作为价格歧视手段的试点计划

IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Ramtin Salamat
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引用次数: 0

摘要

当消费者的估价和与产品匹配的可能性存在差异时,卖方可以通过提供试用计划作为说服工具,以充分提取剩余,从而受益。在挑剔的消费者面前,他们对产品质量持怀疑态度,但如果产品符合他们的标准,他们愿意支付额外的费用,提供一个试用菜单可以让卖家筛选消费者,并提取更多的剩余。如果消费者对匹配良好的产品的评价越高,消费者的期望评价越怀疑,消费者的期望评价是他们匹配良好的概率的一个递增的凹函数,卖方可以通过提供一个试验计划菜单来提取全部剩余。这种试验的基本原理不同于文献中基于风险规避或高边际成本的其他试验。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Trial plans as a means of price discrimination
When consumers differ in both their valuations and their likelihood of being well-matched with the product, the seller can benefit from offering trial plans as persuasion instruments to the extent of full surplus extraction. In the presence of picky consumers, those skeptical about product quality but willing to pay a premium if the product meets their standards, offering a menu of trials allows the seller to screen consumers and extract more surplus. If consumers with a higher valuation for a well matched product are more skeptical and consumers' expected valuation is an increasing and concave function of their probability of being well-matched, the seller can extract the full surplus by offering a menu of trial plans. This rationale for trials differs from others in the literature which are based on risk aversion or high marginal cost.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
9.10%
发文量
148
期刊介绍: Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology
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