在与专业供应商的创新竞赛中鼓励多样化

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-08-19 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.003

Konstantinos Protopappas , David Rietzke

{"title":"在与专业供应商的创新竞赛中鼓励多样化","authors":"Konstantinos Protopappas , David Rietzke","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the optimal design of an innovation contest where a buyer seeks product variety and faces a moral hazard problem. The suppliers are specialized and may differ in their flexibility to adopt approaches outside their areas of expertise. If the specializations are sufficiently different and suppliers are otherwise symmetric, the buyer attains the first-best with a fixed-prize contest (FPC). If one supplier is inherently advantaged or the specializations are sufficiently close, the first-best is unattainable with an FPC. In all cases, an auction is an optimal contest and implements the first-best, provided the buyer can discriminate within the contest; if not, the buyer may prefer an FPC.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"153 ","pages":"Pages 586-621"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2025-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Incentivizing variety in innovation contests with specialized suppliers\",\"authors\":\"Konstantinos Protopappas , David Rietzke\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.003\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>We study the optimal design of an innovation contest where a buyer seeks product variety and faces a moral hazard problem. The suppliers are specialized and may differ in their flexibility to adopt approaches outside their areas of expertise. If the specializations are sufficiently different and suppliers are otherwise symmetric, the buyer attains the first-best with a fixed-prize contest (FPC). If one supplier is inherently advantaged or the specializations are sufficiently close, the first-best is unattainable with an FPC. In all cases, an auction is an optimal contest and implements the first-best, provided the buyer can discriminate within the contest; if not, the buyer may prefer an FPC.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48291,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Games and Economic Behavior\",\"volume\":\"153 \",\"pages\":\"Pages 586-621\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-08-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Games and Economic Behavior\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825625001095\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Games and Economic Behavior","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825625001095","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了一个创新竞赛的最优设计问题，其中购买者寻求产品的多样性并面临道德风险问题。供应商是专业化的，在采用其专业领域以外的方法的灵活性方面可能有所不同。如果专业化足够不同，供应商在其他方面是对称的，则买方通过固定奖金竞赛（FPC）获得第一名。如果一个供应商具有固有的优势，或者专业化程度足够接近，那么通过FPC是无法达到最佳的。在所有情况下，拍卖都是一种最优竞争，只要买家能够在竞争中有所区别；如果没有，买方可能更喜欢FPC。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Incentivizing variety in innovation contests with specialized suppliers

We study the optimal design of an innovation contest where a buyer seeks product variety and faces a moral hazard problem. The suppliers are specialized and may differ in their flexibility to adopt approaches outside their areas of expertise. If the specializations are sufficiently different and suppliers are otherwise symmetric, the buyer attains the first-best with a fixed-prize contest (FPC). If one supplier is inherently advantaged or the specializations are sufficiently close, the first-best is unattainable with an FPC. In all cases, an auction is an optimal contest and implements the first-best, provided the buyer can discriminate within the contest; if not, the buyer may prefer an FPC.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Games and Economic Behavior ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

9.10%

发文量

148

期刊介绍： Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology