{"title":"Why do children pass in the centipede game? Cognitive limitations v. risk calculations","authors":"Isabelle Brocas , Juan D. Carrillo","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Children and adolescents from 8 to 16 years old play the centipede game in the laboratory, where non-equilibrium behavior (passing) can occur for two reasons: an inability to backward induct (cognitive limitation) or a decision to best respond to the empirical risk and take a measured chance (behavioral sophistication). We find that logical abilities develop gradually. While young participants are (as expected) least likely to perform backward induction, those who do, tend to over-estimate the ability of their peers to behave similarly. With age, participants gradually learn to think strategically and to best respond to their beliefs about others. Overall, the centipede game is an ideal test case for studying the development of abilities, as it disentangles the causes for passing in young children and in teenagers. Interestingly, shrewdness does not transform into earnings, and we document for the first time a game of strategy where payoffs monotonically <em>decrease</em> with age.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 295-311"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149689","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The impact of perceived strength in the war of attrition","authors":"David P. Myatt","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In a war of attrition a player's <em>perceived strength</em> is the distribution describing beliefs about her valuation. Small asymmetries in strength have a large effect: in the unique equilibrium of a game with a deadline the war ends quickly (instantly, as the deadline becomes infinite) with a concession by the (perceived) weaker player. The ranking of strength compares hazard rates in the upper tails of the distributions of beliefs; greater uncertainty about a player tends to give her more strength. The results also hold if techniques other than a deadline are used to obtain a unique equilibrium.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 260-277"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Priority, solidarity, and egalitarianism in the capability approach","authors":"Inkee Jang , Biung-Ghi Ju","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine resource allocation in the context of the capability approach with multi-dimensional human functioning outputs. We aim to provide an egalitarian foundation for human development indices (HDIs) using <span><span>Parfit</span></span>'s (<span><span>1997</span></span>) priority principle, which says that when a person becomes more disabled, ceteris paribus, he should receive more resources. An HDI-egalitarian rule allocates resources in such a way that all individuals attain an equal HDI-index value. Using the priority principle or its variant, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the whole family of HDI-egalitarian rules, the weighted arithmetic mean HDI-egalitarian rules, and the weighted geometric mean HDI-egalitarian rules.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 469-479"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143396022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Computing agents' reputation within a network","authors":"Federico Grigis , Sergio Ortobelli Lozza , Sebastiano Vitali","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a model of information transmission and reputation building within a social network that exploits portfolio theory and option structures. The network aims to estimate an unknown parameter through multiple communication rounds. At every communication round, estimates of different agents' abilities are shared, avoiding the repetition of information. These estimates are interpreted as financial assets driven by a compound Poisson process. After every communication round, agents construct a fictitious portfolio of options whose underlying is the vector of shared estimates. The portfolio's weights are exploited to aggregate the information received in the communication round. Sufficient conditions for reaching consensus or polarization are provided.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 312-333"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Contracting with heterogeneous researchers","authors":"Han Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the design of contracts that incentivize a researcher to conduct a costly experiment, extending the work of <span><span>Yoder (2022)</span></span> from binary states to a general state space. The cost is private information of the researcher. When the experiment is observable, we find the optimal contract and show that higher types choose more costly experiments, but not necessarily more Blackwell informative ones. When only the experiment result is observable, the principal can still achieve the same optimal outcome if and only if a certain monotonicity condition with respect to types holds. Our analysis demonstrates that the general case is qualitatively different than the binary one, but that the contracting problem remains tractable.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 278-294"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Homophily and infections: Static and dynamic effects","authors":"Matteo Bizzarri , Fabrizio Panebianco , Paolo Pin","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyze the effect of homophily in the diffusion of a harmful state between two groups of agents that differ in immunization rates. Homophily has a very different impact on the steady state infection level (that is increasing in homophily when homophily is small, and decreasing when high), and on the cumulative number of infections generated by a deviation from the steady state (that, instead, is decreasing in homophily when homophily is small, and increasing when high). If immunization rates are endogenous, homophily has the opposite impact on the infection level of the two groups. However, the sign of the group-level impact is reversed if immunization is motivated by infection risk or peer pressure. If motivations are group-specific, homophily can decrease immunization in both groups.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 235-259"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Asymptotic full revelation in cheap talk with many senders","authors":"Oleg Rubanov","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I construct an equilibrium in a cheap talk game with multiple senders that converges to full revelation exponentially fast as the number of senders increases. The senders' biases can be relatively large (comparable to the size of the state space) and have any signs. The equilibrium is robust to replacement noise and exists even if the senders can send only two types of messages.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 191-196"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The optimality of (stochastic) veto delegation","authors":"Xiaoxiao Hu , Haoran Lei","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyze the optimal delegation problem between a principal and an agent, assuming that the latter has state-independent preferences. We demonstrate that if the principal is more risk-averse than the agent toward non-status quo options, an optimal mechanism is a <em>veto mechanism</em>. In a veto mechanism, the principal uses veto (i.e., maintaining the status quo) to balance the agent's incentives and does not randomize among non-status quo options. We characterize the optimal veto mechanism in a one-dimensional setting. In the solution, the principal uses veto only when the state surpasses a critical threshold.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 215-234"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar , Jorge Bruno , Renaud Foucart , Sonali SenGupta
{"title":"Efficient public good provision between and within groups","authors":"Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar , Jorge Bruno , Renaud Foucart , Sonali SenGupta","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We generalize the model of <span><span>Gallice and Monzón (2019)</span></span> to incorporate a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their observation of an incomplete sample of past contributions. We show that full cooperation between and within groups is possible with self-interested players on a fixed horizon. Position uncertainty implies the existence of an equilibrium where groups of players conditionally cooperate in the hope of influencing further groups. Conditional cooperation implies that each group member is pivotal, so that efficient simultaneous provision within groups is an equilibrium.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 183-190"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ideological consistency and valence","authors":"Enriqueta Aragonès , Dimitrios Xefteris","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study electoral competition between two win-motivated candidates, considering that voters care both about the valence and the ideological consistency of the competing candidates. When valence asymmetries are not too large we find a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which (i) platform polarization (i.e. the distance between the candidates' policy proposals) is solely determined by the strength of preferences for consistency, and (ii) the expected policy outcome may move to the right as the valence of the leftist candidate increases. When valence differences are large, a mixed equilibrium emerges: the high-valence left-wing candidate chooses a moderate right policy and the low-valence right-wing candidate responds, usually, with an extreme right position and, occasionally, with a moderate left one. Our analysis provides novel insights regarding candidates' flip-flopping incentives, and parties' motives to nominate low-quality candidates.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 160-182"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143149648","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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