{"title":"Revealed preference domains from random choice","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Ordinal random utility models (RUMs) are based on the presumption that fluctuating preferences drive stochastic choices. We study a novel property of RUM subclasses called exclusiveness, satisfied whenever the supports of all RUM representations of stochastic choice data, rationalizable by a RUM over preferences within a specific domain, also belong to that domain. We demonstrate that well-known preference domains such as the single-peaked, single-dipped, triple-wise value-restricted and peak-monotone are RUM-exclusive, alongside a novel domain we term peak-pit on a line. Building on existing characterization results, we show how these preference domains can be directly revealed from stochastic choice data, without the need to compute all RUM representations.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001039/pdfft?md5=dc3ba46b29d53fe68d8330605bf07c24&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624001039-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142050345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cooperation, norms, and gene-culture coevolution","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper studies how a continuum of individuals interacting in a binary public goods game can secure cooperation through transmitting and enforcing norms. The evolutionary model consists of three distinct dimensions: behavior, norms, and approval preferences. In line with the <em>indirect approach</em> proposed by <span><span>Güth and Yaari (1992)</span></span>, behavior results from utility maximization, while norms and approval preferences evolve over time. The underlying evolutionary processes differ concerning speed and nature. Whereas norms evolve at the cultural level through peer interactions and socialization, approval preferences are (at least partly) biologically inherited and transmitted from parents to their offspring. We find that if cultural and biological reproductive fitnesses are derived from material and social factors, then an interplay of social disapproval mechanisms gives rise to stable equilibria in which positive cooperation levels persist. Moreover, we find stable equilibria characterized by heterogeneous behavior and moral attitudes across individuals.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001003/pdfft?md5=dd3fd49a7d67ed3bbc0d74dd665f0452&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624001003-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142021236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Group bargaining: A model of international treaty ratification","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We consider non-cooperative bargaining over a fixed surplus between two groups that may differ in size and the supermajority threshold they employ for within-group ratification. We find that total allocation to a group does not depend on group size and increases with the supermajority threshold. We use the Gini coefficient to study within-group inequality as an outcome of interest and find that inequality increases with group size and decreases with the supermajority threshold. Finally, we study delegation by concentrating the ability to influence proposals within a subset of group members. Delegation to a subgroup decreases the group's total allocation because non-delegates accept lower allocations. Inequality is higher if delegation is employed, and it is decreasing in the size of the delegate committee.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001015/pdfft?md5=e3c8480ce4658f2eac150677a1d0bdde&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624001015-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142011088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An observability paradox in linked enforcement","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The presence of observation errors limits players' ability to detect deviations, and hence the possibility of efficient cooperation in repeated games. When players interact repeatedly in <em>multiple</em> games with imperfect observation in at least one game, however, we find a novel spillover effect that enhances players' ability to sustain cooperation. This finding suggests the presence of observation error can increase the likelihood of efficient cooperation when players interact in multiple repeated games simultaneously. Our result has important implications for industrial organizations, relational contracts, and international cooperation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141963183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"School choice with independent versus consolidated districts","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper studies the welfare effects of school district consolidation. Using incomplete rank-ordered lists (ROLs) submitted for admission to the Hungarian secondary school system, we estimate complete ROLs assuming that parents do not use dominated strategies and that the matching outcome is stable. These estimates aid in constructing a counterfactual district-based assignment and discerning the factors driving parents' preferences over schools. We find that district consolidation leads to large welfare gains in Budapest, equivalent to students attending a school five kilometres closer to their residences. These gains offset the additional travel distances incurred in the consolidated assignment. 73% of matched students benefit from district consolidation, while fewer than 3% are assigned to a less preferred school. Students from smaller and less under-demanded districts benefit relatively more, as well as those with high academic ability. Using reported preferences instead of estimated ones also yields large gains from district consolidation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624000976/pdfft?md5=cea808608b56c71649186a48bbcb2044&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624000976-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141786006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Non-Parametric Identification and Testing of Quantal Response Equilibrium","authors":"Johannes Hoelzemann, Ryan Webb, Erhao Xie","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.004","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the falsifiability and identification of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) when each player's utility and error distribution are relaxed to be unknown non-parametric functions. Using the variation of players' choices across a series of games, we first show that both the utility function and the distribution of errors are non-parametrically over-identified. This over-identification result further suggests a straightforward testing procedure for QRE which achieves the desired type-1 error and maintains a small type-2 error. To apply this methodology, we conduct an experimental study of the matching pennies game. Our non-parametric estimates strongly reject the conventional Logit choice probability. Moreover, when the utility and the error distribution are sufficiently flexible and heterogeneous, the quantal response hypothesis cannot be rejected for 70% of participants. However, strong assumptions such as linear utility, logistically distributed errors, and homogeneity lead to substantially higher rejection rates.","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141784155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Bouke Klein Teeselink, Dennie van Dolder, Martijn J. van den Assem, Jason D. Dana
{"title":"High-stakes failures of backward induction","authors":"Bouke Klein Teeselink, Dennie van Dolder, Martijn J. van den Assem, Jason D. Dana","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.001","url":null,"abstract":"We examine high-stakes strategic choice using more than 40 years of data from the American TV game show . In every episode, contestants play the , a sequential game of perfect information for which the optimal strategy can be found through backward induction. We find that contestants systematically deviate from the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. These departures from optimality are well explained by a modified agent quantal response model that allows for limited foresight. The results suggest that many contestants simplify the decision problem by adopting a myopic representation, and optimize their chances of beating the next contestant only. In line with learning, contestants' choices improve over the course of our sample period.","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141786007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reputation-based persuasion platforms","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this paper, we introduce a two-stage Bayesian persuasion model in which a third-party platform controls the information available to the sender about users' preferences. We aim to characterize the optimal information disclosure policy of the platform, which maximizes average user utility, under the assumption that the sender also follows its own optimal policy. We show that this problem can be reduced to a model of market segmentation, in which probabilities are mapped into valuations. We then introduce a repeated variation of the persuasion platform problem in which myopic users arrive sequentially. In this setting, the platform controls the sender's information about users and maintains a reputation for the sender, punishing it if it fails to act truthfully on a certain subset of signals. We provide a characterization of the optimal platform policy in the reputation-based setting, which is then used to simplify the optimization problem of the platform.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141786008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Gender and cooperation in the presence of negative externalities","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Social dilemmas often impose negative externalities on third parties. We experimentally analyze gender differences in cooperation in such a setting, i.e., a prisoner's dilemma game, with a passive third party that may be harmed when active players mutually cooperate. Applying a within-subjects setting, we compare cooperation under anonymity and social information, as personal characteristics are commonly known in real-life relations. Results show that the presence of a negative externality particularly affects guilt-averse women, who cooperate less often independently of the degree of information they receive. No gender difference is found absent negative externalities.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624000927/pdfft?md5=b74554089c3ffafedd68918f617ea5c2&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624000927-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141708154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Random partitions, potential, value, and externalities","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The Shapley value equals a player's contribution to the potential of a game. The potential is a most natural one-number summary of a game, which can be computed as the expected accumulated worth of a random partition of the players. This computation integrates the coalition formation of all players and readily extends to games with externalities. We investigate those potential functions for games with externalities that can be computed this way. It turns out that the potential that corresponds to the MPW solution introduced by <span><span>Macho-Stadler et al.</span></span> (<span><span>2007</span></span>, J. Econ. Theory 135, 339–356) is unique in the following sense. It is obtained as the expected accumulated worth of a random partition, it generalizes the potential for games without externalities, and it induces a solution that satisfies the null player property even in the presence of externalities.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141729104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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