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The refinement of Nash equilibrium based on equilibrium models of imperfectly rational behavior 基于不完全理性行为均衡模型的纳什均衡的细化
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-01-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.005
Rodrigo A. Velez , Alexander L. Brown
{"title":"The refinement of Nash equilibrium based on equilibrium models of imperfectly rational behavior","authors":"Rodrigo A. Velez ,&nbsp;Alexander L. Brown","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div><span>This paper introduces a refinement of Nash equilibrium (NE) to determine the relevance of weakly dominated NE in games. We adapt </span><span><span>Harsanyi (1973)</span></span>'s concept of “approachability,” originally based on games with randomly disturbed payoffs, and extend it to a broader family that encompasses the most widely used equilibrium models of imperfectly rational behavior. We identify a singular NE refinement, <em>approximate payoff monotone equilibrium</em> (APME), that coincides with the set of NE that are approachable by regular quantal response equilibria as well as control cost models. We advocate for APME based on its 1) foundation in models that rationalize empirically observed behavior; 2) ability to discriminate between equilibria without automatically discarding weakly dominated behavior; and 3) computational simplicity in applications where the structure of NE is known. We illustrate the value of APME in three applications in which empirical studies suggest that weakly dominated NE are relevant.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"157 ","pages":"Pages 516-534"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147538222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Success functions in large contests 成功在大型比赛中发挥作用
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-02-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.004
Yaron Azrieli , Christopher P. Chambers
{"title":"Success functions in large contests","authors":"Yaron Azrieli ,&nbsp;Christopher P. Chambers","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider contests with a large set (continuum) of participants and axiomatize contest success functions that arise when performance is composed of both effort and a random element, and when winners are those whose performance exceeds a cutoff determined by the designer’s budget constraint. Any such <em>Random Performance Function (RPF)</em> satisfies a Co-monotonicity property, which implies that opponents’ effort distributions can be unambiguously ranked based on how competitive they are. We prove that Co-monotonicity, along with standard continuity and monotonicity properties, in fact characterize the class of RPFs. We also describe necessary and sufficient conditions for the noise term to have an additive structure. “The idea of a continuum of traders may seem outlandish to the reader. Actually, it is no stranger than a continuum of prices or of strategies or a continuum of &lt;ddq&gt;‘particles’&lt;/ddq&gt; in fluid mechanics... It should be emphasized that our consideration of a continuum of traders is not merely a mathematical exercise; it is the expression of an economic idea.” In: <em>Markets with a continuum of traders</em>, Robert J. Aumann, Econometrica 1964</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"157 ","pages":"Pages 253-262"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147384947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategyproof mechanism for two heterogeneous facilities with constant approximation ratio 具有恒定近似比的两个异构设施的防策略机制
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.008
Minming Li , Pinyan Lu , Xingchen Sha , Yuhao Yao , Jialin Zhang
{"title":"Strategyproof mechanism for two heterogeneous facilities with constant approximation ratio","authors":"Minming Li ,&nbsp;Pinyan Lu ,&nbsp;Xingchen Sha ,&nbsp;Yuhao Yao ,&nbsp;Jialin Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this paper, we study the two-facility location games with optional preference where the acceptable set of facilities for each agent could be different and an agent’s cost is his distance to the closest facility within his acceptable set. The objective is to minimize the total cost of all agents while achieving strategyproofness. For general metrics, we design a deterministic strategyproof mechanism for the problem with an approximation ratio of <span><math><mrow><mn>1</mn><mo>+</mo><mn>2</mn><mi>α</mi></mrow></math></span>, where <em>α</em> is the approximation ratio of the offline optimization version. In particular, for the setting on a line, our mechanism achieves an approximation ratio of <span><math><mrow><mn>1</mn><mo>+</mo><msqrt><mn>2</mn></msqrt></mrow></math></span>, which is tight and improves the previous best upper bound of <span><math><mrow><mi>n</mi><mo>/</mo><mn>2</mn><mo>+</mo><mn>1</mn></mrow></math></span> (Chen et al., 2020).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"157 ","pages":"Pages 125-137"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147385031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Repugnant transactions: The role of agency and severe consequences 令人反感的交易：代理的作用和严重后果
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.001
Hande Erkut , Dorothea Kübler
{"title":"Repugnant transactions: The role of agency and severe consequences","authors":"Hande Erkut ,&nbsp;Dorothea Kübler","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Repugnance constrains market design because inacceptable or repugnant transactions must be avoided. To better understand what makes a transaction repugnant, we study two potential causes: limited agency, e.g., one party being forced to accept an offer, and severe consequences of the transaction. In a laboratory experiment, we find that spectators prohibit transactions with limited agency more frequently than with full agency, especially when the consequences are severe rather than mild. The main findings of the experiment are corroborated by a vignette study on the acceptability of kidney sales. The results point to policies that can mitigate repugnance.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"157 ","pages":"Pages 22-33"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146024585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Rent dissipation and streamlined costs: Laboratory experiments 租金耗散和成本精简：实验室实验
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2023-11-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.10.014
Charles A. Holt , Angela M. Smith
{"title":"Rent dissipation and streamlined costs: Laboratory experiments","authors":"Charles A. Holt ,&nbsp;Angela M. Smith","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2023.10.014","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2023.10.014","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div><span>The effect of group size and effort cost on rent dissipation in the standard Tullock rent seeking model is examined using a laboratory experiment. Data support qualitative comparative static </span>Nash equilibrium predictions as reductions in both group size and effort cost increase effort levels. However, effort and dissipation rates are above Nash predictions for all treatments. In addition, while cutting per-unit effort costs in half increases individual effort levels, they do not fully double as predicted and therefore lower rent dissipation, creating a policy-relevant “streamlining effect”. A quantal response equilibrium, which adds stochastic elements into the game structure, predicts the observed higher effort levels and dissipation but is proven to be unable to explain the streamlining effect. A modification of quantal response that incorporates implementation error noise and loss aversion outperforms other estimated models and tracks the observed all data patterns more closely, including the streamlining effect.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"157 ","pages":"Pages 379-394"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135411078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Non-parametric identification and testing of quantal response equilibrium 数量反应平衡的非参数识别和测试
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2024-07-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.004
Johannes Hoelzemann , Ryan Webb , Erhao Xie
{"title":"Non-parametric identification and testing of quantal response equilibrium","authors":"Johannes Hoelzemann ,&nbsp;Ryan Webb ,&nbsp;Erhao Xie","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies the falsifiability and identification of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) when each player's utility and error distribution are relaxed to be unknown non-parametric functions. Using the variation of players' choices across a series of games, we first show that both the utility function and the distribution of errors are non-parametrically over-identified. This over-identification result further suggests a straightforward testing procedure for QRE which achieves the desired type-1 error and maintains a small type-2 error. To apply this methodology, we conduct an experimental study of the matching pennies game. Our non-parametric estimates strongly reject the conventional Logit choice probability. Moreover, when the utility and the error distribution are sufficiently flexible and heterogeneous, the quantal response hypothesis cannot be rejected for 70% of participants. However, strong assumptions such as linear utility, logistically distributed errors, and homogeneity lead to substantially higher rejection rates.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"157 ","pages":"Pages 637-659"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141784155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
High-stakes failures of backward induction 后向诱导的高风险失败
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2024-07-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.001
Bouke Klein Teeselink , Dennie van Dolder , Martijn J. van den Assem , Jason D. Dana
{"title":"High-stakes failures of backward induction","authors":"Bouke Klein Teeselink ,&nbsp;Dennie van Dolder ,&nbsp;Martijn J. van den Assem ,&nbsp;Jason D. Dana","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine high-stakes strategic choice using more than 40 years of data from the American TV game show <em>The Price Is Right</em>. In every episode, contestants play the <em>Showcase Showdown</em>, a sequential game of perfect information for which the optimal strategy can be found through backward induction. We find that contestants systematically deviate from the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. These departures from optimality are well explained by a modified agent quantal response model that allows for limited foresight. The results suggest that many contestants simplify the decision problem by adopting a myopic representation, and optimize their chances of beating the next contestant only. In line with learning, contestants' choices improve over the course of our sample period.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"157 ","pages":"Pages 418-439"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141786007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A generalization of von Neumann’s reduction from the assignment problem to zero-sum games 将冯·诺伊曼的简化方法从分配问题推广到零和博弈
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.009
Ilan Adler , Martin Bullinger , Vijay V. Vazirani
{"title":"A generalization of von Neumann’s reduction from the assignment problem to zero-sum games","authors":"Ilan Adler ,&nbsp;Martin Bullinger ,&nbsp;Vijay V. Vazirani","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.009","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.009","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The equivalence between von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem for zero-sum games and the LP Duality Theorem connects cornerstone problems of the two fields of game theory and optimization, respectively, and has been the subject of intense scrutiny for seven decades. Yet, as observed in this paper, the proof of the difficult direction of this equivalence is unsatisfactory: It does not assign distinct roles to the two players of the game, as is natural from the definition of a zero-sum game.</div><div>In retrospect, a partial resolution to this predicament was provided in another brilliant paper of von Neumann (1953), which reduced the assignment problem to zero-sum games. However, the underlying LP is highly specialized — all entries of its objective function vector are strictly positive, the constraint vector is all ones, and the constraint matrix is 0/1.</div><div>We generalize von Neumann’s result along two directions, each allowing negative entries in certain parts of the LP. Our reductions make explicit the roles of the two players of the reduced game, namely their maximin strategies are to play optimal solutions to the primal and dual LPs. Furthermore, unlike previous reductions, the value of the reduced game reveals the value of the given LP. Our generalizations encompass several basic economic scenarios.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"157 ","pages":"Pages 226-236"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147384941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Duality in financial networks 金融网络的二元性
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.002
Martijn W. Ketelaars, Peter Borm, P. Jean-Jacques Herings
{"title":"Duality in financial networks","authors":"Martijn W. Ketelaars,&nbsp;Peter Borm,&nbsp;P. Jean-Jacques Herings","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article introduces the concept of duality in financial networks, which entails the division of losses versus gains. In bankruptcy problems, in which a bankrupt entity divides its non-negative assets among a group of claimants, duality is well understood. Financial networks generalize bankruptcy problems by allowing for multiple agents with individual assets interconnected by mutual claims. We argue that allowing for negative assets is imperative to adequately formulate duality for financial networks. We show that there is a linear relationship between transfer schemes based on claims rules in a financial network and transfer schemes based on the dual of those claims rules in the dual financial network. Moreover, dual financial networks enable us to define dual transfer rules and dual allocation rules. We show that both self-dual transfer rules and self-dual allocation rules have to be based on self-dual claims rules. On the other hand, we demonstrate that transfer rules based on self-dual claims rules need not be self-dual, whereas allocation rules based on self-dual claims rules are always self-dual.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"157 ","pages":"Pages 88-108"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146079352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Outcome destabilization 结果不稳定
IF 1 3区 经济学
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.004
Francesc Dilmé
{"title":"Outcome destabilization","authors":"Francesc Dilmé","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In a game in extensive form, we say that a sequence of trembles destabilizes an outcome if there is no corresponding sequence of payoff perturbations and Nash outcomes converging to the outcome. We use equilibrium destabilization to characterize sequential equilibria and sequentially stable outcomes, and to reinterpret standard selection criteria in signaling games as a means of ruling out implausible equilibria by identifying destabilizing tremble sequences. We show that the existence of a maximally destabilizing sequence of trembles (destabilizing all outcomes but one) significantly simplifies studying strategically stable behavior in complex games such as finitely repeated games.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"157 ","pages":"Pages 34-49"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146024586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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