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Clubs and networks 俱乐部和网络
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-07-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.005
{"title":"Clubs and networks","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A recurring theme in the study of society is the concentration of influence and power that is driven through unequal membership of groups and associations. In some instances, these bodies constitute a small world while in others they are fragmented into distinct cliques. This paper presents a new model of clubs and networks to understand the sources of individual marginalization and the origins of small and large worlds.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624000939/pdfft?md5=72720b7767c2282157ae21491fb8c2b1&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624000939-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141622707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Peace in an unequal world? Experimental evidence on the relationship between inequality and conflict in a guns-vs-butter setting 不平等世界中的和平？枪支与黄油环境下不平等与冲突之间关系的实验证据
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-07-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.006
{"title":"Peace in an unequal world? Experimental evidence on the relationship between inequality and conflict in a guns-vs-butter setting","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study addresses the emergence of (unarmed) peace and investments in arms within a guns-vs-butter conflict setting. We introduce a novel feature within the conflict game and separate the decision to start a conflict and the investment in arms, following the theoretical framework of <span><span>Garfinkel and Syropoulos (2021)</span></span>. Based on this model we experimentally examine the emergence of peace while varying resource inequality among conflicting parties. We find that inequality leads to more conflicts and higher investments in arms. Despite these trends, achieving a state of unarmed peace is rarely observed in both treatments. Our results highlight the critical role of trust in attaining peaceful outcomes and show that armed peace, although not an optimal strategy in either treatment, is one of the most frequently chosen decisions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624000940/pdfft?md5=3b475f98d8ae07e19b2cf67b68262bbc&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624000940-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141637237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a discrete ponds dilemma 离散池塘困境中存在纯策略纳什均衡
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-07-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.001
Vasily Gusev , Alexander Nesterov , Mikhail Reshetov , Alex Suzdaltsev
{"title":"The existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a discrete ponds dilemma","authors":"Vasily Gusev ,&nbsp;Alexander Nesterov ,&nbsp;Mikhail Reshetov ,&nbsp;Alex Suzdaltsev","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In a variety of economic situations discrete agents choose one resource among several available resources and, once admitted to the resource of choice, divide it among fellow agents admitted there. The amount of the resource an agent gets is proportional to her relative ability to acquire this particular resource, what we refer to as an agent's weight at the resource. The relevant applications include students self-selecting into colleges, politicians self-selecting into races, and athletes self-selecting into teams. We find that this game has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in at least three special cases: 1) when agents have the same weight at each resource, 2) when all resources are the same, 3) when there are only two resources. We also show that this game always has an approximate Nash equilibrium when the number of players is large. Existence in the general case remains an open problem.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141605260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Asymmetric auctions: Perturbations, ε- equilibrium, and equilibrium 不对称拍卖：扰动、ε- 均衡和均衡
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-07-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.003
G.V.A. Dharanan , Alex Ellis
{"title":"Asymmetric auctions: Perturbations, ε- equilibrium, and equilibrium","authors":"G.V.A. Dharanan ,&nbsp;Alex Ellis","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We consider first-price auctions with independent and private valuations that have asymmetric valuation distributions and supports. We first show the existence of equilibrium in these auctions through a perturbation approach, thereby establishing that the limit of Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) of such perturbed auctions is indeed the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) of the limit auction with asymmetric supports. We then characterize this BNE and show that the <em>ε</em>-equilibrium (<em>ε</em>-BNE) of the auction with asymmetric supports is a BNE of “close” auctions with common supports. We then demonstrate some numerical examples.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624000848/pdfft?md5=1c0c326a51b5668c077ca7abb2a60ed7&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624000848-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141586174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Social learning with partial and aggregate information: Experimental evidence 利用部分和总体信息进行社会学习：实验证据
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.005
Elisa Cavatorta , Antonio Guarino , Steffen Huck
{"title":"Social learning with partial and aggregate information: Experimental evidence","authors":"Elisa Cavatorta ,&nbsp;Antonio Guarino ,&nbsp;Steffen Huck","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In our information cascade experiments, we study social learning in decision-making situations in which decisions “not to do” are unobservable. Subjects, in sequence, choose whether to invest or not, without knowing their position. They observe a private signal and the number of investments made by their predecessors, but not how many predecessors have chosen not to invest. We find that down cascades, in which agents neglect the signal and do not invest, occur, in contrast with the equilibrium predictions. Up cascades, in which agents invest independently of the signal, occur, but less than in equilibrium.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141145152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Posted offers with charitable promises: True preferences and strategic behavior 带有慈善承诺的发布要约：真实偏好与策略行为
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.010
Claudia Schwirplies , Andreas Lange
{"title":"Posted offers with charitable promises: True preferences and strategic behavior","authors":"Claudia Schwirplies ,&nbsp;Andreas Lange","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.010","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We report experimental findings on the role of charitable promises in settings with posted offers. We vary the enforceability of such promises within variants of ultimatum games where the proposer suggests a split between herself, the responder and a charitable donation. By reneging on initial pledges, dishonest proposers can change the final allocation to their advantage. Providing ex post information on actual donations while leaving the contract incomplete outperforms a complete contract where proposers cannot renege on their charitable promises. The ex post information allows proposers to improve their image by voluntarily giving more than pledged and thus proving that the charitable pledge was not used for strategic reasons. We identify proposer competition as another (surprising) mechanism that partly eliminates cheating among accepted offers, but it also favors offers without charitable pledge.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624000800/pdfft?md5=ddede15a0454ed7bb330d85d6b44bb1d&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624000800-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141484723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences 单峰和单浸偏好的策略防范性
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.011
{"title":"Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.011","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.011","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We analyze the problem of locating a public facility in a domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences when the social planner knows the type of preference (single-peaked or single-dipped) of each agent. Our main result characterizes all strategy-proof rules and shows that they can be decomposed into two steps. In the first step, the agents with single-peaked preferences are asked about their peaks and, for each profile of reported peaks, at most two alternatives are preselected. In the second step, the agents with single-dipped preferences are asked to reveal their dips to complete the decision between the preselected alternatives. Our result generalizes the findings of <span><span>Moulin (1980)</span></span> and <span><span>Barberà and Jackson (1994)</span></span> for single-peaked and of <span><span>Manjunath (2014)</span></span> for single-dipped preferences. Finally, we show that all strategy-proof rules are also group strategy-proof and analyze the implications of Pareto efficiency.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624000824/pdfft?md5=7b7a44b15c04aeb940db3acfc1fdd298&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624000824-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141729105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bicriteria Nash flows over time 双标准纳什流量随时间变化
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-06-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.002
Tim Oosterwijk , Daniel Schmand , Marc Schröder
{"title":"Bicriteria Nash flows over time","authors":"Tim Oosterwijk ,&nbsp;Daniel Schmand ,&nbsp;Marc Schröder","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Flows over time are a natural way to incorporate flow dynamics that arise in various applications such as traffic networks. In this paper we introduce a natural variant of the deterministic fluid queuing model in which users aim to minimize their costs subject to arrival at their destination before a pre-specified deadline. We determine the existence and the structure of Nash flows over time and fully characterize the price of anarchy for this model. The price of anarchy measures the ratio of the quality of the equilibrium and the quality of the optimum flow, where we evaluate the quality using two different natural performance measures: the throughput for a given deadline and the makespan for a given amount of flow. While it turns out that both prices of anarchy can be unbounded in general, we provide tight bounds for the important subclass of parallel path graphs.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624000836/pdfft?md5=a56d3241c546f13dc49a509b94370f60&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624000836-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141586045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Capacity design in school choice 择校中的能力设计
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-06-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.002
Mustafa Oğuz Afacan , Umut Dur , Martin Van der Linden
{"title":"Capacity design in school choice","authors":"Mustafa Oğuz Afacan ,&nbsp;Umut Dur ,&nbsp;Martin Van der Linden","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study a new variant of the school choice problem in which capacities can be altered by distributing additional seats across schools in response to students' reported preferences. We show that heuristic solutions to this capacity design problem can be inefficient, even if they focus on allocating seats to the most demanded schools. We introduce a simple class of algorithms that, in the problem where additional seats can be distributed, characterizes the set of efficient matchings among those that respect priorities. We also investigate the incentive properties of this class of efficient algorithms.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141403915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How alliances form and conflict ensues 联盟如何形成，冲突如何发生
IF 1.1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-06-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.009
Lu Dong , Lingbo Huang , Jaimie W. Lien , Jie Zheng
{"title":"How alliances form and conflict ensues","authors":"Lu Dong ,&nbsp;Lingbo Huang ,&nbsp;Jaimie W. Lien ,&nbsp;Jie Zheng","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.009","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In a social network in which friendly and rival bilateral links can be formed, how do alliances between decision-makers form, and what determines whether a conflict will arise? We study a network formation game between ex-ante symmetric players in the laboratory to examine the dynamics of alliance formation and conflict evolution. A peaceful equilibrium yields the greatest social welfare, while a successful bullying attack transfers the victimized player's resources evenly to the attackers at a cost. In within-subject and between-subject laboratory experiments, we find that the relative frequency of peaceful and bullying outcomes increases in the cost of attack. We further examine the dynamics leading to the final network and find that groups tend to coordinate quickly on a first target for attack, while the first attacker entails a non-negligible risk of successful counter-attack. These findings provide insights for understanding social dynamics in group coordination.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141428945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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