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Games and Economic Behavior最新文献

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Maxmin, coalitions and evolution Maxmin，联盟和进化
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-08-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.002
Jonathan Newton, Miharu Naono
{"title":"Maxmin, coalitions and evolution","authors":"Jonathan Newton,&nbsp;Miharu Naono","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Maxmin decision making can take place at an individual or a coalitional level. We allow evolution to choose between the two, determining the relative shares of individual and coalitional decision making. We consider factors that favor or disfavor the evolution of coalitionality and apply our framework to social dilemmas, oligopolistic price competition and voting on committees.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 474-498"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144841074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Social learning among opinion leaders 意见领袖的社会学习
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-08-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.011
Yangbo Song
{"title":"Social learning among opinion leaders","authors":"Yangbo Song","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.011","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.011","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I study information aggregation among opinion leaders, who have access to private information, observe their predecessor's move, and care about both taking a correct action and maximizing the measure of followers. Potential followers are uninformed agents who care solely about the truth and choose to agree with either the current opinion leader or their predecessor. I find that the distinct incentive of an opinion leader to disagree with their predecessor, although encouraging every individual opinion leader to rely more on their private signal, actually exacerbates herding asymptotically in equilibrium. The learning patterns remain robust and lead to a number of practical implications in richer strategic environments. For instance, social learning becomes less precise when opinion leaders observe more predecessors; informational crowding-out could emerge between opinion leaders and agents if the latter became privately informed; etc.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 451-473"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144830190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Advisors with hidden motives 别有用心的谋士
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-08-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.009
Paula Onuchic
{"title":"Advisors with hidden motives","authors":"Paula Onuchic","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.009","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.009","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>An advisor discloses evidence about an object to a potential buyer, who doesn't know the object's value or the profitability of its sale (the advisor's motives). I characterize optimal disclosure rules that balance two goals: maximizing the overall probability of sale, and steering sales from lower- to higher-profitability objects. I consider the implications of a regulation that forces the advisor to always reveal her motives to the buyer. I show that whether such policies induce the advisor to disclose more evidence about the object's value hinges on the curvature of the buyer's demand for the object. This result refines our understanding of effective regulation of advisor-advisee communication with and without commitment.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 431-450"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144828240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Robust group manipulation with indifferences 冷漠的稳健群体操纵
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-08-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.001
Steven Kivinen
{"title":"Robust group manipulation with indifferences","authors":"Steven Kivinen","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We define two belief-free notions of coalitional non-manipulability that rule out coalitions in which some agents are indifferent. <em>Strong robust group strategy-proofness</em> typically yields negative results as it often rules out desirable rules. <em>Semi-strong robust group strategy-proofness</em> permits desirable rules in some environments. The differences between these properties highlight a crucial link between standard truthtelling properties: all members of a successful deviating coalition believe the outcome changes, and indifferent members believe they are essential to implement the change.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 554-568"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144878204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule 与私人信息讨价还价的立法：多数同意和一致同意规则的比较
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-08-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.010
David Piazolo, Christoph Vanberg
{"title":"Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule","authors":"David Piazolo,&nbsp;Christoph Vanberg","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.010","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.010","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate the effects of alternative voting rules in a three-person, two-period bargaining game with private information. A single proposer is seeking to secure agreement to a proposal under either majority or unanimity rule. Two responders have privately known disagreement payoffs. We characterize Bayesian equilibria in stagewise undominated strategies. Our central result is that responders are ‘more expensive’ under unanimity rule because they like to be perceived as high types. Inefficient delay and disagreement are more likely under unanimity rule, except under very restrictive parameter conditions. Our analysis provides a theoretical foundation for intuitions that have been stated informally before. In addition, it yields deeper insights into the underlying incentives and what they imply for optimal behavior in bargaining with private information.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 499-522"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144865683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A game-theoretic model of misinformation spread on social networks 错误信息在社交网络上传播的博弈论模型
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-07-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.007
Chin-Chia Hsu , Amir Ajorlou , Ali Jadbabaie
{"title":"A game-theoretic model of misinformation spread on social networks","authors":"Chin-Chia Hsu ,&nbsp;Amir Ajorlou ,&nbsp;Ali Jadbabaie","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model of sharing decisions among users of a Twitter-like social network. Agents have a subjective prior on an unobservable real-valued state, representing their beliefs on a topic that is subject to a binary action. Agents cast their binary action, matching the sign of the state. Before the action stage, a small fraction of agents receive a piece of news which impacts their beliefs. Those who receive the news update their belief and make a decision as to whether to share the news with their followers in order to influence their beliefs, and in turn their actions, given a fixed cost for sharing. We characterize the underlying news spread as an endogenous Susceptible-Infected (SI) epidemic process and derive agents' sharing decisions as well as the size of the sharing cascade at the equilibrium of the game. We show that lower credibility news can result in a larger cascade than fully credible news provided that the network connectivity surpasses a <em>connectivity limit</em>. We further delineate the relationship between cascade size, network connectivity, and news credibility in terms of polarization and diversity in prior beliefs: We demonstrate that increased polarization reduces the connectivity limit whereas larger in-party diversity has a non-monotone effect on the connectivity limit, which depends on both the levels of polarization and in-party diversity. Our results provide a theoretical foundation for recent empirical observations demonstrating faster and wider spread of low-credibility and false information on social networks.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 386-407"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144750400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Minimal stable voting rules 最小稳定投票规则
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-07-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.006
Héctor Hermida-Rivera
{"title":"Minimal stable voting rules","authors":"Héctor Hermida-Rivera","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this paper, I characterize minimal stable voting rules and minimal self-stable constitutions (i.e., pairs of voting rules) for societies in which only power matters. To do so, I first let players' preference profiles over voting rules satisfy four natural axioms commonly used in the analysis of power: non-dominance, anonymity, null player, and swing player. I then provide simple notions of minimal stability and minimal self-stability, and show that the families of minimal stable voting rules and minimal self-stable constitutions are fairly small. Finally, I conclude that political parties have evolved to ensure the minimal self-stability of otherwise not minimal self-stable constitutions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 541-553"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144865682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Axiomatic analysis of approval-based scoring rules 基于批准的评分规则的公理化分析
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-07-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.004
Tuva Bardal , Ulle Endriss
{"title":"Axiomatic analysis of approval-based scoring rules","authors":"Tuva Bardal ,&nbsp;Ulle Endriss","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Approval-based scoring rules require participants to submit ballots that correspond to the candidates they approve of, and each candidate then receives some score from each ballot it appears on. One particularly natural class of approval-based scoring rules is the class of size-approval rules. For rules in this class, each ballot is weighted based on the number of candidates it contains. We provide a deep axiomatic analysis of the class of size-approval rules and related classes of approval-based scoring rules. We organise existing work by shedding light on the exact role played by core axioms involved in previous characterisations of size-approval rules, while also providing multiple new characterisations of the same class and its closest relatives. We furthermore provide an original characterisation of even-and-equal cumulative voting, the most paradigmatic representative of the size-approval voting rules, where each ballot's weight is inversely proportional to its size.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 345-358"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144722050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dual communication in a social network: Contributing and dedicating attention 社交网络中的双重沟通：贡献和奉献注意力
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-07-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.003
Gabrielle Demange
{"title":"Dual communication in a social network: Contributing and dedicating attention","authors":"Gabrielle Demange","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Communication between individuals often involves two types of dual activities. On social media such as Facebook, for example, users produce content (posts) and pay attention to their friends' posts. These activities are dual as a user is more inclined to produce posts the more friends react to them and is more inclined to dedicate attention to a friend's posts the more numerous these posts are. This paper builds and analyzes a simple game with dual activities and dedicated attention when agents communicate through a follower-influencer network (say, X-Twitter). Equilibria can be multiple, each characterized by its attention network, which describes who pays attention to whom, resulting in a partition of cohesive subgroups who pay and receive attention from each other and do not communicate with agents in other subgroups. The stars-equilibria, where attention in each subgroup is focused on a single influencer, stand apart: activities and payoffs are high on average but unequal. Furthermore, they are the only equilibria stable to perturbations or to self-enforcing deviations from coalitions (coalition-proofness).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 359-385"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144721933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Pay it forward: Theory and experiment 传递：理论与实验
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-07-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.002
Amanda Chuan , Hanzhe Zhang
{"title":"Pay it forward: Theory and experiment","authors":"Amanda Chuan ,&nbsp;Hanzhe Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We theoretically and experimentally investigate psychological motivations behind pay-it-forward behavior. We construct a psychological game-theoretic model that incorporates altruism, inequity aversion, and indirect reciprocity following <span><span>Rabin (1993)</span></span>, <span><span>Fehr and Schmidt (1999)</span></span>, and <span><span>Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)</span></span>. We test this model using games in which players choose to give to strangers, potentially after receiving a gift from an unrelated benefactor. Our experiment reveals that altruism and indirect reciprocity spur people to pay kind actions forward, informing how kindness begets further kindness. However, inequity aversion hinders giving even when giving will allow one's kindness to be paid forward. Our paper informs how kind behaviors get passed on among parties that never directly interact, which has implications for the formation of social norms and behavioral conduct within workplaces, neighborhoods, and communities.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 294-314"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144672218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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