稳定是选择律师的权利：律师匹配问题

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-03-31 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.009

Kemal Kıvanç Aköz , Emre Doğan , Onur Kesten , Danisz Okulicz

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引用次数: 0

摘要

世界各地的司法制度在允许诉讼当事人行使聘请律师权利的程度上存在很大差异。当诉讼当事人可以完全自由地选择律师，反之亦然时，诉讼当事人与律师之间的阻碍配对必须被消除，从而实现稳定的配对。在这种情况下，就会出现负外部性：实力较强的律师与诉讼当事人之间的配对会与对方诉讼当事人及其律师的利益相冲突。我们的研究表明，只要案件结构是二分式的，并且在每一类案件中，案件主要是根据其中一方的优势来区分的，就能保证稳定匹配的存在。我们描述了实现的匹配可以合理化为稳定匹配的条件。稳定的配对总是会导致每个类别中的负同类律师配对。代理人最优的稳定匹配不一定存在。稳定匹配总是有效的，但可能不属于核心匹配。

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Stability as right to counsel of choice: A lawyers' matching problem

Judicial systems around the world widely differ in the degree they allow litigants to exercise their right to legal counsel. When litigants are completely free to choose their lawyers and vice versa, blocking pairs between litigants and lawyers must be eliminated leading to stable matchings. In this context, a negative externality arises: a pairing between a stronger lawyer and a litigant conflicts with the interests of the opposing litigant and his lawyer. We show that the existence of a stable matching is guaranteed whenever the case structure is dichotomous and within each class, cases are primarily differentiated by the advantage they give to one of the sides. We characterize conditions under which realized matchings can be rationalized as stable. Stable matchings always lead to negatively assortative lawyer pairings within each class. Agent-optimal stable matchings do not necessarily exist. Stable matchings are always efficient, but may not belong to the core.

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来源期刊

Games and Economic Behavior ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

9.10%

发文量

148

期刊介绍： Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology