Core stability and strategy-proofness in hedonic coalition formation problems with friend-oriented preferences

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-08-21 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.007

Bettina Klaus , Flip Klijn , Seçkin Özbilen

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We study hedonic coalition formation problems with friend-oriented preferences; that is, each agent has preferences over his coalitions based on a partition of the set of agents, except himself, into “friends” and “enemies” such that (E) adding an enemy makes him strictly worse off and (F) adding a friend together with a set of enemies makes him strictly better off. Friend-oriented preferences induce a so-called friendship graph where vertices are agents and directed edges point to friends.

We show that the partition associated with the strongly connected components (SCC) of the friendship graph is in the strict core. We then prove that the SCC mechanism, which assigns the SCC partition to each hedonic coalition formation problem with friend-oriented preferences, satisfies a strong group incentive compatibility property: group strategy-proofness. Our main result is that on any “rich” subdomain of friend-oriented preferences, the SCC mechanism is the only mechanism that satisfies core stability and strategy-proofness.

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具有朋友导向偏好的享乐联盟形成问题的核心稳定性和策略抗扰性

我们研究了朋友导向偏好下的享乐联盟形成问题；也就是说，每个主体对自己的联盟都有偏好，这是基于除了自己之外的主体划分为“朋友”和“敌人”，这样(E)增加一个敌人会使他的情况严格恶化，(F)增加一个朋友和一组敌人会使他的情况严格好转。面向朋友的偏好产生了一个所谓的友谊图，其中顶点是代理，有向边指向朋友。我们证明了与友谊图的强连通分量（SCC）相关联的划分是在严格核中。在此基础上，我们证明了SCC机制满足一个强群体激励相容性质：群体策略证明性。SCC机制将SCC分区分配给每个具有朋友导向偏好的享乐联盟形成问题。我们的主要结果是，在任何面向朋友的偏好的“丰富”子域上，SCC机制是唯一满足核心稳定性和策略抗性的机制。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Games and Economic Behavior ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

9.10%

发文量

148

期刊介绍： Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology