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Corrigendum to: “Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests”
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-12-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.002
Zhonghong Kuang, Hangcheng Zhao, Jie Zheng
{"title":"Corrigendum to: “Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests”","authors":"Zhonghong Kuang,&nbsp;Hangcheng Zhao,&nbsp;Jie Zheng","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Two privately informed contestants compete in a contest, and the organizer ex-ante designs a public anonymous disclosure policy to maximize the contestants’ total effort. We fully characterize ridge distributions, under which the organizer achieves the first-best outcome in equilibrium: the allocation is efficient, and the entire surplus goes to the organizer. When the prior is a mixture of a ridge distribution and a perfectly correlated distribution, the first-best outcome is achievable by a signal that solely generates ridge distributions as posteriors.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Page 197"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Supermodularity and incentive reversal in teams
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-12-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.001
Svetlana Boyarchenko , Dominika Machowska , Iryna Topolyan
{"title":"Supermodularity and incentive reversal in teams","authors":"Svetlana Boyarchenko ,&nbsp;Dominika Machowska ,&nbsp;Iryna Topolyan","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper takes a new look at the issue of incentive reversal in (strategic) team games, by relying on supermodularity techniques. In a setting with no contractual possibilities, we provide minimal sufficient conditions for one or both players to supply less effort in exogenously more productive environments, at the two extremal Nash equilibria. Unlike the existing literature, the analysis does not utilize concavity and other unnecessary assumptions and explicitly takes into account existence and possible multiplicity of pure-strategy Nash equilibria. We derive respective sufficient conditions for strong and weak incentive reversal for asymmetric games under strategic complementarity and substitutability respectively. We also consider incentive reversal for a broad class of symmetric games. These parsimonious conditions allow for a more transparent intuitive interpretation of the results.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 93-105"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the efficiency of queueing in dynamic matching markets
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-12-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.019
Laura Doval , Balázs Szentes
{"title":"On the efficiency of queueing in dynamic matching markets","authors":"Laura Doval ,&nbsp;Balázs Szentes","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.019","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.019","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study a two-sided dynamic matching market where agents arrive randomly. An arriving agent is immediately matched if agents are waiting on the other side. Otherwise, the agent decides whether to exit the market or join a queue to wait for a match. Waiting is costly: agents discount the future and incur costs while they wait. We characterize the equilibrium and socially optimal queue sizes under first-come, first-served. Depending on the model parameters, equilibrium queues can be shorter or longer than efficiency would require them to be. Indeed, socially optimal queues may be unbounded, even if equilibrium queues are not. By contrast, when agents only incur flow costs while they wait, equilibrium queues are typically longer than socially optimal ones (cf. <span><span>Baccara et al., 2020</span></span>). Unlike one-sided markets, the comparison between equilibrium and socially optimal queues in two-sided markets depends on agents' time preferences.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 106-130"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-12-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.017
Shurojit Chatterji , Jordi Massó , Shigehiro Serizawa
{"title":"On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem","authors":"Shurojit Chatterji ,&nbsp;Jordi Massó ,&nbsp;Shigehiro Serizawa","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.017","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.017","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where multiple private goods have to be assigned to a set of agents with entitlements and where preferences display satiation. We show that if the rule is in addition tops-only, same-sided and individually rational with respect to the entitlements, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as multi-dimensional single-peakedness relative to the entitlements). We also provide a converse of this main finding. It turns out that this domain coincides with the one already identified in a general set up with public goods. We relate the domain of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences relative to the entitlements to well-known restricted domains with private goods under which non-trivial and strategy-proof rules do exist.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 48-70"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Marital stability with committed couples: A revealed preference analysis
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-12-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.018
Mikhail Freer , Khushboo Surana
{"title":"Marital stability with committed couples: A revealed preference analysis","authors":"Mikhail Freer ,&nbsp;Khushboo Surana","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.018","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.018","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We present a revealed preference characterization of marital stability where some couples are committed. A couple is committed if they can divorce only with mutual consent. We provide theoretical insights into the potential of the characterization for identifying intrahousehold consumption patterns. We demonstrate that without price variation for private goods among potential couples, intrahousehold resource allocations can only be identified for non-committed couples. We conduct simulations using Dutch household data to support our theoretical findings. Our results show that with price variation, the empirical implications of marital stability allow for the identification of household consumption allocations for both committed and non-committed couples.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 131-159"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
When is trust robust?
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-12-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.015
Luca Anderlini , Larry Samuelson , Daniele Terlizzese
{"title":"When is trust robust?","authors":"Luca Anderlini ,&nbsp;Larry Samuelson ,&nbsp;Daniele Terlizzese","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.015","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.015","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine an economy in which interactions are more productive if agents can trust others to refrain from cheating. Some agents are scoundrels, who cheat at every opportunity, while others cheat only if the cost of cheating, a decreasing function of the proportion of cheaters, is sufficiently low. The economy exhibits multiple equilibria. As the proportion of scoundrels in the economy declines, the high-trust equilibrium can be disrupted by arbitrarily small perturbations or by arbitrarily small infusions of low-trust agents, while the low-trust equilibrium becomes impervious to perturbations and infusions of high-trust agents. Scoundrels may thus have the effect of making trust more robust.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 34-47"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Taming selten's horse with impulse response
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-11-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.014
Tibor Neugebauer , Abdolkarim Sadrieh , Reinhard Selten
{"title":"Taming selten's horse with impulse response","authors":"Tibor Neugebauer ,&nbsp;Abdolkarim Sadrieh ,&nbsp;Reinhard Selten","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.014","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.014","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The paper experimentally examines the predictive power of the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium concept in the three-player Game of Selten's Horse. At first sight, our data show little support of the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium and rather favor the imperfect equilibrium. We introduce deterministic impulse response trajectories that converge on the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. The impulse response trajectories are remarkably close – closer than the trajectories from a reinforcement learning model – to the observed dynamics of the game in the short run (50 periods). The quantal response approach also converges on the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium as the error rates decline, suggesting that the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium may be reached in the long run. In the long run (up to 250 periods), however, behavior seems to settle at a non-equilibrium distribution of strategies that rather supports efficient outcomes, instead of converging to the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 71-92"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Credibility of group manipulation in random assignments
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-11-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.016
Homa Hosseinzadeh Ranjbar, Mehdi Feizi
{"title":"Credibility of group manipulation in random assignments","authors":"Homa Hosseinzadeh Ranjbar,&nbsp;Mehdi Feizi","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.016","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.016","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>For the random assignment problem, we introduce the notion of <em>collusion-proofness</em> that happens if the rule is immune to any collusion on misreporting preferences as it is either not profitable to form or profitable to betray. We characterize collusion-proofne<em>ss</em>and prove that an assignment rule is collusion-proof if and only if it is strategy-proof and non-bossy. Therefore, the random serial dictatorship rule is immune to any collusive agreement between agents on preference misrepresentation, though it is not (weakly) group strategy-proof. This result gives us a possibility between collusion-proofness, ex-post Pareto efficiency, and equal treatment of equals. Furthermore, we proved that a large family of strategy-proof mechanisms called rank exchange mechanisms, à la <span><span>Shende and Purohit (2023)</span></span>, are collusion-proof but group manipulable.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 27-33"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Status quo bias with choice overload 选择过多的现状偏见
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-11-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.012
Jiaqi Yang
{"title":"Status quo bias with choice overload","authors":"Jiaqi Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.012","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.012","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper proposes a model that parsimoniously captures evidence on status quo bias, the reference effect and choice overload. Choice overload is behaviorally defined as an increase in intensity of status quo bias when the menu enlarges. Our decision maker follows a two-step procedure by first limiting consideration to the alternatives that weakly dominate the status quo according to a menu-dependent list of attributes, and then maximizing preference over this subset with tie breaking in favor of the status quo. Choice overload is generated by the key feature that the list of attributes is increasing in menu size. An axiomatic characterization and three applications are provided. In particular, a policy maker has to nudge the agent through a series of small changes in her choice problems. An incumbent firm can deter entry by exploiting choice overload, while an entrant firm can introduce new product more efficiently using information on attention.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"149 ","pages":"Pages 170-186"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142746460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A general characterization of the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-11-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.011
Yuya Wakabayashi , Ryosuke Sakai , Shigehiro Serizawa
{"title":"A general characterization of the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices","authors":"Yuya Wakabayashi ,&nbsp;Ryosuke Sakai ,&nbsp;Shigehiro Serizawa","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.011","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.011","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider economies consisting of arbitrary numbers of agents and objects, and study the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers. Each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand), and has non-quasi-linear preferences, which accommodate income effects or nonlinear borrowing costs. The seller may derive benefit from objects. We show that on the non-quasi-linear domain, the minimum price Walrasian rule in which reserve prices are equal to the benefit the seller derives is the only rule satisfying four desirable properties; efficiency, individual rationality for the buyers, no-subsidy, and strategy-proofness. Moreover, we characterize the minimum price Walrasian rule by efficiency, overall individual rationality, and strategy-proofness.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 1-26"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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