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Marital stability with committed couples: A revealed preference analysis
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-12-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.018
Mikhail Freer , Khushboo Surana
{"title":"Marital stability with committed couples: A revealed preference analysis","authors":"Mikhail Freer ,&nbsp;Khushboo Surana","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.018","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.018","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We present a revealed preference characterization of marital stability where some couples are committed. A couple is committed if they can divorce only with mutual consent. We provide theoretical insights into the potential of the characterization for identifying intrahousehold consumption patterns. We demonstrate that without price variation for private goods among potential couples, intrahousehold resource allocations can only be identified for non-committed couples. We conduct simulations using Dutch household data to support our theoretical findings. Our results show that with price variation, the empirical implications of marital stability allow for the identification of household consumption allocations for both committed and non-committed couples.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 131-159"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
When is trust robust?
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-12-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.015
Luca Anderlini , Larry Samuelson , Daniele Terlizzese
{"title":"When is trust robust?","authors":"Luca Anderlini ,&nbsp;Larry Samuelson ,&nbsp;Daniele Terlizzese","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.015","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.015","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine an economy in which interactions are more productive if agents can trust others to refrain from cheating. Some agents are scoundrels, who cheat at every opportunity, while others cheat only if the cost of cheating, a decreasing function of the proportion of cheaters, is sufficiently low. The economy exhibits multiple equilibria. As the proportion of scoundrels in the economy declines, the high-trust equilibrium can be disrupted by arbitrarily small perturbations or by arbitrarily small infusions of low-trust agents, while the low-trust equilibrium becomes impervious to perturbations and infusions of high-trust agents. Scoundrels may thus have the effect of making trust more robust.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 34-47"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Taming selten's horse with impulse response
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-11-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.014
Tibor Neugebauer , Abdolkarim Sadrieh , Reinhard Selten
{"title":"Taming selten's horse with impulse response","authors":"Tibor Neugebauer ,&nbsp;Abdolkarim Sadrieh ,&nbsp;Reinhard Selten","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.014","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.014","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The paper experimentally examines the predictive power of the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium concept in the three-player Game of Selten's Horse. At first sight, our data show little support of the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium and rather favor the imperfect equilibrium. We introduce deterministic impulse response trajectories that converge on the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. The impulse response trajectories are remarkably close – closer than the trajectories from a reinforcement learning model – to the observed dynamics of the game in the short run (50 periods). The quantal response approach also converges on the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium as the error rates decline, suggesting that the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium may be reached in the long run. In the long run (up to 250 periods), however, behavior seems to settle at a non-equilibrium distribution of strategies that rather supports efficient outcomes, instead of converging to the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 71-92"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Credibility of group manipulation in random assignments
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-11-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.016
Homa Hosseinzadeh Ranjbar, Mehdi Feizi
{"title":"Credibility of group manipulation in random assignments","authors":"Homa Hosseinzadeh Ranjbar,&nbsp;Mehdi Feizi","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.016","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.016","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>For the random assignment problem, we introduce the notion of <em>collusion-proofness</em> that happens if the rule is immune to any collusion on misreporting preferences as it is either not profitable to form or profitable to betray. We characterize collusion-proofne<em>ss</em>and prove that an assignment rule is collusion-proof if and only if it is strategy-proof and non-bossy. Therefore, the random serial dictatorship rule is immune to any collusive agreement between agents on preference misrepresentation, though it is not (weakly) group strategy-proof. This result gives us a possibility between collusion-proofness, ex-post Pareto efficiency, and equal treatment of equals. Furthermore, we proved that a large family of strategy-proof mechanisms called rank exchange mechanisms, à la <span><span>Shende and Purohit (2023)</span></span>, are collusion-proof but group manipulable.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 27-33"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Status quo bias with choice overload 选择过多的现状偏见
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-11-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.012
Jiaqi Yang
{"title":"Status quo bias with choice overload","authors":"Jiaqi Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.012","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.012","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper proposes a model that parsimoniously captures evidence on status quo bias, the reference effect and choice overload. Choice overload is behaviorally defined as an increase in intensity of status quo bias when the menu enlarges. Our decision maker follows a two-step procedure by first limiting consideration to the alternatives that weakly dominate the status quo according to a menu-dependent list of attributes, and then maximizing preference over this subset with tie breaking in favor of the status quo. Choice overload is generated by the key feature that the list of attributes is increasing in menu size. An axiomatic characterization and three applications are provided. In particular, a policy maker has to nudge the agent through a series of small changes in her choice problems. An incumbent firm can deter entry by exploiting choice overload, while an entrant firm can introduce new product more efficiently using information on attention.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"149 ","pages":"Pages 170-186"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142746460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A general characterization of the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-11-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.011
Yuya Wakabayashi , Ryosuke Sakai , Shigehiro Serizawa
{"title":"A general characterization of the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices","authors":"Yuya Wakabayashi ,&nbsp;Ryosuke Sakai ,&nbsp;Shigehiro Serizawa","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.011","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.011","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider economies consisting of arbitrary numbers of agents and objects, and study the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers. Each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand), and has non-quasi-linear preferences, which accommodate income effects or nonlinear borrowing costs. The seller may derive benefit from objects. We show that on the non-quasi-linear domain, the minimum price Walrasian rule in which reserve prices are equal to the benefit the seller derives is the only rule satisfying four desirable properties; efficiency, individual rationality for the buyers, no-subsidy, and strategy-proofness. Moreover, we characterize the minimum price Walrasian rule by efficiency, overall individual rationality, and strategy-proofness.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 1-26"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
School choice with farsighted students 有远见的学生选择学校
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-11-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.010
Ata Atay , Ana Mauleon , Vincent Vannetelbosch
{"title":"School choice with farsighted students","authors":"Ata Atay ,&nbsp;Ana Mauleon ,&nbsp;Vincent Vannetelbosch","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.010","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.010","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism may not belong to any farsighted stable set. Hence, the TTC mechanism provides an assignment that is not only Pareto efficient but also farsightedly stable. Moreover, looking forward three steps ahead is already sufficient for stabilizing the matching obtained from the TTC. In addition, we show that variations of TTC that improve in terms of no justified envy are farsightedly stable, but may require more farsightedness on behalf of students.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"149 ","pages":"Pages 148-163"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142746458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Axiomatic bargaining theory: New wine from old bottles 公理讨价还价理论：旧瓶装新酒
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-11-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.009
Dominik Karos , Shiran Rachmilevitch
{"title":"Axiomatic bargaining theory: New wine from old bottles","authors":"Dominik Karos ,&nbsp;Shiran Rachmilevitch","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.009","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.009","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Five classical and uncontroversial axioms—symmetry, weak Pareto optimality, restricted monotonicity, midpoint domination, and superadditivity—characterize a bargaining solution. It assigns to each player their midpoint, that is, the <em>n</em>-th share of their utopia point, and equally divides what remains.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"149 ","pages":"Pages 112-117"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142721655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Boundedness of the range of a strategy-proof social choice function 无策略社会选择函数范围的有界性
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-11-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.013
Shigehiro Serizawa , John A. Weymark
{"title":"Boundedness of the range of a strategy-proof social choice function","authors":"Shigehiro Serizawa ,&nbsp;John A. Weymark","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.013","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.013","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>For the provision of <span><math><mi>m</mi><mo>≥</mo><mn>1</mn></math></span> divisible public goods, relatively weak restrictions on the domain of a strategy-proof social choice function are identified that ensure that its range is bounded. Domain restrictions are also identified for which strategy-proofness implies that the range and the option sets of a social choice function are compact. To illustrate the usefulness of these results, it is shown how a theorem about generalized median voter schemes due to Barberà, Massó, and Serizawa can be established without their assumption that the range of a social choice function is compact provided that the tops of the preferences are not restricted to be finite.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"149 ","pages":"Pages 164-169"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142746459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal private payoff manipulation against commitment in extensive-form games 广泛形式博弈中针对承诺的最优私人报酬操纵
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-11-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.008
Yurong Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Yuhao Li
{"title":"Optimal private payoff manipulation against commitment in extensive-form games","authors":"Yurong Chen,&nbsp;Xiaotie Deng,&nbsp;Yuhao Li","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Stackelberg equilibrium describes the optimal strategies of a player, when she (the leader) first credibly commits to a strategy. Her opponent (the follower) will best respond to her commitment. To compute the optimal commitment, a leader must learn enough follower's payoff information. The follower can then potentially provide fake information, to induce a different final game outcome that benefits him more than when he truthfully behaves.</div><div>We study such follower's manipulation in extensive-form games. For all four settings considered, we characterize all the inducible game outcomes. We show the polynomial-time tractability of finding the optimal payoff function to misreport. We compare the follower's optimal attainable utilities among different settings, with the true game fixed. In particular, one comparison shows that the follower gets no less when the leader's strategy space expands from pure strategies to behavioral strategies. Our work completely resolves this follower's optimal manipulation problem on extensive-form game trees.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"149 ","pages":"Pages 118-147"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142721656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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