buyer's value is binary, no combination of buyer surplus and seller profit can be implemented other than those achieved by providing the same information to all seller types. We use the result to characterize the set of implementable welfare outcomes and demonstrate the trade-off between buyer surplus and efficiency.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 131-144"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144263720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategy-proofness, efficiency, and the core in matching problems with transfers 无策略性、效率和转移匹配问题的核心
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-06-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.001
Shuhei Morimoto
{"title":"Strategy-proofness, efficiency, and the core in matching problems with transfers","authors":"Shuhei Morimoto","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study a class of matching problems in which monetary transfers are possible. In this paper, we establish a close connection between the core and the existence of desirable rules that satisfy strategy-proofness or one-sided strategy-proofness. In our main result, we show that the optimal core is a unified lower bound of welfare for the existence of rules that satisfy strategy-proofness (or one-sided strategy-proofness), efficiency, individual rationality, and no subsidy. Applying this result, we also obtain impossibility and characterization results in our environment.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 30-41"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144241155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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