Lone wolves just got lonelier

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-04-11 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.010

Esteban Peralta

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper shows that, within familiar environments with transferable utilities, the set of unmatched agents is the same across all allocations that are stable in markets with one-sided incomplete information. The result does not hold in markets without transfers.

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孤狼只会变得更孤独

本文表明，在具有可转移效用的熟悉环境中，在片面不完全信息市场中，所有稳定分配的不匹配代理集是相同的。在没有转移支付的市场中，这一结果并不成立。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Games and Economic Behavior ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

9.10%

发文量

148

期刊介绍： Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology